[test] master_test #1

kernel-patches-bot · 2022-02-15T17:04:46Z

branch: master_test
base:bpf-next
version: edc21dc

Since we've started treating fallocate more like a file write, we should flush the log to disk if the user has asked for synchronous writes either by setting it via fcntl flags, or inode flags, or with the sync mount option. We've already got a helper for this, so use it. [The original patch by Darrick was massaged by Dave to fit this patchset] Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>

Unlike .queue_rq, in .submit_async_event drivers may not check the ctrl readiness for AER submission. This may lead to a use-after-free condition that was observed with nvme-tcp. The race condition may happen in the following scenario: 1. driver executes its reset_ctrl_work 2. -> nvme_stop_ctrl - flushes ctrl async_event_work 3. ctrl sends AEN which is received by the host, which in turn schedules AEN handling 4. teardown admin queue (which releases the queue socket) 5. AEN processed, submits another AER, calling the driver to submit 6. driver attempts to send the cmd ==> use-after-free In order to fix that, add ctrl state check to validate the ctrl is actually able to accept the AER submission. This addresses the above race in controller resets because the driver during teardown should: 1. change ctrl state to RESETTING 2. flush async_event_work (as well as other async work elements) So after 1,2, any other AER command will find the ctrl state to be RESETTING and bail out without submitting the AER. Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>

While nvme_tcp_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler itself changing the ctrl state. Tested-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>

While nvme_rdma_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler itself changing the ctrl state. Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>

Refuse SIDA memops on guests which are not protected. For normal guests, the secure instruction data address designation, which determines the location we access, is not under control of KVM. Fixes: 19e1227 (KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer) Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

Kyle reported that rr[0] has started to malfunction on Comet Lake and later CPUs due to EFI starting to make use of CPL3 [1] and the PMU event filtering not distinguishing between regular CPL3 and SMM CPL3. Since this is a privilege violation, default disable SMM visibility where possible. Administrators wanting to observe SMM cycles can easily change this using the sysfs attribute while regular users don't have access to this file. [0] https://rr-project.org/ [1] See the Intel white paper "Trustworthy SMM on the Intel vPro Platform" at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=300300, particularly the end of page 5. Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com> Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YfKChjX61OW4CkYm@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net

The intent has always been that perf_event_attr::sig_data should also be modifiable along with PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES, because it is observable by user space if SIGTRAP on events is requested. Currently only PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT is modifiable, and explicitly copies relevant breakpoint-related attributes in hw_breakpoint_copy_attr(). This misses copying perf_event_attr::sig_data. Since sig_data is not specific to PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, introduce a helper to copy generic event-type-independent attributes on modification. Fixes: 97ba62b ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-1-elver@google.com

Test that PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES correctly modifies perf_event_attr::sig_data as well. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-2-elver@google.com

…rchitectures Due to the alignment requirements of siginfo_t, as described in 3ddb3fd ("signal, perf: Fix siginfo_t by avoiding u64 on 32-bit architectures"), siginfo_t::si_perf_data is limited to an unsigned long. However, perf_event_attr::sig_data is an u64, to avoid having to deal with compat conversions. Due to being an u64, it may not immediately be clear to users that sig_data is truncated on 32 bit architectures. Add a comment to explicitly point this out, and hopefully help some users save time by not having to deduce themselves what's happening. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-3-elver@google.com

Add a check for !buf->single before calling pt_buffer_region_size in a place where a missing check can cause a kernel crash. Fixes a bug introduced by commit 6706384 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Opportunistically use single range output mode"), which added a support for PT single-range output mode. Since that commit if a PT stop filter range is hit while tracing, the kernel will crash because of a null pointer dereference in pt_handle_status due to calling pt_buffer_region_size without a ToPA configured. The commit which introduced single-range mode guarded almost all uses of the ToPA buffer variables with checks of the buf->single variable, but missed the case where tracing was stopped by the PT hardware, which happens when execution hits a configured stop filter. Tested that hitting a stop filter while PT recording successfully records a trace with this patch but crashes without this patch. Fixes: 6706384 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Opportunistically use single range output mode") Signed-off-by: Tristan Hume <tristan@thume.ca> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220127220806.73664-1-tristan@thume.ca

In kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run() we enter an RCU extended quiescent state (EQS) by calling guest_enter_irqoff(), and unmask IRQs prior to exiting the EQS by calling guest_exit(). As the IRQ entry code will not wake RCU in this case, we may run the core IRQ code and IRQ handler without RCU watching, leading to various potential problems. Additionally, we do not inform lockdep or tracing that interrupts will be enabled during guest execution, which caan lead to misleading traces and warnings that interrupts have been enabled for overly-long periods. This patch fixes these issues by using the new timing and context entry/exit helpers to ensure that interrupts are handled during guest vtime but with RCU watching, with a sequence: guest_timing_enter_irqoff(); guest_state_enter_irqoff(); < run the vcpu > guest_state_exit_irqoff(); < take any pending IRQs > guest_timing_exit_irqoff(); Since instrumentation may make use of RCU, we must also ensure that no instrumented code is run during the EQS. I've split out the critical section into a new kvm_riscv_enter_exit_vcpu() helper which is marked noinstr. Fixes: 99cdc6c ("RISC-V: Add initial skeletal KVM support") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org> Cc: Atish Patra <atishp@atishpatra.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>

Those applications that run in VU mode and access the time CSR cause a virtual instruction trap as Guest kernel currently does not initialize the scounteren CSR. To fix this, we should make CY, TM, and IR counters accessibile by default in VU mode (similar to OpenSBI). Fixes: a33c72f ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement VCPU create, init and destroy functions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mayuresh Chitale <mchitale@ventanamicro.com> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>

The SBI implementation version returned by KVM RISC-V should be the Host Linux version code. Fixes: c62a768 ("RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI v0.2 base extension") Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com> Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>

…from TODO list)" This reverts commit b3ec8cd. Revert the second (of 2) commits which disabled scrolling acceleration in fbcon/fbdev. It introduced a regression for fbdev-supported graphic cards because of the performance penalty by doing screen scrolling by software instead of using the existing graphic card 2D hardware acceleration. Console scrolling acceleration was disabled by dropping code which checked at runtime the driver hardware capabilities for the BINFO_HWACCEL_COPYAREA or FBINFO_HWACCEL_FILLRECT flags and if set, it enabled scrollmode SCROLL_MOVE which uses hardware acceleration to move screen contents. After dropping those checks scrollmode was hard-wired to SCROLL_REDRAW instead, which forces all graphic cards to redraw every character at the new screen position when scrolling. This change effectively disabled all hardware-based scrolling acceleration for ALL drivers, because now all kind of 2D hardware acceleration (bitblt, fillrect) in the drivers isn't used any longer. The original commit message mentions that only 3 DRM drivers (nouveau, omapdrm and gma500) used hardware acceleration in the past and thus code for checking and using scrolling acceleration is obsolete. This statement is NOT TRUE, because beside the DRM drivers there are around 35 other fbdev drivers which depend on fbdev/fbcon and still provide hardware acceleration for fbdev/fbcon. The original commit message also states that syzbot found lots of bugs in fbcon and thus it's "often the solution to just delete code and remove features". This is true, and the bugs - which actually affected all users of fbcon, including DRM - were fixed, or code was dropped like e.g. the support for software scrollback in vgacon (commit 973c096). So to further analyze which bugs were found by syzbot, I've looked through all patches in drivers/video which were tagged with syzbot or syzkaller back to year 2005. The vast majority fixed the reported issues on a higher level, e.g. when screen is to be resized, or when font size is to be changed. The few ones which touched driver code fixed a real driver bug, e.g. by adding a check. But NONE of those patches touched code of either the SCROLL_MOVE or the SCROLL_REDRAW case. That means, there was no real reason why SCROLL_MOVE had to be ripped-out and just SCROLL_REDRAW had to be used instead. The only reason I can imagine so far was that SCROLL_MOVE wasn't used by DRM and as such it was assumed that it could go away. That argument completely missed the fact that SCROLL_MOVE is still heavily used by fbdev (non-DRM) drivers. Some people mention that using memcpy() instead of the hardware acceleration is pretty much the same speed. But that's not true, at least not for older graphic cards and machines where we see speed decreases by factor 10 and more and thus this change leads to console responsiveness way worse than before. That's why the original commit is to be reverted. By reverting we reintroduce hardware-based scrolling acceleration and fix the performance regression for fbdev drivers. There isn't any impact on DRM when reverting those patches. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220202135531.92183-2-deller@gmx.de

This reverts commit 39aead8. Revert the first (of 2) commits which disabled scrolling acceleration in fbcon/fbdev. It introduced a regression for fbdev-supported graphic cards because of the performance penalty by doing screen scrolling by software instead of using the existing graphic card 2D hardware acceleration. Console scrolling acceleration was disabled by dropping code which checked at runtime the driver hardware capabilities for the BINFO_HWACCEL_COPYAREA or FBINFO_HWACCEL_FILLRECT flags and if set, it enabled scrollmode SCROLL_MOVE which uses hardware acceleration to move screen contents. After dropping those checks scrollmode was hard-wired to SCROLL_REDRAW instead, which forces all graphic cards to redraw every character at the new screen position when scrolling. This change effectively disabled all hardware-based scrolling acceleration for ALL drivers, because now all kind of 2D hardware acceleration (bitblt, fillrect) in the drivers isn't used any longer. The original commit message mentions that only 3 DRM drivers (nouveau, omapdrm and gma500) used hardware acceleration in the past and thus code for checking and using scrolling acceleration is obsolete. This statement is NOT TRUE, because beside the DRM drivers there are around 35 other fbdev drivers which depend on fbdev/fbcon and still provide hardware acceleration for fbdev/fbcon. The original commit message also states that syzbot found lots of bugs in fbcon and thus it's "often the solution to just delete code and remove features". This is true, and the bugs - which actually affected all users of fbcon, including DRM - were fixed, or code was dropped like e.g. the support for software scrollback in vgacon (commit 973c096). So to further analyze which bugs were found by syzbot, I've looked through all patches in drivers/video which were tagged with syzbot or syzkaller back to year 2005. The vast majority fixed the reported issues on a higher level, e.g. when screen is to be resized, or when font size is to be changed. The few ones which touched driver code fixed a real driver bug, e.g. by adding a check. But NONE of those patches touched code of either the SCROLL_MOVE or the SCROLL_REDRAW case. That means, there was no real reason why SCROLL_MOVE had to be ripped-out and just SCROLL_REDRAW had to be used instead. The only reason I can imagine so far was that SCROLL_MOVE wasn't used by DRM and as such it was assumed that it could go away. That argument completely missed the fact that SCROLL_MOVE is still heavily used by fbdev (non-DRM) drivers. Some people mention that using memcpy() instead of the hardware acceleration is pretty much the same speed. But that's not true, at least not for older graphic cards and machines where we see speed decreases by factor 10 and more and thus this change leads to console responsiveness way worse than before. That's why the original commit is to be reverted. By reverting we reintroduce hardware-based scrolling acceleration and fix the performance regression for fbdev drivers. There isn't any impact on DRM when reverting those patches. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220202135531.92183-3-deller@gmx.de

Add a config option CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_LEGACY_ACCELERATION to enable bitblt and fillrect hardware acceleration in the framebuffer console. If disabled, such acceleration will not be used, even if it is supported by the graphics hardware driver. If you plan to use DRM as your main graphics output system, you should disable this option since it will prevent compiling in code which isn't used later on when DRM takes over. For all other configurations, e.g. if none of your graphic cards support DRM (yet), DRM isn't available for your architecture, or you can't be sure that the graphic card in the target system will support DRM, you most likely want to enable this option. In the non-accelerated case (e.g. when DRM is used), the inlined fb_scrollmode() function is hardcoded to return SCROLL_REDRAW and as such the compiler is able to optimize much unneccesary code away. In this v3 patch version I additionally changed the GETVYRES() and GETVXRES() macros to take a pointer to the fbcon_display struct. This fixes the build when console rotation is enabled and helps the compiler again to optimize out code. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220202135531.92183-4-deller@gmx.de

Commit ceaa762 ("block: move direct_IO into our own read_iter handler") introduced several regressions for bdev DIO: 1. read spanning EOF always returns 0 instead of the number of bytes read. This is because "count" is assigned early and isn't updated when the iterator is truncated: $ lsblk -o name,size /dev/vdb NAME SIZE vdb 1G $ xfs_io -d -c 'pread -b 4M 1021M 4M' /dev/vdb read 0/4194304 bytes at offset 1070596096 0.000000 bytes, 0 ops; 0.0007 sec (0.000000 bytes/sec and 0.0000 ops/sec) instead of $ xfs_io -d -c 'pread -b 4M 1021M 4M' /dev/vdb read 3145728/4194304 bytes at offset 1070596096 3 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0007 sec (3.865 GiB/sec and 1319.2612 ops/sec) 2. truncated iterator isn't reexpanded 3. iterator isn't reverted on blkdev_direct_IO() error 4. zero size read no longer skips atime update Fixes: ceaa762 ("block: move direct_IO into our own read_iter handler") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201100420.25875-1-idryomov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 5.17, take #1 - Rework guest entry logic - Make CY, TM, and IR counters accessible in VU mode - Fix SBI implementation version

If we're doing an uncached read of the directory, then we ideally want to read only the exact set of entries that will fit in the buffer supplied by the getdents() system call. So unlike the case where we're reading into the page cache, let's send only one READDIR call, before trying to fill up the buffer. Fixes: 35df59d ("NFS: Reduce number of RPC calls when doing uncached readdir") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Ensure that we initialise desc->cache_entry_index correctly in uncached_readdir(). Fixes: d1bacf9 ("NFS: add readdir cache array") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If we've reached the end of the directory, then cache that information in the context so that we don't need to do an uncached readdir in order to rediscover that fact. Fixes: 794092c ("NFS: Do uncached readdir when we're seeking a cookie in an empty page cache") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error, so it is better to check the return value of it. Fixes: 3323eec ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory. Fixes: 4af4662 ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Commit c2426d2 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template variable to avoid multiple template selection. Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored. Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash= are not ignored. Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called. Reported-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2426d2 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and rule == NULL. Fixes: 483ec26 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The recv path of secure mode is intertwined with that of crc mode. While it's slightly more efficient that way (the ciphertext is read into the destination buffer and decrypted in place, thus avoiding two potentially heavy memory allocations for the bounce buffer and the corresponding sg array), it isn't really amenable to changes. Sacrifice that edge and align with the send path which always uses a full-sized bounce buffer (currently there is no other way -- if the kernel crypto API ever grows support for streaming (piecewise) en/decryption for GCM [1], we would be able to easily take advantage of that on both sides). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20141225202830.GA18794@gondor.apana.org.au/ Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>

Both msgr1 and msgr2 in crc mode are zero copy in the sense that message data is read from the socket directly into the destination buffer. We assume that the destination buffer is stable (i.e. remains unchanged while it is being read to) though. Otherwise, CRC errors ensue: libceph: read_partial_message 0000000048edf8ad data crc 1063286393 != exp. 228122706 libceph: osd1 (1)192.168.122.1:6843 bad crc/signature libceph: bad data crc, calculated 57958023, expected 1805382778 libceph: osd2 (2)192.168.122.1:6876 integrity error, bad crc Introduce rxbounce option to enable use of a bounce buffer when receiving message data. In particular this is needed if a mapped image is a Windows VM disk, passed to QEMU. Windows has a system-wide "dummy" page that may be mapped into the destination buffer (potentially more than once into the same buffer) by the Windows Memory Manager in an effort to generate a single large I/O [1][2]. QEMU makes a point of preserving overlap relationships when cloning I/O vectors, so krbd gets exposed to this behaviour. [1] "What Is Really in That MDL?" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn614012(v=vs.85) [2] https://blogs.msmvps.com/kernelmustard/2005/05/04/dummy-pages/ URL: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1973317 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>

We're missing the `f` prefix to have python do string interpolation, so we'd never end up printing what the actual "unexpected" error is. Fixes: ee92ed3 ("kunit: add run_checks.py script to validate kunit changes") Signed-off-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

Leon reported NULL pointer deref with nowait support: [ 15.123761] device-mapper: raid: Loading target version 1.15.1 [ 15.124185] device-mapper: raid: Ignoring chunk size parameter for RAID 1 [ 15.124192] device-mapper: raid: Choosing default region size of 4MiB [ 15.129524] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 [ 15.129530] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 15.129533] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 15.129535] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 15.129538] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 15.129541] CPU: 5 PID: 494 Comm: ldmtool Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-1-mainline #1 9fe89d43dfcb215d2731e6f8851740520778615e [ 15.129546] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS ELITE/X570 AORUS ELITE, BIOS F36e 10/14/2021 [ 15.129549] RIP: 0010:blk_queue_flag_set+0x7/0x20 [ 15.129555] Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 35 e4 e0 04 02 48 8d 57 28 bf 40 01 \ 00 00 e9 16 c1 be ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 ff <f0> 48 0f ab 7e 60 \ 31 f6 89 f7 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 [ 15.129559] RSP: 0018:ffff966b81987a88 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 15.129562] RAX: ffff8b11c363a0d0 RBX: ffff8b11e294b070 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 15.129564] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000001d [ 15.129566] RBP: ffff8b11e294b058 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 15.129568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b11e294b070 [ 15.129570] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8b11e294b000 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 15.129572] FS: 00007fa96e826780(0000) GS:ffff8b18deb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 15.129575] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 15.129577] CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000010b8ce000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ 15.129580] Call Trace: [ 15.129582] <TASK> [ 15.129584] md_run+0x67c/0xc70 [md_mod 1e470c1b6bcf1114198109f42682f5a2740e9531] [ 15.129597] raid_ctr+0x134a/0x28ea [dm_raid 6a645dd7519e72834bd7e98c23497eeade14cd63] [ 15.129604] ? dm_split_args+0x63/0x150 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129615] dm_table_add_target+0x188/0x380 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129625] table_load+0x13b/0x370 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129635] ? dev_suspend+0x2d0/0x2d0 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129644] ctl_ioctl+0x1bd/0x460 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129655] dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x20 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129663] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8e/0xd0 [ 15.129667] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 15.129672] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x23/0x50 [ 15.129675] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129677] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129679] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x23/0x50 [ 15.129682] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129684] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129686] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 15.129689] RIP: 0033:0x7fa96ecd559b [ 15.129692] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c \ c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff \ ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a5 a8 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 15.129696] RSP: 002b:00007ffcaf85c258 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 15.129699] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa96f1b48f0 RCX: 00007fa96ecd559b [ 15.129701] RDX: 00007fa97017e610 RSI: 00000000c138fd09 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 15.129702] RBP: 00007fa96ebab583 R08: 00007fa97017c9e0 R09: 00007ffcaf85bf27 [ 15.129704] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fa97017e610 [ 15.129706] R13: 00007fa97017e640 R14: 00007fa97017e6c0 R15: 00007fa97017e530 [ 15.129709] </TASK> This is caused by missing mddev->queue check for setting QUEUE_FLAG_NOWAIT Fix this by moving the QUEUE_FLAG_NOWAIT logic to under mddev->queue check. Fixes: f51d46d ("md: add support for REQ_NOWAIT") Reported-by: Leon Möller <jkhsjdhjs@totally.rip> Tested-by: Leon Möller <jkhsjdhjs@totally.rip> Cc: Vishal Verma <vverma@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>

This will be used to help make decisions on what to do in misconfigured systems. v2: squash in semicolon fix from Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

Currently, when configuring TMU (Time Management Unit) mode of a given router, we take into account only its own TMU requirements ignoring other routers in the domain. This is problematic if the router we are configuring has lower TMU requirements than what is already configured in the domain. In the scenario below, we have a host router with two USB4 ports: A and B. Port A connected to device router #1 (which supports CL states) and existing DisplayPort tunnel, thus, the TMU mode is HiFi uni-directional. 1. Initial topology [Host] A/ / [Device #1] / Monitor 2. Plug in device #2 (that supports CL states) to downstream port B of the host router [Host] A/ B\ / \ [Device #1] [Device #2] / Monitor The TMU mode on port B and port A will be configured to LowRes which is not what we want and will cause monitor to start flickering. To address this we first scan the domain and search for any router configured to HiFi uni-directional mode, and if found, configure TMU mode of the given router to HiFi uni-directional as well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Fine <gil.fine@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>

The purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error of split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper layer. However, it's not working well on some cases. * Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error When btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls btrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that btrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function is btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() accesses the orig_bbio's bio context to increase the error count. That works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough fast, orig_bbio's (remaining part after split) bio context may not be properly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio (the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier split btrfs_bio's completion. That will result in NULL pointer dereference. That bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1] and it shows the following trace. [1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create "-d raid0 -m raid1" FS. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ #474 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5) RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080 RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58 R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0 ? _printk+0x58/0x73 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750 ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs] btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs] dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0 __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410 btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0 btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs] ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs] extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs] extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs] ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs] do_writepages+0xd4/0x240 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x4c0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xb0 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22c/0x560 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0 wb_writeback+0x1d6/0x3f0 wb_workfn+0x334/0x520 process_one_work+0x1ee/0x570 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc6/0x130 worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xee/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: dm_mod btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq rapl CR2: 0000000000000020 * Case 2. Earlier completion of orig_bbio for mirrored btrfs_bios btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() assumes the end_io function for orig_bbio is called last among split bios. In that case, btrfs_orig_write_end_io() sets the bio->bi_status to BLK_STS_IOERR by seeing the bioc->error [2]. Otherwise, the increased orig_bio's bioc->error is not checked by anyone and return BLK_STS_OK to the upper layer. [2] Actually, this is not true. Because we only increases orig_bioc->errors by max_errors, the condition "atomic_read(&bioc->error) > bioc->max_errors" is still not met if only one split btrfs_bio fails. * Case 3. Later completion of orig_bbio for un-mirrored btrfs_bios In contrast to the above case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() is not working well if un-mirrored orig_bbio is completed last. It sets orig_bbio->bio.bi_status to the btrfs_bio's error. But, that is easily over-written by orig_bbio's completion status. If the status is BLK_STS_OK, the upper layer would not know the failure. * Solution Considering the above cases, we can only save the error status in the orig_bbio (remaining part after split) itself as it is always available. Also, the saved error status should be propagated when all the split btrfs_bios are finished (i.e, bbio->pending_ios == 0). This commit introduces "status" to btrfs_bbio and saves the first error of split bios to original btrfs_bio's "status" variable. When all the split bios are finished, the saved status is loaded into original btrfs_bio's status. With this commit, btrfs/146 on zoned devices does not hit the NULL pointer dereference anymore. Fixes: 852eee6 ("btrfs: allow btrfs_submit_bio to split bios") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Running rcutorture scenario TREE05, the below warning is triggered. [ 32.604594] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 32.605928] 6.11.0-rc5-00040-g4ba4f1afb6a9 #55238 Not tainted [ 32.607812] ----------------------------- [ 32.609140] kernel/events/core.c:13946 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 32.611595] other info that might help us debug this: [ 32.614247] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 32.616392] 3 locks held by cpuhp/4/35: [ 32.617687] #0: ffffffffb666a650 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x4e/0x200 [ 32.620563] #1: ffffffffb666cd20 (cpuhp_state-down){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x4e/0x200 [ 32.623412] #2: ffffffffb677c288 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: perf_event_exit_cpu_context+0x32/0x2f0 In perf_event_clear_cpumask(), uses list_for_each_entry_rcu() without an obvious RCU read-side critical section. Either pmus_srcu or pmus_lock is good enough to protect the pmus list. In the current context, pmus_lock is already held. The list_for_each_entry_rcu() is not required. Fixes: 4ba4f1a ("perf: Generic hotplug support for a PMU with a scope") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/2b66dff8-b827-494b-b151-1ad8d56f13e6@paulmck-laptop/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202409131559.545634cc-oliver.sang@intel.com Reported-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240913162340.2142976-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com

… non-PCI device The function cxl_endpoint_gather_bandwidth() invokes pci_bus_read/write_XXX(), however, not all CXL devices are presently implemented via PCI. It is recognized that the cxl_test has realized a CXL device using a platform device. Calling pci_bus_read/write_XXX() in cxl_test will cause kernel panic: platform cxl_host_bridge.3: host supports CXL (restricted) Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3ef17856fcae4fbd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? die_addr+0x38/0x60 ? exc_general_protection+0x1f5/0x4b0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? pci_bus_read_config_word+0x1c/0x60 pcie_capability_read_word+0x93/0xb0 pcie_link_speed_mbps+0x18/0x50 cxl_pci_get_bandwidth+0x18/0x60 [cxl_core] cxl_endpoint_gather_bandwidth.constprop.0+0xf4/0x230 [cxl_core] ? xas_store+0x54/0x660 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x13/0x40 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0xe7/0x270 cxl_region_shared_upstream_bandwidth_update+0x9c/0x790 [cxl_core] cxl_region_attach+0x520/0x7e0 [cxl_core] store_targetN+0xf2/0x120 [cxl_core] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13a/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x23b/0x410 ksys_write+0x53/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e And Ying also reported a KASAN error with similar calltrace. Reported-by: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/87y12w9vp5.fsf@yhuang6-desk2.ccr.corp.intel.com Fixes: a5ab0de ("cxl: Calculate region bandwidth of targets with shared upstream link") Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Tested-by: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241022030054.258942-1-lizhijian@fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>

In support of investigating an initialization failure report [1], cxl_test was updated to register mock memory-devices after the mock root-port/bus device had been registered. That led to cxl_test crashing with a use-after-free bug with the following signature: cxl_port_attach_region: cxl region3: cxl_host_bridge.0:port3 decoder3.0 add: mem0:decoder7.0 @ 0 next: cxl_switch_uport.0 nr_eps: 1 nr_targets: 1 cxl_port_attach_region: cxl region3: cxl_host_bridge.0:port3 decoder3.0 add: mem4:decoder14.0 @ 1 next: cxl_switch_uport.0 nr_eps: 2 nr_targets: 1 cxl_port_setup_targets: cxl region3: cxl_switch_uport.0:port6 target[0] = cxl_switch_dport.0 for mem0:decoder7.0 @ 0 1) cxl_port_setup_targets: cxl region3: cxl_switch_uport.0:port6 target[1] = cxl_switch_dport.4 for mem4:decoder14.0 @ 1 [..] cxld_unregister: cxl decoder14.0: cxl_region_decode_reset: cxl_region region3: mock_decoder_reset: cxl_port port3: decoder3.0 reset 2) mock_decoder_reset: cxl_port port3: decoder3.0: out of order reset, expected decoder3.1 cxl_endpoint_decoder_release: cxl decoder14.0: [..] cxld_unregister: cxl decoder7.0: 3) cxl_region_decode_reset: cxl_region region3: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bc3: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [..] RIP: 0010:to_cxl_port+0x8/0x60 [cxl_core] [..] Call Trace: <TASK> cxl_region_decode_reset+0x69/0x190 [cxl_core] cxl_region_detach+0xe8/0x210 [cxl_core] cxl_decoder_kill_region+0x27/0x40 [cxl_core] cxld_unregister+0x5d/0x60 [cxl_core] At 1) a region has been established with 2 endpoint decoders (7.0 and 14.0). Those endpoints share a common switch-decoder in the topology (3.0). At teardown, 2), decoder14.0 is the first to be removed and hits the "out of order reset case" in the switch decoder. The effect though is that region3 cleanup is aborted leaving it in-tact and referencing decoder14.0. At 3) the second attempt to teardown region3 trips over the stale decoder14.0 object which has long since been deleted. The fix here is to recognize that the CXL specification places no mandate on in-order shutdown of switch-decoders, the driver enforces in-order allocation, and hardware enforces in-order commit. So, rather than fail and leave objects dangling, always remove them. In support of making cxl_region_decode_reset() always succeed, cxl_region_invalidate_memregion() failures are turned into warnings. Crashing the kernel is ok there since system integrity is at risk if caches cannot be managed around physical address mutation events like CXL region destruction. A new device_for_each_child_reverse_from() is added to cleanup port->commit_end after all dependent decoders have been disabled. In other words if decoders are allocated 0->1->2 and disabled 1->2->0 then port->commit_end only decrements from 2 after 2 has been disabled, and it decrements all the way to zero since 1 was disabled previously. Link: http://lore.kernel.org/20241004212504.1246-1-gourry@gourry.net [1] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 176baef ("cxl/hdm: Commit decoder state to hardware") Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Cc: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/172964782781.81806.17902885593105284330.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>

The following BUG was triggered: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.12.0-rc2-XXX #406 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/1:1/62 is trying to lock: ffffff8801593030 (&cpc_ptr->rmw_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpc_write+0xcc/0x370 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by kworker/1:1/62: #0: ffffff897ef5ec98 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: raw_spin_rq_lock_nested+0x2c/0x50 #1: ffffff880154e238 (&sg_policy->update_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sugov_update_shared+0x3c/0x280 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-g9654bd3e8806 #406 Workqueue: 0x0 (events) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xa4/0x130 show_stack+0x20/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x28 __lock_acquire+0x480/0x1ad8 lock_acquire+0x114/0x310 _raw_spin_lock+0x50/0x70 cpc_write+0xcc/0x370 cppc_set_perf+0xa0/0x3a8 cppc_cpufreq_fast_switch+0x40/0xc0 cpufreq_driver_fast_switch+0x4c/0x218 sugov_update_shared+0x234/0x280 update_load_avg+0x6ec/0x7b8 dequeue_entities+0x108/0x830 dequeue_task_fair+0x58/0x408 __schedule+0x4f0/0x1070 schedule+0x54/0x130 worker_thread+0xc0/0x2e8 kthread+0x130/0x148 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 sugov_update_shared() locks a raw_spinlock while cpc_write() locks a spinlock. To have a correct wait-type order, update rmw_lock to a raw spinlock and ensure that interrupts will be disabled on the CPU holding it. Fixes: 60949b7 ("ACPI: CPPC: Fix MASK_VAL() usage") Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241028125657.1271512-1-pierre.gondois@arm.com [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

When we compile and load lib/slub_kunit.c,it will cause a panic. The root cause is that __kmalloc_cache_noprof was directly called instead of kmem_cache_alloc,which resulted in no alloc_tag being allocated.This caused current->alloc_tag to be null,leading to a null pointer dereference in alloc_tag_ref_set. Despite the fact that my colleague Pei Xiao will later fix the code in slub_kunit.c,we still need fix null pointer check logic for ref and tag to avoid panic caused by a null pointer dereference. Here is the log for the panic: [ 74.779373][ T2158] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 [ 74.780130][ T2158] Mem abort info: [ 74.780406][ T2158] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 74.780756][ T2158] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 74.781225][ T2158] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 74.781529][ T2158] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 74.781836][ T2158] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 74.782288][ T2158] Data abort info: [ 74.782577][ T2158] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 74.783068][ T2158] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 74.783533][ T2158] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 74.784010][ T2158] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000105f34000 [ 74.784586][ T2158] [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 74.785293][ T2158] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 74.785805][ T2158] Modules linked in: slub_kunit kunit ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute ip6table_nat ip6table_mangle 4 [ 74.790661][ T2158] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2158 Comm: kunit_try_catch Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W N 6.12.0-rc3+ #2 [ 74.791535][ T2158] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [N]=TEST [ 74.791889][ T2158] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 74.792479][ T2158] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 74.793101][ T2158] pc : alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0x120/0x270 [ 74.793607][ T2158] lr : alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0x120/0x270 [ 74.794095][ T2158] sp : ffff800084d33cd0 [ 74.794418][ T2158] x29: ffff800084d33cd0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 74.795095][ T2158] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff80007b30e314 [ 74.795822][ T2158] x23: ffff000390ff6f10 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000088 [ 74.796555][ T2158] x20: ffff000390285840 x19: fffffd7fc3ef7830 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 74.797283][ T2158] x17: ffff8000800e63b4 x16: ffff80007b33afc4 x15: ffff800081654c00 [ 74.798011][ T2158] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d383531325420 x12: 5b5d383734363537 [ 74.798744][ T2158] x11: ffff800084d337e0 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 [ 74.799476][ T2158] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : ffff80008219d188 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff [ 74.800206][ T2158] x5 : ffff0003fdbc9208 x4 : ffff800081edd188 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 74.800932][ T2158] x2 : 0beaa6dee1ac5a00 x1 : 0beaa6dee1ac5a00 x0 : ffff80037c2cb000 [ 74.801656][ T2158] Call trace: [ 74.801954][ T2158] alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0x120/0x270 [ 74.802494][ T2158] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x148/0x33c [ 74.802976][ T2158] test_kmalloc_redzone_access+0x4c/0x104 [slub_kunit] [ 74.803607][ T2158] kunit_try_run_case+0x70/0x17c [kunit] [ 74.804124][ T2158] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x2c/0x4c [kunit] [ 74.804768][ T2158] kthread+0x10c/0x118 [ 74.805141][ T2158] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 74.805540][ T2158] Code: b9400a80 11000400 b9000a80 97ffd858 (f94012d3) [ 74.806176][ T2158] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 74.808130][ T2158] Starting crashdump kernel... Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241020070819.307944-1-hao.ge@linux.dev Fixes: e0a955b ("mm/codetag: add pgalloc_tag_copy()") Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <gehao@kylinos.cn> Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However, bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock (raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock (spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted ----------------------------- test_maps/4881 is trying to lock: ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by test_maps/4881: #0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270 #1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0 lock_acquire+0x182/0x450 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70 bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70 bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110 bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0 free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0 htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80 bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270 htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80 bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270 bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380 __sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60 x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is still a spinlock. Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion. Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map. There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr: (1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value()) It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(), because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems. It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old element as well. (2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value()) Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(), htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(). For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these elements have been removed from the hash llist. Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation, __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept it as is. (3) fd_htab_map_free() It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr without raw_spinlock_t. (4) bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem() It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr without raw_spinlock_t. After moving free_htab_elem() outside htab bucket lock scope, using pcpu_freelist_push() instead of __pcpu_freelist_push() to disable the irq before freeing elements, and protecting the invocations of bpf_mem_cache_free() with migrate_{disable|enable} pair. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>

When PREEMPT_RT is enabled, 'spinlock_t' becomes preemptible and bpf program has owned a raw_spinlock under a interrupt handler, which results in invalid lock acquire context. [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241031-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- swapper/0/0 is trying to lock: ffff8880261e7a00 (&trie->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: trie_delete_elem+0x96/0x6a0 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:462 other info that might help us debug this: context-{3:3} 5 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: ffff888020bb75c8 (&vp_dev->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vp_vring_interrupt drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:80 [inline] #0: ffff888020bb75c8 (&vp_dev->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vp_interrupt+0x142/0x200 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:113 #1: ffff88814174a120 (&vb->stop_update_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #1: ffff88814174a120 (&vb->stop_update_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: stats_request+0x6f/0x230 drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c:438 #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __queue_work+0x199/0xf50 kernel/workqueue.c:2259 #3: ffff8880b863dd18 (&pool->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __queue_work+0x759/0xf50 #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2339 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_trace_run1+0x1d6/0x520 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2380 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241031-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4826 [inline] check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 trie_delete_elem+0x96/0x6a0 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:462 bpf_prog_2c29ac5cdc6b1842+0x43/0x47 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1290 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:701 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:708 [inline] __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2340 [inline] bpf_trace_run1+0x2ca/0x520 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2380 trace_workqueue_activate_work+0x186/0x1f0 include/trace/events/workqueue.h:59 __queue_work+0xc7b/0xf50 kernel/workqueue.c:2338 queue_work_on+0x1c2/0x380 kernel/workqueue.c:2390 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:662 [inline] stats_request+0x1a3/0x230 drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c:441 vring_interrupt+0x21d/0x380 drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c:2595 vp_vring_interrupt drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:82 [inline] vp_interrupt+0x192/0x200 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:113 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x29a/0xa80 kernel/irq/handle.c:158 handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:193 [inline] handle_irq_event+0x89/0x1f0 kernel/irq/handle.c:210 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x48a/0xae0 kernel/irq/chip.c:720 generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:173 [inline] handle_irq arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 [inline] call_irq_handler arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:259 [inline] __common_interrupt+0x136/0x230 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:285 common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:278 </IRQ> Reported-by: syzbot+b506de56cbbb63148c33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6723db4a.050a0220.35b515.0168.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 66150d0 ("bpf, lpm: Make locking RT friendly") Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>

The test in the follow-up patch triggers the following kernel panic: Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 465 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc4-gd1d187515 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-pr4 RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0015041 Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ccc RSP: 0018:ffffc9000187fd20 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82c54639 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000187fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000004cba6383 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff88810438b7a0 R15: ffffffff8369d7a0 FS: 00007f05178006c0(0000) GS:ffff888236e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f0508c94000 CR3: 0000000100d16003 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x68/0x80 ? die+0x3b/0x90 ? exc_int3+0xca/0xe0 ? asm_exc_int3+0x3e/0x50 run_struct_ops+0x58/0xb0 [bpf_testmod] param_attr_store+0xa2/0x100 module_attr_store+0x25/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x50/0x70 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x146/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x27e/0x530 ksys_write+0x75/0x100 __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x1d30/0x1f30 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f051831727f Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 d5 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 108 RSP: 002b:00007f05177ffdf0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05178006c0 RCX: 00007f051831727f RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f05177ffe30 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f05177ffe90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000b R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: ffffffffffffff30 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007ffd926bfd50 R15: 00007f0517000000 </TASK> It's because the sleepable prog is still running when the struct_ops map is released. To fix it, follow the approach used in bpf_tramp_image_put. First, before release struct_ops map, wait a rcu_tasks_trace gp for sleepable progs to finish. Then, wait a rcu_tasks gp for normal progs and the rest trampoline insns to finish. Additionally, switch to call_rcu to remove the synchronous waiting, as suggested by Alexei and Martin. Fixes: b671c20 ("bpf: Retire the struct_ops map kvalue->refcnt.") Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

When PREEMPT_RT is enabled, 'spinlock_t' becomes preemptible and bpf program has owned a raw_spinlock under a interrupt handler, which results in invalid lock acquire context. [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241031-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- swapper/0/0 is trying to lock: ffff8880261e7a00 (&trie->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: trie_delete_elem+0x96/0x6a0 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:462 other info that might help us debug this: context-{3:3} 5 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: ffff888020bb75c8 (&vp_dev->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vp_vring_interrupt drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:80 [inline] #0: ffff888020bb75c8 (&vp_dev->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vp_interrupt+0x142/0x200 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:113 #1: ffff88814174a120 (&vb->stop_update_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #1: ffff88814174a120 (&vb->stop_update_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: stats_request+0x6f/0x230 drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c:438 #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __queue_work+0x199/0xf50 kernel/workqueue.c:2259 #3: ffff8880b863dd18 (&pool->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __queue_work+0x759/0xf50 #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2339 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_trace_run1+0x1d6/0x520 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2380 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241031-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4826 [inline] check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 trie_delete_elem+0x96/0x6a0 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:462 bpf_prog_2c29ac5cdc6b1842+0x43/0x47 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1290 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:701 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:708 [inline] __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2340 [inline] bpf_trace_run1+0x2ca/0x520 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2380 trace_workqueue_activate_work+0x186/0x1f0 include/trace/events/workqueue.h:59 __queue_work+0xc7b/0xf50 kernel/workqueue.c:2338 queue_work_on+0x1c2/0x380 kernel/workqueue.c:2390 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:662 [inline] stats_request+0x1a3/0x230 drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c:441 vring_interrupt+0x21d/0x380 drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c:2595 vp_vring_interrupt drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:82 [inline] vp_interrupt+0x192/0x200 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:113 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x29a/0xa80 kernel/irq/handle.c:158 handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:193 [inline] handle_irq_event+0x89/0x1f0 kernel/irq/handle.c:210 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x48a/0xae0 kernel/irq/chip.c:720 generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:173 [inline] handle_irq arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 [inline] call_irq_handler arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:259 [inline] __common_interrupt+0x136/0x230 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:285 common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:278 </IRQ> Reported-by: syzbot+b506de56cbbb63148c33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6723db4a.050a0220.35b515.0168.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 66150d0 ("bpf, lpm: Make locking RT friendly") Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>

For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However, bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock (raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock (spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted ----------------------------- test_maps/4881 is trying to lock: ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by test_maps/4881: #0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270 #1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0 lock_acquire+0x182/0x450 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70 bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70 bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110 bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0 free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0 htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80 bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270 htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80 bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270 bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380 __sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60 x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is still a spinlock. Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion. Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map. There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr: (1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value()) It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(), because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems. It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old element as well. (2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value()) Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(), htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(). For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these elements have been removed from the hash llist. Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation, __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept it as is. (3) fd_htab_map_free() It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr without raw_spinlock_t. (4) bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem() It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr without raw_spinlock_t. After moving free_htab_elem() outside htab bucket lock scope, using pcpu_freelist_push() instead of __pcpu_freelist_push() to disable the irq before freeing elements, and protecting the invocations of bpf_mem_cache_free() with migrate_{disable|enable} pair. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241106063542.357743-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

When PREEMPT_RT is enabled, 'spinlock_t' becomes preemptible and bpf program has owned a raw_spinlock under a interrupt handler, which results in invalid lock acquire context. [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241031-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- swapper/0/0 is trying to lock: ffff8880261e7a00 (&trie->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: trie_delete_elem+0x96/0x6a0 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:462 other info that might help us debug this: context-{3:3} 5 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: ffff888020bb75c8 (&vp_dev->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vp_vring_interrupt drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:80 [inline] #0: ffff888020bb75c8 (&vp_dev->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vp_interrupt+0x142/0x200 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:113 #1: ffff88814174a120 (&vb->stop_update_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #1: ffff88814174a120 (&vb->stop_update_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: stats_request+0x6f/0x230 drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c:438 #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __queue_work+0x199/0xf50 kernel/workqueue.c:2259 #3: ffff8880b863dd18 (&pool->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __queue_work+0x759/0xf50 #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2339 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e939f20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_trace_run1+0x1d6/0x520 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2380 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241031-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4826 [inline] check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 trie_delete_elem+0x96/0x6a0 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:462 bpf_prog_2c29ac5cdc6b1842+0x43/0x47 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1290 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:701 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:708 [inline] __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2340 [inline] bpf_trace_run1+0x2ca/0x520 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2380 trace_workqueue_activate_work+0x186/0x1f0 include/trace/events/workqueue.h:59 __queue_work+0xc7b/0xf50 kernel/workqueue.c:2338 queue_work_on+0x1c2/0x380 kernel/workqueue.c:2390 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:662 [inline] stats_request+0x1a3/0x230 drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c:441 vring_interrupt+0x21d/0x380 drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c:2595 vp_vring_interrupt drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:82 [inline] vp_interrupt+0x192/0x200 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:113 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x29a/0xa80 kernel/irq/handle.c:158 handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:193 [inline] handle_irq_event+0x89/0x1f0 kernel/irq/handle.c:210 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x48a/0xae0 kernel/irq/chip.c:720 generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:173 [inline] handle_irq arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 [inline] call_irq_handler arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:259 [inline] __common_interrupt+0x136/0x230 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:285 common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:278 </IRQ> Reported-by: syzbot+b506de56cbbb63148c33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6723db4a.050a0220.35b515.0168.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 66150d0 ("bpf, lpm: Make locking RT friendly") Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>

For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However, bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock (raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock (spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted ----------------------------- test_maps/4881 is trying to lock: ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by test_maps/4881: #0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270 #1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0 lock_acquire+0x182/0x450 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70 bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70 bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110 bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0 free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0 htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80 bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270 htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80 bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270 bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380 __sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60 x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is still a spinlock. Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion. Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map. There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr: (1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value()) It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(), because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems. It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old element as well. (2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value()) Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(), htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(). For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these elements have been removed from the hash llist. Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation, __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept it as is. (3) fd_htab_map_free() It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr without raw_spinlock_t. (4) bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem() It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr without raw_spinlock_t. After moving free_htab_elem() outside htab bucket lock scope, using pcpu_freelist_push() instead of __pcpu_freelist_push() to disable the irq before freeing elements, and protecting the invocations of bpf_mem_cache_free() with migrate_{disable|enable} pair. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241106063542.357743-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>

Enqueue packets in dql after dma engine starts causes race condition. Tx transfer starts once dma engine is started and may execute dql dequeue in completion before it gets queued. It results in following kernel crash while running iperf stress test: kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! <snip> Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP pc : dql_completed+0x238/0x248 lr : dql_completed+0x3c/0x248 Call trace: dql_completed+0x238/0x248 axienet_dma_tx_cb+0xa0/0x170 xilinx_dma_do_tasklet+0xdc/0x290 tasklet_action_common+0xf8/0x11c tasklet_action+0x30/0x3c handle_softirqs+0xf8/0x230 <snip> Start dmaengine after enqueue in dql fixes the crash. Fixes: 6a91b84 ("net: axienet: Introduce dmaengine support") Signed-off-by: Suraj Gupta <suraj.gupta2@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241030062533.2527042-2-suraj.gupta2@amd.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Recently, we got a customer report that CIFS triggers oops while reconnecting to a server. [0] The workload runs on Kubernetes, and some pods mount CIFS servers in non-root network namespaces. The problem rarely happened, but it was always while the pod was dying. The root cause is wrong reference counting for network namespace. CIFS uses kernel sockets, which do not hold refcnt of the netns that the socket belongs to. That means CIFS must ensure the socket is always freed before its netns; otherwise, use-after-free happens. The repro steps are roughly: 1. mount CIFS in a non-root netns 2. drop packets from the netns 3. destroy the netns 4. unmount CIFS We can reproduce the issue quickly with the script [1] below and see the splat [2] if CONFIG_NET_NS_REFCNT_TRACKER is enabled. When the socket is TCP, it is hard to guarantee the netns lifetime without holding refcnt due to async timers. Let's hold netns refcnt for each socket as done for SMC in commit 9744d2b ("smc: Fix use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler()."). Note that we need to move put_net() from cifs_put_tcp_session() to clean_demultiplex_info(); otherwise, __sock_create() still could touch a freed netns while cifsd tries to reconnect from cifs_demultiplex_thread(). Also, maybe_get_net() cannot be put just before __sock_create() because the code is not under RCU and there is a small chance that the same address happened to be reallocated to another netns. [0]: CIFS: VFS: \\XXXXXXXXXXX has not responded in 15 seconds. Reconnecting... CIFS: Serverclose failed 4 times, giving up Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 14de99e461f84a07 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 [14de99e461f84a07] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cls_bpf sch_ingress nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 dns_resolver tcp_diag inet_diag veth xt_state xt_connmark nf_conntrack_netlink xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sm4_ce_cipher sm4 sm3_ce sm3 sha3_ce sha512_ce sha512_arm64 sha1_ce ena button sch_fq_codel loop fuse configfs dmi_sysfs sha2_ce sha256_arm64 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax efivarfs CPU: 5 PID: 2690970 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.1.103-109.184.amzn2023.aarch64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 r7g.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018 pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238 lr : __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc sp : ffff8000265db790 x29: ffff8000265db790 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 000000000000bd01 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000b4baf8000 x24: ffff00047b5e4580 x23: ffff8000265db7e0 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff00047b5e4500 x20: ffff0010e3f694f8 x19: 14de99e461f849f7 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 3f92800abd010002 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0010e3f69420 x9 : ffff800008a6f294 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffff001924354280 x3 : ffff8000265db7e0 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0010e3f694f8 x0 : ffff00047b5e4500 Call trace: fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238 __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2c4/0x398 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x60/0x8c tcp_v4_connect+0x290/0x488 __inet_stream_connect+0x108/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x78 kernel_connect+0x6c/0xac generic_ip_connect+0x10c/0x6c8 [cifs] __reconnect_target_unlocked+0xa0/0x214 [cifs] reconnect_dfs_server+0x144/0x460 [cifs] cifs_reconnect+0x88/0x148 [cifs] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x230/0x430 [cifs] cifs_read_from_socket+0x74/0xa8 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xf8/0x704 [cifs] kthread+0xd0/0xd4 Code: aa0003f8 f8480f13 eb18027f 540006c0 (b9401264) [1]: CIFS_CRED="/root/cred.cifs" CIFS_USER="Administrator" CIFS_PASS="Password" CIFS_IP="X.X.X.X" CIFS_PATH="//${CIFS_IP}/Users/Administrator/Desktop/CIFS_TEST" CIFS_MNT="/mnt/smb" DEV="enp0s3" cat <<EOF > ${CIFS_CRED} username=${CIFS_USER} password=${CIFS_PASS} domain=EXAMPLE.COM EOF unshare -n bash -c " mkdir -p ${CIFS_MNT} ip netns attach root 1 ip link add eth0 type veth peer veth0 netns root ip link set eth0 up ip -n root link set veth0 up ip addr add 192.168.0.2/24 dev eth0 ip -n root addr add 192.168.0.1/24 dev veth0 ip route add default via 192.168.0.1 dev eth0 ip netns exec root sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o ${DEV} -j MASQUERADE mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${CIFS_MNT} -o vers=3.0,sec=ntlmssp,credentials=${CIFS_CRED},rsize=65536,wsize=65536,cache=none,echo_interval=1 touch ${CIFS_MNT}/a.txt ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o ${DEV} -j MASQUERADE " umount ${CIFS_MNT} [2]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000004bbc008d has 1/1 users at sk_alloc (./include/net/net_namespace.h:339 net/core/sock.c:2227) inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:326 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1576) generic_ip_connect (fs/smb/client/connect.c:3075) cifs_get_tcp_session.part.0 (fs/smb/client/connect.c:3160 fs/smb/client/connect.c:1798) cifs_mount_get_session (fs/smb/client/trace.h:959 fs/smb/client/connect.c:3366) dfs_mount_share (fs/smb/client/dfs.c:63 fs/smb/client/dfs.c:285) cifs_mount (fs/smb/client/connect.c:3622) cifs_smb3_do_mount (fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c:949) smb3_get_tree (fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:784 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:802 fs/smb/client/fs_context.c:794) vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1800) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:3508 fs/namespace.c:3834) __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:3848 fs/namespace.c:4057 fs/namespace.c:4034 fs/namespace.c:4034) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Acked-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

Unloading the ice driver while switchdev port representors are added to a bridge can lead to kernel panic. Reproducer: modprobe ice devlink dev eswitch set $PF1_PCI mode switchdev ip link add $BR type bridge ip link set $BR up echo 2 > /sys/class/net/$PF1/device/sriov_numvfs sleep 2 ip link set $PF1 master $BR ip link set $VF1_PR master $BR ip link set $VF2_PR master $BR ip link set $PF1 up ip link set $VF1_PR up ip link set $VF2_PR up ip link set $VF1 up rmmod irdma ice When unloading the driver, ice_eswitch_detach() is eventually called as part of VF freeing. First, it removes a port representor from xarray, then unregister_netdev() is called (via repr->ops.rem()), finally representor is deallocated. The problem comes from the bridge doing its own deinit at the same time. unregister_netdev() triggers a notifier chain, resulting in ice_eswitch_br_port_deinit() being called. It should set repr->br_port = NULL, but this does not happen since repr has already been removed from xarray and is not found. Regardless, it finishes up deallocating br_port. At this point, repr is still not freed and an fdb event can happen, in which ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work() takes repr->br_port and tries to use it, which causes a panic (use after free). Note that this only happens with 2 or more port representors added to the bridge, since with only one representor port, the bridge deinit is slightly different (ice_eswitch_br_port_deinit() is called via ice_eswitch_br_ports_flush(), not ice_eswitch_br_port_unlink()). Trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf129010fd1a93284: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x8948287e8d499420-0x8948287e8d499427] (...) Workqueue: ice_bridge_wq ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work [ice] RIP: 0010:__rht_bucket_nested+0xb4/0x180 (...) Call Trace: (...) ice_eswitch_br_fdb_find+0x3fa/0x550 [ice] ? __pfx_ice_eswitch_br_fdb_find+0x10/0x10 [ice] ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work+0x2de/0x1e60 [ice] ? __schedule+0xf60/0x5210 ? mutex_lock+0x91/0xe0 ? __pfx_ice_eswitch_br_fdb_event_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] ? ice_eswitch_br_update_work+0x1f4/0x310 [ice] (...) A workaround is available: brctl setageing $BR 0, which stops the bridge from adding fdb entries altogether. Change the order of operations in ice_eswitch_detach(): move the call to unregister_netdev() before removing repr from xarray. This way repr->br_port will be correctly set to NULL in ice_eswitch_br_port_deinit(), preventing a panic. Fixes: fff292b ("ice: add VF representors one by one") Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Sujai Buvaneswaran <sujai.buvaneswaran@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>

The RTC update work involves runtime resuming the UFS controller. Hence, only start the RTC update work after runtime power management in the UFS driver has been fully initialized. This patch fixes the following kernel crash: Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Workqueue: events ufshcd_rtc_work Call trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P) pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c (L) pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c ufshcd_rtc_work+0x138/0x1b4 process_one_work+0x148/0x288 worker_thread+0x2cc/0x3d4 kthread+0x110/0x114 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Reported-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/0c0bc528-fdc2-4106-bc99-f23ae377f6f5@linaro.org/ Fixes: 6bf999e ("scsi: ufs: core: Add UFS RTC support") Cc: Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241031212632.2799127-1-bvanassche@acm.org Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com> Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> # on SM8650-HDK Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

In unlikely event that we fail during sending the new VF GGTT configuration to the GuC, we will free only the GGTT node data struct but will miss to release the actual GGTT allocation. This will later lead to list corruption, GGTT space leak and finally risking crash when unloading the driver: [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: Failed to provision VF1 with 1073741824 (1.00 GiB) GGTT (-EIO) [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: VF1 provisioning remains at 0 (0 B) GGTT [ ] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff88813cfcd628), but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff88813cfe2028). [ ] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x6b/0xb0 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] drm_mm_insert_node_in_range+0x2c0/0x4e0 [ ] xe_ggtt_node_insert+0x46/0x70 [xe] [ ] pf_provision_vf_ggtt+0x7f5/0xa70 [xe] [ ] xe_gt_sriov_pf_config_set_ggtt+0x5e/0x770 [xe] [ ] ggtt_set+0x4b/0x70 [xe] [ ] simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb0/0x110 [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: Failed to provision VF1 with 1073741824 (1.00 GiB) GGTT (-ENOSPC) [ ] ... [drm] GT0: PF: VF1 provisioning remains at 0 (0 B) GGTT [ ] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ ] RIP: 0010:drm_mm_remove_node+0x1b7/0x390 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] <TASK> [ ] ? die_addr+0x2e/0x80 [ ] ? exc_general_protection+0x1a1/0x3e0 [ ] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 [ ] ? drm_mm_remove_node+0x1b7/0x390 [ ] ggtt_node_remove+0xa5/0xf0 [xe] [ ] xe_ggtt_node_remove+0x35/0x70 [xe] [ ] xe_ttm_bo_destroy+0x123/0x220 [xe] [ ] intel_user_framebuffer_destroy+0x44/0x70 [xe] [ ] intel_plane_destroy_state+0x3b/0xc0 [xe] [ ] drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0x1cd/0x2f0 [ ] intel_atomic_state_clear+0x9/0x20 [xe] [ ] __drm_atomic_state_free+0x1d/0xb0 Fix that by using pf_release_ggtt() on the error path, which now works regardless if the node has GGTT allocation or not. Fixes: 34e8042 ("drm/xe: Make xe_ggtt_node struct independent") Signed-off-by: Michal Wajdeczko <michal.wajdeczko@intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20241104144901.1903-1-michal.wajdeczko@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 43b1dd2b550f0861ce80fbfffd5881b1b26272b1) Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>

vp_modern_avq_cleanup() and vp_del_vqs() clean up admin vq resources by virtio_pci_vq_info pointer. The info pointer of admin vq is stored in vp_dev->admin_vq.info instead of vp_dev->vqs[]. Using the info pointer from vp_dev->vqs[] for admin vq causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference bug. In vp_modern_avq_cleanup() and vp_del_vqs(), get the info pointer from vp_dev->admin_vq.info for admin vq to clean up the resources. Also make info ptr as argument of vp_del_vq() to be symmetric with vp_setup_vq(). vp_reset calls vp_modern_avq_cleanup, and causes the Call Trace: ================================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:0000000000000000 ... CPU: 49 UID: 0 PID: 4439 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5 #1 RIP: 0010:vp_reset+0x57/0x90 [virtio_pci] Call Trace: <TASK> ... ? vp_reset+0x57/0x90 [virtio_pci] ? vp_reset+0x38/0x90 [virtio_pci] virtio_reset_device+0x1d/0x30 remove_vq_common+0x1c/0x1a0 [virtio_net] virtnet_remove+0xa1/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtio_dev_remove+0x46/0xa0 ... virtio_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0x810 [virtio_pci] ================================================================== Fixes: 4c3b54a ("virtio_pci_modern: use completion instead of busy loop to wait on admin cmd result") Signed-off-by: Feng Liu <feliu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@nvidia.com> Message-Id: <20241024135406.81388-1-feliu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

In the error recovery path of mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(), the cleanup is executed and at the end put_device() is called which ends up calling mlx5_vdpa_free(). This function will execute the same cleanup all over again. Most resources support being cleaned up twice, but the recent mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() doesn't. This change drops the explicit cleanup from within the mlx5_vdpa_dev_add() and lets mlx5_vdpa_free() do its work. This issue was discovered while trying to add 2 vdpa devices with the same name: $> vdpa dev add name vdpa-0 mgmtdev auxiliary/mlx5_core.sf.2 $> vdpa dev add name vdpa-0 mgmtdev auxiliary/mlx5_core.sf.3 ... yields the following dump: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2811 Comm: vdpa Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:destroy_workqueue+0xe/0x2a0 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffff88814920b9a8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105c10000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff888100400168 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888100120c00 R09: ffffffff828578c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888131fd99a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888105c10580 FS: 00007fdfa6b4f740(0000) GS:ffff88852ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000b8 CR3: 000000018db09006 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x130 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? destroy_workqueue+0xe/0x2a0 mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources+0x2b/0x40 [mlx5_vdpa] mlx5_vdpa_free+0x45/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa] vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa] device_release+0x31/0x90 kobject_put+0x8d/0x230 mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x328/0x8b0 [mlx5_vdpa] vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x2b8/0x4c0 [vdpa] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x180/0x2b0 ? __vdpa_alloc_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [vdpa] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1fc/0x2d0 netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x410 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x105/0x160 ? __count_memcg_events+0x53/0xe0 ? handle_mm_fault+0x100/0x220 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40d/0x620 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fdfa6c66b57 Code: ... RSP: 002b:00007ffeace22998 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a498608350 RCX: 00007fdfa6c66b57 RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: 000055a498608350 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffeace229c0 R08: 00007fdfa6d35200 R09: 000000000000000c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055a4986082a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffeace233f3 </TASK> Modules linked in: ... CR2: 00000000000000b8 Fixes: 6211165 ("vdpa/mlx5: Postpone MR deletion") Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com> Message-Id: <20241105185101.1323272-2-dtatulea@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>

syzbot and Daan report a NULL pointer crash in the new full swap cluster reclaim work: > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 > Workqueue: events swap_reclaim_work > RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x20/0x1c0 lib/list_debug.c:49 > Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 fe 48 83 c7 08 48 83 ec 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 19 01 00 00 48 89 f2 48 8b 4e 08 48 b8 00 00 00 > RSP: 0018:ffffc90000bb7c30 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88807b9ae078 > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000008 > RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000004f R12: dffffc0000000000 > R13: ffffffffffffffb8 R14: ffff88807b9ae000 R15: ffffc90003af1000 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 00007fffaca68fb8 CR3: 00000000791c8000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline] > __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline] > list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline] > swap_reclaim_full_clusters+0x109/0x460 mm/swapfile.c:748 > swap_reclaim_work+0x2e/0x40 mm/swapfile.c:779 The syzbot console output indicates a virtual environment where swapfile is on a rotational device. In this case, clusters aren't actually used, and si->full_clusters is not initialized. Daan's report is from qemu, so likely rotational too. Make sure to only schedule the cluster reclaim work when clusters are actually in use. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241107142335.GB1172372@cmpxchg.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/672ac50b.050a0220.2edce.1517.GAE@google.com/ Link: systemd/systemd#35044 Fixes: 5168a68 ("mm, swap: avoid over reclaim of full clusters") Reported-by: syzbot+078be8bfa863cb9e0c6b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reported-by: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com> Cc: Kairui Song <ryncsn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Jordy says: " In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer (map->max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer (k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value for map->max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check: if (k >= map->max_entries) return -EINVAL; This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2), which is then used as an array index in m->xsk_map[k], which results in an out-of-bounds access. spin_lock_bh(&m->lock); map_entry = &m->xsk_map[k]; // Out-of-bounds map_entry old_xs = unrcu_pointer(xchg(map_entry, NULL)); // Oob write if (old_xs) xsk_map_sock_delete(old_xs, map_entry); spin_unlock_bh(&m->lock); The xchg operation can then be used to cause an out-of-bounds write. Moreover, the invalid map_entry passed to xsk_map_sock_delete can lead to further memory corruption. " It indeed results in following splat: [76612.897343] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2e461108 [76612.904330] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [76612.909639] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [76612.914855] PGD 0 P4D 0 [76612.917431] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [76612.921859] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 10318 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #470 [76612.929189] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [76612.939781] RIP: 0010:xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60 [76612.944738] Code: 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 63 2e 3b 6f 24 73 38 4c 8d a7 f8 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 2d bf 05 00 48 8d b4 eb 00 01 00 00 31 ff <48> 87 3e 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 3e bc 05 00 31 [76612.963774] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002e407df8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [76612.969079] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002e461000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [76612.976323] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc8fc2e461108 RDI: 0000000000000000 [76612.983569] RBP: ffffffff80000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007 [76612.990812] R10: ffffc9002e407e18 R11: ffff888108a38858 R12: ffffc9002e4610f8 [76612.998060] R13: ffff888108a38858 R14: 00007ffd1ae0ac78 R15: ffffc9002e4610c0 [76613.005303] FS: 00007f80b6f59740(0000) GS:ffff8897e0ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [76613.013517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [76613.019349] CR2: ffffc8fc2e461108 CR3: 000000011e3ef001 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [76613.026595] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [76613.033841] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [76613.041086] PKRU: 55555554 [76613.043842] Call Trace: [76613.046331] <TASK> [76613.048468] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [76613.051581] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450 [76613.055747] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30 [76613.059649] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 [76613.063988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140 [76613.067975] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [76613.072229] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60 [76613.076573] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x23/0x60 [76613.080914] __sys_bpf+0x19b7/0x23c0 [76613.084555] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20 [76613.088194] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0 [76613.091832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [76613.096962] RIP: 0033:0x7f80b6d1e88d [76613.100592] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [76613.119631] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1ae0ac68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 [76613.131330] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f80b6d1e88d [76613.142632] RDX: 0000000000000098 RSI: 00007ffd1ae0ad20 RDI: 0000000000000003 [76613.153967] RBP: 00007ffd1ae0adc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [76613.166030] R10: 00007f80b6f77040 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd1ae0aed8 [76613.177130] R13: 000055ddf42ce1e9 R14: 000055ddf42d0d98 R15: 00007f80b6fab040 [76613.188129] </TASK> Fix this by simply changing key type from int to u32. Fixes: fbfc504 ("bpf: introduce new bpf AF_XDP map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP") Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>

Jordy reported issue against XSKMAP which also applies to DEVMAP - the index used for accessing map entry, due to being a signed integer, causes the OOB writes. Fix is simple as changing the type from int to u32, however, when compared to XSKMAP case, one more thing needs to be addressed. When map is released from system via dev_map_free(), we iterate through all of the entries and an iterator variable is also an int, which implies OOB accesses. Again, change it to be u32. Example splat below: [ 160.724676] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2c001000 [ 160.731662] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 160.736876] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 160.742095] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 160.744678] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 160.749106] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: kworker/u145:12 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #487 [ 160.757050] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 160.767642] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred [ 160.773308] RIP: 0010:dev_map_free+0x77/0x170 [ 160.777735] Code: 00 e8 fd 91 ed ff e8 b8 73 ed ff 41 83 7d 18 19 74 6e 41 8b 45 24 49 8b bd f8 00 00 00 31 db 85 c0 74 48 48 63 c3 48 8d 04 c7 <48> 8b 28 48 85 ed 74 30 48 8b 7d 18 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 b3 52 fa ff [ 160.796777] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ee1fe38 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 160.802086] RAX: ffffc8fc2c001000 RBX: 0000000080000000 RCX: 0000000000000024 [ 160.809331] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: ffffc9002c001000 [ 160.816576] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000023 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 160.823823] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000ee6b2 R12: dead000000000122 [ 160.831066] R13: ffff88810c928e00 R14: ffff8881002df405 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 160.838310] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8897e0c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 160.846528] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 160.852357] CR2: ffffc8fc2c001000 CR3: 0000000005c32006 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 160.859604] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 160.866847] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 160.874092] PKRU: 55555554 [ 160.876847] Call Trace: [ 160.879338] <TASK> [ 160.881477] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [ 160.884586] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450 [ 160.888746] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30 [ 160.892647] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 [ 160.896988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140 [ 160.900973] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 160.905232] ? dev_map_free+0x77/0x170 [ 160.909043] ? dev_map_free+0x58/0x170 [ 160.912857] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x51/0x90 [ 160.917196] process_one_work+0x142/0x370 [ 160.921272] worker_thread+0x29e/0x3b0 [ 160.925082] ? rescuer_thread+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 160.929157] kthread+0xd4/0x110 [ 160.932355] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 160.936079] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ 160.943396] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 160.950803] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 160.958482] </TASK> Fixes: 546ac1f ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references") Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>

Jordy says: " In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer (map->max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer (k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value for map->max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check: if (k >= map->max_entries) return -EINVAL; This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2), which is then used as an array index in m->xsk_map[k], which results in an out-of-bounds access. spin_lock_bh(&m->lock); map_entry = &m->xsk_map[k]; // Out-of-bounds map_entry old_xs = unrcu_pointer(xchg(map_entry, NULL)); // Oob write if (old_xs) xsk_map_sock_delete(old_xs, map_entry); spin_unlock_bh(&m->lock); The xchg operation can then be used to cause an out-of-bounds write. Moreover, the invalid map_entry passed to xsk_map_sock_delete can lead to further memory corruption. " It indeed results in following splat: [76612.897343] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2e461108 [76612.904330] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [76612.909639] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [76612.914855] PGD 0 P4D 0 [76612.917431] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [76612.921859] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 10318 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #470 [76612.929189] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [76612.939781] RIP: 0010:xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60 [76612.944738] Code: 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 63 2e 3b 6f 24 73 38 4c 8d a7 f8 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 2d bf 05 00 48 8d b4 eb 00 01 00 00 31 ff <48> 87 3e 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 3e bc 05 00 31 [76612.963774] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002e407df8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [76612.969079] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002e461000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [76612.976323] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc8fc2e461108 RDI: 0000000000000000 [76612.983569] RBP: ffffffff80000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007 [76612.990812] R10: ffffc9002e407e18 R11: ffff888108a38858 R12: ffffc9002e4610f8 [76612.998060] R13: ffff888108a38858 R14: 00007ffd1ae0ac78 R15: ffffc9002e4610c0 [76613.005303] FS: 00007f80b6f59740(0000) GS:ffff8897e0ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [76613.013517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [76613.019349] CR2: ffffc8fc2e461108 CR3: 000000011e3ef001 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [76613.026595] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [76613.033841] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [76613.041086] PKRU: 55555554 [76613.043842] Call Trace: [76613.046331] <TASK> [76613.048468] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [76613.051581] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450 [76613.055747] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30 [76613.059649] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 [76613.063988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140 [76613.067975] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [76613.072229] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60 [76613.076573] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x23/0x60 [76613.080914] __sys_bpf+0x19b7/0x23c0 [76613.084555] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20 [76613.088194] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0 [76613.091832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [76613.096962] RIP: 0033:0x7f80b6d1e88d [76613.100592] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [76613.119631] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1ae0ac68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 [76613.131330] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f80b6d1e88d [76613.142632] RDX: 0000000000000098 RSI: 00007ffd1ae0ad20 RDI: 0000000000000003 [76613.153967] RBP: 00007ffd1ae0adc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [76613.166030] R10: 00007f80b6f77040 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd1ae0aed8 [76613.177130] R13: 000055ddf42ce1e9 R14: 000055ddf42d0d98 R15: 00007f80b6fab040 [76613.188129] </TASK> Fix this by simply changing key type from int to u32. Fixes: fbfc504 ("bpf: introduce new bpf AF_XDP map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP") Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>

Jordy reported issue against XSKMAP which also applies to DEVMAP - the index used for accessing map entry, due to being a signed integer, causes the OOB writes. Fix is simple as changing the type from int to u32, however, when compared to XSKMAP case, one more thing needs to be addressed. When map is released from system via dev_map_free(), we iterate through all of the entries and an iterator variable is also an int, which implies OOB accesses. Again, change it to be u32. Example splat below: [ 160.724676] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2c001000 [ 160.731662] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 160.736876] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 160.742095] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 160.744678] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 160.749106] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: kworker/u145:12 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #487 [ 160.757050] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 160.767642] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred [ 160.773308] RIP: 0010:dev_map_free+0x77/0x170 [ 160.777735] Code: 00 e8 fd 91 ed ff e8 b8 73 ed ff 41 83 7d 18 19 74 6e 41 8b 45 24 49 8b bd f8 00 00 00 31 db 85 c0 74 48 48 63 c3 48 8d 04 c7 <48> 8b 28 48 85 ed 74 30 48 8b 7d 18 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 b3 52 fa ff [ 160.796777] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ee1fe38 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 160.802086] RAX: ffffc8fc2c001000 RBX: 0000000080000000 RCX: 0000000000000024 [ 160.809331] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: ffffc9002c001000 [ 160.816576] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000023 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 160.823823] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000ee6b2 R12: dead000000000122 [ 160.831066] R13: ffff88810c928e00 R14: ffff8881002df405 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 160.838310] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8897e0c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 160.846528] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 160.852357] CR2: ffffc8fc2c001000 CR3: 0000000005c32006 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 160.859604] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 160.866847] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 160.874092] PKRU: 55555554 [ 160.876847] Call Trace: [ 160.879338] <TASK> [ 160.881477] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [ 160.884586] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450 [ 160.888746] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30 [ 160.892647] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 [ 160.896988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140 [ 160.900973] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 160.905232] ? dev_map_free+0x77/0x170 [ 160.909043] ? dev_map_free+0x58/0x170 [ 160.912857] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x51/0x90 [ 160.917196] process_one_work+0x142/0x370 [ 160.921272] worker_thread+0x29e/0x3b0 [ 160.925082] ? rescuer_thread+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 160.929157] kthread+0xd4/0x110 [ 160.932355] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 160.936079] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ 160.943396] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 160.950803] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 160.958482] </TASK> Fixes: 546ac1f ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references") Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>

Dave Chinner and others added 30 commits February 1, 2022 14:14

Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-fixes-5.17-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux

cb4f084

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 5.17, take #1 - Rework guest entry logic - Make CY, TM, and IR counters accessible in VU mode - Fix SBI implementation version

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