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27 changes: 0 additions & 27 deletions CHANGELOG.md

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3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions LICENSE
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MIT

Copyright (c) 2023 Lúcás C. Meier
Copyright (c) 2025 NEAR One Limited

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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72 changes: 70 additions & 2 deletions README.md
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# MPC Threshold Signatures
This repo contains implementations of Cait-Sith and FROST, used by the [MPC node](https://github.com/near/mpc) to compute threshold signatures.
# Threshold Signatures
This repository offers cryptographic implementations of **threshold ECDSA** and **threshold EdDSA**. Prior to [PR#15](https://github.com/near/threshold-signatures/pull/15), the implementation had undergone professional <ins>audit</ins>.

The ECDSA code implements an OT-based threshold protocol and a Secret-Sharing based one. The former
is originally imported from the [Cait-Sith](https://github.com/cronokirby/cait-sith) library and amended to meet our industrial needs. This includes modifying parts of the code to improve the performance, augment the security, and generalize functions' syntax. The latter however is implemented from scratch and follows \[[DJNPØ](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/501)\]

The EdDSA implementation is mainly a wrapper of the [Frost](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/frost) signing functions instantiated with Curve25519.

# Code organization

The repository provides implementations for both ECDSA and EdDSA.
Each signature scheme has its own repository that implements it, namely, `src/ecdsa` and `src/eddsa`.
Additionally `src/crypto` implements generic mathematical and cryptographic tools used for both schemes such as polynomial manipulations, randomness generation, commitment schemes, etc... `src/crypto/proofs` implements \[[Mau09](https://crypto.ethz.ch/publications/files/Maurer09.pdf)\] proofs for discrete logarithms, and `src/protocol` allows defining participants, communication channels, asynchronous functions that run and test the protocol and reliable broadcast channel.
Some additional files are found in `src`. `src/participants.rs` provides complex structures related to participants mainly based on hash maps and `src/generic_dkg.rs` implements a distributed key generation (DKG) that is agnostic of the curve.

# Important Technical Details
## Threshold ECDSA Functionalities
The threshold ECDSA scheme is implemented over curve Secp256k1.
The following functionalities are provided:
1) **Distributed Key Generation (DKG)**: allows multiple parties to each generate its own secret key shares and a corresponding master public key.
2) **Key Resharing**: allows multiple parties to reshare their keys adding new members or kicking old members. If the sets of new/old participants is the same, then we talk about *key refreshing*.
3) **Beaver Triple Generation (offline)**: Allows the distributive generation of multiplicative (Beaver) triples $(a,b,c)$ and their commitments $(A, B, C)$ where
$c = a\cdot b$ and where $(A,B,C) = (g^a, g^b, g^c)$. These triples are essential for creating the presignatures.
4) **Presigning (offline)**: Allows generating some presignatures during an offline signing phase that will be consumed during the online signing phase when the message to be signed is known to the signers.
5) **Signing (online)**: Corresponds to the online signing phase in which the signing parties produce a valid signature

## Threshold EdDSA Functionalities
The threshold EdDSA scheme is implemented over curve
Curve25519. We refer to such scheme as Ed25519.
The following functionalities are provided:
1) **Distributed Key Generation (DKG)**: Same as in ECDSA.
2) **Key Resharing**: Same as in ECDSA.
3) **Signing (online)**: Threshold EdDSA is generally more efficient than threshold ECDSA due to the mathematical formula behind the signature computation. Our Ed25519 implementation does not necessitate an offline phase of computation.

## Comments

* We do not implement any verification algorithm. In fact, a party possessing the message-signature pair can simply run the verification algorithm of the corresponding classic, non-distributed scheme using the master verification key.

* Both implemented ECDSA and EdDSA schemes do not currently provide **Robustness** i.e. recovery in case a participants drops out during presigning/signing.

* Our ECDSA signing scheme outsources the message hash to the function caller (i.e. expects a hashed message as input and does not internally hash the input). However, our EdDSA implementation does not outsource the message hashing instead internally performs the message hash. This distinction is an artifact of the multiple different verifiers implemented in the wild where some might perform a "double hashing" and others not.
(See \[[PoeRas24](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-57718-5_10)\] for an in-depth security study of ECDSA with outsourced hashing).

* This implementation allows arbitrary number of parties and thresholds as long as the latter verifies some basic requirements (see the [documentation](docs/ecdsa/orchestration.md)). However, it is worth mentioning that the ECDSA scheme scales non-efficiently with the number of participants (Benchmarks to be added soon).

* **🚨 Important 🚨:** Our DKG/Resharing protocol is the same for both ECDSA and EdDSA except the underlying elliptic curve instantiation. Internally, this DKG makes use of a reliable broadcast channel implemented for asynchronous peer-to-peer communication. Due to a fundamental impossibility theorem for asynchronous broadcast channel, our DKG/Resharing protocol can only tolerate $n/3$ malicious parties where $n$ is the total number of parties.

# Build and Test
Building the crate is fairly simple using
``cargo build``.

Run ``cargo test`` to run all the built-in test cases. Some of the tests might take some time to run as they require running complex protocols with multiple participants at once.

# Benchmarks
* Benchmarks with 8 nodes -- TODO: https://github.com/near/threshold-signatures/issues/8

# Acknowledgements
This implementation relies on
[Cait-Sith](https://github.com/cronokirby/cait-sith) and
[Frost](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/frost) and was possible thanks to contributors that actively put this together:
<center>
Mårten Blankfors<br>
Robin Cheng<br>
Reynaldo Gil Pons<br>
Chelsea Komlo<br>
George Kuska<br>
Matej Pavlovic<br>
Simon Rastikian<br>
Bowen Wang<br>
</center>
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