tenderloin: disable v4l2 #1
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Temporary fix for torvalds#749 Signed-off-by: Nikolay Nizov <nizovn@gmail.com>
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There are a couple of seq_files which use the single_open() interface. This interface requires that the whole output must fit into a single buffer. E.g. for /proc/stat allocation failures have been observed because an order-4 memory allocation failed due to memory fragmentation. In such situations reading /proc/stat is not possible anymore. Therefore change the seq_file code to fallback to vmalloc allocations which will usually result in a couple of order-0 allocations and hence also work if memory is fragmented. For reference a call trace where reading from /proc/stat failed: sadc: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x1040d0 CPU: 1 PID: 192063 Comm: sadc Not tainted 3.10.0-123.el7.s390x #1 [...] Call Trace: show_stack+0x6c/0xe8 warn_alloc_failed+0xd6/0x138 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x9da/0xb68 __get_free_pages+0x2e/0x58 kmalloc_order_trace+0x44/0xc0 stat_open+0x5a/0xd8 proc_reg_open+0x8a/0x140 do_dentry_open+0x1bc/0x2c8 finish_open+0x46/0x60 do_last+0x382/0x10d0 path_openat+0xc8/0x4f8 do_filp_open+0x46/0xa8 do_sys_open+0x114/0x1f0 sysc_tracego+0x14/0x1a Conflicts: fs/seq_file.c Bug: 17871993 Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thorsten Diehl <thorsten.diehl@de.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Git-commit: 058504e Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Change-Id: Iad795a92fee1983c300568429a6283c48625bd9a Signed-off-by: Jeremy Gebben <jgebben@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Naveen Ramaraj <nramaraj@codeaurora.org>
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There are a couple of seq_files which use the single_open() interface. This interface requires that the whole output must fit into a single buffer. E.g. for /proc/stat allocation failures have been observed because an order-4 memory allocation failed due to memory fragmentation. In such situations reading /proc/stat is not possible anymore. Therefore change the seq_file code to fallback to vmalloc allocations which will usually result in a couple of order-0 allocations and hence also work if memory is fragmented. For reference a call trace where reading from /proc/stat failed: sadc: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x1040d0 CPU: 1 PID: 192063 Comm: sadc Not tainted 3.10.0-123.el7.s390x #1 [...] Call Trace: show_stack+0x6c/0xe8 warn_alloc_failed+0xd6/0x138 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x9da/0xb68 __get_free_pages+0x2e/0x58 kmalloc_order_trace+0x44/0xc0 stat_open+0x5a/0xd8 proc_reg_open+0x8a/0x140 do_dentry_open+0x1bc/0x2c8 finish_open+0x46/0x60 do_last+0x382/0x10d0 path_openat+0xc8/0x4f8 do_filp_open+0x46/0xa8 do_sys_open+0x114/0x1f0 sysc_tracego+0x14/0x1a Conflicts: fs/seq_file.c Bug: 17871993 Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thorsten Diehl <thorsten.diehl@de.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Git-commit: 058504e Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Change-Id: Iad795a92fee1983c300568429a6283c48625bd9a Signed-off-by: Jeremy Gebben <jgebben@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Naveen Ramaraj <nramaraj@codeaurora.org>
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There are a couple of seq_files which use the single_open() interface. This interface requires that the whole output must fit into a single buffer. E.g. for /proc/stat allocation failures have been observed because an order-4 memory allocation failed due to memory fragmentation. In such situations reading /proc/stat is not possible anymore. Therefore change the seq_file code to fallback to vmalloc allocations which will usually result in a couple of order-0 allocations and hence also work if memory is fragmented. For reference a call trace where reading from /proc/stat failed: sadc: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x1040d0 CPU: 1 PID: 192063 Comm: sadc Not tainted 3.10.0-123.el7.s390x #1 [...] Call Trace: show_stack+0x6c/0xe8 warn_alloc_failed+0xd6/0x138 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x9da/0xb68 __get_free_pages+0x2e/0x58 kmalloc_order_trace+0x44/0xc0 stat_open+0x5a/0xd8 proc_reg_open+0x8a/0x140 do_dentry_open+0x1bc/0x2c8 finish_open+0x46/0x60 do_last+0x382/0x10d0 path_openat+0xc8/0x4f8 do_filp_open+0x46/0xa8 do_sys_open+0x114/0x1f0 sysc_tracego+0x14/0x1a Conflicts: fs/seq_file.c Bug: 17871993 Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thorsten Diehl <thorsten.diehl@de.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Git-commit: 058504e Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Change-Id: Iad795a92fee1983c300568429a6283c48625bd9a Signed-off-by: Jeremy Gebben <jgebben@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Naveen Ramaraj <nramaraj@codeaurora.org>
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ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ torvalds#21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
Change-Id: I512142f8f1e1b2a8dc063209666dbce9737377e7
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There are a couple of seq_files which use the single_open() interface. This interface requires that the whole output must fit into a single buffer. E.g. for /proc/stat allocation failures have been observed because an order-4 memory allocation failed due to memory fragmentation. In such situations reading /proc/stat is not possible anymore. Therefore change the seq_file code to fallback to vmalloc allocations which will usually result in a couple of order-0 allocations and hence also work if memory is fragmented. For reference a call trace where reading from /proc/stat failed: sadc: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x1040d0 CPU: 1 PID: 192063 Comm: sadc Not tainted 3.10.0-123.el7.s390x #1 [...] Call Trace: show_stack+0x6c/0xe8 warn_alloc_failed+0xd6/0x138 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x9da/0xb68 __get_free_pages+0x2e/0x58 kmalloc_order_trace+0x44/0xc0 stat_open+0x5a/0xd8 proc_reg_open+0x8a/0x140 do_dentry_open+0x1bc/0x2c8 finish_open+0x46/0x60 do_last+0x382/0x10d0 path_openat+0xc8/0x4f8 do_filp_open+0x46/0xa8 do_sys_open+0x114/0x1f0 sysc_tracego+0x14/0x1a Conflicts: fs/seq_file.c Bug: 17871993 Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thorsten Diehl <thorsten.diehl@de.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Git-commit: 058504e Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Change-Id: Iad795a92fee1983c300568429a6283c48625bd9a Signed-off-by: Jeremy Gebben <jgebben@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Naveen Ramaraj <nramaraj@codeaurora.org>
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Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Change-Id: I0787d5a38c730ecb75d3c08f28f0ab36295d59e7 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 1594e46)
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ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ torvalds#21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
Change-Id: I512142f8f1e1b2a8dc063209666dbce9737377e7
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…ernor For the sync_freq feature currently we check pcpu->policy->cur frequency for each online cpu. But for a CPU that isn't using interactive governor or for an offline CPU, pcpu->policy can be null or an invalid value. This patch tries to avoid that scenario by using pcpu->target_freq instead of policy->cur to get the frequency of an online CPU. Kernel crash without this patch: [ 20.132373] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000028 [ 20.132375] pgd = c34f34c0 [ 20.132377] pgd = ef6f2440 [ 20.132383] [00000028] *pgd=00000000 [ 20.132385] [ 20.132388] [00000028] *pgd=2e98f003, *pmd=00000000 [ 20.132390] Internal error: Oops: 205 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 20.132394] Modules linked in: [ 20.132398] CPU: 0 PID: 1560 Comm: chown Tainted: G W 3.10.0-perf-gb12057b-00001-ga2c6c16-dirty #7 [ 20.132401] task: ef9af300 ti: ee49c000 task.ti: ee49c000 [ 20.132411] PC is at cpufreq_interactive_timer+0x10c/0x650 [ 20.132415] LR is at cpufreq_interactive_timer+0x128/0x650 <snip> [ 20.133002] [<c07eb204>] (cpufreq_interactive_timer+0x10c/0x650) from [<c02804d8>] (call_timer_fn+0x80/0x198) [ 20.133012] [<c02804d8>] (call_timer_fn+0x80/0x198) from [<c0280acc>] (run_timer_softirq+0x1f8/0x270) [ 20.133019] [<c0280acc>] (run_timer_softirq+0x1f8/0x270) from [<c0279e20>] (__do_softirq+0x12c/0x2d4) [ 20.133025] [<c0279e20>] (__do_softirq+0x12c/0x2d4) from [<c027a2d4>] (irq_exit+0x74/0xc8) [ 20.133034] [<c027a2d4>] (irq_exit+0x74/0xc8) from [<c0206a00>] (handle_IRQ+0x68/0x8c) [ 20.133041] [<c0206a00>] (handle_IRQ+0x68/0x8c) from [<c02004b8>] (gic_handle_irq+0x3c/0x60) [ 20.133051] [<c02004b8>] (gic_handle_irq+0x3c/0x60) from [<c0ac6900>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x70) <snip> Change-Id: Ie834f5d383de4d41e0fe6fbd40c8b0a0c05d82f5 Signed-off-by: Vijay Ganti <viganti@codeaurora.org>
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Below Kernel panic is observed due to race condition, where
sock_has_perm called in a thread and is trying to access sksec->sid
without checking sksec. Just before that, sk->sk_security was set
to NULL by selinux_sk_free_security through sk_free in other thread.
31704.949269: <3> IPv4: Attempt to release alive inet socket dd81b200
31704.959049: <1> Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at \
virtual address 00000000
31704.983562: <1> pgd = c6b74000
31704.985248: <1> [00000000] *pgd=00000000
31704.996591: <0> Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
31705.001016: <6> Modules linked in: adsprpc [last unloaded: wlan]
31705.006659: <6> CPU: 1 Tainted: G O \
(3.4.0-g837ab9b-00003-g6bcd9c6 #1)
31705.014042: <6> PC is at sock_has_perm+0x58/0xd4
31705.018292: <6> LR is at sock_has_perm+0x58/0xd4
31705.022546: <6> pc : [<c0341e8c>] lr : [<c0341e8c>] \
psr: 60000013
31705.022549: <6> sp : dda27f00 ip : 00000000 fp : 5f36fc84
31705.034002: <6> r10: 00004000 r9 : 0000009d r8 : e8c2b700
31705.039211: <6> r7 : dda27f24 r6 : dd81b200 r5 : 00000000 \
r4 : 00000000
31705.045721: <6> r3 : 00000000 r2 : dda27ef8 r1 : 00000000 \
r0 : dda27f54
31705.052232: <6> Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM \
Segment user
31705.059349: <6> Control: 10c5787d Table: 10d7406a DAC: 00000015
.
.
.
.
31705.697816: <6> [<c0341e8c>] (sock_has_perm+0x58/0xd4) from \
[<c033ed10>] (security_socket_getsockopt+0x14/0x1c)
31705.707534: <6> [<c033ed10>] (security_socket_getsockopt+0x14/0x1c) \
from [<c0745c18>] (sys_getsockopt+0x34/0xa8)
31705.717343: <6> [<c0745c18>] (sys_getsockopt+0x34/0xa8) from \
[<c0106140>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
31705.726193: <0> Code: e59832e8 e5933058 e5939004 ebfac736 (e5953000)
31705.732635: <4> ---[ end trace 22889004dafd87bd ]---
Change-Id: I79c3fb525f35ea2494d53788788cd71a38a32d6b
Signed-off-by: Satya Durga Srinivasu Prabhala <satyap@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Osvaldo Banuelos <osvaldob@codeaurora.org>
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There are a couple of seq_files which use the single_open() interface. This interface requires that the whole output must fit into a single buffer. E.g. for /proc/stat allocation failures have been observed because an order-4 memory allocation failed due to memory fragmentation. In such situations reading /proc/stat is not possible anymore. Therefore change the seq_file code to fallback to vmalloc allocations which will usually result in a couple of order-0 allocations and hence also work if memory is fragmented. For reference a call trace where reading from /proc/stat failed: sadc: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x1040d0 CPU: 1 PID: 192063 Comm: sadc Not tainted 3.10.0-123.el7.s390x #1 [...] Call Trace: show_stack+0x6c/0xe8 warn_alloc_failed+0xd6/0x138 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x9da/0xb68 __get_free_pages+0x2e/0x58 kmalloc_order_trace+0x44/0xc0 stat_open+0x5a/0xd8 proc_reg_open+0x8a/0x140 do_dentry_open+0x1bc/0x2c8 finish_open+0x46/0x60 do_last+0x382/0x10d0 path_openat+0xc8/0x4f8 do_filp_open+0x46/0xa8 do_sys_open+0x114/0x1f0 sysc_tracego+0x14/0x1a Conflicts: fs/seq_file.c Bug: 17871993 Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thorsten Diehl <thorsten.diehl@de.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Git-commit: 058504e Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Change-Id: Iad795a92fee1983c300568429a6283c48625bd9a Signed-off-by: Jeremy Gebben <jgebben@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Naveen Ramaraj <nramaraj@codeaurora.org>
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Under stress occasions some TI devices might not return early when reading the status register during the quirk invocation of xhci_irq made by usb_hcd_pci_remove. This means that instead of returning, we end up handling this interruption in the middle of a shutdown. Since xhci->event_ring has already been freed in xhci_mem_cleanup, we end up accessing freed memory, causing the Oops below. commit 8c24d6d ("usb: xhci: stop everything on the first call to xhci_stop") is the one that changed the instant in which we clean up the event queue when stopping a device. Before, we didn't call xhci_mem_cleanup at the first time xhci_stop is executed (for the shared HCD), instead, we only did it after the invocation for the primary HCD, much later at the removal path. The code flow for this oops looks like this: xhci_pci_remove() usb_remove_hcd(xhci->shared) xhci_stop(xhci->shared) xhci_halt() xhci_mem_cleanup(xhci); // Free the event_queue usb_hcd_pci_remove(primary) xhci_irq() // Access the event_queue if STS_EINT is set. Crash. xhci_stop() xhci_halt() // return early The fix modifies xhci_stop to only cleanup the xhci data when releasing the primary HCD. This way, we still have the event_queue configured when invoking xhci_irq. We still halt the device on the first call to xhci_stop, though. I could reproduce this issue several times on the mainline kernel by doing a bind-unbind stress test with a specific storage gadget attached. I also ran the same test over-night with my patch applied and didn't observe the issue anymore. [ 113.334124] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000028 [ 113.335514] Faulting instruction address: 0xd00000000d4f767c [ 113.336839] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 113.338214] SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA PowerNV [c000000efe47ba90] c000000000720850 usb_hcd_irq+0x50/0x80 [c000000efe47bac0] c00000000073d328 usb_hcd_pci_remove+0x68/0x1f0 [c000000efe47bb00] d00000000daf0128 xhci_pci_remove+0x78/0xb0 [xhci_pci] [c000000efe47bb30] c00000000055cf70 pci_device_remove+0x70/0x110 [c000000efe47bb70] c00000000061c6bc __device_release_driver+0xbc/0x190 [c000000efe47bba0] c00000000061c7d0 device_release_driver+0x40/0x70 [c000000efe47bbd0] c000000000619510 unbind_store+0x120/0x150 [c000000efe47bc20] c0000000006183c4 drv_attr_store+0x64/0xa0 [c000000efe47bc60] c00000000039f1d0 sysfs_kf_write+0x80/0xb0 [c000000efe47bca0] c00000000039e14c kernfs_fop_write+0x18c/0x1f0 [c000000efe47bcf0] c0000000002e962c __vfs_write+0x6c/0x190 [c000000efe47bd90] c0000000002eab40 vfs_write+0xc0/0x200 [c000000efe47bde0] c0000000002ec85c SyS_write+0x6c/0x110 [c000000efe47be30] c000000000009260 system_call+0x38/0x108 Change-Id: I987ae6f8b54b6488b1668df5c67628f17e828863 Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Cc: joel@jms.id.au Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.3+ Tested-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Git-commit: 27a41a8 Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git [prathampratap@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pratham Pratap <prathampratap@codeaurora.org>
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When running with a local patch which moves the '_stext' symbol to the very beginning of the kernel text area, I got the following panic with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY: usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff88103dfff000 (<linear kernel text>) (4096 bytes) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:79! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... CPU: 0 PID: 4800 Comm: cp Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3.after+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0X3D66, BIOS 2.5.4 01/22/2016 task: ffff880817444140 task.stack: ffff880816274000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8121c796>] __check_object_size+0x76/0x413 RSP: 0018:ffff880816277c40 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000006b RBX: ffff88103dfff000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88081f80dfa8 RDI: ffff88081f80dfa8 RBP: ffff880816277c90 R08: 000000000000054c R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: 0000000000001000 R13: ffff88103e000000 R14: ffff88103dffffff R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fb9d1750800(0000) GS:ffff88081f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000021d2000 CR3: 000000081a08f000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 Stack: ffff880816277cc8 0000000000010000 000000043de07000 0000000000000000 0000000000001000 ffff880816277e60 0000000000001000 ffff880816277e28 000000000000c000 0000000000001000 ffff880816277ce8 ffffffff8136c3a6 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8136c3a6>] copy_page_to_iter_iovec+0xa6/0x1c0 [<ffffffff8136e766>] copy_page_to_iter+0x16/0x90 [<ffffffff811970e3>] generic_file_read_iter+0x3e3/0x7c0 [<ffffffffa06a738d>] ? xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0xad/0x260 [xfs] [<ffffffff816e6262>] ? down_read+0x12/0x40 [<ffffffffa06a61b1>] xfs_file_buffered_aio_read+0x51/0xc0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa06a6692>] xfs_file_read_iter+0x62/0xb0 [xfs] [<ffffffff812224cf>] __vfs_read+0xdf/0x130 [<ffffffff81222c9e>] vfs_read+0x8e/0x140 [<ffffffff81224195>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff81003a47>] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x160 [<ffffffff816e8421>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: 0033:[<00007fb9d0c33c00>] 0x7fb9d0c33c00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc9c262f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: fffffffffff8ffff RCX: 00007fb9d0c33c00 RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 00000000021c3000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000021c3000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffc9c264d6c R10: 00007ffc9c262c50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000010000 R13: 00007ffc9c2630b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000010000 Code: 81 48 0f 44 d0 48 c7 c6 90 4d a3 81 48 c7 c0 bb b3 a2 81 48 0f 44 f0 4d 89 e1 48 89 d9 48 c7 c7 68 16 a3 81 31 c0 e8 f4 57 f7 ff <0f> 0b 48 8d 90 00 40 00 00 48 39 d3 0f 83 22 01 00 00 48 39 c3 RIP [<ffffffff8121c796>] __check_object_size+0x76/0x413 RSP <ffff880816277c40> The checked object's range [ffff88103dfff000, ffff88103e000000) is valid, so there shouldn't have been a BUG. The hardened usercopy code got confused because the range's ending address is the same as the kernel's text starting address at 0xffff88103e000000. The overlap check is slightly off. Fixes: f5509cc ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Change-Id: I839dbf4ddbb4d9874026a42abed557eb9b3f8bef (cherry picked from commit 94cd97a) Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Git-commit: 93b0c0ca55ff927a72bb38c554a0505c5dfaab4f Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common Signed-off-by: Shiraz Hashim <shashim@codeaurora.org>
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Executing from a non-executable area gives an ugly message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0e08 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880700 Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected on CPU2, code 0x8400000e -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 2 PID: 998 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ torvalds#13 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077e35780 ti: ffff800077970000 task.ti: ffff800077970000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 The 'IABT (current EL)' indicates the error but it's a bit cryptic without knowledge of the ARM ARM. There is also no indication of the specific address which triggered the fault. The increase in kernel page permissions makes hitting this case more likely as well. Handling the case in the vectors gives a much more familiar looking error message: lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0840 lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880680 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008880680 pgd = ffff8000089b2000 [ffff000008880680] *pgd=00000000489b4003, *pud=0000000048904003, *pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 8400000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 997 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ torvalds#24 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff800077f9f080 ti: ffff800008a1c000 task.ti: ffff800008a1c000 PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8 LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88 Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Bug: 31432001 Change-Id: Ifba74589ba2cf05b28335d4fd3e3140ef73668db (cherry picked from commit 9adeb8e) Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Git-commit: 97ac8db Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common Signed-off-by: Shiraz Hashim <shashim@codeaurora.org>
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Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Change-Id: I0787d5a38c730ecb75d3c08f28f0ab36295d59e7 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
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ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ torvalds#21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Change-Id: I372ae33eb3c6bfd50ad7ac235b442a7056482f17
Fixes: cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @U
keyctl add user user "a" @U
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ torvalds#49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @U
keyctl add trusted user "a" @U
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Change-Id: I171d566f431c56208e1fe279f466d2d399a9ac7c
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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commit 1d147bf upstream. There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be processed while a packet is being transmitted. This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in the TX path. As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time. Additionally, it can lead to the crash below. Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock. Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations. In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to reduce locking overhead. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0 IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211] *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1 EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211] EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000 ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000) iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9 Stack: e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0 ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210 ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002 Call Trace: [<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211] [<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211] [<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211] [<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211] [<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211] [<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950 [<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250 [<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150 [<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0 Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> [reword commit log, use a separate lock] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Change-Id: Ib19f397902dbaf2c0f915ae063464d176819c920
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An issue was observed when a userspace task exits. The page which hits error here is the zero page. In binder mmap, the whole of vma is not mapped. On a task crash, when debuggerd reads the binder regions, the unmapped areas fall to do_anonymous_page in handle_pte_fault, due to the absence of a vm_fault handler. This results in zero page being mapped. Later in zap_pte_range, vm_normal_page returns zero page in the case of VM_MIXEDMAP and it results in the error. BUG: Bad page map in process mediaserver pte:9dff379f pmd:9bfbd831 page:c0ed8e60 count:1 mapcount:-1 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x404(referenced|reserved) addr:40c3f000 vm_flags:10220051 anon_vma: (null) mapping:d9fe0764 index:fd vma->vm_ops->fault: (null) vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: binder_mmap+0x0/0x274 CPU: 0 PID: 1463 Comm: mediaserver Tainted: G W 3.10.17+ #1 [<c001549c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) from [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) from [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) from [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) from [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) from [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) from [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) from [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) from [<c0011500>] (do_signal+0xa8/0x3b8) Add a vm_fault handler which returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, and prevents the wrong fallback to do_anonymous_page. CRs-Fixed: 673147 Change-Id: I43730a51b6c819538b46c5e4dc5c96c8a384098d Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <vinayakm.list@gmail.com> Patch-mainline: linux-arm-kernel @ 06/02/14, 18:17 Signed-off-by: Vignesh Radhakrishnan <vigneshr@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Subbaraman Narayanamurthy <subbaram@codeaurora.org>
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…eset The problem occurs when iptables constructs the tcp reset packet. It doesn't initialize the pointer to the tcp header within the skb. When the skb is passed to the ixgbe driver for transmit, the ixgbe driver attempts to access the tcp header and crashes. Currently, other drivers (such as our 1G e1000e or igb drivers) don't access the tcp header on transmit unless the TSO option is turned on. <1>BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000d <1>IP: [<d081621c>] ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x8cc/0x2260 [ixgbe] <4>*pdpt = 0000000085e5d001 *pde = 0000000000000000 <0>Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [...] <4>Pid: 0, comm: swapper Tainted: P 2.6.35.12 #1 Greencity/Thurley <4>EIP: 0060:[<d081621c>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 16 <4>EIP is at ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x8cc/0x2260 [ixgbe] <4>EAX: c7628820 EBX: 00000007 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 <4>ESI: 00000008 EDI: c6882180 EBP: dfc6b000 ESP: ced95c48 <4> DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 <0>Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=ced94000 task=ced73bd0 task.ti=ced94000) <0>Stack: <4> cbec7418 c779e0d8 c77cc888 c77cc8a8 0903010a 00000000 c77c0008 00000002 <4><0> cd4997c0 00000010 dfc6b000 00000000 d0d176c9 c77cc8d8 c6882180 cbec7318 <4><0> 00000004 00000004 cbec7230 cbec7110 00000000 cbec70c0 c779e000 00000002 <0>Call Trace: <4> [<d0d176c9>] ? 0xd0d176c9 <4> [<d0d18a4d>] ? 0xd0d18a4d <4> [<411e243e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x218/0x2d7 <4> [<411f03d7>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x4b/0x114 <4> [<411f056a>] ? __qdisc_run+0xca/0xe0 <4> [<411e28b0>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x2d1/0x3d0 <4> [<411e8120>] ? neigh_resolve_output+0x1c5/0x20f <4> [<411e94a1>] ? neigh_update+0x29c/0x330 <4> [<4121cf29>] ? arp_process+0x49c/0x4cd <4> [<411f80c9>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xac <4> [<4121ca8d>] ? arp_process+0x0/0x4cd <4> [<4121ca8d>] ? arp_process+0x0/0x4cd <4> [<4121c6d5>] ? T.901+0x38/0x3b <4> [<4121c918>] ? arp_rcv+0xa3/0xb4 <4> [<4121ca8d>] ? arp_process+0x0/0x4cd <4> [<411e1173>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x32b/0x346 <4> [<411e19e1>] ? netif_receive_skb+0x5a/0x5f <4> [<411e1ea9>] ? napi_skb_finish+0x1b/0x30 <4> [<d0816eb4>] ? ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x1564/0x2260 [ixgbe] <4> [<41013468>] ? lapic_next_event+0x13/0x16 <4> [<410429b2>] ? clockevents_program_event+0xd2/0xe4 <4> [<411e1b03>] ? net_rx_action+0x55/0x127 <4> [<4102da1a>] ? __do_softirq+0x77/0xeb <4> [<4102dab1>] ? do_softirq+0x23/0x27 <4> [<41003a67>] ? do_IRQ+0x7d/0x8e <4> [<41002a69>] ? common_interrupt+0x29/0x30 <4> [<41007bcf>] ? mwait_idle+0x48/0x4d <4> [<4100193b>] ? cpu_idle+0x37/0x4c <0>Code: df 09 d7 0f 94 c2 0f b6 d2 e9 e7 fb ff ff 31 db 31 c0 e9 38 ff ff ff 80 78 06 06 0f 85 3e fb ff ff 8b 7c 24 38 8b 8f b8 00 00 00 <0f> b6 51 0d f6 c2 01 0f 85 27 fb ff ff 80 e2 02 75 0d 8b 6c 24 <0>EIP: [<d081621c>] ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x8cc/0x2260 [ixgbe] SS:ESP Signed-off-by: Mukund Jampala <jbmukund@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Change-Id: I4866944d4992f703e55afcb20e9746a416d3d498
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[Fixed upstream as part of 0b728e1, but that's a much larger patch, this is only the nfs portion backported as needed.] Fix the following Oops in 3.5.1: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038 IP: [<ffffffffa03789cd>] nfs_lookup_revalidate+0x2d/0x480 [nfs] PGD 337c63067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU 5 Modules linked in: nfs fscache nfsd lockd nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrpc af_packet binfmt_misc cpufreq_conservative cpufreq_userspace cpufreq_powersave dm_mod acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp gpio_ich kvm_intel joydev kvm ioatdma hid_generic igb lpc_ich i7core_edac edac_core ptp serio_raw dca pcspkr i2c_i801 mfd_core sg pps_core usbhid crc32c_intel microcode button autofs4 uhci_hcd ttm drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_hp_sw scsi_dh_alua scsi_dh edd fan ata_piix thermal processor thermal_sys Pid: 30431, comm: java Not tainted 3.5.1-2-default #1 Supermicro X8DTT/X8DTT RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03789cd>] [<ffffffffa03789cd>] nfs_lookup_revalidate+0x2d/0x480 [nfs] RSP: 0018:ffff8801b418bd38 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: 00000000fffffff6 RBX: ffff88032016d800 RCX: 0000000000000020 RDX: ffffffff00000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8801824a7b00 RBP: ffff8801b418bdf8 R08: 7fffff0034323030 R09: fffffffff04c03ed R10: ffff8801824a7b00 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8801824a7b00 R13: ffff8801824a7b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8803201725d0 FS: 00002b53a46cb700(0000) GS:ffff88033fc20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 000000020a426000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process java (pid: 30431, threadinfo ffff8801b418a000, task ffff8801b5d20600) Stack: ffff8801b418be44 ffff88032016d800 ffff8801b418bdf8 0000000000000000 ffff8801824a7b00 ffff8801b418bdd7 ffff8803201725d0 ffffffff8116a9c0 ffff8801b5c38dc0 0000000000000007 ffff88032016d800 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8116a9c0>] lookup_dcache+0x80/0xe0 [<ffffffff8116aa43>] __lookup_hash+0x23/0x90 [<ffffffff8116b4a5>] lookup_one_len+0xc5/0x100 [<ffffffffa03869a3>] nfs_sillyrename+0xe3/0x210 [nfs] [<ffffffff8116cadf>] vfs_unlink.part.25+0x7f/0xe0 [<ffffffff8116f22c>] do_unlinkat+0x1ac/0x1d0 [<ffffffff815717b9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<00002b5348b5f527>] 0x2b5348b5f526 Code: ec 38 b8 f6 ff ff ff 4c 89 64 24 18 4c 89 74 24 28 49 89 fc 48 89 5c 24 08 48 89 6c 24 10 49 89 f6 4c 89 6c 24 20 4c 89 7c 24 30 <f6> 46 38 40 0f 85 d1 00 00 00 e8 c4 c4 df e0 48 8b 58 30 49 89 RIP [<ffffffffa03789cd>] nfs_lookup_revalidate+0x2d/0x480 [nfs] RSP <ffff8801b418bd38> CR2: 0000000000000038 ---[ end trace 845113ed191985dd ]--- This Oops affects 3.5 kernels and older, and is due to lookup_one_len() calling down to the dentry revalidation code with a NULL pointer to struct nameidata. It is fixed upstream by commit 0b728e1 (stop passing nameidata * to ->d_revalidate()) Change-Id: I1e7132315dff4feecbf93a4bf557842f8c8b2ef0 Reported-by: Richard Ems <richard.ems@cape-horn-eng.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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I can reliably reproduce the following panic by simply setting an audit rule on a recent 3.5.0+ kernel: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000040 IP: [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 PGD 7acd9067 PUD 7b8fb067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [torvalds#86] SMP Modules linked in: nfs nfs_acl auth_rpcgss fscache lockd sunrpc tpm_bios btrfs zlib_deflate libcrc32c kvm_amd kvm joydev virtio_net pcspkr i2c_piix4 floppy virtio_balloon microcode virtio_blk cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] CPU 0 Pid: 1286, comm: abrt-dump-oops Tainted: G D 3.5.0+ #1 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d1250>] [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007aebfc38 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003692d860 RCX: 00000000000038c4 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88006baf5d80 RDI: ffff88003692d860 RBP: ffff88007aebfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880036d30f00 R14: ffff88006baf5d80 R15: ffff88003692d800 FS: 00007f7562634740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000003643d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process abrt-dump-oops (pid: 1286, threadinfo ffff88007aebe000, task ffff880079614530) Stack: ffff88007aebfdf8 ffff88007aebff28 ffff88007aebfc98 ffffffff81211358 ffff88003692d860 0000000000000000 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffffffff810d4968 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffff8800000038c4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81211358>] ? ext4_lookup+0xe8/0x160 [<ffffffff810d4968>] __audit_inode+0x118/0x2d0 [<ffffffff811955a9>] do_last+0x999/0xe80 [<ffffffff81191fe8>] ? inode_permission+0x18/0x50 [<ffffffff81171efa>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11a/0x130 [<ffffffff81195b4a>] path_openat+0xba/0x420 [<ffffffff81196111>] do_filp_open+0x41/0xa0 [<ffffffff811a24bd>] ? alloc_fd+0x4d/0x120 [<ffffffff811855cd>] do_sys_open+0xed/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810d40cc>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xcc/0x300 [<ffffffff811856c1>] sys_open+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff81611ca9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b RSP <ffff88007aebfc38> CR2: 0000000000000040 The problem is that do_last is passing a negative dentry to audit_inode. The comments on lookup_open note that it can pass back a negative dentry if O_CREAT is not set. This patch fixes the oops, but I'm not clear on whether there's a better approach. Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Change-Id: I7524a9a34db320d3e7452e4f8c58f6e2c5d38887
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When we try to open a file with O_TMPFILE flag, we will trigger a bug.
The root cause is that in ext4_orphan_add() we check ->i_nlink == 0 and
this check always fails because we set ->i_nlink = 1 in
inode_init_always(). We can use the following program to trigger it:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
fd = open(argv[1], O_TMPFILE, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open ");
return -1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
The oops message looks like this:
kernel: kernel BUG at fs/ext3/namei.c:1992!
kernel: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
kernel: Modules linked in: ext4 jbd2 crc16 cpufreq_ondemand ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod parport_pc parport serio_raw sg dcdbas pcspkr i2c_i801 ehci_pci ehci_hcd button acpi_cpufreq mperf e1000e ptp pps_core ttm drm_kms_helper drm hwmon i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ext3 jbd sd_mod ahci libahci libata scsi_mod uhci_hcd
kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 2882 Comm: tst_tmpfile Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1+ #4
kernel: Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 780 /0V4W66, BIOS A05 08/11/2010
kernel: task: ffff880112d30050 ti: ffff8801124d4000 task.ti: ffff8801124d4000
kernel: RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa00db5ae>] [<ffffffffa00db5ae>] ext3_orphan_add+0x6a/0x1eb [ext3]
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff8801124d5cc8 EFLAGS: 00010202
kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880111510128 RCX: ffff8801114683a0
kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880111510128 RDI: ffff88010fcf65a8
kernel: RBP: ffff8801124d5d18 R08: 0080000000000000 R09: ffffffffa00d3b7f
kernel: R10: ffff8801114683a0 R11: ffff8801032a2558 R12: 0000000000000000
kernel: R13: ffff88010fcf6800 R14: ffff8801032a2558 R15: ffff8801115100d8
kernel: FS: 00007f5d172b5700(0000) GS:ffff880117c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
kernel: CR2: 00007f5d16df15d0 CR3: 0000000110b1d000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
kernel: Stack:
kernel: 000000000000000c ffff8801048a7dc8 ffff8801114685a8 ffffffffa00b80d7
kernel: ffff8801124d5e38 ffff8801032a2558 ffff88010ce24d68 0000000000000000
kernel: ffff88011146b300 ffff8801124d5d44 ffff8801124d5d78 ffffffffa00db7e1
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffffa00b80d7>] ? journal_start+0x8c/0xbd [jbd]
kernel: [<ffffffffa00db7e1>] ext3_tmpfile+0xb2/0x13b [ext3]
kernel: [<ffffffff821076f8>] path_openat+0x11f/0x5e7
kernel: [<ffffffff821c86b4>] ? list_del+0x11/0x30
kernel: [<ffffffff82065fa2>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x33/0x38
kernel: [<ffffffff82107cd5>] do_filp_open+0x3f/0x8d
kernel: [<ffffffff82112532>] ? __alloc_fd+0x50/0x102
kernel: [<ffffffff820f9296>] do_sys_open+0x13b/0x1cd
kernel: [<ffffffff820f935c>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
kernel: [<ffffffff82398c02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
kernel: Code: 39 c7 0f 85 67 01 00 00 0f b7 03 25 00 f0 00 00 3d 00 40 00 00 74 18 3d 00 80 00 00 74 11 3d 00 a0 00 00 74 0a 83 7b 48 00 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 49 8b 85 50 03 00 00 4c 89 f6 48 c7 c7 c0 99 0e a0
kernel: RIP [<ffffffffa00db5ae>] ext3_orphan_add+0x6a/0x1eb [ext3]
kernel: RSP <ffff8801124d5cc8>
Here we couldn't call clear_nlink() directly because in d_tmpfile() we
will call inode_dec_link_count() to decrease ->i_nlink. So this commit
tries to call d_tmpfile() before ext4_orphan_add() to fix this problem.
Change-Id: I7c71cb75eaa579fd85d37dd8b1d22cb843d48361
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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When we try to open a file with O_TMPFILE flag, we will trigger a bug.
The root cause is that in ext4_orphan_add() we check ->i_nlink == 0 and
this check always fails because we set ->i_nlink = 1 in
inode_init_always(). We can use the following program to trigger it:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
fd = open(argv[1], O_TMPFILE, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open ");
return -1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
The oops message looks like this:
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/namei.c:2572!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dlci bridge stp hidp cmtp kernelcapi l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core sctp libcrc32c rfcomm tun fuse nfnetli
nk can_raw ipt_ULOG can_bcm x25 scsi_transport_iscsi ipx p8023 p8022 appletalk phonet psnap vmw_vsock_vmci_transport af_key vmw_vmci rose vsock atm can netrom ax25 af_rxrpc ir
da pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bluetooth nfc rfkill rds caif_socket caif crc_ccitt af_802154 llc2 llc snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec serio_raw snd_pcm pcsp
kr edac_core snd_page_alloc snd_timer snd soundcore r8169 mii sr_mod cdrom pata_atiixp radeon backlight drm_kms_helper ttm
CPU: 1 PID: 1812571 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1+ torvalds#12
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. GA-MA78GM-S2H/GA-MA78GM-S2H, BIOS F12a 04/23/2010
task: ffff88007dfe69a0 ti: ffff88010f7b6000 task.ti: ffff88010f7b6000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8125ce69>] [<ffffffff8125ce69>] ext4_orphan_add+0x299/0x2b0
RSP: 0018:ffff88010f7b7cf8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800966d3020 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007dfe70b8 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88010f7b7d40 R08: ffff880126a3c4e0 R09: ffff88010f7b7ca0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801271fd668
R13: ffff8800966d2f78 R14: ffff88011d7089f0 R15: ffff88007dfe69a0
FS: 00007f70441a3740(0000) GS:ffff88012a800000(0000) knlGS:00000000f77c96c0
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000002834000 CR3: 0000000107964000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
DR0: 0000000000780000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
0000000000002000 00000020810b6dde 0000000000000000 ffff88011d46db00
ffff8800966d3020 ffff88011d7089f0 ffff88009c7f4c10 ffff88010f7b7f2c
ffff88007dfe69a0 ffff88010f7b7da8 ffffffff8125cfac ffff880100000004
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8125cfac>] ext4_tmpfile+0x12c/0x180
[<ffffffff811cba78>] path_openat+0x238/0x700
[<ffffffff8100afc4>] ? native_sched_clock+0x24/0x80
[<ffffffff811cc647>] do_filp_open+0x47/0xa0
[<ffffffff811db73f>] ? __alloc_fd+0xaf/0x200
[<ffffffff811ba2e4>] do_sys_open+0x124/0x210
[<ffffffff81010725>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x25/0x290
[<ffffffff811ba3ee>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[<ffffffff816ca8d4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[<ffffffff81001001>] ? start_thread_common.constprop.6+0x1/0xa0
Code: 04 00 00 00 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 c4 77 04 00 e9 43 fe ff ff 66 25 00 d0 66 3d 00 80 0f 84 0e fe ff ff 83 7b 48 00 0f 84 04 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 8c 24 50 07 00 00 e9 88 fe ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00
Here we couldn't call clear_nlink() directly because in d_tmpfile() we
will call inode_dec_link_count() to decrease ->i_nlink. So this commit
tries to call d_tmpfile() before ext4_orphan_add() to fix this problem.
Change-Id: I04dca79854fc9b4932df853251e28419721aabf5
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Tested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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We can end up allocating a new compression stream with GFP_KERNEL from
within the IO path, which may result is nested (recursive) IO operations.
That can introduce problems if the IO path in question is a reclaimer,
holding some locks that will deadlock nested IOs.
Allocate streams and working memory using GFP_NOIO flag, forbidding
recursive IO and FS operations.
An example:
[ 747.233722] inconsistent {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} -> {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} usage.
[ 747.233724] git/20158 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
[ 747.233725] (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811e31db>] start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555
[ 747.233733] {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} state was registered at:
[ 747.233735] [<ffffffff8107b8e9>] __lock_acquire+0x8da/0x117b
[ 747.233738] [<ffffffff8107c950>] lock_acquire+0x10c/0x1a7
[ 747.233740] [<ffffffff811e323e>] start_this_handle+0x52d/0x555
[ 747.233742] [<ffffffff811e331a>] jbd2__journal_start+0xb4/0x237
[ 747.233744] [<ffffffff811cc6c7>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x108/0x17e
[ 747.233748] [<ffffffff811a90bf>] ext4_dirty_inode+0x32/0x61
[ 747.233750] [<ffffffff8115f37e>] __mark_inode_dirty+0x16b/0x60c
[ 747.233754] [<ffffffff81150ad6>] iput+0x11e/0x274
[ 747.233757] [<ffffffff8114bfbd>] __dentry_kill+0x148/0x1b8
[ 747.233759] [<ffffffff8114c9d9>] shrink_dentry_list+0x274/0x44a
[ 747.233761] [<ffffffff8114d38a>] prune_dcache_sb+0x4a/0x55
[ 747.233763] [<ffffffff8113b1ad>] super_cache_scan+0xfc/0x176
[ 747.233767] [<ffffffff810fa089>] shrink_slab.part.14.constprop.25+0x2a2/0x4d3
[ 747.233770] [<ffffffff810fcccb>] shrink_zone+0x74/0x140
[ 747.233772] [<ffffffff810fd924>] kswapd+0x6b7/0x930
[ 747.233774] [<ffffffff81058887>] kthread+0x107/0x10f
[ 747.233778] [<ffffffff814fadff>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 747.233783] irq event stamp: 138297
[ 747.233784] hardirqs last enabled at (138297): [<ffffffff8107aff3>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x113/0x12f
[ 747.233786] hardirqs last disabled at (138296): [<ffffffff8107af13>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x33/0x12f
[ 747.233788] softirqs last enabled at (137818): [<ffffffff81040f89>] __do_softirq+0x2d3/0x3e9
[ 747.233792] softirqs last disabled at (137813): [<ffffffff81041292>] irq_exit+0x41/0x95
[ 747.233794]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 747.233796] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 747.233797] CPU0
[ 747.233798] ----
[ 747.233799] lock(jbd2_handle);
[ 747.233801] <Interrupt>
[ 747.233801] lock(jbd2_handle);
[ 747.233803]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 747.233805] 5 locks held by git/20158:
[ 747.233806] #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81155411>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x4b
[ 747.233811] #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#2/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81145087>] lock_rename+0xd9/0xe3
[ 747.233817] #2: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f8e2>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x3f/0x6b
[ 747.233822] #3: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11/4){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f909>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x66/0x6b
[ 747.233827] #4: (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811e31db>] start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555
[ 747.233831]
stack backtrace:
[ 747.233834] CPU: 2 PID: 20158 Comm: git Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7-next-20150615-dbg-00016-g8bdf555-dirty torvalds#211
[ 747.233837] ffff8800a56cea40 ffff88010d0a75f8 ffffffff814f446d ffffffff81077036
[ 747.233840] ffffffff823a84b0 ffff88010d0a7638 ffffffff814f3849 0000000000000001
[ 747.233843] 000000000000000a ffff8800a56cf6f8 ffff8800a56cea40 ffffffff810795dd
[ 747.233846] Call Trace:
[ 747.233849] [<ffffffff814f446d>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x6e
[ 747.233852] [<ffffffff81077036>] ? up+0x39/0x3e
[ 747.233854] [<ffffffff814f3849>] print_usage_bug.part.23+0x25b/0x26a
[ 747.233857] [<ffffffff810795dd>] ? print_shortest_lock_dependencies+0x182/0x182
[ 747.233859] [<ffffffff8107a9c9>] mark_lock+0x384/0x56d
[ 747.233862] [<ffffffff8107ac11>] mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76
[ 747.233865] [<ffffffffa023d2f3>] ? zcomp_strm_alloc+0x25/0x73 [zram]
[ 747.233867] [<ffffffff8107d13b>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xb2/0xb5
[ 747.233870] [<ffffffff8112bac7>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x32/0x1e2
[ 747.233873] [<ffffffffa023d2f3>] zcomp_strm_alloc+0x25/0x73 [zram]
[ 747.233876] [<ffffffffa023d428>] zcomp_strm_multi_find+0xe7/0x173 [zram]
[ 747.233879] [<ffffffffa023d58b>] zcomp_strm_find+0xc/0xe [zram]
[ 747.233881] [<ffffffffa023f292>] zram_bvec_rw+0x2ca/0x7e0 [zram]
[ 747.233885] [<ffffffffa023fa8c>] zram_make_request+0x1fa/0x301 [zram]
[ 747.233889] [<ffffffff812142f8>] generic_make_request+0x9c/0xdb
[ 747.233891] [<ffffffff8121442e>] submit_bio+0xf7/0x120
[ 747.233895] [<ffffffff810f1c0c>] ? __test_set_page_writeback+0x1a0/0x1b8
[ 747.233897] [<ffffffff811a9d00>] ext4_io_submit+0x2e/0x43
[ 747.233899] [<ffffffff811a9efa>] ext4_bio_write_page+0x1b7/0x300
[ 747.233902] [<ffffffff811a2106>] mpage_submit_page+0x60/0x77
[ 747.233905] [<ffffffff811a25b0>] mpage_map_and_submit_buffers+0x10f/0x21d
[ 747.233907] [<ffffffff811a6814>] ext4_writepages+0xc8c/0xe1b
[ 747.233910] [<ffffffff810f3f77>] do_writepages+0x23/0x2c
[ 747.233913] [<ffffffff810ea5d1>] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x84/0x8b
[ 747.233915] [<ffffffff810ea657>] filemap_flush+0x1c/0x1e
[ 747.233917] [<ffffffff811a3851>] ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0xb8/0x117
[ 747.233919] [<ffffffff811af52a>] ext4_rename+0x132/0x6dc
[ 747.233921] [<ffffffff8107ac11>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76
[ 747.233924] [<ffffffff811afafd>] ext4_rename2+0x29/0x2b
[ 747.233926] [<ffffffff811427ea>] vfs_rename+0x540/0x636
[ 747.233928] [<ffffffff81146a01>] SyS_renameat2+0x359/0x44d
[ 747.233931] [<ffffffff81146b26>] SyS_rename+0x1e/0x20
[ 747.233933] [<ffffffff814faa17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
[minchan@kernel.org: add stable mark]
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
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…ction (cherry-pick from commit 81da9b1) There is no point in overriding the size class below. It causes fatal corruption on the next chunk on the 3264-bytes size class, which is the last size class that is not huge. For example, if the requested size was exactly 3264 bytes, current zsmalloc allocates and returns a chunk from the size class of 3264 bytes, not 4096. User access to this chunk may overwrite head of the next adjacent chunk. Here is the panic log captured when freelist was corrupted due to this: Kernel BUG at ffffffc00030659c [verbose debug info unavailable] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: exynos-snapshot: core register saved(CPU:5) CPUMERRSR: 0000000000000000, L2MERRSR: 0000000000000000 exynos-snapshot: context saved(CPU:5) exynos-snapshot: item - log_kevents is disabled CPU: 5 PID: 898 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 3.10.61-4497415-eng #1 task: ffffffc0b8783d80 ti: ffffffc0b71e8000 task.ti: ffffffc0b71e8000 PC is at obj_idx_to_offset+0x0/0x1c LR is at obj_malloc+0x44/0xe8 pc : [<ffffffc00030659c>] lr : [<ffffffc000306604>] pstate: a0000045 sp : ffffffc0b71eb790 x29: ffffffc0b71eb790 x28: ffffffc00204c000 x27: 000000000001d96f x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffffc098cc3500 x24: ffffffc0a13f2810 x23: ffffffc098cc3501 x22: ffffffc0a13f2800 x21: 000011e1a02006e3 x20: ffffffc0a13f2800 x19: ffffffbc02a7e000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000feb x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 00000000a01003e3 x13: 0000000000000020 x12: fffffffffffffff0 x11: ffffffc08b264000 x10: 00000000e3a01004 x9 : ffffffc08b263fea x8 : ffffffc0b1e611c0 x7 : ffffffc000307d24 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000038 x4 : 000000000000011e x3 : ffffffbc00003e90 x2 : 0000000000000cc0 x1 : 00000000d0100371 x0 : ffffffbc00003e90 Bug: 25951511 Change-Id: I0c82f61aa779ddf906212ab6e47e16c088fe683c Reported-by: Sooyong Suk <s.suk@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Heesub Shin <heesub.shin@samsung.com> Tested-by: Sooyong Suk <s.suk@samsung.com> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
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bfq maintains a 'next-in-service' cache to prevent expensive lookups in the hot path. However, the cache sometimes becomes inconsistent and triggers a BUG: [44042.622839] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]BUG: failure at ../../../../../../kernel/cyanogen/mt6735/block/bfq-sched.c:72/bfq_check_next_in_service()! [44042.622858] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000dead [44042.622866] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]pgd = ffffffc001361000 [44042.622872] [0000dead] *pgd=000000007d816003, *pud=000000007d816003, *pmd=000000007d817003, *pte=0000000000000000 [44042.622890] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]Internal error: Oops: 96000045 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [44042.622907] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]CPU: 3 PID: 154 Comm: mmcqd/0 Tainted: [44042.622915] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]Hardware name: MT6735 (DT) [44042.622922] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]task: ffffffc0378a6000 ti: ffffffc0378c4000 [44042.622936] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]PC is at bfq_dispatch_requests+0x6c4/0x9bc [44042.622944] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]LR is at bfq_dispatch_requests+0x6bc/0x9bc [44042.622952] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]pc : [<ffffffc000306a68>] lr : [<ffffffc000306a60>] pstate: 800001c5 [44042.622958] -(3)[154:mmcqd/0]sp : ffffffc0378c7d30 [44042.622962] x29: ffffffc0378c7d30 x28: 0000000000000000 [44042.622972] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffc006c58810 [44042.622981] x25: ffffffc037f89820 x24: ffffffc000f14000 [44042.622990] x23: ffffffc036adb088 x22: ffffffc0369b2800 [44042.623000] x21: ffffffc036adb098 x20: ffffffc01d6a3b60 [44042.623009] x19: ffffffc036adb0c8 x18: 0000007f8cfa1500 [44042.623018] x17: 0000007f8db44f40 x16: ffffffc00012d0c0 [44042.623027] x15: 0000007f8dde04d8 x14: 676f6e6179632f6c [44042.623037] x13: 656e72656b2f2e2e x12: 2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e [44042.623046] x11: 2e2f2e2e2f2e2e20 x10: 7461206572756c69 [44042.623055] x9 : 6166203a4755425d x8 : 00000000001f0cc5 [44042.623064] x7 : ffffffc000f3d5a0 x6 : 000000000000008b [44042.623073] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000004 [44042.623082] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 0000000000000001 [44042.623091] x1 : 0000000000000aee x0 : 000000000000dead This patch makes the lookup resilient to cache inconsistencies by doing the expensive recomputation in cases where the bug would otherwise be triggered. Ticket: PORRDIGE-527 Change-Id: I5dd701960057983a42d3d3bd57521e8d17c03d7f
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commit 7b74e91 upstream. While adding and removing a lot of disks disks and partitions this sometimes shows up: WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted) Hardware name: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/dev/block/259:751' Modules linked in: raid1 autofs4 bnx2fc cnic uio fcoe libfcoe libfc 8021q scsi_transport_fc scsi_tgt garp stp llc sunrpc cpufreq_ondemand powernow_k8 freq_table mperf ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log power_meter microcode dcdbas serio_raw amd64_edac_mod edac_core edac_mce_amd i2c_piix4 i2c_core k10temp bnx2 sg ixgbe dca mdio ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_round_robin sr_mod cdrom sd_mod crc_t10dif ata_generic pata_acpi pata_atiixp ahci mptsas mptscsih mptbase scsi_transport_sas dm_multipath dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] Pid: 44103, comm: async/16 Not tainted 2.6.32-195.el6.x86_64 #1 Call Trace: warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130 sysfs_do_create_link+0x12b/0x170 sysfs_create_link+0x13/0x20 device_add+0x317/0x650 idr_get_new+0x13/0x50 add_partition+0x21c/0x390 rescan_partitions+0x32b/0x470 sd_open+0x81/0x1f0 [sd_mod] __blkdev_get+0x1b6/0x3c0 blkdev_get+0x10/0x20 register_disk+0x155/0x170 add_disk+0xa6/0x160 sd_probe_async+0x13b/0x210 [sd_mod] add_wait_queue+0x46/0x60 async_thread+0x102/0x250 default_wake_function+0x0/0x20 async_thread+0x0/0x250 kthread+0x96/0xa0 child_rip+0xa/0x20 kthread+0x0/0xa0 child_rip+0x0/0x20 This most likely happens because dev_t is freed while the number is still used and idr_get_new() is not protected on every use. The fix adds a mutex where it wasn't before and moves the dev_t free function so it is called after device del. Signed-off-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4912aa6 upstream. crocode i2c_i801 i2c_core iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support shpchp ioatdma dca be2net sg ses enclosure ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod crc_t10dif ahci megaraid_sas(U) dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] Pid: 491, comm: scsi_eh_0 Tainted: G W ---------------- 2.6.32-220.13.1.el6.x86_64 #1 IBM -[8722PAX]-/00D1461 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8124e424>] [<ffffffff8124e424>] blk_requeue_request+0x94/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffff881057eefd60 EFLAGS: 00010012 RAX: ffff881d99e3e8a8 RBX: ffff881d99e3e780 RCX: ffff881d99e3e8a8 RDX: ffff881d99e3e8a8 RSI: ffff881d99e3e780 RDI: ffff881d99e3e780 RBP: ffff881057eefd80 R08: ffff881057eefe90 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff881057f92338 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff881057f92338 R15: ffff883058188000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880040200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000006d3ec0 CR3: 000000302cd7d000 CR4: 00000000000406b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process scsi_eh_0 (pid: 491, threadinfo ffff881057eee000, task ffff881057e29540) Stack: 0000000000001057 0000000000000286 ffff8810275efdc0 ffff881057f16000 <0> ffff881057eefdd0 ffffffff81362323 ffff881057eefe20 ffffffff8135f393 <0> ffff881057e29af8 ffff8810275efdc0 ffff881057eefe78 ffff881057eefe90 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81362323>] __scsi_queue_insert+0xa3/0x150 [<ffffffff8135f393>] ? scsi_eh_ready_devs+0x5e3/0x850 [<ffffffff81362a23>] scsi_queue_insert+0x13/0x20 [<ffffffff8135e4d4>] scsi_eh_flush_done_q+0x104/0x160 [<ffffffff8135fb6b>] scsi_error_handler+0x35b/0x660 [<ffffffff8135f810>] ? scsi_error_handler+0x0/0x660 [<ffffffff810908c6>] kthread+0x96/0xa0 [<ffffffff8100c14a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff81090830>] ? kthread+0x0/0xa0 [<ffffffff8100c140>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 Code: 00 00 eb d1 4c 8b 2d 3c 8f 97 00 4d 85 ed 74 bf 49 8b 45 00 49 83 c5 08 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 ff d0 49 8b 45 00 48 85 c0 75 eb eb a4 <0f> 0b eb fe 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 0f 1f 44 00 00 RIP [<ffffffff8124e424>] blk_requeue_request+0x94/0xa0 RSP <ffff881057eefd60> The RIP is this line: BUG_ON(blk_queued_rq(rq)); After digging through the code, I think there may be a race between the request completion and the timer handler running. A timer is started for each request put on the device's queue (see blk_start_request->blk_add_timer). If the request does not complete before the timer expires, the timer handler (blk_rq_timed_out_timer) will mark the request complete atomically: static inline int blk_mark_rq_complete(struct request *rq) { return test_and_set_bit(REQ_ATOM_COMPLETE, &rq->atomic_flags); } and then call blk_rq_timed_out. The latter function will call scsi_times_out, which will return one of BLK_EH_HANDLED, BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER or BLK_EH_NOT_HANDLED. If BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER is returned, blk_clear_rq_complete is called, and blk_add_timer is again called to simply wait longer for the request to complete. Now, if the request happens to complete while this is going on, what happens? Given that we know the completion handler will bail if it finds the REQ_ATOM_COMPLETE bit set, we need to focus on the completion handler running after that bit is cleared. So, from the above paragraph, after the call to blk_clear_rq_complete. If the completion sets REQ_ATOM_COMPLETE before the BUG_ON in blk_add_timer, we go boom there (I haven't seen this in the cores). Next, if we get the completion before the call to list_add_tail, then the timer will eventually fire for an old req, which may either be freed or reallocated (there is evidence that this might be the case). Finally, if the completion comes in *after* the addition to the timeout list, I think it's harmless. The request will be removed from the timeout list, req_atom_complete will be set, and all will be well. This will only actually explain the coredumps *IF* the request structure was freed, reallocated *and* queued before the error handler thread had a chance to process it. That is possible, but it may make sense to keep digging for another race. I think that if this is what was happening, we would see other instances of this problem showing up as null pointer or garbage pointer dereferences, for example when the request structure was not re-used. It looks like we actually do run into that situation in other reports. This patch moves the BUG_ON(test_bit(REQ_ATOM_COMPLETE, &req->atomic_flags)); from blk_add_timer to the only caller that could trip over it (blk_start_request). It then inverts the calls to blk_clear_rq_complete and blk_add_timer in blk_rq_timed_out to address the race. I've boot tested this patch, but nothing more. Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Once we failed to merge inline data into inode page during flushing inline inode, we will skip invoking inode_dec_dirty_pages, which makes dirty page count incorrect, result in panic in ->evict_inode, Fix it. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/inode.c:336! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 PID: 10004 Comm: umount Tainted: G O 4.6.0-rc5+ torvalds#17 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 task: f0c33000 ti: c5212000 task.ti: c5212000 EIP: 0060:[<f89aacb5>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 3 EIP is at f2fs_evict_inode+0x85/0x490 [f2fs] EAX: 00000001 EBX: c4529ea0 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000 ESI: c0131000 EDI: f89dd0a0 EBP: c5213e9c ESP: c5213e78 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: b75878c0 CR3: 1a36a700 CR4: 000406f0 Stack: c4529ea0 c4529ef4 c5213e8c c176d45c c4529ef4 00000000 c4529ea0 c4529fac f89dd0a0 c5213eb0 c1204a68 c5213ed8 c452a2b4 c6680930 c5213ec0 c1204b64 c6680d44 c6680620 c5213eec c120588d ee84b000 ee84b5c0 c5214000 ee84b5e0 Call Trace: [<c176d45c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x50 [<c1204a68>] evict+0xa8/0x170 [<c1204b64>] dispose_list+0x34/0x50 [<c120588d>] evict_inodes+0x10d/0x130 [<c11ea941>] generic_shutdown_super+0x41/0xe0 [<c1185190>] ? unregister_shrinker+0x40/0x50 [<c1185190>] ? unregister_shrinker+0x40/0x50 [<c11eac52>] kill_block_super+0x22/0x70 [<f89af23e>] kill_f2fs_super+0x1e/0x20 [f2fs] [<c11eae1d>] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 [<c11eb383>] deactivate_super+0x43/0x60 [<c1208ec9>] cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x80 [<c1208f50>] __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 [<c107d091>] task_work_run+0x71/0x90 [<c105725a>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x72/0x9e [<c1001c7c>] do_fast_syscall_32+0x19c/0x1c0 [<c176dd48>] sysenter_past_esp+0x45/0x74 EIP: [<f89aacb5>] f2fs_evict_inode+0x85/0x490 [f2fs] SS:ESP 0068:c5213e78 ---[ end trace d30536330b7fdc58 ]--- Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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An issue was observed when a userspace task exits. The page which hits error here is the zero page. In binder mmap, the whole of vma is not mapped. On a task crash, when debuggerd reads the binder regions, the unmapped areas fall to do_anonymous_page in handle_pte_fault, due to the absence of a vm_fault handler. This results in zero page being mapped. Later in zap_pte_range, vm_normal_page returns zero page in the case of VM_MIXEDMAP and it results in the error. BUG: Bad page map in process mediaserver pte:9dff379f pmd:9bfbd831 page:c0ed8e60 count:1 mapcount:-1 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x404(referenced|reserved) addr:40c3f000 vm_flags:10220051 anon_vma: (null) mapping:d9fe0764 index:fd vma->vm_ops->fault: (null) vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: binder_mmap+0x0/0x274 CPU: 0 PID: 1463 Comm: mediaserver Tainted: G W 3.10.17+ #1 [<c001549c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) from [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) from [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) from [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) from [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) from [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) from [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) from [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) from [<c0011500>] (do_signal+0xa8/0x3b8) Add a vm_fault handler which returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, and prevents the wrong fallback to do_anonymous_page. CRs-Fixed: 673147 Change-Id: I43730a51b6c819538b46c5e4dc5c96c8a384098d Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <vinayakm.list@gmail.com> Patch-mainline: linux-arm-kernel @ 06/02/14, 18:17 Signed-off-by: Vignesh Radhakrishnan <vigneshr@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Subbaraman Narayanamurthy <subbaram@codeaurora.org>
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so, we need give a protection and return a error value. [ 7341.474236] [drm:do_intel_finish_page_flip] *ERROR* invalid or inactive unpin_work! [ 7341.494464] atomisp-css2400b0_v21 0000:00:03.0: unhandled css stored event: 0x20 [ 7341.503627] vmap allocation for size 208896 failed: use vmalloc=<size> to increase size.<=================== map failed [ 7341.507135] [drm:do_intel_finish_page_flip] *ERROR* invalid or inactive unpin_work! [ 7341.503848] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 7341.520394] IP: [<c18f5c1b>] sst_load_all_modules_elf+0x1bb/0x850 [ 7341.527216] *pdpt = 0000000030dfe001 *pde = 0000000000000000 [ 7341.533640] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 7341.540360] [drm:do_intel_finish_page_flip] *ERROR* invalid or inactive unpin_work! [ 7341.538037] Modules linked in: atomisp_css2400b0_v21 lm3554 ov2722 imx1x5 atmel_mxt_ts vxd392 videobuf_vmalloc videobuf_core lm_dump(O) bcm_bt_lpm hdmi_audio bcm4334x(O) [ 7341.563531] CPU: 1 PID: 525 Comm: mediaserver Tainted: G W O 3.10.20-262518-ga83c053 #1 [ 7341.573253] task: f0994ec0 ti: f09f0000 task.ti: f09f0000 [ 7341.579284] EIP: 0060:[<c18f5c1b>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 1 [ 7341.585415] EIP is at sst_load_all_modules_elf+0x1bb/0x850 [ 7341.591541] EAX: 00000000 EBX: e3595ba0 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00031c1c [ 7341.598541] ESI: e04a0000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: f09f1d80 ESP: f09f1cf4 [ 7341.605542] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 003b SS: 0068 [ 7341.611573] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 30db4000 CR4: 001007f0 [ 7341.618573] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 7341.625575] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 7341.629856] Stack: [ 7341.632097] f09f1d57 00000019 c1d656d7 c1d658d3 c1d56409 00000f28 c1d64af9 18000103 [ 7341.640766] 01000001 00080000 c1f910a0 f326f4c8 00000034 f326f520 00000002 e04a02bc [ 7341.649465] 00000001 f326e014 c1f910b0 e04a0000 c0080100 00031c1c e3595ba0 c0080100 [ 7341.658149] Call Trace: [ 7341.660888] [<c18f6308>] sst_post_download_byt+0x58/0xb0 [ 7341.666925] [<c18f4fbc>] sst_load_fw+0xdc/0x510 [ 7341.672086] [<c1a7b2c0>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x250/0x370 [ 7341.678507] [<c1a80e05>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x55/0xe0 [ 7341.684346] [<c18f1294>] sst_download_fw+0x14/0x60 [ 7341.689796] [<c1a7b403>] ? mutex_lock+0x23/0x30 [ 7341.694954] [<c18f191c>] intel_sst_check_device+0x6c/0x120 [ 7341.701181] [<c18f1d08>] sst_set_generic_params+0x1b8/0x4a0 [ 7341.707504] [<c1a80e05>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x55/0xe0 [ 7341.713341] [<c1a80e05>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x55/0xe0 [ 7341.719178] [<c1a7b2c0>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x250/0x370 [ 7341.725600] [<c1320d84>] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0xe4/0x1d0 [ 7341.732022] [<c18e35f5>] sst_set_mixer_param+0x25/0x40 [ 7341.737859] [<c18e3853>] lpe_mixer_ihf_set+0xb3/0x160 [ 7341.743602] [<c1855b99>] snd_ctl_ioctl+0xa89/0xb40 [ 7341.749052] [<c1331e65>] ? path_openat+0xa5/0x3d0 [ 7341.754409] [<c1447857>] ? avc_has_perm_flags+0xc7/0x170 [ 7341.760441] [<c1855110>] ? snd_ctl_elem_add_user+0x540/0x540 [ 7341.766862] [<c1334047>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x77/0x5e0 [ 7341.772117] [<c144842a>] ? inode_has_perm.isra.42.constprop.79+0x3a/0x50 [ 7341.779705] [<c14490a0>] ? file_has_perm+0xa0/0xb0 [ 7341.785155] [<c14493b8>] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x48/0xe0 [ 7341.791090] [<c1334628>] SyS_ioctl+0x78/0x90 [ 7341.795958] [<c1a7dde8>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [ 7341.800925] [<c1a70000>] ? mm_fault_error+0x13c/0x198 Change-Id: I53d372d205dec87e15abeb9849d6cae88faeb546 Signed-off-by: zhang jun <jun.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Git-commit: 2b1278c Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git [tdas@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge and return failure only if we vmalloc'ed pages and used them to store the firmware data.] Signed-off-by: Taniya Das <tdas@codeaurora.org>
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…eset The problem occurs when iptables constructs the tcp reset packet. It doesn't initialize the pointer to the tcp header within the skb. When the skb is passed to the ixgbe driver for transmit, the ixgbe driver attempts to access the tcp header and crashes. Currently, other drivers (such as our 1G e1000e or igb drivers) don't access the tcp header on transmit unless the TSO option is turned on. <1>BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000d <1>IP: [<d081621c>] ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x8cc/0x2260 [ixgbe] <4>*pdpt = 0000000085e5d001 *pde = 0000000000000000 <0>Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [...] <4>Pid: 0, comm: swapper Tainted: P 2.6.35.12 #1 Greencity/Thurley <4>EIP: 0060:[<d081621c>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 16 <4>EIP is at ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x8cc/0x2260 [ixgbe] <4>EAX: c7628820 EBX: 00000007 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 <4>ESI: 00000008 EDI: c6882180 EBP: dfc6b000 ESP: ced95c48 <4> DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 <0>Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=ced94000 task=ced73bd0 task.ti=ced94000) <0>Stack: <4> cbec7418 c779e0d8 c77cc888 c77cc8a8 0903010a 00000000 c77c0008 00000002 <4><0> cd4997c0 00000010 dfc6b000 00000000 d0d176c9 c77cc8d8 c6882180 cbec7318 <4><0> 00000004 00000004 cbec7230 cbec7110 00000000 cbec70c0 c779e000 00000002 <0>Call Trace: <4> [<d0d176c9>] ? 0xd0d176c9 <4> [<d0d18a4d>] ? 0xd0d18a4d <4> [<411e243e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x218/0x2d7 <4> [<411f03d7>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x4b/0x114 <4> [<411f056a>] ? __qdisc_run+0xca/0xe0 <4> [<411e28b0>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x2d1/0x3d0 <4> [<411e8120>] ? neigh_resolve_output+0x1c5/0x20f <4> [<411e94a1>] ? neigh_update+0x29c/0x330 <4> [<4121cf29>] ? arp_process+0x49c/0x4cd <4> [<411f80c9>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xac <4> [<4121ca8d>] ? arp_process+0x0/0x4cd <4> [<4121ca8d>] ? arp_process+0x0/0x4cd <4> [<4121c6d5>] ? T.901+0x38/0x3b <4> [<4121c918>] ? arp_rcv+0xa3/0xb4 <4> [<4121ca8d>] ? arp_process+0x0/0x4cd <4> [<411e1173>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x32b/0x346 <4> [<411e19e1>] ? netif_receive_skb+0x5a/0x5f <4> [<411e1ea9>] ? napi_skb_finish+0x1b/0x30 <4> [<d0816eb4>] ? ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x1564/0x2260 [ixgbe] <4> [<41013468>] ? lapic_next_event+0x13/0x16 <4> [<410429b2>] ? clockevents_program_event+0xd2/0xe4 <4> [<411e1b03>] ? net_rx_action+0x55/0x127 <4> [<4102da1a>] ? __do_softirq+0x77/0xeb <4> [<4102dab1>] ? do_softirq+0x23/0x27 <4> [<41003a67>] ? do_IRQ+0x7d/0x8e <4> [<41002a69>] ? common_interrupt+0x29/0x30 <4> [<41007bcf>] ? mwait_idle+0x48/0x4d <4> [<4100193b>] ? cpu_idle+0x37/0x4c <0>Code: df 09 d7 0f 94 c2 0f b6 d2 e9 e7 fb ff ff 31 db 31 c0 e9 38 ff ff ff 80 78 06 06 0f 85 3e fb ff ff 8b 7c 24 38 8b 8f b8 00 00 00 <0f> b6 51 0d f6 c2 01 0f 85 27 fb ff ff 80 e2 02 75 0d 8b 6c 24 <0>EIP: [<d081621c>] ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring+0x8cc/0x2260 [ixgbe] SS:ESP Signed-off-by: Mukund Jampala <jbmukund@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Change-Id: I4866944d4992f703e55afcb20e9746a416d3d498
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I can reliably reproduce the following panic by simply setting an audit rule on a recent 3.5.0+ kernel: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000040 IP: [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 PGD 7acd9067 PUD 7b8fb067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [torvalds#86] SMP Modules linked in: nfs nfs_acl auth_rpcgss fscache lockd sunrpc tpm_bios btrfs zlib_deflate libcrc32c kvm_amd kvm joydev virtio_net pcspkr i2c_piix4 floppy virtio_balloon microcode virtio_blk cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] CPU 0 Pid: 1286, comm: abrt-dump-oops Tainted: G D 3.5.0+ #1 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d1250>] [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007aebfc38 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003692d860 RCX: 00000000000038c4 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88006baf5d80 RDI: ffff88003692d860 RBP: ffff88007aebfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880036d30f00 R14: ffff88006baf5d80 R15: ffff88003692d800 FS: 00007f7562634740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000003643d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process abrt-dump-oops (pid: 1286, threadinfo ffff88007aebe000, task ffff880079614530) Stack: ffff88007aebfdf8 ffff88007aebff28 ffff88007aebfc98 ffffffff81211358 ffff88003692d860 0000000000000000 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffffffff810d4968 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffff8800000038c4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81211358>] ? ext4_lookup+0xe8/0x160 [<ffffffff810d4968>] __audit_inode+0x118/0x2d0 [<ffffffff811955a9>] do_last+0x999/0xe80 [<ffffffff81191fe8>] ? inode_permission+0x18/0x50 [<ffffffff81171efa>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11a/0x130 [<ffffffff81195b4a>] path_openat+0xba/0x420 [<ffffffff81196111>] do_filp_open+0x41/0xa0 [<ffffffff811a24bd>] ? alloc_fd+0x4d/0x120 [<ffffffff811855cd>] do_sys_open+0xed/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810d40cc>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xcc/0x300 [<ffffffff811856c1>] sys_open+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff81611ca9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b RSP <ffff88007aebfc38> CR2: 0000000000000040 The problem is that do_last is passing a negative dentry to audit_inode. The comments on lookup_open note that it can pass back a negative dentry if O_CREAT is not set. This patch fixes the oops, but I'm not clear on whether there's a better approach. Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Change-Id: I7524a9a34db320d3e7452e4f8c58f6e2c5d38887
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When we try to open a file with O_TMPFILE flag, we will trigger a bug.
The root cause is that in ext4_orphan_add() we check ->i_nlink == 0 and
this check always fails because we set ->i_nlink = 1 in
inode_init_always(). We can use the following program to trigger it:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
fd = open(argv[1], O_TMPFILE, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open ");
return -1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
The oops message looks like this:
kernel: kernel BUG at fs/ext3/namei.c:1992!
kernel: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
kernel: Modules linked in: ext4 jbd2 crc16 cpufreq_ondemand ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod parport_pc parport serio_raw sg dcdbas pcspkr i2c_i801 ehci_pci ehci_hcd button acpi_cpufreq mperf e1000e ptp pps_core ttm drm_kms_helper drm hwmon i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ext3 jbd sd_mod ahci libahci libata scsi_mod uhci_hcd
kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 2882 Comm: tst_tmpfile Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1+ #4
kernel: Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 780 /0V4W66, BIOS A05 08/11/2010
kernel: task: ffff880112d30050 ti: ffff8801124d4000 task.ti: ffff8801124d4000
kernel: RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa00db5ae>] [<ffffffffa00db5ae>] ext3_orphan_add+0x6a/0x1eb [ext3]
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff8801124d5cc8 EFLAGS: 00010202
kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880111510128 RCX: ffff8801114683a0
kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880111510128 RDI: ffff88010fcf65a8
kernel: RBP: ffff8801124d5d18 R08: 0080000000000000 R09: ffffffffa00d3b7f
kernel: R10: ffff8801114683a0 R11: ffff8801032a2558 R12: 0000000000000000
kernel: R13: ffff88010fcf6800 R14: ffff8801032a2558 R15: ffff8801115100d8
kernel: FS: 00007f5d172b5700(0000) GS:ffff880117c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
kernel: CR2: 00007f5d16df15d0 CR3: 0000000110b1d000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
kernel: Stack:
kernel: 000000000000000c ffff8801048a7dc8 ffff8801114685a8 ffffffffa00b80d7
kernel: ffff8801124d5e38 ffff8801032a2558 ffff88010ce24d68 0000000000000000
kernel: ffff88011146b300 ffff8801124d5d44 ffff8801124d5d78 ffffffffa00db7e1
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffffa00b80d7>] ? journal_start+0x8c/0xbd [jbd]
kernel: [<ffffffffa00db7e1>] ext3_tmpfile+0xb2/0x13b [ext3]
kernel: [<ffffffff821076f8>] path_openat+0x11f/0x5e7
kernel: [<ffffffff821c86b4>] ? list_del+0x11/0x30
kernel: [<ffffffff82065fa2>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x33/0x38
kernel: [<ffffffff82107cd5>] do_filp_open+0x3f/0x8d
kernel: [<ffffffff82112532>] ? __alloc_fd+0x50/0x102
kernel: [<ffffffff820f9296>] do_sys_open+0x13b/0x1cd
kernel: [<ffffffff820f935c>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
kernel: [<ffffffff82398c02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
kernel: Code: 39 c7 0f 85 67 01 00 00 0f b7 03 25 00 f0 00 00 3d 00 40 00 00 74 18 3d 00 80 00 00 74 11 3d 00 a0 00 00 74 0a 83 7b 48 00 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 49 8b 85 50 03 00 00 4c 89 f6 48 c7 c7 c0 99 0e a0
kernel: RIP [<ffffffffa00db5ae>] ext3_orphan_add+0x6a/0x1eb [ext3]
kernel: RSP <ffff8801124d5cc8>
Here we couldn't call clear_nlink() directly because in d_tmpfile() we
will call inode_dec_link_count() to decrease ->i_nlink. So this commit
tries to call d_tmpfile() before ext4_orphan_add() to fix this problem.
Change-Id: I7c71cb75eaa579fd85d37dd8b1d22cb843d48361
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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When we try to open a file with O_TMPFILE flag, we will trigger a bug.
The root cause is that in ext4_orphan_add() we check ->i_nlink == 0 and
this check always fails because we set ->i_nlink = 1 in
inode_init_always(). We can use the following program to trigger it:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
fd = open(argv[1], O_TMPFILE, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open ");
return -1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
The oops message looks like this:
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/namei.c:2572!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dlci bridge stp hidp cmtp kernelcapi l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core sctp libcrc32c rfcomm tun fuse nfnetli
nk can_raw ipt_ULOG can_bcm x25 scsi_transport_iscsi ipx p8023 p8022 appletalk phonet psnap vmw_vsock_vmci_transport af_key vmw_vmci rose vsock atm can netrom ax25 af_rxrpc ir
da pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bluetooth nfc rfkill rds caif_socket caif crc_ccitt af_802154 llc2 llc snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec serio_raw snd_pcm pcsp
kr edac_core snd_page_alloc snd_timer snd soundcore r8169 mii sr_mod cdrom pata_atiixp radeon backlight drm_kms_helper ttm
CPU: 1 PID: 1812571 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1+ torvalds#12
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. GA-MA78GM-S2H/GA-MA78GM-S2H, BIOS F12a 04/23/2010
task: ffff88007dfe69a0 ti: ffff88010f7b6000 task.ti: ffff88010f7b6000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8125ce69>] [<ffffffff8125ce69>] ext4_orphan_add+0x299/0x2b0
RSP: 0018:ffff88010f7b7cf8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800966d3020 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007dfe70b8 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88010f7b7d40 R08: ffff880126a3c4e0 R09: ffff88010f7b7ca0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801271fd668
R13: ffff8800966d2f78 R14: ffff88011d7089f0 R15: ffff88007dfe69a0
FS: 00007f70441a3740(0000) GS:ffff88012a800000(0000) knlGS:00000000f77c96c0
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000002834000 CR3: 0000000107964000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
DR0: 0000000000780000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
0000000000002000 00000020810b6dde 0000000000000000 ffff88011d46db00
ffff8800966d3020 ffff88011d7089f0 ffff88009c7f4c10 ffff88010f7b7f2c
ffff88007dfe69a0 ffff88010f7b7da8 ffffffff8125cfac ffff880100000004
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8125cfac>] ext4_tmpfile+0x12c/0x180
[<ffffffff811cba78>] path_openat+0x238/0x700
[<ffffffff8100afc4>] ? native_sched_clock+0x24/0x80
[<ffffffff811cc647>] do_filp_open+0x47/0xa0
[<ffffffff811db73f>] ? __alloc_fd+0xaf/0x200
[<ffffffff811ba2e4>] do_sys_open+0x124/0x210
[<ffffffff81010725>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x25/0x290
[<ffffffff811ba3ee>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[<ffffffff816ca8d4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[<ffffffff81001001>] ? start_thread_common.constprop.6+0x1/0xa0
Code: 04 00 00 00 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 c4 77 04 00 e9 43 fe ff ff 66 25 00 d0 66 3d 00 80 0f 84 0e fe ff ff 83 7b 48 00 0f 84 04 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 8c 24 50 07 00 00 e9 88 fe ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00
Here we couldn't call clear_nlink() directly because in d_tmpfile() we
will call inode_dec_link_count() to decrease ->i_nlink. So this commit
tries to call d_tmpfile() before ext4_orphan_add() to fix this problem.
Change-Id: I04dca79854fc9b4932df853251e28419721aabf5
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Tested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the
benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+
compilers.
As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct"
version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version
for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the
"byteshift" implementation for both.
Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis:
Test case:
int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
With the current ARM version:
foo:
ldrb r3, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
mov r3, r3, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
orr r3, r3, r1, asl #8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
orr r0, r3, r0, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
bx lr @
bar:
stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @,
mov r2, #0 @ tmp184,
ldrb r5, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B]
ldrb r4, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B]
ldrb ip, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
ldrb r1, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
mov r5, r5, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B],
ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
orr r5, r5, r4, asl #8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B],
ldrb r6, [r0, #7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B]
orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
mov ip, ip, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
ldrb r1, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
orr ip, ip, r7, asl #8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
orr r3, r5, r6, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B],
orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
orr ip, ip, r1, asl torvalds#24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
mov r1, r3 @,
orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194
ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
bx lr
In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why
wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all
the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc.
Now with the asm-generic version:
foo:
ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x
bx lr @
bar:
mov r3, r0 @ x, x
ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x
ldr r1, [r3, #4] @ unaligned @,
bx lr @
This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for
ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do
unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we
remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows:
long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; }
then the resulting code is:
bar:
ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,,
bx lr @
So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have
influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above
unaligned code results are not just an accident.
Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the
resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an
ARMv5 target:
foo:
ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x
ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140,
ldrb r2, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143,
ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146,
orr r3, r3, r1, asl #8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
orr r3, r3, r2, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
orr r0, r3, r0, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146,
bx lr @
bar:
stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @,
ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x
ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140,
ldrb r3, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149,
ldrb r6, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150,
ldrb r5, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143,
ldrb r4, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153,
ldrb r1, [r0, #7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156,
ldrb ip, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146,
orr r2, r2, r7, asl #8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
orr r3, r3, r6, asl #8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150,
orr r2, r2, r5, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
orr r3, r3, r4, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153,
orr r0, r2, ip, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146,
orr r1, r3, r1, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp155, tmp156,
ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
bx lr
Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I
couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself.
Change-Id: I91ea5a5e83de4bbdbb53883fe0dbf00719a8e382
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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Under stress occasions some TI devices might not return early when reading the status register during the quirk invocation of xhci_irq made by usb_hcd_pci_remove. This means that instead of returning, we end up handling this interruption in the middle of a shutdown. Since xhci->event_ring has already been freed in xhci_mem_cleanup, we end up accessing freed memory, causing the Oops below. commit 8c24d6d ("usb: xhci: stop everything on the first call to xhci_stop") is the one that changed the instant in which we clean up the event queue when stopping a device. Before, we didn't call xhci_mem_cleanup at the first time xhci_stop is executed (for the shared HCD), instead, we only did it after the invocation for the primary HCD, much later at the removal path. The code flow for this oops looks like this: xhci_pci_remove() usb_remove_hcd(xhci->shared) xhci_stop(xhci->shared) xhci_halt() xhci_mem_cleanup(xhci); // Free the event_queue usb_hcd_pci_remove(primary) xhci_irq() // Access the event_queue if STS_EINT is set. Crash. xhci_stop() xhci_halt() // return early The fix modifies xhci_stop to only cleanup the xhci data when releasing the primary HCD. This way, we still have the event_queue configured when invoking xhci_irq. We still halt the device on the first call to xhci_stop, though. I could reproduce this issue several times on the mainline kernel by doing a bind-unbind stress test with a specific storage gadget attached. I also ran the same test over-night with my patch applied and didn't observe the issue anymore. [ 113.334124] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000028 [ 113.335514] Faulting instruction address: 0xd00000000d4f767c [ 113.336839] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 113.338214] SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA PowerNV [c000000efe47ba90] c000000000720850 usb_hcd_irq+0x50/0x80 [c000000efe47bac0] c00000000073d328 usb_hcd_pci_remove+0x68/0x1f0 [c000000efe47bb00] d00000000daf0128 xhci_pci_remove+0x78/0xb0 [xhci_pci] [c000000efe47bb30] c00000000055cf70 pci_device_remove+0x70/0x110 [c000000efe47bb70] c00000000061c6bc __device_release_driver+0xbc/0x190 [c000000efe47bba0] c00000000061c7d0 device_release_driver+0x40/0x70 [c000000efe47bbd0] c000000000619510 unbind_store+0x120/0x150 [c000000efe47bc20] c0000000006183c4 drv_attr_store+0x64/0xa0 [c000000efe47bc60] c00000000039f1d0 sysfs_kf_write+0x80/0xb0 [c000000efe47bca0] c00000000039e14c kernfs_fop_write+0x18c/0x1f0 [c000000efe47bcf0] c0000000002e962c __vfs_write+0x6c/0x190 [c000000efe47bd90] c0000000002eab40 vfs_write+0xc0/0x200 [c000000efe47bde0] c0000000002ec85c SyS_write+0x6c/0x110 [c000000efe47be30] c000000000009260 system_call+0x38/0x108 Change-Id: I987ae6f8b54b6488b1668df5c67628f17e828863 Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Cc: joel@jms.id.au Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.3+ Tested-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Git-commit: 27a41a8 Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git [prathampratap@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pratham Pratap <prathampratap@codeaurora.org>
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Jul 26, 2022
It is possible to disable VFs while the PF driver is processing requests from the VF driver. This can result in a panic. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000000000106c PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 8 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G I --------- - Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/06WXJT, BIOS 2.8.2 08/27/2020 RIP: 0010:ixgbe_msg_task+0x4c8/0x1690 [ixgbe] Code: 00 00 48 8d 04 40 48 c1 e0 05 89 7c 24 24 89 fd 48 89 44 24 10 83 ff 01 0f 84 b8 04 00 00 4c 8b 64 24 10 4d 03 a5 48 22 00 00 <41> 80 7c 24 4c 00 0f 84 8a 03 00 00 0f b7 c7 83 f8 08 0f 84 8f 0a RSP: 0018:ffffb337869f8df8 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000001020 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000002b RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000029780 R10: 00006957d8f42832 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001020 R13: ffff8a00e8978ac0 R14: 000000000000002b R15: ffff8a00e8979c80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a07dfd00000(0000) knlGS:00000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000106c CR3: 0000000063e10004 CR4: 00000000007726e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x140 ? try_to_wake_up+0x1cd/0x550 ? ixgbevf_update_xcast_mode+0x71/0xc0 [ixgbevf] ixgbe_msix_other+0x17e/0x310 [ixgbe] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80 handle_irq_event+0x36/0x53 handle_edge_irq+0x82/0x190 handle_irq+0x1c/0x30 do_IRQ+0x49/0xd0 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf This can be eventually be reproduced with the following script: while : do echo 63 > /sys/class/net/<devname>/device/sriov_numvfs sleep 1 echo 0 > /sys/class/net/<devname>/device/sriov_numvfs sleep 1 done Add lock when disabling SR-IOV to prevent process VF mailbox communication. Fixes: d773d13 ("ixgbe: Fix memory leak when SR-IOV VFs are direct assigned") Signed-off-by: Piotr Skajewski <piotrx.skajewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715214456.2968711-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [shr-distribution#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The following warning was seen: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:557 apply_returns (arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:557 (discriminator 1)) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-00008-gee88d363d156 shr-distribution#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-4 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:apply_returns (arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:557 (discriminator 1)) Code: ff ff 74 cb 48 83 c5 04 49 39 ee 0f 87 81 fe ff ff e9 22 ff ff ff 0f 0b 48 83 c5 04 49 39 ee 0f 87 6d fe ff ff e9 0e ff ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c5 04 49 39 ee 0f 87 59 fe ff ff e9 fa fe ff ff 48 89 The warning happened when apply_returns() failed to convert "JMP __x86_return_thunk" to RET. It was instead a JMP to nowhere, due to the thunk relocation not getting resolved. That rodata.o code is objcopy'd to .rodata, and later memcpy'd, so relocations don't work (and are apparently silently ignored). LKDTM is only used for testing, so the naked RET should be fine. So just disable return thunks for that file. While at it, disable objtool and KCSAN for the file. Fixes: 0b53c37 ("x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Debugged-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ys58BxHxoDZ7rfpr@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
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The vmf->page can be NULL when the wp_page_reuse() is invoked by wp_pfn_shared(), it will cause the following panic: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [shr-distribution#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 18 PID: 923 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8.bm.1-amd64 torvalds#263 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g14 RIP: 0010:_compound_head+0x0/0x40 [...] Call Trace: wp_page_reuse+0x1c/0xa0 do_wp_page+0x1a5/0x3f0 __handle_mm_fault+0x8cf/0xd20 handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0 do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680 exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170 asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 To fix it, this patch performs a NULL pointer check before dereferencing the vmf->page. Fixes: 6c28760 ("mm: remember exclusively mapped anonymous pages with PG_anon_exclusive") Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The commit cb51a37 ("EDAC/ghes: Setup DIMM label from DMI and use it in error reports") enforced that both the bank and device strings passed to dimm_setup_label() are not NULL. However, there are BIOSes, for example on a HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 03/15/2019 which don't populate both strings: Handle 0x0020, DMI type 17, 84 bytes Memory Device Array Handle: 0x0013 Error Information Handle: Not Provided Total Width: 72 bits Data Width: 64 bits Size: 32 GB Form Factor: DIMM Set: None Locator: PROC 1 DIMM 1 <===== device Bank Locator: Not Specified <===== bank This results in a buffer overflow because ghes_edac_register() calls strlen() on an uninitialized label, which had non-zero values left over from krealloc_array(): detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:983! invalid opcode: 0000 [shr-distribution#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G I 5.18.6-200.fc36.x86_64 shr-distribution#1 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 03/15/2019 RIP: 0010:fortify_panic ... Call Trace: <TASK> ghes_edac_register.cold ghes_probe platform_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __driver_attach ? __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_dev bus_add_driver driver_register acpi_ghes_init acpi_init ? acpi_sleep_proc_init do_one_initcall The label contains garbage because the commit in Fixes reallocs the DIMMs array while scanning the system but doesn't clear the newly allocated memory. Change dimm_setup_label() to always initialize the label to fix the issue. Set it to the empty string in case BIOS does not provide both bank and device so that ghes_edac_register() can keep the default label given by edac_mc_alloc_dimms(). [ bp: Rewrite commit message. ] Fixes: b9cae27 ("EDAC/ghes: Scan the system once on driver init") Co-developed-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719220124.760359-1-toshi.kani@hpe.com
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Aug 12, 2022
While RTC clock was added in H616 ccu_common list, it was not in H6 list. That caused invalid pointer dereference like this: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000020c Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000004d574000 [000000000000020c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [shr-distribution#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 PID: 339 Comm: cat Tainted: G B 5.18.0-rc1+ #1352 Hardware name: Tanix TX6 (DT) pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : ccu_gate_is_enabled+0x48/0x74 lr : ccu_gate_is_enabled+0x40/0x74 sp : ffff80000c0b76d0 x29: ffff80000c0b76d0 x28: 00000000016e3600 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000002 x24: ffff00000952fe08 x23: ffff800009611400 x22: ffff00000952fe79 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff80000aad6f08 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d x16: 2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d x15: 2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000f2f2f2f2 x12: ffff700001816e89 x11: 1ffff00001816e88 x10: ffff700001816e88 x9 : dfff800000000000 x8 : ffff80000c0b7447 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff700001816e88 x5 : ffff80000c0b7440 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800008935c50 x2 : dfff800000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000020c Call trace: ccu_gate_is_enabled+0x48/0x74 clk_core_is_enabled+0x7c/0x1c0 clk_summary_show_subtree+0x1dc/0x334 clk_summary_show_subtree+0x250/0x334 clk_summary_show_subtree+0x250/0x334 clk_summary_show_subtree+0x250/0x334 clk_summary_show_subtree+0x250/0x334 clk_summary_show+0x90/0xdc seq_read_iter+0x248/0x6d4 seq_read+0x17c/0x1fc full_proxy_read+0x90/0xf0 vfs_read+0xdc/0x28c ksys_read+0xc8/0x174 __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x5c invoke_syscall+0x60/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x160 do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa0 el0_svc+0x68/0x160 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x140 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 Code: d1006260 97e5c981 785e8260 8b0002a0 (b9400000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix that by adding rtc clock to H6 ccu_common list too. Fixes: 38d321b ("clk: sunxi-ng: h6-r: Add RTC gate clock") Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719183725.2605141-1-jernej.skrabec@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Tofee
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Aug 12, 2022
…able Some cloud hypervisors do not provide IBPB on very recent CPU processors, including AMD processors affected by Retbleed. Using IBPB before firmware calls on such systems would cause a GPF at boot like the one below. Do not enable such calls when IBPB support is not present. EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17 general protection fault, maybe for address 0x1: 0000 [shr-distribution#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ shr-distribution#7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts RIP: 0010:efi_call_rts Code: e8 37 33 58 ff 41 bf 48 00 00 00 49 89 c0 44 89 f9 48 83 c8 01 4c 89 c2 48 c1 ea 20 66 90 b9 49 00 00 00 b8 01 00 00 00 31 d2 <0f> 30 e8 7b 9f 5d ff e8 f6 f8 ff ff 4c 89 f1 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 48 RSP: 0018:ffffb373800d7e38 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000000049 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff94fbc19d8fe0 RDI: ffff94fbc1b2b300 RBP: ffffb373800d7e70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000000000000b R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffffb3738001fd78 R13: ffff94fbc2fcfc00 R14: ffffb3738001fd80 R15: 0000000000000048 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94fc3da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff94fc30201000 CR3: 000000006f610000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __wake_up process_one_work worker_thread ? rescuer_thread kthread ? kthread_complete_and_exit ret_from_fork </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 28a99e9 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls") Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728122602.2500509-1-cascardo@canonical.com
shr-project
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Aug 13, 2022
commit 7ae19d4 upstream. A kasan error was reported during fuzzing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in neon_poly1305_blocks.constprop.0+0x1b4/0x250 [poly1305_neon] Read of size 4 at addr ffff0010e293f010 by task syz-executor.5/1646715 CPU: 4 PID: 1646715 Comm: syz-executor.5 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0.aarch64 #1 Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.59 01/31/2019 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x394 show_stack+0x34/0x4c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x158/0x1e4 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x68/0x204 mm/kasan/report.c:387 __kasan_report+0xe0/0x140 mm/kasan/report.c:547 kasan_report+0x44/0xe0 mm/kasan/report.c:564 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:187 [inline] __asan_load4+0x94/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:252 neon_poly1305_blocks.constprop.0+0x1b4/0x250 [poly1305_neon] neon_poly1305_do_update+0x6c/0x15c [poly1305_neon] neon_poly1305_update+0x9c/0x1c4 [poly1305_neon] crypto_shash_update crypto/shash.c:131 [inline] shash_finup_unaligned+0x84/0x15c crypto/shash.c:179 crypto_shash_finup+0x8c/0x140 crypto/shash.c:193 shash_digest_unaligned+0xb8/0xe4 crypto/shash.c:201 crypto_shash_digest+0xa4/0xfc crypto/shash.c:217 crypto_shash_tfm_digest+0xb4/0x150 crypto/shash.c:229 essiv_skcipher_setkey+0x164/0x200 [essiv] crypto_skcipher_setkey+0xb0/0x160 crypto/skcipher.c:612 skcipher_setkey+0x3c/0x50 crypto/algif_skcipher.c:305 alg_setkey+0x114/0x2a0 crypto/af_alg.c:220 alg_setsockopt+0x19c/0x210 crypto/af_alg.c:253 __sys_setsockopt+0x190/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2123 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2134 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2131 [inline] __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x78/0x94 net/socket.c:2131 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x64/0x100 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x220/0x230 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 do_el0_svc+0xb4/0xd4 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:217 el0_svc+0x24/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:353 el0_sync_handler+0x160/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:369 el0_sync+0x160/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:683 This error can be reproduced by the following code compiled as ko on a system with kasan enabled: #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/poly1305.h> char test_data[] = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e"; int init(void) { struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL; char *data = NULL, *out = NULL; tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("poly1305", 0, 0); data = kmalloc(POLY1305_KEY_SIZE - 1, GFP_KERNEL); out = kmalloc(POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); memcpy(data, test_data, POLY1305_KEY_SIZE - 1); crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, data, POLY1305_KEY_SIZE - 1, out); kfree(data); kfree(out); return 0; } void deinit(void) { } module_init(init) module_exit(deinit) MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); The root cause of the bug sits in neon_poly1305_blocks. The logic neon_poly1305_blocks() performed is that if it was called with both s[] and r[] uninitialized, it will first try to initialize them with the data from the first "block" that it believed to be 32 bytes in length. First 16 bytes are used as the key and the next 16 bytes for s[]. This would lead to the aforementioned read out-of-bound. However, after calling poly1305_init_arch(), only 16 bytes were deducted from the input and s[] is initialized yet again with the following 16 bytes. The second initialization of s[] is certainly redundent which indicates that the first initialization should be for r[] only. This patch fixes the issue by calling poly1305_init_arm64() instead of poly1305_init_arch(). This is also the implementation for the same algorithm on arm platform. Fixes: f569ca1 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Temporary fix for torvalds#749
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Nizov nizovn@gmail.com