forked from monero-project/monero
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
MMS: Test PR against master, with diff display problem #1
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
To help protect one's privacy from traffic volume analysis for people using Tor or I2P. This will really fly once we relay txes on a timer rather than on demand, though. Off by default for now since it's wasteful and doesn't bring anything until I2P's in.
This reverts commit 7f8bdeb.
Turns out getting the global shared_ptr hits the profile, and passing it around still keeps it at close to ~1% CPU, which is too much for mostly silent logging. Leak the object instead, which is even safer for late logging.
Some of the inputs for block in a span will be from other earlier blocks in that span. Keep track of those outputs so we don't have to look them up again after those early blocks are added to the blockchain.
Only for pre rct for obvious reasons. Note: DO NOT use a known spent list which includes outputs which are not known spent. If the list includes any output that's just strongly thought to be spent, but not provably so, you risk finding yourself unable to sync past the point where that output is spent. I estimate only 200 MB saved on current mainnet though, unless the new blackballing rule unearths a good amount of large-amount-set extra spent outs.
If not present, the tool will scan the blockchain, since scanning for this is fairly fast.
add new public method to Blockchain and update according to code review update after review: better lock/unlock, try catch and coding style
- simple device callback object added. Device can request passphrase/PIN entry via the callback or notify user some action is required - callback is routed to wallet2, which routes the callback to i_wallet_callback so CLI or GUI wallets can support passphrase entry for HW tokens - wallet: device open needs wallet callback first - passphrase protected device needs wallet callback so user can enter passphrase
Ledger does some basic checks on them
This avoids the miner erroring out trying to submit blocks to a core that's already shut down (and avoids pegging the CPU while we're busy shutting down).
Since it's all inline, I suspect the compiler will merge the duplicate stores anyway.
It comes before the logger is initialized, so gets displayed even though it should not be by default, and apparenly comes too early for (some versions of) Android, where it crashes.
So people who want a timstamp get a timestamp
Fixing a build warning on g++ 7.3.0
- adds a new option `--hw-device-deriv-path` to the simple wallet. Enables to specify wallet derivation path / wallet code (path avoided so it can be misinterpreted as a file path). - devices can use different derivation mechanisms. Trezor uses standard SLIP-10 mechanism with fixed SLIP-44 prefix for Monero - Trezor: when empty, the default derivation mechanism is used with 44'/128'/0'. When entered the derivation path is 44'/128'/PATH. - Trezor: the path is always taken as elements are hardened (1<<31 bit turned on)
When doing a first refresh on HW-token based wallet KI sync is required if money were received. Received money may indicate wallet was already used before the restore I.e., some transaction could have been already sent from the wallet. The spent UTXO would not be detected as spent which could lead to double spending errors on submitting a new transaction. Thus if the wallet is HW-token based with the cold signing protocol and the first refresh detected received money the user is asked to perform the key image sync.
…heck - checks if the device is in the correct usable state - implements check for the v2.0.9 firmware which does not support payment IDs - simple transacttion check, payment id fmt consistency - minor fixes, refactoring, webusb session counting fix
3dba7f2 protocol: option to pad transaction relay to the next kB (moneromooo-monero)
d71f89e device/trezor: device/trezor: correct device initialization, status check (Dusan Klinec) 65b9bca device/trezor: python2 compatibility - bundle dependencies (Dusan Klinec) 9cf636a device/trezor: ask for KI sync on first refresh (Dusan Klinec) d21dad7 device: enable to use multiple independent device wallets (Dusan Klinec) 318cc78 device/trezor: passphrase entry on host (Dusan Klinec)
9b5efad simplewallet: enable donation on testnet/stagenet for easier testing (stoffu)
2be31b4 blockchain_blackball: spot when all outputs of an amount are spent (moneromooo-monero)
4f74a31 http -> https (Dimitris Apostolou)
dc1c125 add command pop_blocks (Jason Wong)
5ca4994 rpc: speed up the common get_output_distribution case while syncing (moneromooo-monero)
756684b blockchain: avoid unnecessary DB lookups when syncing (moneromooo-monero)
e98ae34 core: fix adding new pre-hoh block when a tx is already in the pool (moneromooo-monero)
ac66541 ringct: fix dummy bulletproofs on ledger in fake mode (moneromooo-monero)
aba9a9c daemon: stop miner before we bring the whole thing down (moneromooo-monero)
0c5dd31 cryptonote: add a set_null for transaction_prefix (moneromooo-monero)
6456cb4 Bulletproof: Initialize members in default construtor. (Tadeas Moravec)
rbrunner7
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 21, 2020
boost::asio::ssl::context is created using specifically TLSv1.2, which blocks the ability to use superior version of TLS like TLSv1.3. Filtering is also made specially later in the code to remove unsafe version for TLS such SSLv2, SSLv3 etc.. This change is removing double filtering to allow TLSv1.2 and above to be used. testssl.sh 3.0rc5 now reports the following (please note monerod was built with USE_EXTRA_EC_CERT): $ ./testssl.sh --openssl=/usr/bin/openssl \ --each-cipher --cipher-per-proto \ --server-defaults --server-preference \ --vulnerable --heartbleed --ccs --ticketbleed \ --robot --renegotiation --compression --breach \ --poodle --tls-fallback --sweet32 --beast --lucky13 \ --freak --logjam --drown --pfs --rc4 --full \ --wide --hints 127.0.0.1:38081 Using "OpenSSL 1.1.1d 10 Sep 2019" [~80 ciphers] on ip-10-97-15-6:/usr/bin/openssl (built: "Dec 3 21:14:51 2019", platform: "linux-x86_64") Start 2019-12-03 21:51:25 -->> 127.0.0.1:38081 (127.0.0.1) <<-- rDNS (127.0.0.1): -- Service detected: HTTP Testing protocols via sockets except NPN+ALPN SSLv2 not offered (OK) SSLv3 not offered (OK) TLS 1 not offered TLS 1.1 not offered TLS 1.2 offered (OK) TLS 1.3 offered (OK): final NPN/SPDY not offered ALPN/HTTP2 not offered Testing for server implementation bugs No bugs found. Testing cipher categories NULL ciphers (no encryption) not offered (OK) Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication) not offered (OK) Export ciphers (w/o ADH+NULL) not offered (OK) LOW: 64 Bit + DES, RC[2,4] (w/o export) not offered (OK) Triple DES Ciphers / IDEA not offered (OK) Average: SEED + 128+256 Bit CBC ciphers not offered Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) offered (OK) Testing robust (perfect) forward secrecy, (P)FS -- omitting Null Authentication/Encryption, 3DES, RC4 PFS is offered (OK), ciphers follow (client/browser support is important here) Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x1302 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 x1303 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 xc030 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 xc02c ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 xcca9 ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 xcca8 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 x1301 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 xc02f ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 xc02b ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Elliptic curves offered: prime256v1 secp384r1 secp521r1 X25519 X448 Testing server preferences Has server cipher order? yes (OK) Negotiated protocol TLSv1.3 Negotiated cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Cipher order TLSv1.2: ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.3: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Testing server defaults (Server Hello) TLS extensions (standard) "renegotiation info/#65281" "EC point formats/monero-project#11" "supported versions/monero-project#43" "key share/monero-project#51" "max fragment length/#1" "extended master secret/monero-project#23" Session Ticket RFC 5077 hint no -- no lifetime advertised SSL Session ID support yes Session Resumption Tickets no, ID: no TLS clock skew Random values, no fingerprinting possible Server Certificate #1 (in response to request w/o SNI) Signature Algorithm SHA256 with RSA Server key size RSA 4096 bits Server key usage -- Server extended key usage -- Serial / Fingerprints 01 / SHA1 132E42981812F5575FA0AE64922B18A81B38C03F SHA256 EBA3CC4AA09DEF26706E64A70DB4BC8D723533BB67EAE12B503A845019FB61DC Common Name (CN) (no CN field in subject) subjectAltName (SAN) missing (NOT ok) -- Browsers are complaining Issuer Trust (hostname) certificate does not match supplied URI Chain of trust NOT ok (self signed) EV cert (experimental) no "eTLS" (visibility info) not present Certificate Validity (UTC) 181 >= 60 days (2019-12-03 21:51 --> 2020-06-02 21:51) # of certificates provided 1 Certificate Revocation List -- OCSP URI -- NOT ok -- neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided OCSP stapling not offered OCSP must staple extension -- DNS CAA RR (experimental) not offered Certificate Transparency -- Server Certificate #2 (in response to request w/o SNI) Signature Algorithm ECDSA with SHA256 Server key size EC 256 bits Server key usage -- Server extended key usage -- Serial / Fingerprints 01 / SHA1 E17B765DD8124525B1407E827B89A31FB167647D SHA256 AFB7F44B1C33831F521357E5AEEB813044CB02532143E92D35650A3FF792A7C3 Common Name (CN) (no CN field in subject) subjectAltName (SAN) missing (NOT ok) -- Browsers are complaining Issuer Trust (hostname) certificate does not match supplied URI Chain of trust NOT ok (self signed) EV cert (experimental) no "eTLS" (visibility info) not present Certificate Validity (UTC) 181 >= 60 days (2019-12-03 21:51 --> 2020-06-02 21:51) # of certificates provided 1 Certificate Revocation List -- OCSP URI -- NOT ok -- neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided OCSP stapling not offered OCSP must staple extension -- DNS CAA RR (experimental) not offered Certificate Transparency -- Testing HTTP header response @ "/" HTTP Status Code 404 Not found (Hint: supply a path which doesn't give a "404 Not found") HTTP clock skew Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL? Strict Transport Security not offered Public Key Pinning -- Server banner Epee-based Application banner -- Cookie(s) (none issued at "/") -- maybe better try target URL of 30x Security headers -- Reverse Proxy banner -- Testing vulnerabilities Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) not vulnerable (OK), no heartbeat extension CCS (CVE-2014-0224) not vulnerable (OK) Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244), experiment. not vulnerable (OK), no session ticket extension ROBOT Server does not support any cipher suites that use RSA key transport Secure Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) not vulnerable (OK) Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation not vulnerable (OK) CRIME, TLS (CVE-2012-4929) not vulnerable (OK) BREACH (CVE-2013-3587) no HTTP compression (OK) - only supplied "/" tested POODLE, SSL (CVE-2014-3566) not vulnerable (OK) TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV (RFC 7507) No fallback possible, no protocol below TLS 1.2 offered (OK) SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183, CVE-2016-6329) not vulnerable (OK) FREAK (CVE-2015-0204) not vulnerable (OK) DROWN (CVE-2016-0800, CVE-2016-0703) not vulnerable on this host and port (OK) make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services https://censys.io/ipv4?q=EBA3CC4AA09DEF26706E64A70DB4BC8D723533BB67EAE12B503A845019FB61DC could help you to find out LOGJAM (CVE-2015-4000), experimental not vulnerable (OK): no DH EXPORT ciphers, no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2 BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) no SSL3 or TLS1 (OK) LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental not vulnerable (OK) RC4 (CVE-2013-2566, CVE-2015-2808) no RC4 ciphers detected (OK) Testing ciphers per protocol via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SSLv2 SSLv3 TLS 1 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 xc030 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 xc02c ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 xcca9 ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 xcca8 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 xc02f ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 xc02b ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS 1.3 x1302 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 x1303 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 x1301 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Running client simulations (HTTP) via sockets Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) Forward Secrecy ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Android 4.2.2 No connection Android 4.4.2 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Android 5.0.0 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Android 6.0 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Android 7.0 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Android 8.1 (native) No connection Android 9.0 (native) TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Chrome 65 Win 7 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Chrome 74 (Win 10) No connection Firefox 62 Win 7 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Firefox 66 (Win 8.1/10) TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 253 bit ECDH (X25519) IE 6 XP No connection IE 7 Vista No connection IE 8 Win 7 No connection IE 8 XP No connection IE 11 Win 7 No connection IE 11 Win 8.1 No connection IE 11 Win Phone 8.1 No connection IE 11 Win 10 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Edge 15 Win 10 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Edge 17 (Win 10) TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Opera 60 (Win 10) No connection Safari 9 iOS 9 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Safari 9 OS X 10.11 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Safari 10 OS X 10.12 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Apple ATS 9 iOS 9 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Tor 17.0.9 Win 7 No connection Java 6u45 No connection Java 7u25 No connection Java 8u161 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) Java 9.0.4 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) OpenSSL 1.0.1l TLSv1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) OpenSSL 1.0.2e TLSv1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 256 bit ECDH (P-256) OpenSSL 1.1.0j (Debian) TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 253 bit ECDH (X25519) OpenSSL 1.1.1b (Debian) TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 253 bit ECDH (X25519) Thunderbird (60.6) TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
No description provided.