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[test] master_test #1

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branch: master_test
base:bpf-next
version: edc21dc

Dave Chinner and others added 30 commits February 1, 2022 14:14
Since we've started treating fallocate more like a file write, we
should flush the log to disk if the user has asked for synchronous
writes either by setting it via fcntl flags, or inode flags, or with
the sync mount option.  We've already got a helper for this, so use
it.

[The original patch by Darrick was massaged by Dave to fit this patchset]

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Unlike .queue_rq, in .submit_async_event drivers may not check the ctrl
readiness for AER submission. This may lead to a use-after-free
condition that was observed with nvme-tcp.

The race condition may happen in the following scenario:
1. driver executes its reset_ctrl_work
2. -> nvme_stop_ctrl - flushes ctrl async_event_work
3. ctrl sends AEN which is received by the host, which in turn
   schedules AEN handling
4. teardown admin queue (which releases the queue socket)
5. AEN processed, submits another AER, calling the driver to submit
6. driver attempts to send the cmd
==> use-after-free

In order to fix that, add ctrl state check to validate the ctrl
is actually able to accept the AER submission.

This addresses the above race in controller resets because the driver
during teardown should:
1. change ctrl state to RESETTING
2. flush async_event_work (as well as other async work elements)

So after 1,2, any other AER command will find the
ctrl state to be RESETTING and bail out without submitting the AER.

Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
While nvme_tcp_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue
state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order
to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error
recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy
the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that
there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler
itself changing the ctrl state.

Tested-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
While nvme_rdma_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue
state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order
to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error
recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy
the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that
there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler
itself changing the ctrl state.

Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Refuse SIDA memops on guests which are not protected.
For normal guests, the secure instruction data address designation,
which determines the location we access, is not under control of KVM.

Fixes: 19e1227 (KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer)
Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Kyle reported that rr[0] has started to malfunction on Comet Lake and
later CPUs due to EFI starting to make use of CPL3 [1] and the PMU
event filtering not distinguishing between regular CPL3 and SMM CPL3.

Since this is a privilege violation, default disable SMM visibility
where possible.

Administrators wanting to observe SMM cycles can easily change this
using the sysfs attribute while regular users don't have access to
this file.

[0] https://rr-project.org/

[1] See the Intel white paper "Trustworthy SMM on the Intel vPro Platform"
at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=300300, particularly the
end of page 5.

Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YfKChjX61OW4CkYm@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
The intent has always been that perf_event_attr::sig_data should also be
modifiable along with PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES, because it is
observable by user space if SIGTRAP on events is requested.

Currently only PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT is modifiable, and explicitly copies
relevant breakpoint-related attributes in hw_breakpoint_copy_attr().
This misses copying perf_event_attr::sig_data.

Since sig_data is not specific to PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, introduce a
helper to copy generic event-type-independent attributes on
modification.

Fixes: 97ba62b ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-1-elver@google.com
Test that PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES correctly modifies
perf_event_attr::sig_data as well.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-2-elver@google.com
…rchitectures

Due to the alignment requirements of siginfo_t, as described in
3ddb3fd ("signal, perf: Fix siginfo_t by avoiding u64 on 32-bit
architectures"), siginfo_t::si_perf_data is limited to an unsigned long.

However, perf_event_attr::sig_data is an u64, to avoid having to deal
with compat conversions. Due to being an u64, it may not immediately be
clear to users that sig_data is truncated on 32 bit architectures.

Add a comment to explicitly point this out, and hopefully help some
users save time by not having to deduce themselves what's happening.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-3-elver@google.com
Add a check for !buf->single before calling pt_buffer_region_size in a
place where a missing check can cause a kernel crash.

Fixes a bug introduced by commit 6706384 ("perf/x86/intel/pt:
Opportunistically use single range output mode"), which added a
support for PT single-range output mode. Since that commit if a PT
stop filter range is hit while tracing, the kernel will crash because
of a null pointer dereference in pt_handle_status due to calling
pt_buffer_region_size without a ToPA configured.

The commit which introduced single-range mode guarded almost all uses of
the ToPA buffer variables with checks of the buf->single variable, but
missed the case where tracing was stopped by the PT hardware, which
happens when execution hits a configured stop filter.

Tested that hitting a stop filter while PT recording successfully
records a trace with this patch but crashes without this patch.

Fixes: 6706384 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Opportunistically use single range output mode")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Hume <tristan@thume.ca>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220127220806.73664-1-tristan@thume.ca
In kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run() we enter an RCU extended quiescent state
(EQS) by calling guest_enter_irqoff(), and unmask IRQs prior to exiting
the EQS by calling guest_exit(). As the IRQ entry code will not wake RCU
in this case, we may run the core IRQ code and IRQ handler without RCU
watching, leading to various potential problems.

Additionally, we do not inform lockdep or tracing that interrupts will
be enabled during guest execution, which caan lead to misleading traces
and warnings that interrupts have been enabled for overly-long periods.

This patch fixes these issues by using the new timing and context
entry/exit helpers to ensure that interrupts are handled during guest
vtime but with RCU watching, with a sequence:

	guest_timing_enter_irqoff();

	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
	< run the vcpu >
	guest_state_exit_irqoff();

	< take any pending IRQs >

	guest_timing_exit_irqoff();

Since instrumentation may make use of RCU, we must also ensure that no
instrumented code is run during the EQS. I've split out the critical
section into a new kvm_riscv_enter_exit_vcpu() helper which is marked
noinstr.

Fixes: 99cdc6c ("RISC-V: Add initial skeletal KVM support")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Cc: Atish Patra <atishp@atishpatra.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Those applications that run in VU mode and access the time CSR cause
a virtual instruction trap as Guest kernel currently does not
initialize the scounteren CSR.

To fix this, we should make CY, TM, and IR counters accessibile
by default in VU mode (similar to OpenSBI).

Fixes: a33c72f ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement VCPU create, init and
destroy functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mayuresh Chitale <mchitale@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
The SBI implementation version returned by KVM RISC-V should be the
Host Linux version code.

Fixes: c62a768 ("RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI v0.2 base extension")
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
…from TODO list)"

This reverts commit b3ec8cd.

Revert the second (of 2) commits which disabled scrolling acceleration
in fbcon/fbdev.  It introduced a regression for fbdev-supported graphic
cards because of the performance penalty by doing screen scrolling by
software instead of using the existing graphic card 2D hardware
acceleration.

Console scrolling acceleration was disabled by dropping code which
checked at runtime the driver hardware capabilities for the
BINFO_HWACCEL_COPYAREA or FBINFO_HWACCEL_FILLRECT flags and if set, it
enabled scrollmode SCROLL_MOVE which uses hardware acceleration to move
screen contents.  After dropping those checks scrollmode was hard-wired
to SCROLL_REDRAW instead, which forces all graphic cards to redraw every
character at the new screen position when scrolling.

This change effectively disabled all hardware-based scrolling acceleration for
ALL drivers, because now all kind of 2D hardware acceleration (bitblt,
fillrect) in the drivers isn't used any longer.

The original commit message mentions that only 3 DRM drivers (nouveau, omapdrm
and gma500) used hardware acceleration in the past and thus code for checking
and using scrolling acceleration is obsolete.

This statement is NOT TRUE, because beside the DRM drivers there are around 35
other fbdev drivers which depend on fbdev/fbcon and still provide hardware
acceleration for fbdev/fbcon.

The original commit message also states that syzbot found lots of bugs in fbcon
and thus it's "often the solution to just delete code and remove features".
This is true, and the bugs - which actually affected all users of fbcon,
including DRM - were fixed, or code was dropped like e.g. the support for
software scrollback in vgacon (commit 973c096).

So to further analyze which bugs were found by syzbot, I've looked through all
patches in drivers/video which were tagged with syzbot or syzkaller back to
year 2005. The vast majority fixed the reported issues on a higher level, e.g.
when screen is to be resized, or when font size is to be changed. The few ones
which touched driver code fixed a real driver bug, e.g. by adding a check.

But NONE of those patches touched code of either the SCROLL_MOVE or the
SCROLL_REDRAW case.

That means, there was no real reason why SCROLL_MOVE had to be ripped-out and
just SCROLL_REDRAW had to be used instead. The only reason I can imagine so far
was that SCROLL_MOVE wasn't used by DRM and as such it was assumed that it
could go away. That argument completely missed the fact that SCROLL_MOVE is
still heavily used by fbdev (non-DRM) drivers.

Some people mention that using memcpy() instead of the hardware acceleration is
pretty much the same speed. But that's not true, at least not for older graphic
cards and machines where we see speed decreases by factor 10 and more and thus
this change leads to console responsiveness way worse than before.

That's why the original commit is to be reverted. By reverting we
reintroduce hardware-based scrolling acceleration and fix the
performance regression for fbdev drivers.

There isn't any impact on DRM when reverting those patches.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220202135531.92183-2-deller@gmx.de
This reverts commit 39aead8.

Revert the first (of 2) commits which disabled scrolling acceleration in
fbcon/fbdev.  It introduced a regression for fbdev-supported graphic cards
because of the performance penalty by doing screen scrolling by software
instead of using the existing graphic card 2D hardware acceleration.

Console scrolling acceleration was disabled by dropping code which
checked at runtime the driver hardware capabilities for the
BINFO_HWACCEL_COPYAREA or FBINFO_HWACCEL_FILLRECT flags and if set, it
enabled scrollmode SCROLL_MOVE which uses hardware acceleration to move
screen contents.  After dropping those checks scrollmode was hard-wired
to SCROLL_REDRAW instead, which forces all graphic cards to redraw every
character at the new screen position when scrolling.

This change effectively disabled all hardware-based scrolling acceleration for
ALL drivers, because now all kind of 2D hardware acceleration (bitblt,
fillrect) in the drivers isn't used any longer.

The original commit message mentions that only 3 DRM drivers (nouveau, omapdrm
and gma500) used hardware acceleration in the past and thus code for checking
and using scrolling acceleration is obsolete.

This statement is NOT TRUE, because beside the DRM drivers there are around 35
other fbdev drivers which depend on fbdev/fbcon and still provide hardware
acceleration for fbdev/fbcon.

The original commit message also states that syzbot found lots of bugs in fbcon
and thus it's "often the solution to just delete code and remove features".
This is true, and the bugs - which actually affected all users of fbcon,
including DRM - were fixed, or code was dropped like e.g. the support for
software scrollback in vgacon (commit 973c096).

So to further analyze which bugs were found by syzbot, I've looked through all
patches in drivers/video which were tagged with syzbot or syzkaller back to
year 2005. The vast majority fixed the reported issues on a higher level, e.g.
when screen is to be resized, or when font size is to be changed. The few ones
which touched driver code fixed a real driver bug, e.g. by adding a check.

But NONE of those patches touched code of either the SCROLL_MOVE or the
SCROLL_REDRAW case.

That means, there was no real reason why SCROLL_MOVE had to be ripped-out and
just SCROLL_REDRAW had to be used instead. The only reason I can imagine so far
was that SCROLL_MOVE wasn't used by DRM and as such it was assumed that it
could go away. That argument completely missed the fact that SCROLL_MOVE is
still heavily used by fbdev (non-DRM) drivers.

Some people mention that using memcpy() instead of the hardware acceleration is
pretty much the same speed. But that's not true, at least not for older graphic
cards and machines where we see speed decreases by factor 10 and more and thus
this change leads to console responsiveness way worse than before.

That's why the original commit is to be reverted. By reverting we
reintroduce hardware-based scrolling acceleration and fix the
performance regression for fbdev drivers.

There isn't any impact on DRM when reverting those patches.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220202135531.92183-3-deller@gmx.de
Add a config option CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_LEGACY_ACCELERATION to
enable bitblt and fillrect hardware acceleration in the framebuffer
console. If disabled, such acceleration will not be used, even if it is
supported by the graphics hardware driver.

If you plan to use DRM as your main graphics output system, you should
disable this option since it will prevent compiling in code which isn't
used later on when DRM takes over.

For all other configurations, e.g. if none of your graphic cards support
DRM (yet), DRM isn't available for your architecture, or you can't be
sure that the graphic card in the target system will support DRM, you
most likely want to enable this option.

In the non-accelerated case (e.g. when DRM is used), the inlined
fb_scrollmode() function is hardcoded to return SCROLL_REDRAW and as such the
compiler is able to optimize much unneccesary code away.

In this v3 patch version I additionally changed the GETVYRES() and GETVXRES()
macros to take a pointer to the fbcon_display struct. This fixes the build when
console rotation is enabled and helps the compiler again to optimize out code.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220202135531.92183-4-deller@gmx.de
Commit ceaa762 ("block: move direct_IO into our own read_iter
handler") introduced several regressions for bdev DIO:

1. read spanning EOF always returns 0 instead of the number of bytes
   read.  This is because "count" is assigned early and isn't updated
   when the iterator is truncated:

     $ lsblk -o name,size /dev/vdb
     NAME SIZE
     vdb    1G
     $ xfs_io -d -c 'pread -b 4M 1021M 4M' /dev/vdb
     read 0/4194304 bytes at offset 1070596096
     0.000000 bytes, 0 ops; 0.0007 sec (0.000000 bytes/sec and 0.0000 ops/sec)

     instead of

     $ xfs_io -d -c 'pread -b 4M 1021M 4M' /dev/vdb
     read 3145728/4194304 bytes at offset 1070596096
     3 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0007 sec (3.865 GiB/sec and 1319.2612 ops/sec)

2. truncated iterator isn't reexpanded
3. iterator isn't reverted on blkdev_direct_IO() error
4. zero size read no longer skips atime update

Fixes: ceaa762 ("block: move direct_IO into our own read_iter handler")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201100420.25875-1-idryomov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
 into HEAD

KVM/riscv fixes for 5.17, take #1

- Rework guest entry logic

- Make CY, TM, and IR counters accessible in VU mode

- Fix SBI implementation version
If we're doing an uncached read of the directory, then we ideally want
to read only the exact set of entries that will fit in the buffer
supplied by the getdents() system call. So unlike the case where we're
reading into the page cache, let's send only one READDIR call, before
trying to fill up the buffer.

Fixes: 35df59d ("NFS: Reduce number of RPC calls when doing uncached readdir")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Ensure that we initialise desc->cache_entry_index correctly in
uncached_readdir().

Fixes: d1bacf9 ("NFS: add readdir cache array")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
If we've reached the end of the directory, then cache that information
in the context so that we don't need to do an uncached readdir in order
to rediscover that fact.

Fixes: 794092c ("NFS: Do uncached readdir when we're seeking a cookie in an empty page cache")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on
error, so it is better to check the return value of it.

Fixes: 3323eec ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so
remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory.

Fixes: 4af4662 ("integrity: IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit c2426d2 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter
ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template
variable to avoid multiple template selection.

Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the
ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes
attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with
ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored.

Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable
template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash=
are not ignored.

Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize
the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called.

Reported-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c2426d2 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy
rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and
rule == NULL.

Fixes: 483ec26 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The recv path of secure mode is intertwined with that of crc mode.
While it's slightly more efficient that way (the ciphertext is read
into the destination buffer and decrypted in place, thus avoiding
two potentially heavy memory allocations for the bounce buffer and
the corresponding sg array), it isn't really amenable to changes.
Sacrifice that edge and align with the send path which always uses
a full-sized bounce buffer (currently there is no other way -- if
the kernel crypto API ever grows support for streaming (piecewise)
en/decryption for GCM [1], we would be able to easily take advantage
of that on both sides).

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20141225202830.GA18794@gondor.apana.org.au/

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Both msgr1 and msgr2 in crc mode are zero copy in the sense that
message data is read from the socket directly into the destination
buffer.  We assume that the destination buffer is stable (i.e. remains
unchanged while it is being read to) though.  Otherwise, CRC errors
ensue:

  libceph: read_partial_message 0000000048edf8ad data crc 1063286393 != exp. 228122706
  libceph: osd1 (1)192.168.122.1:6843 bad crc/signature

  libceph: bad data crc, calculated 57958023, expected 1805382778
  libceph: osd2 (2)192.168.122.1:6876 integrity error, bad crc

Introduce rxbounce option to enable use of a bounce buffer when
receiving message data.  In particular this is needed if a mapped
image is a Windows VM disk, passed to QEMU.  Windows has a system-wide
"dummy" page that may be mapped into the destination buffer (potentially
more than once into the same buffer) by the Windows Memory Manager in
an effort to generate a single large I/O [1][2].  QEMU makes a point of
preserving overlap relationships when cloning I/O vectors, so krbd gets
exposed to this behaviour.

[1] "What Is Really in That MDL?"
    https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn614012(v=vs.85)
[2] https://blogs.msmvps.com/kernelmustard/2005/05/04/dummy-pages/

URL: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1973317
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
We're missing the `f` prefix to have python do string interpolation, so
we'd never end up printing what the actual "unexpected" error is.

Fixes: ee92ed3 ("kunit: add run_checks.py script to validate kunit changes")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Leon reported NULL pointer deref with nowait support:

[   15.123761] device-mapper: raid: Loading target version 1.15.1
[   15.124185] device-mapper: raid: Ignoring chunk size parameter for RAID 1
[   15.124192] device-mapper: raid: Choosing default region size of 4MiB
[   15.129524] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060
[   15.129530] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[   15.129533] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[   15.129535] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   15.129538] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   15.129541] CPU: 5 PID: 494 Comm: ldmtool Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-1-mainline #1 9fe89d43dfcb215d2731e6f8851740520778615e
[   15.129546] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS ELITE/X570 AORUS ELITE, BIOS F36e 10/14/2021
[   15.129549] RIP: 0010:blk_queue_flag_set+0x7/0x20
[   15.129555] Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 35 e4 e0 04 02 48 8d 57 28 bf 40 01 \
       00 00 e9 16 c1 be ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 ff <f0> 48 0f ab 7e 60 \
       31 f6 89 f7 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
[   15.129559] RSP: 0018:ffff966b81987a88 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   15.129562] RAX: ffff8b11c363a0d0 RBX: ffff8b11e294b070 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   15.129564] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000001d
[   15.129566] RBP: ffff8b11e294b058 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   15.129568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b11e294b070
[   15.129570] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8b11e294b000 R15: 0000000000000001
[   15.129572] FS:  00007fa96e826780(0000) GS:ffff8b18deb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   15.129575] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   15.129577] CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000010b8ce000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[   15.129580] Call Trace:
[   15.129582]  <TASK>
[   15.129584]  md_run+0x67c/0xc70 [md_mod 1e470c1b6bcf1114198109f42682f5a2740e9531]
[   15.129597]  raid_ctr+0x134a/0x28ea [dm_raid 6a645dd7519e72834bd7e98c23497eeade14cd63]
[   15.129604]  ? dm_split_args+0x63/0x150 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e]
[   15.129615]  dm_table_add_target+0x188/0x380 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e]
[   15.129625]  table_load+0x13b/0x370 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e]
[   15.129635]  ? dev_suspend+0x2d0/0x2d0 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e]
[   15.129644]  ctl_ioctl+0x1bd/0x460 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e]
[   15.129655]  dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x20 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e]
[   15.129663]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8e/0xd0
[   15.129667]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[   15.129672]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x23/0x50
[   15.129675]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
[   15.129677]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
[   15.129679]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x23/0x50
[   15.129682]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
[   15.129684]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
[   15.129686]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[   15.129689] RIP: 0033:0x7fa96ecd559b
[   15.129692] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c \
    c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff \
    ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a5 a8 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[   15.129696] RSP: 002b:00007ffcaf85c258 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[   15.129699] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa96f1b48f0 RCX: 00007fa96ecd559b
[   15.129701] RDX: 00007fa97017e610 RSI: 00000000c138fd09 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   15.129702] RBP: 00007fa96ebab583 R08: 00007fa97017c9e0 R09: 00007ffcaf85bf27
[   15.129704] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fa97017e610
[   15.129706] R13: 00007fa97017e640 R14: 00007fa97017e6c0 R15: 00007fa97017e530
[   15.129709]  </TASK>

This is caused by missing mddev->queue check for setting QUEUE_FLAG_NOWAIT
Fix this by moving the QUEUE_FLAG_NOWAIT logic to under mddev->queue check.

Fixes: f51d46d ("md: add support for REQ_NOWAIT")
Reported-by: Leon Möller <jkhsjdhjs@totally.rip>
Tested-by: Leon Möller <jkhsjdhjs@totally.rip>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vverma@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
This will be used to help make decisions on what to do in
misconfigured systems.

v2: squash in semicolon fix from Stephen Rothwell

Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 25, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 28, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 30, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 30, 2025
On pSeries, when user attempts to use the same vfio container used by
different iommu group, the spapr_tce_set_window() returns -EPERM
and the subsequent cleanup leads to the below crash.

   Kernel attempted to read user page (308) - exploit attempt?
   BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000308
   Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001ce358
   Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
   NIP:  c0000000001ce358 LR: c0000000001ce05c CTR: c00000000005add0
   <snip>
   NIP [c0000000001ce358] spapr_tce_unset_window+0x3b8/0x510
   LR [c0000000001ce05c] spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510
   Call Trace:
     spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510 (unreliable)
     tce_iommu_attach_group+0x24c/0x340 [vfio_iommu_spapr_tce]
     vfio_container_attach_group+0xec/0x240 [vfio]
     vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x548/0xb00 [vfio]
     sys_ioctl+0x754/0x1580
     system_call_exception+0x13c/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
   <snip>
   --- interrupt: 3000

Fix this by having null check for the tbl passed to the
spapr_tce_unset_window().

Fixes: f431a8c ("powerpc/iommu: Reimplement the iommu_table_group_ops for pSeries")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vaishnavi Bhat <vaish123@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <sbhat@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/173674009556.1559.12487885286848752833.stgit@linux.ibm.com
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 30, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 1, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
Packets handled by hardware have added secpath as a way to inform XFRM
core code that this path was already handled. That secpath is not needed
at all after policy is checked and it is removed later in the stack.

However, in the case of IP forwarding is enabled (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward),
that secpath is not removed and packets which already were handled are reentered
to the driver TX path with xfrm_offload set.

The following kernel panic is observed in mlx5 in such case:

 mlx5_core 0000:04:00.0 enp4s0f0np0: Link up
 mlx5_core 0000:04:00.1 enp4s0f1np1: Link up
 Initializing XFRM netlink socket
 IPsec XFRM device driver
 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-alex #3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf
 RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00
 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00
 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  ? show_regs+0x63/0x70
  ? __die_body+0x20/0x60
  ? __die+0x2b/0x40
  ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x550
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3ed/0x870
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x190
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
  mlx5e_ipsec_handle_tx_skb+0xe7/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_xmit+0x58e/0x1980 [mlx5_core]
  ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0
  dev_hard_start_xmit+0x82/0x1d0
  sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x390
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d8/0xee0
  ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0
  ? internal_add_timer+0x48/0x70
  ? mod_timer+0xe2/0x2b0
  neigh_resolve_output+0x115/0x1b0
  __neigh_update+0x26a/0xc50
  neigh_update+0x14/0x20
  arp_process+0x2cb/0x8e0
  ? __napi_build_skb+0x5e/0x70
  arp_rcv+0x11e/0x1c0
  ? dev_gro_receive+0x574/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1cf/0x1f0
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x183/0x2a0
  napi_complete_done+0x76/0x1c0
  mlx5e_napi_poll+0x234/0x7a0 [mlx5_core]
  __napi_poll+0x2d/0x1f0
  net_rx_action+0x1a6/0x370
  ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50
  ? irq_int_handler+0x15/0x20 [mlx5_core]
  handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x2f0
  ? handle_irq_event+0x44/0x60
  irq_exit_rcu+0xdb/0x100
  common_interrupt+0x98/0xc0
  </IRQ>
  <TASK>
  asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40
 RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10
 Code: 09 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 22
 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 7f e9 36 00 fb
40 00 83 ff 07 77 21 89 ff ff 24 fd 88 3d a1 bd 0f 21 f8
 RSP: 0018:ffffffffbe603de8 EFLAGS: 00000202
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000f92f46680
 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000000518d4
 RBP: ffffffffbe603df0 R08: 000000cd42e4dffb R09: ffffffffbe603d70
 R10: 0000004d80d62680 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffbe60bf40
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffbe60aff8
  ? default_idle+0x9/0x20
  arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0x10
  default_idle_call+0x29/0xf0
  do_idle+0x1f2/0x240
  cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30
  rest_init+0xe7/0x100
  start_kernel+0x76b/0xb90
  x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
  x86_64_start_kernel+0xc0/0x110
  ? setup_ghcb+0xe/0x130
  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 xfrm_interface
xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 xfrm_user xfrm_algo binfmt_misc
intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm input_leds serio_raw
qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc
scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456
async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx
libcrc32c raid1 raid0 mlx5_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3
sha1_ssse3 ahci mlxfw i2c_i801 libahci i2c_mux i2c_smbus psample
virtio_rng pci_hyperv_intf aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf
 RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00
 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00
 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
 Kernel Offset: 0x3b800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Fixes: 5958372 ("xfrm: add RX datapath protection for IPsec packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Cassen <acassen@corp.free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
On some systems, the same CPU (with the same APIC ID) is assigned a
different logical CPU id after commit ec9aedb ("x86/acpi: Ignore
invalid x2APIC entries").

This means that Linux enumerates the CPUs in a different order, which
violates ACPI specification[1] that states:

  "OSPM should initialize processors in the order that they appear in
   the MADT"

The problematic commit parses all LAPIC entries before any x2APIC
entries, aiming to ignore x2APIC entries with APIC ID < 255 when valid
LAPIC entries exist. However, it disrupts the CPU enumeration order on
systems where x2APIC entries precede LAPIC entries in the MADT.

Fix this problem by:

 1) Parsing LAPIC entries first without registering them in the
    topology to evaluate whether valid LAPIC entries exist.

 2) Restoring the MADT in order parser which invokes either the LAPIC
    or the X2APIC parser function depending on the entry type.

The X2APIC parser still ignores entries < 0xff in case that #1 found
valid LAPIC entries independent of their position in the MADT table.

Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#madt-processor-local-apic-sapic-structure-entry-order
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241010213136.668672-1-jmattson@google.com/
Fixes: ec9aedb ("x86/acpi: Ignore invalid x2APIC entries")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250117081420.4046737-1-rui.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load #1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load #2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load #2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load #2 is not
executed until load #1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <rlance@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    #10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory
reclaim.  If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger
watchdog.

watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0
Call Trace:
	_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40
	folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90
	folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150
	lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40
	process_one_work+0x17d/0x350
	worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
	kthread+0xe8/0x120
	ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
	ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

lruvec->lru_lock owner:

PID: 2865     TASK: ffff888139214d40  CPU: 40   COMMAND: "kswapd0"
 #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555
 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171
 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920
 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4
 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde
    [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403]
    RIP: ffffffffa597df53  RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60  RCX: ffffea04a2196f88
    RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60  RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60  RDI: ffffea04a2197048
    RBP: ffff88812cbd3010   R8: ffffea04a2197008   R9: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffffea04a2197008
    R13: ffffea04a2197048  R14: ffffc90006fb7de8  R15: 0000000003e3e937
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    <NMI exception stack>
 #5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53
 #6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788
 #7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0
 #8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354
 #9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238
crash>

Scenario:
User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active.
Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area.
Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached.
However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from
the ZONE_NORMAL area.

Reproduce:
Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon).
mkdir /tmp/memory
mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M
tail /tmp/memory/block

Terminal 2:
vmstat -a 1
active will increase.
procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ...
 r  b   swpd   free  inact active   si   so    bi    bo
 1  0   0 1445623076 45898836 83646008    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 43450228 86094616    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 41003480 88541364    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 38557088 90987756    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 36109688 93435156    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619552 33663256 95881632    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 31217140 98327792    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 28769988 100774944    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 26322348 103222584    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 23875592 105669340    0    0     0

cat /proc/meminfo | head
Active(anon) increase.
MemTotal:       1579941036 kB
MemFree:        1445618500 kB
MemAvailable:   1453013224 kB
Buffers:            6516 kB
Cached:         128653956 kB
SwapCached:            0 kB
Active:         118110812 kB
Inactive:       11436620 kB
Active(anon):   115345744 kB
Inactive(anon):   945292 kB

When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers
the ZONE_DMA32 watermark.

perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR
perf script
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2
nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0
nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844
nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844
nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29
nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0
nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon

See nr_scanned=28835844.
28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB.

If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers
the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur.

In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup.
Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB.

   [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53
    ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000
    ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8
    ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48
    ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937
    ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000

About the Fixes:
Why did it take eight years to be discovered?

The problem requires the following conditions to occur:
1. The device memory should be large enough.
2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area.
3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark.

If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32
area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect.

notes:
The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL,
but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241119060842.274072-1-liuye@kylinos.cn
Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis")
Signed-off-by: liuye <liuye@kylinos.cn>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
Prevent double queueing of implicit ODP mr destroy work by using
__xa_cmpxchg() to make sure this is the only time we are destroying this
specific mr.

Without this change, we could try to invalidate this mr twice, which in
turn could result in queuing a MR work destroy twice, and eventually the
second work could execute after the MR was freed due to the first work,
causing a user after free and trace below.

   refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
   WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12178 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
   Modules linked in: bonding ib_ipoib vfio_pci ip_gre geneve nf_tables ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ipip tunnel4 ib_umad rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 mlx5_ib vfio ib_uverbs mlx5_core iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
   CPU: 2 PID: 12178 Comm: kworker/u20:5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1_net_next_mlx5_58c644e #1
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
   Workqueue: events_unbound free_implicit_child_mr_work [mlx5_ib]
   RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
   Code: 48 c7 c7 38 95 2a 82 c6 05 bc c6 fe 00 01 e8 0c 66 aa ff 0f 0b 5b c3 48 c7 c7 e0 94 2a 82 c6 05 a7 c6 fe 00 01 e8 f5 65 aa ff <0f> 0b 5b c3 90 8b 07 3d 00 00 00 c0 74 12 83 f8 01 74 13 8d 50 ff
   RSP: 0018:ffff8881008e3e40 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
   RDX: ffff88852c91b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88852c91b5c0
   RBP: ffff8881dacd4e00 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000019
   R10: 000000000000072e R11: 0000000063666572 R12: ffff88812bfd9e00
   R13: ffff8881c792d200 R14: ffff88810011c005 R15: ffff8881002099c0
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00007f5694b5e000 CR3: 00000001153f6003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    ? refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
    free_implicit_child_mr_work+0x180/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib]
    process_one_work+0x1cc/0x3c0
    worker_thread+0x218/0x3c0
    kthread+0xc6/0xf0
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
    </TASK>

Fixes: 5256edc ("RDMA/mlx5: Rework implicit ODP destroy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/c96b8645a81085abff739e6b06e286a350d1283d.1737274283.git.leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <phaddad@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
The following failure was reported on HPE ProLiant D320:

[   10.693310][    T1] tpm_tis STM0925:00: 2.0 TPM (device-id 0x3, rev-id 0)
[   10.848132][    T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   10.853559][    T1] WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4727 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[   10.862827][    T1] Modules linked in:
[   10.866671][    T1] CPU: 59 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-lp155.2.g52785e2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 588cd98293a7c9eba9013378d807364c088c9375
[   10.882741][    T1] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL320 Gen12/ProLiant DL320 Gen12, BIOS 1.20 10/28/2024
[   10.892170][    T1] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[   10.898103][    T1] Code: 24 08 e9 4a fe ff ff e8 34 36 fa ff e9 88 fe ff ff 83 fe 0a 0f 86 b3 fd ff ff 80 3d 01 e7 ce 01 00 75 09 c6 05 f8 e6 ce 01 01 <0f> 0b 45 31 ff e9 e5 fe ff ff f7 c2 00 00 08 00 75 42 89 d9 80 e1
[   10.917750][    T1] RSP: 0000:ffffb7cf40077980 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   10.923777][    T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000040cc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   10.931727][    T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000040cc0

The above transcript shows that ACPI pointed a 16 MiB buffer for the log
events because RSI maps to the 'order' parameter of __alloc_pages_noprof().
Address the bug by moving from devm_kmalloc() to devm_add_action() and
kvmalloc() and devm_add_action().

Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.16+
Fixes: 55a82ab ("[PATCH] tpm: add bios measurement log")
Reported-by: Andy Liang <andy.liang@hpe.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219495
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Tested-by: Andy Liang <andy.liang@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
In commit e4b5ccd ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL
after job completion"), we introduced a change to assign the job pointer
to NULL after completing a job, indicating job completion.

However, this approach created a race condition between the DRM
scheduler workqueue and the IRQ execution thread. As soon as the fence is
signaled in the IRQ execution thread, a new job starts to be executed.
This results in a race condition where the IRQ execution thread sets the
job pointer to NULL simultaneously as the `run_job()` function assigns
a new job to the pointer.

This race condition can lead to a NULL pointer dereference if the IRQ
execution thread sets the job pointer to NULL after `run_job()` assigns
it to the new job. When the new job completes and the GPU emits an
interrupt, `v3d_irq()` is triggered, potentially causing a crash.

[  466.310099] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000c0
[  466.318928] Mem abort info:
[  466.321723]   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[  466.325479]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[  466.330807]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[  466.333864]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[  466.337010]   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[  466.341900] Data abort info:
[  466.344783]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[  466.350285]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[  466.355350]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[  466.360677] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000089772000
[  466.367140] [00000000000000c0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[  466.375875] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  466.382163] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep binfmt_misc vc4 snd_soc_hdmi_codec drm_display_helper cec brcmfmac_wcc spidev rpivid_hevc(C) drm_client_lib brcmfmac hci_uart drm_dma_helper pisp_be btbcm brcmutil snd_soc_core aes_ce_blk v4l2_mem2mem bluetooth aes_ce_cipher snd_compress videobuf2_dma_contig ghash_ce cfg80211 gf128mul snd_pcm_dmaengine videobuf2_memops ecdh_generic sha2_ce ecc videobuf2_v4l2 snd_pcm v3d sha256_arm64 rfkill videodev snd_timer sha1_ce libaes gpu_sched snd videobuf2_common sha1_generic drm_shmem_helper mc rp1_pio drm_kms_helper raspberrypi_hwmon spi_bcm2835 gpio_keys i2c_brcmstb rp1 raspberrypi_gpiomem rp1_mailbox rp1_adc nvmem_rmem uio_pdrv_genirq uio i2c_dev drm ledtrig_pattern drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight fuse dm_mod ip_tables x_tables ipv6
[  466.458429] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2008 Comm: chromium Tainted: G         C         6.13.0-v8+ #18
[  466.467336] Tainted: [C]=CRAP
[  466.470306] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT)
[  466.476157] pstate: 404000c9 (nZcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[  466.483143] pc : v3d_irq+0x118/0x2e0 [v3d]
[  466.487258] lr : __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x228
[  466.492327] sp : ffffffc080003ea0
[  466.495646] x29: ffffffc080003ea0 x28: ffffff80c0c94200 x27: 0000000000000000
[  466.502807] x26: ffffffd08dd81d7b x25: ffffff80c0c94200 x24: ffffff8003bdc200
[  466.509969] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000000000a7 x21: 0000000000000000
[  466.517130] x20: ffffff8041bb0000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000
[  466.524291] x17: ffffffafadfb0000 x16: ffffffc080000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[  466.531452] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[  466.538613] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffd08c527eb0
[  466.545777] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[  466.552941] x5 : ffffffd08c4100d0 x4 : ffffffafadfb0000 x3 : ffffffc080003f70
[  466.560102] x2 : ffffffc0829e8058 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000
[  466.567263] Call trace:
[  466.569711]  v3d_irq+0x118/0x2e0 [v3d] (P)
[  466.573826]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x228
[  466.578546]  handle_irq_event+0x54/0xb8
[  466.582391]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xac/0x240
[  466.586498]  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x34/0x58
[  466.591128]  gic_handle_irq+0x48/0xd8
[  466.594798]  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58
[  466.598730]  do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98
[  466.602923]  el0_interrupt+0x44/0xc0
[  466.606508]  __el0_irq_handler_common+0x18/0x28
[  466.611050]  el0t_64_irq_handler+0x10/0x20
[  466.615156]  el0t_64_irq+0x198/0x1a0
[  466.618740] Code: 52800035 3607faf3 f9442e80 52800021 (f9406018)
[  466.624853] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  466.629483] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
[  466.636384] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[  466.640320] Kernel Offset: 0x100c400000 from 0xffffffc080000000
[  466.646259] PHYS_OFFSET: 0x0
[  466.649141] CPU features: 0x100,00000170,00901250,0200720b
[  466.654644] Memory Limit: none
[  466.657706] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Fix the crash by assigning the job pointer to NULL before signaling the
fence. This ensures that the job pointer is cleared before any new job
starts execution, preventing the race condition and the NULL pointer
dereference crash.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e4b5ccd ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL after job completion")
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jose Maria Casanova Crespo <jmcasanova@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Iago Toral Quiroga <itoral@igalia.com>
Tested-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250123012403.20447-1-mcanal@igalia.com
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
When testing the atomic write fix patches, the f2fs_bug_on was
triggered as below:

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:935!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00033-gc283a70d3497 #5
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x65/0xb0
 ? die+0x9f/0xc0
 ? do_trap+0xa1/0x170
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? handle_invalid_op+0x65/0x80
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x39/0x50
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
 ? __pfx_f2fs_get_dquots+0x10/0x10
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x2e5/0x520
 evict+0x186/0x2f0
 prune_icache_sb+0x75/0xb0
 super_cache_scan+0x1a8/0x200
 do_shrink_slab+0x163/0x320
 shrink_slab+0x2fc/0x470
 drop_slab+0x82/0xf0
 drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x4e/0xb0
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x183/0x280
 vfs_write+0x36d/0x450
 ksys_write+0x68/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x1a0
 ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11/0x60
 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0xa0

The root cause is: f2fs uses FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED to indicate dirty
atomic files during commit. If the inode is dirtied during commit,
such as by f2fs_i_pino_write, the vfs inode keeps clean and the
f2fs inode is set to FI_DIRTY_INODE. The FI_DIRTY_INODE flag cann't
be cleared by write_inode later due to the clean vfs inode. Finally,
f2fs_bug_on is triggered due to this inconsistent state when evict.

To reproduce this situation:
- fd = open("/mnt/test.db", O_WRONLY)
- ioctl(fd, F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE)
- mv /mnt/test.db /mnt/test1.db
- ioctl(fd, F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE)
- echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches

To fix this problem, clear FI_DIRTY_INODE after commit, then
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync will ensure a consistent dirty state.

Fixes: fccaa81 ("f2fs: prevent atomic file from being dirtied before commit")
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Jianan Huang <huangjianan@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
…g_info

syz reported:

(syz-executor404,5313,0):ocfs2_truncate_log_append:5874 ERROR: bug
expression: tl_count > ocfs2_truncate_recs_per_inode(osb->sb) ||
tl_count == 0
(syz-executor404,5313,0):ocfs2_truncate_log_append:5874 ERROR: Truncate
record count on #77 invalid wanted 39, actual 2087
------------[ cut here  ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5874!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5313 Comm: syz-executor404 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00299-g11066801dd4b #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_truncate_log_append+0x9a8/0x9c0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5868
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cf16f40 EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: b4b54f1d10640800 RBX: 0000000000000027 RCX: b4b54f1d10640800
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000cf17070 R08: ffffffff8174a14c R09: 1ffff11003f8519a
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1003f8519b R12: 1ffff110085f5f58
R13: ffffff3800000000 R14: 000000000000004d R15: ffff8880438f0008
FS:  00005555722df380(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000002000f000 CR3: 000000004010e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ocfs2_remove_btree_range+0x1303/0x1860 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5789
ocfs2_remove_inode_range+0xff3/0x29f0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1907
ocfs2_reflink_remap_extent fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:4537 [inline]
ocfs2_reflink_remap_blocks+0xcd4/0x1f30 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:4684
ocfs2_remap_file_range+0x5fa/0x8d0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2736
vfs_copy_file_range+0xc07/0x1510 fs/read_write.c:1615
__do_sys_copy_file_range fs/read_write.c:1705 [inline]
__se_sys_copy_file_range+0x3f2/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:1668
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd327167af9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 61 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe6b8e22e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000146
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd3271b005e RCX: 00007fd327167af9
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fd3271de610 R08: 000000000000d8c2 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000640 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffe6b8e24b8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>

The fuzz image has a truncate log inode whose tl_count is bigger than
ocfs2_truncate_recs_per_inode() so it triggers the BUG in
ocfs2_truncate_log_append().

As what the check in ocfs2_truncate_log_append() does, just do same check
into ocfs2_get_truncate_log_info when truncate log inode is reading in so
we can bail out earlier.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250108024119.60313-1-glass.su@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Reported-by: Liebes Wang <wanghaichi0403@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/CADCV8souQhdP0RdQF1U7KTWtuHDfpn+3LnTt-EEuMmB-pMRrgQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#u
Reported-by: syzbot+a66542ca5ebb4233b563@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+a66542ca5ebb4233b563@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 5, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 5, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 6, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 6, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - atomics/load_acquire
  - atomics/store_release
  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  "r1 = 8;"
    #1:  "store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1);"
    #2:  "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
    #3:  "r2 = r10;"
    #4:  "r2 += r1;"	/* mark_precise */
    #5:  "r0 = 0;"
    #6:  "exit;"

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on the pre-defined __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
feature macro, which implies -mcpu>=v4.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 7, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  r1 = 8;
      /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */
    #1:  .8byte %[store_release];
    #2:  r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);
    #3:  r2 = r10;
    #4:  r2 += r1;
    #5:  r0 = 0;
    #6:  exit;

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on #ifdef ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS.  Currently they
only run for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 7, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  r1 = 8;
      /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */
    #1:  .8byte %[store_release];
    #2:  r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);
    #3:  r2 = r10;
    #4:  r2 += r1;
    #5:  r0 = 0;
    #6:  exit;

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on #ifdef ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS.  Currently they
only run for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 7, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  r1 = 8;
      /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */
    #1:  .8byte %[store_release];
    #2:  r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);
    #3:  r2 = r10;
    #4:  r2 += r1;
    #5:  r0 = 0;
    #6:  exit;

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on #ifdef ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS.  Currently they
only run for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  r1 = 8;
      /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */
    #1:  .8byte %[store_release];
    #2:  r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);
    #3:  r2 = r10;
    #4:  r2 += r1;
    #5:  r0 = 0;
    #6:  exit;

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on #ifdef ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS.  Currently they
only run for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
…uctions

Add several ./test_progs tests:

  - arena_atomics/load_acquire
  - arena_atomics/store_release
  - verifier_load_acquire/*
  - verifier_store_release/*
  - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire
  - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release

The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the
new instructions correctly.

Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier
"remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack
slot.  For example, if we take a look at the test program:

    #0:  r1 = 8;
      /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */
    #1:  .8byte %[store_release];
    #2:  r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);
    #3:  r2 = r10;
    #4:  r2 += r1;
    #5:  r0 = 0;
    #6:  exit;

At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack,
then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the
stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected:

  VERIFIER LOG:
  =============
...
  math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed

All new tests depend on #ifdef ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS.  Currently they
only run for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
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