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quic-viskuma and others added 14 commits May 16, 2025 20:29
Integrate the Qualcomm Commit Emails Check Action to validate the commit's author
and committer email addresses - https://github.com/qualcomm/commit-emails-check-action

Signed-off-by: VISHAL KUMAR <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>
The QCS8300 Camera clock controller is a derivative of SA8775P, but has
few additional clocks and offset differences. Hence, add support for
QCS8300 Camera clock controller by extending the SA8775P CamCC.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Imran Shaik <quic_imrashai@quicinc.com>

Change-Id: I18a9a199a7dfb822279c9dd7aab2ffe69a89e889
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250109-qcs8300-mm-patches-new-v4-0-63e8ac268b02@quicinc.com/
Patch-mainline: linux-clk @ 01/09/25, 14:27
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Hashim <quic_shashim@quicinc.com>
Add the global clock controller support for QCS615 SoC.

Change-Id: I211757d296f64c52264f679aeff02dd6cd872e90
Signed-off-by: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Imran Shaik <quic_imrashai@quicinc.com>
Correct the ngpios entry to account for the UFS_RESET pin being exported
as a GPIO in addition to the real GPIOs, allowing the UFS driver to toggle
it.

Fixes: b698f36 ("pinctrl: qcom: add the tlmm driver for QCS615 platform")
Change-Id: If4c29ae49c23997129673136091f361df697fa42
Signed-off-by: Lijuan Gao <quic_lijuang@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241219-correct_gpio_ranges-v2-3-19af8588dbd0@quicinc.com/
Signed-off-by: Yuanjie Yang <quic_yuanjiey@quicinc.com>
Need email checker on qcom-next-staging branch only

Co-authored-by: Nasser Grainawi <nasser.grainawi@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: VISHAL KUMAR <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Kumar <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>
Includes the following components:
1. aws_s3_helper (composite action):
   - Supports three modes: single-upload, multi-upload, and download
   - Uploads files to S3 with dynamic paths based on GitHub context
   - Generates pre-signed URLs for uploaded files
   - Outputs a single URL or a JSON file of URLs depending on mode
   - Uploads presigned_urls.json as an artifact in multi-upload mode

2. pull_docker_image (composite action):
   - Clone kmake-image repository
   - Build the docker image using kmake-image Dockerfile

3. build (workflow):
   - Uses an AWS runner to build kernel artifacts
   - Uses pull_docker_image to get docker image
   - Builds the kernel using a reusable `build` action
   - Packages and lists key artifacts (Image, vmlinux, dtb, modules)
   - Uploads artifacts to S3 using `aws_s3_helper`
   - Cleans up workspace and appends a build summary

4. build_workspace (composite action):
   - Downloads required dependencies (ramdisk, systemd-boot)
   - Builds the kernel using Docker and outputs modules
   - Packages DLKM into the downloaded ramdisk

5. test_action (composite action):
   - Parses presigned_urls.json to extract artifact URLs
   - Updates metadata.json and cloudData.json using Docker + jq
   - Uploads updated metadata to S3 and injects its URL into cloudData
   - Adds firmware and ramdisk URLs via pre-signed S3 links
   - Generates a LAVA job definition using a Python script,
   qualcomm_linux/job_render repository

6. test (workflow):
   - Uses pull_docker_image to get docker image
   - Download artifact URLs list generated by build workflow
   - Triggers the LAVA job using job definition
   - Gets the LAVA job results

This commit establishes a basic docker-based CI pipeline for kernel builds
and automated artifact handling via AWS S3.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Kumar <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>
… premerge (#9)

Signed-off-by: Vishal Kumar <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: sgaud-quic <sgaud@qti.qualcomm.com>
@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic force-pushed the qcom-next-staging branch from 9c9b99e to 33e7185 Compare May 25, 2025 05:48
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sgaud-quic commented May 25, 2025

Depends on #9

@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic force-pushed the qcom-next-staging branch from 33e7185 to f787833 Compare May 25, 2025 14:16
Signed-off-by: sgaud-quic <sgaud@qti.qualcomm.com>
@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic force-pushed the qcom-next-staging branch 9 times, most recently from 55650df to 7cd7350 Compare May 29, 2025 12:20
@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic force-pushed the qcom-next-staging branch 2 times, most recently from ead7585 to 1de61d1 Compare June 3, 2025 13:34
@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic force-pushed the qcom-next-staging branch 13 times, most recently from a331aac to ba87907 Compare June 6, 2025 02:26
@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic closed this Jun 6, 2025
@sgaud-quic sgaud-quic deleted the sgaud-quic-patch-7 branch June 6, 2025 06:35
sgaud-quic pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 1, 2025
Jann Horn reported a use-after-free in unix_stream_read_generic().

The following sequences reproduce the issue:

  $ python3
  from socket import *
  s1, s2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
  s1.send(b'x', MSG_OOB)
  s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB)     # leave a consumed OOB skb
  s1.send(b'y', MSG_OOB)
  s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB)     # leave a consumed OOB skb
  s1.send(b'z', MSG_OOB)
  s2.recv(1)              # recv 'z' illegally
  s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB)     # access 'z' skb (use-after-free)

Even though a user reads OOB data, the skb holding the data stays on
the recv queue to mark the OOB boundary and break the next recv().

After the last send() in the scenario above, the sk2's recv queue has
2 leading consumed OOB skbs and 1 real OOB skb.

Then, the following happens during the next recv() without MSG_OOB

  1. unix_stream_read_generic() peeks the first consumed OOB skb
  2. manage_oob() returns the next consumed OOB skb
  3. unix_stream_read_generic() fetches the next not-yet-consumed OOB skb
  4. unix_stream_read_generic() reads and frees the OOB skb

, and the last recv(MSG_OOB) triggers KASAN splat.

The 3. above occurs because of the SO_PEEK_OFF code, which does not
expect unix_skb_len(skb) to be 0, but this is true for such consumed
OOB skbs.

  while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) {
    skip -= unix_skb_len(skb);
    skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
    ...
  }

In addition to this use-after-free, there is another issue that
ioctl(SIOCATMARK) does not function properly with consecutive consumed
OOB skbs.

So, nothing good comes out of such a situation.

Instead of complicating manage_oob(), ioctl() handling, and the next
ECONNRESET fix by introducing a loop for consecutive consumed OOB skbs,
let's not leave such consecutive OOB unnecessarily.

Now, while receiving an OOB skb in unix_stream_recv_urg(), if its
previous skb is a consumed OOB skb, it is freed.

[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106ef2904 by task python3/315

CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 315 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-00407-gec315832f6f9 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
 print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521)
 kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:636)
 unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
 unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:2708 net/unix/af_unix.c:2847)
 unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048)
 sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20))
 __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278)
 __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1))
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f8911fcea06
Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fffdb0dccb0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffdb0dcdc8 RCX: 00007f8911fcea06
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f8911a5e060 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fffdb0dccd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f89119a7d20
R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 315:
 kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
 kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
 __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:348)
 kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:250 mm/slub.c:4148 mm/slub.c:4197 mm/slub.c:4249)
 __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:660 (discriminator 4))
 alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1336 net/core/skbuff.c:6668)
 sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2993)
 unix_stream_sendmsg (./include/net/sock.h:1847 net/unix/af_unix.c:2256 net/unix/af_unix.c:2418)
 __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:712 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:2226 (discriminator 20))
 __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2233 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1))
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Freed by task 315:
 kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
 kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
 kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:579 (discriminator 1))
 __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:271)
 kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4643 (discriminator 3) mm/slub.c:4745 (discriminator 3))
 unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:3010)
 unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048)
 sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20))
 __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278)
 __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1))
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106ef28c0
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 68 bytes inside of
 freed 224-byte region [ffff888106ef28c0, ffff888106ef29a0)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106ef3cc0 pfn:0x106ef2
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x200000000000040(head|node=0|zone=2)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004
raw: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004
head: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0200000000000001 ffffea00041bbc81 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888106ef2800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
 ffff888106ef2880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888106ef2900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff888106ef2980: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888106ef2a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: 314001f ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250619041457.1132791-2-kuni1840@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
sgaud-quic pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2025
It is reported that on Acer Nitro V15 suspend only works properly if the
keyboard backlight is turned off. In looking through the issue Acer Nitro
V15 has a GPIO (#8) specified in _AEI but it has no matching notify device
in _EVT. The values for GPIO #8 change as keyboard backlight is turned on
and off.

This makes it seem that GPIO #8 is actually supposed to be solely for
keyboard backlight.  Turning off the interrupt for this GPIO fixes the issue.
Add a quirk that does just that.

Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4169
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <westeri@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
sgaud-quic pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2025
A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack
entry from the hash bucket list:
    [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172]
    [..]
 #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack]
 #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack]
 #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack]
    [..]

The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in
a partially initialised state:

 ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value
 (hence crash).
 ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected
 ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.

Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry.  If we ignore
ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly
allocated but not yet inserted into the hash:
  - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash
  - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow
    rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.

If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED,
__nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.

Theory is that we did hit following race:

cpu x 			cpu y			cpu z
 found entry E		found entry E
 E is expired		<preemption>
 nf_ct_delete()
 return E to rcu slab
					init_conntrack
					E is re-inited,
					ct->status set to 0
					reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev
					stores hash value.

cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x.
E is now re-inited on cpu z.  cpu y was preempted before
checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.

					->refcnt set to 1
					E now owned by skb
					->timeout set to 30000

If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as
expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.

					nf_conntrack_confirm gets called
					sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED
					This is wrong: E is not yet added
					to hashtable.

cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED:
			<resumes>
			nf_ct_expired()
			 -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s)
			confirmed bit set.

cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable:
			nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit
			__nf_ct_delete_from_lists

Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash:
cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:

			wait for spinlock held by z

					CONFIRMED is set but there is no
					guarantee ct will be added to hash:
					"chaintoolong" or "clash resolution"
					logic both skip the insert step.
					reply hnnode.pprev still stores the
					hash value.

					unlocks spinlock
					return NF_DROP
			<unblocks, then
			 crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>

In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink
E again right away but no crash occurs.

Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence:
ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets
destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.

To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table
insertion but before the unlock.

Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen
before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and
before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.

It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right
before the CONFIRMED bit was set:

Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation"
case: the entry will be skipped.

Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.

The gc sequence is:
 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry
 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry.
 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.

nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an
expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes
ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date
instead of a relative time.  Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry.

Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence:

 1. Check if entry has expired.
 2. Obtain a reference.
 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1:
    4 - entry is still observed as expired
    5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU
      and confirm bit gets set
    6 - confirm bit is seen
    7 - valid entry is removed again

First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either
confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for
re-inited conntrack objects.

This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without
commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list")
|= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes.

Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <rzvncj@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20250627142758.25664-1-fw@strlen.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/4239da15-83ff-4ca4-939d-faef283471bb@gmail.com/
Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
sgaud-quic pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2025
[WHAT]
IGT kms_cursor_legacy's long-nonblocking-modeset-vs-cursor-atomic
fails with NULL pointer dereference. This can be reproduced with
both an eDP panel and a DP monitors connected.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 2960 Comm: kms_cursor_lega Not tainted
6.16.0-99-custom #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Hardware name: AMD ........
 RIP: 0010:dc_stream_get_scanoutpos+0x34/0x130 [amdgpu]
 Code: 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 49 89 ce 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49
 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 18 48 8b 87 a0 64 00 00 48 89 75 d0 48 c7 c6 e0 41 30
 c2 <48> 8b 38 48 8b 9f 68 06 00 00 e8 8d d7 fd ff 31 c0 48 81 c3 e0 02
 RSP: 0018:ffffd0f3c2bd7608 EFLAGS: 00010292
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffd0f3c2bd7668
 RDX: ffffd0f3c2bd7664 RSI: ffffffffc23041e0 RDI: ffff8b32494b8000
 RBP: ffffd0f3c2bd7648 R08: ffffd0f3c2bd766c R09: ffffd0f3c2bd7760
 R10: ffffd0f3c2bd7820 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b32494b8000
 R13: ffffd0f3c2bd7664 R14: ffffd0f3c2bd7668 R15: ffffd0f3c2bd766c
 FS:  000071f631b68700(0000) GS:ffff8b399f114000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001b8105000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dm_crtc_get_scanoutpos+0xd7/0x180 [amdgpu]
 amdgpu_display_get_crtc_scanoutpos+0x86/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
 ? __pfx_amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x10/0x10[amdgpu]
 amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x27/0x50 [amdgpu]
 drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp_internal+0xf7/0x400
 drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp+0x1c/0x30
 drm_crtc_get_last_vbltimestamp+0x55/0x90
 drm_crtc_next_vblank_start+0x45/0xa0
 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_fences+0x81/0x1f0
 ...

Cc: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 621e55f)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
sgaud-quic pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 12, 2026
Commit 1767bb2 ("ipv6: mcast: Don't hold RTNL for
IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP.") removed the RTNL lock for
IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP operations. However, this
change triggered the following call trace on my BeagleBone Black board:
  WARNING: net/8021q/vlan_core.c:236 at vlan_for_each+0x120/0x124, CPU#0: rpcbind/496
  RTNL: assertion failed at net/8021q/vlan_core.c (236)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 UID: 997 PID: 496 Comm: rpcbind Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-next-20260122-yocto-standard+ #8 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree)
  Call trace:
   unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x28/0x2c
   show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x30/0x38
   dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xb8/0x11c
   __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x130/0x194
   warn_slowpath_fmt from vlan_for_each+0x120/0x124
   vlan_for_each from cpsw_add_mc_addr+0x54/0xd8
   cpsw_add_mc_addr from __hw_addr_ref_sync_dev+0xc4/0xec
   __hw_addr_ref_sync_dev from __dev_mc_add+0x78/0x88
   __dev_mc_add from igmp6_group_added+0x84/0xec
   igmp6_group_added from __ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x1fc/0x2f0
   __ipv6_dev_mc_inc from __ipv6_sock_mc_join+0x124/0x1b4
   __ipv6_sock_mc_join from do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x84c/0x1168
   do_ipv6_setsockopt from ipv6_setsockopt+0x88/0xc8
   ipv6_setsockopt from do_sock_setsockopt+0xe8/0x19c
   do_sock_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt+0x84/0xac
   __sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x5

This trace occurs because vlan_for_each() is called within
cpsw_ndo_set_rx_mode(), which expects the RTNL lock to be held.
Since modifying vlan_for_each() to operate without the RTNL lock is not
straightforward, and because ndo_set_rx_mode() is invoked both with and
without the RTNL lock across different code paths, simply adding
rtnl_lock() in cpsw_ndo_set_rx_mode() is not a viable solution.

To resolve this issue, we opt to execute the actual processing within
a work queue, following the approach used by the icssg-prueth driver.

Fixes: 1767bb2 ("ipv6: mcast: Don't hold RTNL for IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP.")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203-bbb-v5-1-ea0ea217a85c@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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