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net: socionext: align NETSEC driver with v4+ submission #3
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The v3/v4 upstream submissions of the NETSEC driver made a backward incompatible change to the DT binding, where the PHY node has been moved into an intermediate MDIO subnode rather than appearing directly under the NETSEC controller node. The new driver can deal with both arrangements, but the old driver will cease to work once systems are upgraded to a new firmware version that uses the new (and official) version of the binding. Therefore, we need to update the driver in erp-noupstream, so the v4.14 installer may still be used regardless of the firmware version, allowing users to upgrade their firmware without regard for which kernel version they are using. NOTE: There was a bug in v4 in the microcode loading routine. A fix has been incorporated into this patch. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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Dec 27, 2017
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aarch64 unhandled signal kernel messages are very verbose, suggesting them to be more of a debugging aid: sigsegv[33]: unhandled level 2 translation fault (11) at 0x00000000, esr 0x92000046, in sigsegv[400000+71000] CPU: 1 PID: 33 Comm: sigsegv Tainted: G W 4.15.0-rc3+ #3 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60000000 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : 0x4003f4 lr : 0x4006bc sp : 0000fffffe94a060 x29: 0000fffffe94a070 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000004001b0 x23: 0000000000486ac8 x22: 00000000004001c8 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000400be8 x19: 0000000000400b30 x18: 0000000000484728 x17: 000000000865ffc8 x16: 000000000000270f x15: 00000000000000b0 x14: 0000000000000002 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0008000020008008 x9 : 000000000000000f x8 : ffffffffffffffff x7 : 0004000000000000 x6 : ffffffffffffffff x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000004003e4 x2 : 0000fffffe94a1e8 x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000000 Disable them by default, so they can be enabled using /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) torvalds#7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) torvalds#8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) torvalds#9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) torvalds#10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) torvalds#11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209084947.22749-1-ying.huang@intel.com Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as follows: [ 347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510 [...] [ 347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [...] [ 347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10 [ 347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000 [ 347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a [ 347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61) [ 347.235221] Call trace: [ 347.237656] 0xffff000002f3a4fc [ 347.240784] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 347.244260] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 347.248694] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 347.251999] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b) [...] In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1 at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index; here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2. While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code emission: # bpftool p d j i 988 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: cmp w2, w10 40: b.ge 0x000000000000007c <-- signed cmp 44: mov x10, #0x20 // torvalds#32 48: cmp x26, x10 4c: b.gt 0x000000000000007c 50: add x26, x26, #0x1 54: mov x10, #0x110 // torvalds#272 58: add x10, x1, x10 5c: lsl x11, x2, #3 60: ldr x11, [x10,x11] <-- faulting insn (f86b694b) 64: cbz x11, 0x000000000000007c [...] Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing. Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccd ("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here, too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616. Result after patch: # bpftool p d j i 268 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: add w2, w2, #0x0 40: cmp w2, w10 44: b.cs 0x0000000000000080 48: mov x10, #0x20 // torvalds#32 4c: cmp x26, x10 50: b.hi 0x0000000000000080 54: add x26, x26, #0x1 58: mov x10, #0x110 // torvalds#272 5c: add x10, x1, x10 60: lsl x11, x2, #3 64: ldr x11, [x10,x11] 68: cbz x11, 0x0000000000000080 [...] Fixes: ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently we can crash perf record when running in pipe mode, like: $ perf record ls | perf report # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options. # perf: Segmentation fault Error: The - file has no samples! The callstack of the crash is: 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name 3513 ev = event_update_event__new(len + 1, PERF_EVENT_UPDATE__NAME, evsel->id[0]); (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name #1 0x00000000005158a4 in perf_event__synthesize_extra_attr #2 0x0000000000443347 in record__synthesize #3 0x00000000004438e3 in __cmd_record #4 0x000000000044514e in cmd_record #5 0x00000000004cbc95 in run_builtin #6 0x00000000004cbf02 in handle_internal_command torvalds#7 0x00000000004cc054 in run_argv torvalds#8 0x00000000004cc422 in main The reason of the crash is that the evsel does not have ids array allocated and the pipe's synthesize code tries to access it. We don't force evsel ids allocation when we have single event, because it's not needed. However we need it when we are in pipe mode even for single event as a key for evsel update event. Fixing this by forcing evsel ids allocation event for single event, when we are in pipe mode. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180302161354.30192-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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syzbot reported a LOCKDEP splat [1] in rt6_age_examine_exception() rt6_age_examine_exception() is called while rt6_exception_lock is held. This lock is the lower one in the lock hierarchy, thus we can not call dst_neigh_lookup() function, as it can fallback to neigh_create() We should instead do a pure RCU lookup. As a bonus we avoid a pair of atomic operations on neigh refcount. [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc4+ torvalds#277 Not tainted syz-executor7/4015 is trying to acquire lock: (&ndev->lock){++--}, at: [<00000000416dce19>] __ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x45/0x350 net/ipv6/mcast.c:928 but task is already holding lock: (&tbl->lock){++-.}, at: [<00000000b5cb1d65>] neigh_ifdown+0x3d/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:292 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&tbl->lock){++-.}: __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312 __neigh_create+0x87e/0x1d90 net/core/neighbour.c:528 neigh_create include/net/neighbour.h:315 [inline] ip6_neigh_lookup+0x9a7/0xba0 net/ipv6/route.c:228 dst_neigh_lookup include/net/dst.h:405 [inline] rt6_age_examine_exception net/ipv6/route.c:1609 [inline] rt6_age_exceptions+0x381/0x660 net/ipv6/route.c:1645 fib6_age+0xfb/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2033 fib6_clean_node+0x389/0x580 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1919 fib6_walk_continue+0x46c/0x8a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1845 fib6_walk+0x91/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1893 fib6_clean_tree+0x1e6/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1970 __fib6_clean_all+0x1f4/0x3a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1986 fib6_clean_all net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1997 [inline] fib6_run_gc+0x16b/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2053 ndisc_netdev_event+0x3c2/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1781 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x262/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6960 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 devinet_ioctl+0x126a/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1080 inet_ioctl+0x184/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:919 sock_do_ioctl+0xef/0x390 net/socket.c:957 sock_ioctl+0x36b/0x610 net/socket.c:1081 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #2 (rt6_exception_lock){+.-.}: __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] rt6_flush_exceptions+0x21/0x210 net/ipv6/route.c:1367 fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1677 [inline] fib6_del+0x624/0x12c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1761 __ip6_del_rt+0xc7/0x120 net/ipv6/route.c:2980 ip6_del_rt+0x132/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2993 __ipv6_dev_ac_dec+0x3b1/0x600 net/ipv6/anycast.c:332 ipv6_dev_ac_dec net/ipv6/anycast.c:345 [inline] ipv6_sock_ac_close+0x2b4/0x3e0 net/ipv6/anycast.c:200 inet6_release+0x48/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:433 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:594 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149 __fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:209 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243 task_work_run+0x199/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x9bb/0x1ad0 kernel/exit.c:865 do_group_exit+0x149/0x400 kernel/exit.c:968 get_signal+0x73a/0x16d0 kernel/signal.c:2469 do_signal+0x90/0x1e90 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:809 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x258/0x2f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6ec/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #1 (&(&tb->tb6_lock)->rlock){+.-.}: __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] __ip6_ins_rt+0x56/0x90 net/ipv6/route.c:1007 ip6_route_add+0x141/0x190 net/ipv6/route.c:2955 addrconf_prefix_route+0x44f/0x620 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:2359 fixup_permanent_addr net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3368 [inline] addrconf_permanent_addr net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3391 [inline] addrconf_notify+0x1ad2/0x2310 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3460 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x15d/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6958 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 do_setlink+0xa22/0x3bb0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2357 rtnl_newlink+0xf37/0x1a50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2965 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x57f/0xb10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4641 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x380 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2444 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4659 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1308 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1334 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1897 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:639 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2047 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2081 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2092 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2088 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (&ndev->lock){++--}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312 __ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x45/0x350 net/ipv6/mcast.c:928 ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x110/0x1f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:961 pndisc_destructor+0x21a/0x340 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:392 pneigh_ifdown net/core/neighbour.c:695 [inline] neigh_ifdown+0x149/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:294 rt6_disable_ip+0x537/0x700 net/ipv6/route.c:3874 addrconf_ifdown+0x14b/0x14f0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3633 addrconf_notify+0x5f8/0x2310 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3557 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x262/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6960 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 devinet_ioctl+0x126a/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1080 inet_ioctl+0x184/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:919 packet_ioctl+0x1ff/0x310 net/packet/af_packet.c:4066 sock_do_ioctl+0xef/0x390 net/socket.c:957 sock_ioctl+0x36b/0x610 net/socket.c:1081 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ndev->lock --> rt6_exception_lock --> &tbl->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&tbl->lock); lock(rt6_exception_lock); lock(&tbl->lock); lock(&ndev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz-executor7/4015: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a2f16daa>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (&tbl->lock){++-.}, at: [<00000000b5cb1d65>] neigh_ifdown+0x3d/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:292 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4015 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ torvalds#277 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x2cd/0x2dc kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1223 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1863 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1976 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2417 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x30a8/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431 lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312 __ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x45/0x350 net/ipv6/mcast.c:928 ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x110/0x1f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:961 pndisc_destructor+0x21a/0x340 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:392 pneigh_ifdown net/core/neighbour.c:695 [inline] neigh_ifdown+0x149/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:294 rt6_disable_ip+0x537/0x700 net/ipv6/route.c:3874 addrconf_ifdown+0x14b/0x14f0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3633 addrconf_notify+0x5f8/0x2310 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3557 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x262/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6960 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 devinet_ioctl+0x126a/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1080 inet_ioctl+0x184/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:919 packet_ioctl+0x1ff/0x310 net/packet/af_packet.c:4066 sock_do_ioctl+0xef/0x390 net/socket.c:957 sock_ioctl+0x36b/0x610 net/socket.c:1081 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 Fixes: c757faa ("ipv6: prepare fib6_age() for exception table") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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commit 31286a8 upstream. Recently the following BUG was reported: Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x3c0000 at process virtual address 0x7fe300000000 Memory failure: 0x3c0000: recovery action for huge page: Recovered BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8dfcc0003000 IP: gup_pgd_range+0x1f0/0xc20 PGD 17ae72067 P4D 17ae72067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI ... CPU: 3 PID: 5467 Comm: hugetlb_1gb Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-mm1-abc+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.fc25 04/01/2014 You can easily reproduce this by calling madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) twice on a 1GB hugepage. This happens because get_user_pages_fast() is not aware of a migration entry on pud that was created in the 1st madvise() event. I think that conversion to pud-aligned migration entry is working, but other MM code walking over page table isn't prepared for it. We need some time and effort to make all this work properly, so this patch avoids the reported bug by just disabling error handling for 1GB hugepage. [n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com: v2] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517284444-18149-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517207283-15769-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c64576 upstream. syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2] We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding: 1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally, sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA deadlock). 2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave the mcast group (sock_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> rtnl_lock) they hang. Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path, now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes. Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread. [1] IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ... WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 but task is already holding lock: IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ... (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000703f78e3>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431 lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643 inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595 start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261 udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x446a69 RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69 RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8 R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60 [2] IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4, id = 0 IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ... INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ torvalds#284 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. syz-executor7 D23688 25421 4408 0x00000004 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline] __schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440 schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499 schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline] __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline] wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline] wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139 kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530 stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253 sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x454889 RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889 RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001 Showing all locks held in the system: 2 locks held by khungtaskd/868: #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline] #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60 kernel/hung_task.c:249 #1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [<0000000037c2f8f9>] debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470 1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247: #0: (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [<000000000d8d6983>] __fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765 2 locks held by getty/4338: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4339: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4340: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4341: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4342: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4343: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4344: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494: #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084 #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000278427d5>] process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088 #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421: #0: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000d414a689>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393 2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000e6d48489>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e0b26cc ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3a38bb9 upstream. syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b30 ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b30 ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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May 17, 2018
commit 352672d upstream. Currently; we're grabbing all of the modesetting locks before adding MST connectors to fbdev. This isn't actually necessary, and causes a deadlock as well: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/1:0/18 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000c832f62d (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] but task is already holding lock: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 drm_modeset_lock+0x71/0x130 [drm] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x7d/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x58/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}: drm_setup_crtcs+0x10c/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&helper->lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &helper->lock --> crtc_ww_class_acquire --> crtc_ww_class_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(crtc_ww_class_acquire); lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(&helper->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/1:0/18: #0: 000000004a05cd50 ((wq_completion)"events_long"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #1: 00000000601c11d1 ((work_completion)(&mgr->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #2: 00000000586ca0df (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3a/0x1b0 [drm] #3: 00000000d3ca0ffa (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x44/0x1b0 [drm] #4: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Hardware name: Gateway FX6840/FX6840, BIOS P01-A3 05/17/2010 Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xcb print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x1ce/0x1db __lock_acquire+0x128f/0x1350 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.13+0x8f/0x1000 lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? drm_modeset_lock+0xb2/0x130 [drm] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 ? kfree+0xcf/0x2a0 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xed/0x180 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? nouveau_connector_aux_xfer+0x7c/0xb0 [nouveau] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3b/0x280 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 ? process_one_work+0x650/0x650 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Taking example from i915, the only time we need to hold any modesetting locks is when changing the port on the mstc, and in that case we only need to hold the connection mutex. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d754941 ] If, for any reason, userland shuts down iscsi transport interfaces before proper logouts - like when logging in to LUNs manually, without logging out on server shutdown, or when automated scripts can't umount/logout from logged LUNs - kernel will hang forever on its sd_sync_cache() logic, after issuing the SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE cmd to all still existent paths. PID: 1 TASK: ffff8801a69b8000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffff8801a69c3a30] __schedule at ffffffff8183e9ee #1 [ffff8801a69c3a80] schedule at ffffffff8183f0d5 #2 [ffff8801a69c3a98] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81842199 #3 [ffff8801a69c3b40] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8183e604 #4 [ffff8801a69c3b70] wait_for_completion_io_timeout at ffffffff8183fc6c #5 [ffff8801a69c3bd0] blk_execute_rq at ffffffff813cfe10 #6 [ffff8801a69c3c88] scsi_execute at ffffffff815c3fc7 torvalds#7 [ffff8801a69c3cc8] scsi_execute_req_flags at ffffffff815c60fe torvalds#8 [ffff8801a69c3d30] sd_sync_cache at ffffffff815d37d7 torvalds#9 [ffff8801a69c3da8] sd_shutdown at ffffffff815d3c3c This happens because iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out(), the transport layer timeout helper, would tell the queue timeout function (scsi_times_out) to reset the request timer over and over, until the session state is back to logged in state. Unfortunately, during server shutdown, this might never happen again. Other option would be "not to handle" the issue in the transport layer. That would trigger the error handler logic, which would also need the session state to be logged in again. Best option, for such case, is to tell upper layers that the command was handled during the transport layer error handler helper, marking it as DID_NO_CONNECT, which will allow completion and inform about the problem. After the session was marked as ISCSI_STATE_FAILED, due to the first timeout during the server shutdown phase, all subsequent cmds will fail to be queued, allowing upper logic to fail faster. Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco <rafael.tinoco@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 #1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 #2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 #3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c #4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 #5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 #6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 torvalds#7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] torvalds#9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 torvalds#10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 torvalds#11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 #1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf #2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 #3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb #4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] #5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] #6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] torvalds#7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] torvalds#8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c64576 upstream. syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2] We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding: 1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally, sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA deadlock). 2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave the mcast group (sock_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> rtnl_lock) they hang. Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path, now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes. Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread. [1] IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ... WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 but task is already holding lock: IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ... (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000703f78e3>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431 lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643 inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595 start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261 udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x446a69 RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69 RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8 R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60 [2] IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4, id = 0 IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ... INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ torvalds#284 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. syz-executor7 D23688 25421 4408 0x00000004 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline] __schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440 schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499 schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline] __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline] wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline] wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139 kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530 stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253 sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x454889 RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889 RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001 Showing all locks held in the system: 2 locks held by khungtaskd/868: #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline] #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60 kernel/hung_task.c:249 #1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [<0000000037c2f8f9>] debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470 1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247: #0: (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [<000000000d8d6983>] __fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765 2 locks held by getty/4338: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4339: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4340: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4341: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4342: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4343: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4344: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494: #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084 #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000278427d5>] process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088 #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421: #0: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000d414a689>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393 2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000e6d48489>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e0b26cc ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 352672d upstream. Currently; we're grabbing all of the modesetting locks before adding MST connectors to fbdev. This isn't actually necessary, and causes a deadlock as well: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/1:0/18 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000c832f62d (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] but task is already holding lock: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 drm_modeset_lock+0x71/0x130 [drm] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x7d/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x58/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}: drm_setup_crtcs+0x10c/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&helper->lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &helper->lock --> crtc_ww_class_acquire --> crtc_ww_class_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(crtc_ww_class_acquire); lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(&helper->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/1:0/18: #0: 000000004a05cd50 ((wq_completion)"events_long"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #1: 00000000601c11d1 ((work_completion)(&mgr->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #2: 00000000586ca0df (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3a/0x1b0 [drm] #3: 00000000d3ca0ffa (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x44/0x1b0 [drm] #4: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Hardware name: Gateway FX6840/FX6840, BIOS P01-A3 05/17/2010 Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xcb print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x1ce/0x1db __lock_acquire+0x128f/0x1350 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.13+0x8f/0x1000 lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? drm_modeset_lock+0xb2/0x130 [drm] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 ? kfree+0xcf/0x2a0 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xed/0x180 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? nouveau_connector_aux_xfer+0x7c/0xb0 [nouveau] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3b/0x280 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 ? process_one_work+0x650/0x650 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Taking example from i915, the only time we need to hold any modesetting locks is when changing the port on the mstc, and in that case we only need to hold the connection mutex. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…s found [ Upstream commit 72f17ba ] If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes torvalds#9 to torvalds#11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread torvalds#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ torvalds#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…s found [ Upstream commit 72f17ba ] If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes torvalds#9 to torvalds#11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread torvalds#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 torvalds#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] torvalds#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ torvalds#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fca3234 ] Executing command 'perf stat -T -- ls' dumps core on x86 and s390. Here is the call back chain (done on x86): # gdb ./perf .... (gdb) r stat -T -- ls ... Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007ffff56d1963 in vasprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) where #0 0x00007ffff56d1963 in vasprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff56ae484 in asprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00000000004f1982 in __parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, list=0xbfb970, name=0xbf3ef0 "cpu", head_config=0xbfb930, auto_merge_stats=false) at util/parse-events.c:1233 #3 0x00000000004f1c8e in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, list=0xbfb970, name=0xbf3ef0 "cpu", head_config=0xbfb930) at util/parse-events.c:1288 #4 0x0000000000537ce3 in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, scanner=0xbf4210) at util/parse-events.y:234 #5 0x00000000004f2c7a in parse_events__scanner (str=0x6b66c0 "task-clock,{instructions,cycles,cpu/cycles-t/,cpu/tx-start/}", parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, start_token=258) at util/parse-events.c:1673 #6 0x00000000004f2e23 in parse_events (evlist=0xbe9990, str=0x6b66c0 "task-clock,{instructions,cycles,cpu/cycles-t/,cpu/tx-start/}", err=0x0) at util/parse-events.c:1713 torvalds#7 0x000000000044e137 in add_default_attributes () at builtin-stat.c:2281 torvalds#8 0x000000000044f7b5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at builtin-stat.c:2828 torvalds#9 0x00000000004c8b0f in run_builtin (p=0xab01a0 <commands+288>, argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:297 torvalds#10 0x00000000004c8d7c in handle_internal_command (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:349 torvalds#11 0x00000000004c8ece in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe20c, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:393 torvalds#12 0x00000000004c929c in main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:537 (gdb) It turns out that a NULL pointer is referenced. Here are the function calls: ... cmd_stat() +---> add_default_attributes() +---> parse_events(evsel_list, transaction_attrs, NULL); 3rd parameter set to NULL Function parse_events(xx, xx, struct parse_events_error *err) dives into a bison generated scanner and creates parser state information for it first: struct parse_events_state parse_state = { .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(parse_state.list), .idx = evlist->nr_entries, .error = err, <--- NULL POINTER !!! .evlist = evlist, }; Now various functions inside the bison scanner are called to end up in __parse_events_add_pmu(struct parse_events_state *parse_state, ..) with first parameter being a pointer to above structure definition. Now the PMU event name is not found (because being executed in a VM) and this function tries to create an error message with asprintf(&parse_state->error.str, ....) which references a NULL pointer and dumps core. Fix this by providing a pointer to the necessary error information instead of NULL. Technically only the else part is needed to avoid the core dump, just lets be safe... Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180308145735.64717-1-tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e ] when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely) the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks. PID: 6766 TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 #1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49 #2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995 #3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef #4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod] #5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50 #6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3 torvalds#7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs] torvalds#8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570 torvalds#9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs] torvalds#10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09 torvalds#11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f torvalds#12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee torvalds#13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6 torvalds#14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210 RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290 RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000c0ed0001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040 R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380 R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210 R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task was trying to mount the cdrom. It allocated and configured a super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock. PID: 6785 TASK: ffff880078720fb0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "systemd-udevd" #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 #1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59 #2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605 #3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838 #4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0 #5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7 #6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de torvalds#7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b torvalds#8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50 torvalds#9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom] torvalds#10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod] torvalds#11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86 torvalds#12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65 torvalds#13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b torvalds#14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7 torvalds#15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf torvalds#16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d torvalds#17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2 torvalds#18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b torvalds#19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33 torvalds#20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e torvalds#21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007f29438b0c20 RSP: 00007ffc76624b78 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70 RSI: 00000000000a0800 RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70 RBP: 00007f2944a5f540 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000020 R10: 00007f2943614c40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffff811fde4e R13: ffff880078417f78 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007f2944a4b010 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change() then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried to flush any cached data for the device. As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount lock associated with the cdrom device. This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task. The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock; the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock. This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d546b67 ] spin_lock/unlock was used instead of spin_un/lock_irq in a procedure used in process space, on a spinlock which can be grabbed in an interrupt. This caused the stack trace below to be displayed (on kernel 4.17.0-rc1 compiled with Lock Debugging enabled): [ 154.661474] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 154.668909] 4.17.0-rc1-rdma_rc_mlx+ #3 Tainted: G I [ 154.675856] ----------------------------------------------------- [ 154.682706] modprobe/10159 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: [ 154.690254] 00000000f3b0e495 (&(&qp_table->lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: mlx4_qp_remove+0x20/0x50 [mlx4_core] [ 154.700927] and this task is already holding: [ 154.707461] 0000000094373b5d (&(&cq->lock)->rlock/1){....}, at: destroy_qp_common+0x111/0x560 [mlx4_ib] [ 154.718028] which would create a new lock dependency: [ 154.723705] (&(&cq->lock)->rlock/1){....} -> (&(&qp_table->lock)->rlock){+.+.} [ 154.731922] but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: [ 154.740798] (&(&cq->lock)->rlock){..-.} [ 154.740800] ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at: [ 154.752163] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0x50 [ 154.757163] mlx4_ib_poll_cq+0x36/0x900 [mlx4_ib] [ 154.762554] ipoib_tx_poll+0x4a/0xf0 [ib_ipoib] ... to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: [ 154.815603] (&(&qp_table->lock)->rlock){+.+.} [ 154.815604] ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at: [ 154.827718] ... [ 154.827720] _raw_spin_lock+0x35/0x50 [ 154.833912] mlx4_qp_lookup+0x1e/0x50 [mlx4_core] [ 154.839302] mlx4_flow_attach+0x3f/0x3d0 [mlx4_core] Since mlx4_qp_lookup() is called only in process space, we can simply replace the spin_un/lock calls with spin_un/lock_irq calls. Fixes: 6dc06c0 ("net/mlx4: Fix the check in attaching steering rules") Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sep 10, 2018
commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e torvalds#7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c torvalds#8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 torvalds#10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c torvalds#11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b torvalds#12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 torvalds#13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b torvalds#14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a torvalds#15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 torvalds#16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 torvalds#17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a torvalds#18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 torvalds#19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d torvalds#20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 torvalds#21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e04e7a7 ] This patch fixes the race between netvsc_probe() and rndis_set_subchannel(), which can cause a deadlock. These are the related 3 paths which show the deadlock: path #1: Workqueue: hv_vmbus_con vmbus_onmessage_work [hv_vmbus] Call Trace: schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock __device_attach bus_probe_device device_add vmbus_device_register vmbus_onoffer vmbus_onmessage_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork path #2: schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock netvsc_probe vmbus_probe really_probe __driver_attach bus_for_each_dev driver_attach_async async_run_entry_fn process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork path #3: Workqueue: events netvsc_subchan_work [hv_netvsc] Call Trace: schedule rndis_set_subchannel netvsc_subchan_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork Before path #1 finishes, path #2 can start to run, because just before the "bus_probe_device(dev);" in device_add() in path #1, there is a line "object_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);", so systemd-udevd can immediately try to load hv_netvsc and hence path #2 can start to run. Next, path #2 offloads the subchannal's initialization to a workqueue, i.e. path #3, so we can end up in a deadlock situation like this: Path #2 gets the device lock, and is trying to get the rtnl lock; Path #3 gets the rtnl lock and is waiting for all the subchannel messages to be processed; Path #1 is trying to get the device lock, but since #2 is not releasing the device lock, path #1 has to sleep; since the VMBus messages are processed one by one, this means the sub-channel messages can't be procedded, so #3 has to sleep with the rtnl lock held, and finally #2 has to sleep... Now all the 3 paths are sleeping and we hit the deadlock. With the patch, we can make sure #2 gets both the device lock and the rtnl lock together, gets its job done, and releases the locks, so #1 and #3 will not be blocked for ever. Fixes: 8195b13 ("hv_netvsc: fix deadlock on hotplug") Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9c86336 ] If load ip6_vti module and create a network namespace when set fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net to 1, then exit the namespace will cause following crash: [ 6601.677036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 6601.679057] PGD 8000000425eca067 P4D 8000000425eca067 PUD 424292067 PMD 0 [ 6601.680483] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 6601.681223] CPU: 7 PID: 93 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 4.18.0+ #3 [ 6601.683153] Hardware name: Fedora Project OpenStack Nova, BIOS seabios-1.7.5-11.el7 04/01/2014 [ 6601.684919] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 6601.685742] RIP: 0010:vti6_exit_batch_net+0x87/0xd0 [ip6_vti] [ 6601.686932] Code: 7b 08 48 89 e6 e8 b9 ea d3 dd 48 8b 1b 48 85 db 75 ec 48 83 c5 08 48 81 fd 00 01 00 00 75 d5 49 8b 84 24 08 01 00 00 48 89 e6 <48> 8b 78 08 e8 90 ea d3 dd 49 8b 45 28 49 39 c6 4c 8d 68 d8 75 a1 [ 6601.690735] RSP: 0018:ffffa897c2737de0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6601.691846] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dead000000000200 [ 6601.693324] RDX: 0000000000000015 RSI: ffffa897c2737de0 RDI: ffffffff9f2ea9e0 [ 6601.694824] RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6601.696314] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8dc323c07e00 [ 6601.697812] R13: ffff8dc324a63100 R14: ffffa897c2737e30 R15: ffffa897c2737e30 [ 6601.699345] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8dc33fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6601.701068] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6601.702282] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000424966002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 6601.703791] Call Trace: [ 6601.704329] cleanup_net+0x1b4/0x2c0 [ 6601.705268] process_one_work+0x16c/0x370 [ 6601.706145] worker_thread+0x49/0x3e0 [ 6601.706942] kthread+0xf8/0x130 [ 6601.707626] ? rescuer_thread+0x340/0x340 [ 6601.708476] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 6601.709266] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Reproduce: modprobe ip6_vti echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net unshare -n exit This because ip6n->tnls_wc[0] point to fallback device in default, but in non-default namespace, ip6n->tnls_wc[0] will be NULL, so add the NULL check comparatively. Fixes: e2948e5 ("ip6_vti: fix creating fallback tunnel device for vti6") Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 21b172e ] Fix the warning below by calling rhashtable_lookup_fast. Also, make some code movements for better quality and human readability. [ 342.450870] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 342.455856] 4.18.0-rc2+ torvalds#17 Tainted: G O [ 342.462210] ----------------------------- [ 342.467202] ./include/linux/rhashtable.h:481 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 342.476568] [ 342.476568] other info that might help us debug this: [ 342.476568] [ 342.486978] [ 342.486978] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 342.495211] 4 locks held by modprobe/3934: [ 342.500265] #0: 00000000e23116b2 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}, at: mlx5_unregister_interface+0x18/0x90 [mlx5_core] [ 342.511953] #1: 00000000ca16db96 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20 [ 342.521109] #2: 00000000a46e2c4b (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}, at: mlx5e_close+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 342.531642] #3: 0000000060c5bde3 (mem_id_lock){+.+.}, at: xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x93/0x6b0 [ 342.541206] [ 342.541206] stack backtrace: [ 342.547075] CPU: 12 PID: 3934 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc2+ torvalds#17 [ 342.556621] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0H21J3, BIOS 1.5.4 10/002/2015 [ 342.565606] Call Trace: [ 342.568861] dump_stack+0x78/0xb3 [ 342.573086] xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x3f5/0x6b0 [ 342.578285] ? __call_rcu+0x220/0x300 [ 342.582911] mlx5e_free_rq+0x38/0xc0 [mlx5_core] [ 342.588602] mlx5e_close_channel+0x20/0x120 [mlx5_core] [ 342.594976] mlx5e_close_channels+0x26/0x40 [mlx5_core] [ 342.601345] mlx5e_close_locked+0x44/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 342.607519] mlx5e_close+0x42/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 342.613005] __dev_close_many+0xb1/0x120 [ 342.617911] dev_close_many+0xa2/0x170 [ 342.622622] rollback_registered_many+0x148/0x460 [ 342.628401] ? __lock_acquire+0x48d/0x11b0 [ 342.633498] ? unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20 [ 342.638495] rollback_registered+0x56/0x90 [ 342.643588] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x7e/0x100 [ 342.649461] unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20 [ 342.654362] mlx5e_remove+0x2a/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 342.659944] mlx5_remove_device+0xe5/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 342.666208] mlx5_unregister_interface+0x39/0x90 [mlx5_core] [ 342.673038] cleanup+0x5/0xbfc [mlx5_core] [ 342.678094] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x16b/0x240 [ 342.683725] ? do_syscall_64+0x1c/0x210 [ 342.688476] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x210 [ 342.693025] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 8d5d885 ("xdp: rhashtable with allocator ID to pointer mapping") Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 46b3722 ] We occasionaly hit following assert failure in 'perf top', when processing the /proc info in multiple threads. perf: ...include/linux/refcount.h:109: refcount_inc: Assertion `!(!refcount_inc_not_zero(r))' failed. The gdb backtrace looks like this: [Switching to Thread 0x7ffff11ba700 (LWP 13749)] 0x00007ffff50839fb in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff50839fb in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff5085800 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007ffff507c0da in __assert_fail_base () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #3 0x00007ffff507c152 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #4 0x0000000000535373 in refcount_inc (r=0x7fffdc009be0) at ...include/linux/refcount.h:109 #5 0x00000000005354f1 in comm_str__get (cs=0x7fffdc009bc0) at util/comm.c:24 #6 0x00000000005356bd in __comm_str__findnew (str=0x7fffd000b260 ":2", root=0xbed5c0 <comm_str_root>) at util/comm.c:72 torvalds#7 0x000000000053579e in comm_str__findnew (str=0x7fffd000b260 ":2", root=0xbed5c0 <comm_str_root>) at util/comm.c:95 torvalds#8 0x000000000053582e in comm__new (str=0x7fffd000b260 ":2", timestamp=0, exec=false) at util/comm.c:111 torvalds#9 0x00000000005363bc in thread__new (pid=2, tid=2) at util/thread.c:57 torvalds#10 0x0000000000523da0 in ____machine__findnew_thread (machine=0xbfde38, threads=0xbfdf28, pid=2, tid=2, create=true) at util/machine.c:457 torvalds#11 0x0000000000523eb4 in __machine__findnew_thread (machine=0xbfde38, ... The failing assertion is this one: REFCOUNT_WARN(!refcount_inc_not_zero(r), ... The problem is that we keep global comm_str_root list, which is accessed by multiple threads during the 'perf top' startup and following 2 paths can race: thread 1: ... thread__new comm__new comm_str__findnew down_write(&comm_str_lock); __comm_str__findnew comm_str__get thread 2: ... comm__override or comm__free comm_str__put refcount_dec_and_test down_write(&comm_str_lock); rb_erase(&cs->rb_node, &comm_str_root); Because thread 2 first decrements the refcnt and only after then it removes the struct comm_str from the list, the thread 1 can find this object on the list with refcnt equls to 0 and hit the assert. This patch fixes the thread 1 __comm_str__findnew path, by ignoring objects that already dropped the refcnt to 0. For the rest of the objects we take the refcnt before comparing its name and release it afterwards with comm_str__put, which can also release the object completely. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Lukasz Odzioba <lukasz.odzioba@intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: kernel-team@lge.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180720101740.GA27176@krava Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Oct 3, 2018
[ Upstream commit b71c69c ] Fixes this warning that was provoked by a pairing: [60258.016221] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [60258.021558] 4.15.0-RD1812-BSP #1 Tainted: G O [60258.027146] -------------------------------------------- [60258.032464] kworker/u5:0/70 is trying to acquire lock: [60258.037609] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}, at: [<87759073>] bt_accept_enqueue+0x3c/0x74 [60258.046863] [60258.046863] but task is already holding lock: [60258.052704] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}, at: [<d22d7106>] l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb+0x1c/0x88 [60258.062905] [60258.062905] other info that might help us debug this: [60258.069441] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [60258.069441] [60258.075368] CPU0 [60258.077821] ---- [60258.080272] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); [60258.085510] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); [60258.090748] [60258.090748] *** DEADLOCK *** [60258.090748] [60258.096676] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [60258.096676] [60258.103472] 5 locks held by kworker/u5:0/70: [60258.107747] #0: ((wq_completion)%shdev->name#2){+.+.}, at: [<9460d092>] process_one_work+0x130/0x4fc [60258.117263] #1: ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}, at: [<9460d092>] process_one_work+0x130/0x4fc [60258.126942] #2: (&conn->chan_lock){+.+.}, at: [<7877c8c3>] l2cap_connect+0x80/0x4f8 [60258.134806] #3: (&chan->lock/2){+.+.}, at: [<2e16c724>] l2cap_connect+0x8c/0x4f8 [60258.142410] #4: (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}, at: [<d22d7106>] l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb+0x1c/0x88 [60258.153043] [60258.153043] stack backtrace: [60258.157413] CPU: 1 PID: 70 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G O 4.15.0-RD1812-BSP #1 [60258.165945] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) [60258.172485] Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [60258.176331] Backtrace: [60258.178797] [<8010c9fc>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010ccbc>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) [60258.186379] r7:80e55fe4 r6:80e55fe4 r5:20050093 r4:00000000 [60258.192058] [<8010cca4>] (show_stack) from [<809864e8>] (dump_stack+0xb0/0xdc) [60258.199301] [<80986438>] (dump_stack) from [<8016ecc8>] (__lock_acquire+0xffc/0x11d4) [60258.207144] r9:5e2bb019 r8:630f974c r7:ba8a5940 r6:ba8a5ed8 r5:815b5220 r4:80fa081c [60258.214901] [<8016dccc>] (__lock_acquire) from [<8016f620>] (lock_acquire+0x78/0x98) [60258.222655] r10:00000040 r9:00000040 r8:808729f0 r7:00000001 r6:00000000 r5:60050013 [60258.230491] r4:00000000 [60258.233045] [<8016f5a8>] (lock_acquire) from [<806ee974>] (lock_sock_nested+0x64/0x88) [60258.240970] r7:00000000 r6:b796e870 r5:00000001 r4:b796e800 [60258.246643] [<806ee910>] (lock_sock_nested) from [<808729f0>] (bt_accept_enqueue+0x3c/0x74) [60258.255004] r8:00000001 r7:ba7d3c00 r6:ba7d3ea4 r5:ba7d2000 r4:b796e800 [60258.261717] [<808729b4>] (bt_accept_enqueue) from [<808aa39c>] (l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb+0x68/0x88) [60258.271117] r5:b796e800 r4:ba7d2000 [60258.274708] [<808aa334>] (l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb) from [<808a294c>] (l2cap_connect+0x190/0x4f8) [60258.283933] r5:00000001 r4:ba6dce00 [60258.287524] [<808a27bc>] (l2cap_connect) from [<808a4a14>] (l2cap_recv_frame+0x744/0x2cf8) [60258.295800] r10:ba6dcf24 r9:00000004 r8:b78d8014 r7:00000004 r6:bb05d000 r5:00000004 [60258.303635] r4:bb05d008 [60258.306183] [<808a42d0>] (l2cap_recv_frame) from [<808a7808>] (l2cap_recv_acldata+0x210/0x214) [60258.314805] r10:b78e7800 r9:bb05d960 r8:00000001 r7:bb05d000 r6:0000000c r5:b7957a80 [60258.322641] r4:ba6dce00 [60258.325188] [<808a75f8>] (l2cap_recv_acldata) from [<8087630c>] (hci_rx_work+0x35c/0x4e8) [60258.333374] r6:80e5743c r5:bb05d7c8 r4:b7957a80 [60258.338004] [<80875fb0>] (hci_rx_work) from [<8013dc7c>] (process_one_work+0x1a4/0x4fc) [60258.346018] r10:00000001 r9:00000000 r8:baabfef8 r7:ba997500 r6:baaba800 r5:baaa5d00 [60258.353853] r4:bb05d7c8 [60258.356401] [<8013dad8>] (process_one_work) from [<8013e028>] (worker_thread+0x54/0x5cc) [60258.364503] r10:baabe038 r9:baaba834 r8:80e05900 r7:00000088 r6:baaa5d18 r5:baaba800 [60258.372338] r4:baaa5d00 [60258.374888] [<8013dfd4>] (worker_thread) from [<801448f8>] (kthread+0x134/0x160) [60258.382295] r10:ba8310b8 r9:bb07dbfc r8:8013dfd4 r7:baaa5d00 r6:00000000 r5:baaa8ac0 [60258.390130] r4:ba831080 [60258.392682] [<801447c4>] (kthread) from [<801080b4>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) [60258.399915] r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:801447c4 [60258.407751] r4:baaa8ac0 r3:baabe000 Signed-off-by: Philipp Puschmann <pp@emlix.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 018349d ] When netvsc device is removed it can call reschedule in RCU context. This happens because canceling the subchannel setup work could (in theory) cause a reschedule when manipulating the timer. To reproduce, run with lockdep enabled kernel and unbind a network device from hv_netvsc (via sysfs). [ 160.682011] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 160.707466] 4.19.0-rc3-uio+ #2 Not tainted [ 160.709937] ----------------------------- [ 160.712352] ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 160.723691] [ 160.723691] other info that might help us debug this: [ 160.723691] [ 160.730955] [ 160.730955] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 160.762813] 5 locks held by rebind-eth.sh/1812: [ 160.766851] #0: 000000008befa37a (sb_writers#6){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x184/0x1b0 [ 160.773416] #1: 00000000b097f236 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xe2/0x1a0 [ 160.783766] #2: 0000000041ee6889 (kn->count#3){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xeb/0x1a0 [ 160.787465] #3: 0000000056d92a74 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x250 [ 160.816987] #4: 0000000030f6031e (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: netvsc_remove+0x1e/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.828629] [ 160.828629] stack backtrace: [ 160.831966] CPU: 1 PID: 1812 Comm: rebind-eth.sh Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3-uio+ #2 [ 160.832952] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v1.0 11/26/2012 [ 160.832952] Call Trace: [ 160.832952] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 160.832952] ___might_sleep+0x1a3/0x240 [ 160.832952] __flush_work+0x57/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? __mutex_lock+0x83/0x990 [ 160.832952] ? __kernfs_remove+0x24f/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? __kernfs_remove+0x1b2/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 [ 160.832952] ? get_work_pool+0x90/0x90 [ 160.832952] __cancel_work_timer+0x13c/0x1e0 [ 160.832952] ? netvsc_remove+0x1e/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.832952] ? __lock_is_held+0x55/0x90 [ 160.832952] netvsc_remove+0x9a/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.832952] vmbus_remove+0x26/0x30 [ 160.832952] device_release_driver_internal+0x18a/0x250 [ 160.832952] unbind_store+0xb4/0x180 [ 160.832952] kernfs_fop_write+0x113/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] __vfs_write+0x36/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6b/0x80 [ 160.832952] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2e/0x60 [ 160.832952] ? __sb_start_write+0x141/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] ? vfs_write+0x184/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] vfs_write+0xbe/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] ksys_write+0x55/0xc0 [ 160.832952] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 160.832952] RIP: 0033:0x7fe48f4c8154 Resolve this by getting RTNL earlier. This is safe because the subchannel work queue does trylock on RTNL and will detect the race. Fixes: 7b2ee50 ("hv_netvsc: common detach logic") Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3e1a127 upstream. When we disable hotplugging on the GPU, we need to be able to synchronize with each connector's hotplug interrupt handler before the interrupt is finally disabled. This can be a problem however, since nouveau_connector_detect() currently grabs a runtime power reference when handling connector probing. This will deadlock the runtime suspend handler like so: [ 861.480896] INFO: task kworker/0:2:61 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.483290] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.485158] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.486332] kworker/0:2 D 0 61 2 0x80000000 [ 861.487044] Workqueue: events nouveau_display_hpd_work [nouveau] [ 861.487737] Call Trace: [ 861.488394] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.489070] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.489744] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 861.490392] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 861.491068] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 861.491753] nouveau_display_hpd_work+0x22/0x60 [nouveau] [ 861.492416] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.493068] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.493722] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.494342] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.494991] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.495648] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.496304] INFO: task kworker/6:2:320 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.496968] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.497654] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.498341] kworker/6:2 D 0 320 2 0x80000080 [ 861.499045] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 861.499739] Call Trace: [ 861.500428] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.501134] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.501851] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.502564] schedule_timeout+0x3a5/0x590 [ 861.503284] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x80 [ 861.503988] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 861.504710] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.505417] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x190 [ 861.506136] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.506845] wait_for_completion+0x12c/0x190 [ 861.507555] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80 [ 861.508268] flush_work+0x1c9/0x280 [ 861.508990] ? flush_workqueue_prep_pwqs+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 861.509735] nvif_notify_put+0xb1/0xc0 [nouveau] [ 861.510482] nouveau_display_fini+0xbd/0x170 [nouveau] [ 861.511241] nouveau_display_suspend+0x67/0x120 [nouveau] [ 861.511969] nouveau_do_suspend+0x5e/0x2d0 [nouveau] [ 861.512715] nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x47/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 861.513435] pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x6b/0x180 [ 861.514165] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.514897] __rpm_callback+0x7a/0x1d0 [ 861.515618] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.516313] rpm_callback+0x24/0x80 [ 861.517027] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.517741] rpm_suspend+0x142/0x6b0 [ 861.518449] pm_runtime_work+0x97/0xc0 [ 861.519144] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.519831] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.520522] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.521220] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.521925] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.522622] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.523299] INFO: task kworker/6:0:1329 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.523977] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.524644] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.525349] kworker/6:0 D 0 1329 2 0x80000000 [ 861.526073] Workqueue: events nvif_notify_work [nouveau] [ 861.526751] Call Trace: [ 861.527411] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.528089] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.528758] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 861.529399] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 861.530073] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 861.530798] nouveau_connector_detect+0x7e/0x510 [nouveau] [ 861.531459] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80 [ 861.532097] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80 [ 861.532819] ? drm_modeset_lock+0x88/0x130 [drm] [ 861.533481] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0xa0/0x100 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.534127] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xa4/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.534940] nouveau_connector_hotplug+0x98/0x120 [nouveau] [ 861.535556] nvif_notify_work+0x2d/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 861.536221] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.536994] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.537757] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.538463] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.539102] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.539815] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.540521] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 861.541696] 2 locks held by kworker/0:2/61: [ 861.542406] #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.543071] #1: 0000000076868126 ((work_completion)(&drm->hpd_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.543814] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/64: [ 861.544535] #0: 0000000059db4b53 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x23/0x185 [ 861.545160] 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/320: [ 861.545896] #0: 00000000d9e1bc59 ((wq_completion)"pm"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.546702] #1: 00000000c9f92d84 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.547443] #2: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: nouveau_display_fini+0x96/0x170 [nouveau] [ 861.548146] 1 lock held by dmesg/983: [ 861.548889] 2 locks held by zsh/1250: [ 861.549605] #0: 00000000348e3cf6 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 [ 861.550393] #1: 000000007009a7a8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: n_tty_read+0xc1/0x870 [ 861.551122] 6 locks held by kworker/6:0/1329: [ 861.551957] #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.552765] #1: 00000000ddb499ad ((work_completion)(¬ify->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.553582] #2: 000000006e013cbe (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x6c/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.554357] #3: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x78/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.555227] #4: 0000000044f294d9 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x3d/0x100 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.556133] #5: 00000000db193642 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock+0x4b/0x130 [drm] [ 861.557864] ============================================= [ 861.559507] NMI backtrace for cpu 2 [ 861.560363] CPU: 2 PID: 64 Comm: khungtaskd Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.561197] Hardware name: LENOVO 20EQS64N0B/20EQS64N0B, BIOS N1EET78W (1.51 ) 05/18/2018 [ 861.561948] Call Trace: [ 861.562757] dump_stack+0x8e/0xd3 [ 861.563516] nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.3+0x14/0x5a [ 861.564269] ? lapic_can_unplug_cpu.cold.27+0x42/0x42 [ 861.565029] nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xa1/0xae [ 861.565789] arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x19/0x20 [ 861.566558] watchdog+0x316/0x580 [ 861.567355] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.568114] ? reset_hung_task_detector+0x20/0x20 [ 861.568863] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.569598] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.570370] Sending NMI from CPU 2 to CPUs 0-1,3-7: [ 861.571426] NMI backtrace for cpu 6 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571429] NMI backtrace for cpu 7 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571432] NMI backtrace for cpu 3 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571464] NMI backtrace for cpu 5 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571467] NMI backtrace for cpu 0 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571469] NMI backtrace for cpu 4 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571472] NMI backtrace for cpu 1 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.572428] Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks So: fix this by making it so that normal hotplug handling /only/ happens so long as the GPU is currently awake without any pending runtime PM requests. In the event that a hotplug occurs while the device is suspending or resuming, we can simply defer our response until the GPU is fully runtime resumed again. Changes since v4: - Use a new trick I came up with using pm_runtime_get() instead of the hackish junk we had before Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…equests commit 7fec8f5 upstream. Currently, nouveau uses the generic drm_fb_helper_output_poll_changed() function provided by DRM as it's output_poll_changed callback. Unfortunately however, this function doesn't grab runtime PM references early enough and even if it did-we can't block waiting for the device to resume in output_poll_changed() since it's very likely that we'll need to grab the fb_helper lock at some point during the runtime resume process. This currently results in deadlocking like so: [ 246.669625] INFO: task kworker/4:0:37 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 246.673398] Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5Lyude-Test+ #2 [ 246.675271] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.676527] kworker/4:0 D 0 37 2 0x80000000 [ 246.677580] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.678704] Call Trace: [ 246.679753] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 246.680916] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 246.681924] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x20 [ 246.683023] __mutex_lock+0x569/0x9a0 [ 246.684035] ? kobject_uevent_env+0x117/0x7b0 [ 246.685132] ? drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x20/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.686179] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 246.687278] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 246.688307] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x20/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.689420] drm_fb_helper_output_poll_changed+0x23/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.690462] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x2a/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.691570] output_poll_execute+0x198/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.692611] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 246.693725] worker_thread+0x214/0x3a0 [ 246.694756] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 246.695856] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 246.696888] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 246.697998] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 246.699034] INFO: task kworker/0:1:60 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 246.700153] Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5Lyude-Test+ #2 [ 246.701182] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.702278] kworker/0:1 D 0 60 2 0x80000000 [ 246.703293] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 246.704393] Call Trace: [ 246.705403] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 246.706439] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 246.707393] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 246.708375] schedule_timeout+0x3a5/0x590 [ 246.709289] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x80 [ 246.710208] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 246.711222] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 246.712134] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x190 [ 246.713094] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 246.713964] wait_for_completion+0x12c/0x190 [ 246.714895] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80 [ 246.715727] ? get_work_pool+0x90/0x90 [ 246.716649] flush_work+0x1c9/0x280 [ 246.717483] ? flush_workqueue_prep_pwqs+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 246.718442] __cancel_work_timer+0x146/0x1d0 [ 246.719247] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20 [ 246.720043] drm_kms_helper_poll_disable+0x1f/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.721123] nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x3d/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 246.721897] pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x6b/0x190 [ 246.722825] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 246.723737] __rpm_callback+0x7a/0x1d0 [ 246.724721] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 246.725607] rpm_callback+0x24/0x80 [ 246.726553] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 246.727376] rpm_suspend+0x142/0x6b0 [ 246.728185] pm_runtime_work+0x97/0xc0 [ 246.728938] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 246.729796] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 246.730614] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 246.731395] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 246.732202] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 246.732878] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 246.733768] INFO: task kworker/4:2:422 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 246.734587] Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5Lyude-Test+ #2 [ 246.735393] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.736113] kworker/4:2 D 0 422 2 0x80000080 [ 246.736789] Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.737665] Call Trace: [ 246.738490] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 246.739250] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 246.739908] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 246.740750] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 246.741541] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 246.742370] nv50_disp_atomic_commit+0x31/0x210 [nouveau] [ 246.743124] drm_atomic_commit+0x4a/0x50 [drm] [ 246.743775] restore_fbdev_mode_atomic+0x1c8/0x240 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.744603] restore_fbdev_mode+0x31/0x140 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.745373] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x54/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.746220] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.746884] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x96/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.747675] drm_fb_helper_output_poll_changed+0x23/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.748544] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x2a/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.749439] nv50_mstm_hotplug+0x15/0x20 [nouveau] [ 246.750111] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x177/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.750764] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0xa8/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.751602] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x51/0x90 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.752314] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 246.752979] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 246.753838] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 246.754619] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 246.755386] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 246.756162] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 246.756847] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 246.758261] 3 locks held by kworker/4:0/37: [ 246.759016] #0: 00000000f8df4d2d ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.759856] #1: 00000000e6065461 ((work_completion)(&(&dev->mode_config.output_poll_work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.760670] #2: 00000000cb66735f (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x20/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.761516] 2 locks held by kworker/0:1/60: [ 246.762274] #0: 00000000fff6be0f ((wq_completion)"pm"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.762982] #1: 000000005ab44fb4 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.763890] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/64: [ 246.764664] #0: 000000008cb8b5c3 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x23/0x185 [ 246.765588] 5 locks held by kworker/4:2/422: [ 246.766440] #0: 00000000232f0959 ((wq_completion)"events_long"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.767390] #1: 00000000bb59b134 ((work_completion)(&mgr->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.768154] #2: 00000000cb66735f (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x4c/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.768966] #3: 000000004c8f0b6b (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: restore_fbdev_mode_atomic+0x4b/0x240 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.769921] #4: 000000004c34a296 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8a/0x1b0 [drm] [ 246.770839] 1 lock held by dmesg/1038: [ 246.771739] 2 locks held by zsh/1172: [ 246.772650] #0: 00000000836d0438 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 [ 246.773680] #1: 000000001f4f4d48 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: n_tty_read+0xc1/0x870 [ 246.775522] ============================================= After trying dozens of different solutions, I found one very simple one that should also have the benefit of preventing us from having to fight locking for the rest of our lives. So, we work around these deadlocks by deferring all fbcon hotplug events that happen after the runtime suspend process starts until after the device is resumed again. Changes since v7: - Fixup commit message - Daniel Vetter Changes since v6: - Remove unused nouveau_fbcon_hotplugged_in_suspend() - Ilia Changes since v5: - Come up with the (hopefully final) solution for solving this dumb problem, one that is a lot less likely to cause issues with locking in the future. This should work around all deadlock conditions with fbcon brought up thus far. Changes since v4: - Add nouveau_fbcon_hotplugged_in_suspend() to workaround deadlock condition that Lukas described - Just move all of this out of drm_fb_helper. It seems that other DRM drivers have already figured out other workarounds for this. If other drivers do end up needing this in the future, we can just move this back into drm_fb_helper again. Changes since v3: - Actually check if fb_helper is NULL in both new helpers - Actually check drm_fbdev_emulation in both new helpers - Don't fire off a fb_helper hotplug unconditionally; only do it if the following conditions are true (as otherwise, calling this in the wrong spot will cause Bad Things to happen): - fb_helper hotplug handling was actually inhibited previously - fb_helper actually has a delayed hotplug pending - fb_helper is actually bound - fb_helper is actually initialized - Add __must_check to drm_fb_helper_suspend_hotplug(). There's no situation where a driver would actually want to use this without checking the return value, so enforce that - Rewrite and clarify the documentation for both helpers. - Make sure to return true in the drm_fb_helper_suspend_hotplug() stub that's provided in drm_fb_helper.h when CONFIG_DRM_FBDEV_EMULATION isn't enabled - Actually grab the toplevel fb_helper lock in drm_fb_helper_resume_hotplug(), since it's possible other activity (such as a hotplug) could be going on at the same time the driver calls drm_fb_helper_resume_hotplug(). We need this to check whether or not drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event() needs to be called anyway Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3795214 ] Fixes the following splat during boot: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 77, name: kworker/2:1 4 locks held by kworker/2:1/77: #0: (ptrval) ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1fc/0x8fc #1: (ptrval) (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1fc/0x8fc #2: (ptrval) (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __device_attach+0x40/0x178 #3: (ptrval) (msm_iommu_lock){....}, at: msm_iommu_add_device+0x28/0xcc irq event stamp: 348 hardirqs last enabled at (347): [<c049dc18>] kfree+0xe0/0x3c0 hardirqs last disabled at (348): [<c0c35cac>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x68 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c0322fd8>] copy_process.part.5+0x280/0x1a68 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<00000000>] (null) Preemption disabled at: [<00000000>] (null) CPU: 2 PID: 77 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5-wt-ath-01075-gaca0516bb4cf torvalds#239 Hardware name: Generic DT based system Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func [<c0314e00>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030fc70>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c030fc70>] (show_stack) from [<c0c16ad8>] (dump_stack+0xa0/0xcc) [<c0c16ad8>] (dump_stack) from [<c035a978>] (___might_sleep+0x1f8/0x2d4) ath10k_sdio mmc2:0001:1: Direct firmware load for ath10k/QCA9377/hw1.0/board-2.bin failed with error -2 [<c035a978>] (___might_sleep) from [<c035aac4>] (__might_sleep+0x70/0xa8) [<c035aac4>] (__might_sleep) from [<c0c3066c>] (__mutex_lock+0x50/0xb28) [<c0c3066c>] (__mutex_lock) from [<c0c31170>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x34) ath10k_sdio mmc2:0001:1: board_file api 1 bmi_id N/A crc32 544289f [<c0c31170>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c052d798>] (kernfs_find_and_get_ns+0x30/0x5c) [<c052d798>] (kernfs_find_and_get_ns) from [<c0531cc8>] (sysfs_add_link_to_group+0x28/0x58) [<c0531cc8>] (sysfs_add_link_to_group) from [<c07ef75c>] (iommu_device_link+0x50/0xb4) [<c07ef75c>] (iommu_device_link) from [<c07f2288>] (msm_iommu_add_device+0xa0/0xcc) [<c07f2288>] (msm_iommu_add_device) from [<c07ec6d0>] (add_iommu_group+0x3c/0x64) [<c07ec6d0>] (add_iommu_group) from [<c07f9d40>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x84/0xc4) [<c07f9d40>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c07ec7c8>] (bus_set_iommu+0xd0/0x10c) [<c07ec7c8>] (bus_set_iommu) from [<c07f1a68>] (msm_iommu_probe+0x5b8/0x66c) [<c07f1a68>] (msm_iommu_probe) from [<c07feaa8>] (platform_drv_probe+0x60/0xbc) [<c07feaa8>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c07fc1fc>] (driver_probe_device+0x30c/0x4cc) [<c07fc1fc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c07fc59c>] (__device_attach_driver+0xac/0x14c) [<c07fc59c>] (__device_attach_driver) from [<c07f9e14>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x68/0xc8) [<c07f9e14>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c07fbd3c>] (__device_attach+0xe4/0x178) [<c07fbd3c>] (__device_attach) from [<c07fc698>] (device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x20) [<c07fc698>] (device_initial_probe) from [<c07faee8>] (bus_probe_device+0x98/0xa0) [<c07faee8>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c07fb4f4>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x74/0x198) [<c07fb4f4>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c0348eb4>] (process_one_work+0x2c4/0x8fc) [<c0348eb4>] (process_one_work) from [<c03497b0>] (worker_thread+0x2c4/0x5cc) [<c03497b0>] (worker_thread) from [<c0350d10>] (kthread+0x180/0x188) [<c0350d10>] (kthread) from [<c03010b4>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) Fixes: 42df43b ("iommu/msm: Make use of iommu_device_register interface") Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Vivek Gautam <vivek.gautam@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cfb03be ] The following lockdep splat was observed: [ 1222.241750] ====================================================== [ 1222.271301] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1222.301060] 4.16.0-10.el8+5.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted [ 1222.326659] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1222.356565] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1222.382660] ((&ioat_chan->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000f71e1a28>] del_timer_sync+0x5/0xf0 [ 1222.422928] [ 1222.422928] but task is already holding lock: [ 1222.451743] (&(&ioat_chan->prep_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000008ea98b12>] ioat_shutdown+0x86/0x100 [ioatdma] : [ 1223.524987] Chain exists of: [ 1223.524987] (&ioat_chan->timer) --> &(&ioat_chan->cleanup_lock)->rlock --> &(&ioat_chan->prep_lock)->rlock [ 1223.524987] [ 1223.594082] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1223.594082] [ 1223.622630] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1223.645080] ---- ---- [ 1223.667404] lock(&(&ioat_chan->prep_lock)->rlock); [ 1223.691535] lock(&(&ioat_chan->cleanup_lock)->rlock); [ 1223.728657] lock(&(&ioat_chan->prep_lock)->rlock); [ 1223.765122] lock((&ioat_chan->timer)); [ 1223.784095] [ 1223.784095] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1223.784095] [ 1223.813492] 4 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1: [ 1223.834677] #0: (reboot_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<0000000056d33456>] SYSC_reboot+0x10f/0x300 [ 1223.873310] #1: (&dev->mutex){....}, at: [<00000000258dfdd7>] device_shutdown+0x1c8/0x660 [ 1223.913604] #2: (&dev->mutex){....}, at: [<0000000068331147>] device_shutdown+0x1d6/0x660 [ 1223.954000] #3: (&(&ioat_chan->prep_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000008ea98b12>] ioat_shutdown+0x86/0x100 [ioatdma] In the ioat_shutdown() function: spin_lock_bh(&ioat_chan->prep_lock); set_bit(IOAT_CHAN_DOWN, &ioat_chan->state); del_timer_sync(&ioat_chan->timer); spin_unlock_bh(&ioat_chan->prep_lock); According to the synchronization rule for the del_timer_sync() function, the caller must not hold locks which would prevent completion of the timer's handler. The timer structure has its own lock that manages its synchronization. Setting the IOAT_CHAN_DOWN bit should prevent other CPUs from trying to use that device anyway, there is probably no need to call del_timer_sync() while holding the prep_lock. So the del_timer_sync() call is now moved outside of the prep_lock critical section to prevent the circular lock dependency. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c495144 upstream. We're getting a lockdep splat because we take the dio_sem under the log_mutex. What we really need is to protect fsync() from logging an extent map for an extent we never waited on higher up, so just guard the whole thing with dio_sem. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.18.0-rc4-xfstests-00025-g5de5edbaf1d4 torvalds#411 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ aio-dio-invalid/30928 is trying to acquire lock: 0000000092621cfd (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 but task is already holding lock: 00000000cefe6b35 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_direct_IO+0x3be/0x400 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 down_write+0x51/0xb0 btrfs_log_changed_extents+0x80/0xa40 btrfs_log_inode+0xbaf/0x1000 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x26f/0xa80 btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x50/0x70 btrfs_sync_file+0x357/0x540 do_fsync+0x38/0x60 __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x12/0x20 do_fast_syscall_32+0x9a/0x2f0 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x84/0x96 -> #4 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x86/0xa10 btrfs_record_unlink_dir+0x2a/0xa0 btrfs_unlink+0x5a/0xc0 vfs_unlink+0xb1/0x1a0 do_unlinkat+0x264/0x2b0 do_fast_syscall_32+0x9a/0x2f0 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x84/0x96 -> #3 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __sb_start_write+0x14d/0x230 start_transaction+0x3e6/0x590 btrfs_evict_inode+0x475/0x640 evict+0xbf/0x1b0 btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x6c/0x90 cleaner_kthread+0x124/0x1a0 kthread+0x106/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 -> #2 (&fs_info->cleaner_delayed_iput_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x86/0xa10 btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x197/0x530 btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0x90 btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x20/0x60 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x87/0x520 do_page_mkwrite+0x31/0xa0 __handle_mm_fault+0x799/0xb00 handle_mm_fault+0x7c/0xe0 __do_page_fault+0x1d3/0x4a0 async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #1 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __sb_start_write+0x14d/0x230 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x6a/0x520 do_page_mkwrite+0x31/0xa0 __handle_mm_fault+0x799/0xb00 handle_mm_fault+0x7c/0xe0 __do_page_fault+0x1d3/0x4a0 async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 down_read+0x48/0xb0 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 get_user_pages_fast+0xa4/0x150 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc3/0x340 do_direct_IO+0xf93/0x1d70 __blockdev_direct_IO+0x32d/0x1c20 btrfs_direct_IO+0x227/0x400 generic_file_direct_write+0xcf/0x180 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x308/0x58c aio_write+0xf8/0x1d0 io_submit_one+0x3a9/0x620 __ia32_compat_sys_io_submit+0xb2/0x270 do_int80_syscall_32+0x5b/0x1a0 entry_INT80_compat+0x88/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_sem --> &ei->log_mutex --> &ei->dio_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ei->dio_sem); lock(&ei->log_mutex); lock(&ei->dio_sem); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by aio-dio-invalid/30928: #0: 00000000cefe6b35 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_direct_IO+0x3be/0x400 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 30928 Comm: aio-dio-invalid Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4-xfstests-00025-g5de5edbaf1d4 torvalds#411 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb print_circular_bug.isra.37+0x297/0x2a4 check_prev_add.constprop.45+0x781/0x7a0 ? __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0 validate_chain.isra.41+0x7f0/0xb00 __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 down_read+0x48/0xb0 ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 get_user_pages_fast+0xa4/0x150 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc3/0x340 do_direct_IO+0xf93/0x1d70 ? __alloc_workqueue_key+0x358/0x490 ? __blockdev_direct_IO+0x14b/0x1c20 __blockdev_direct_IO+0x32d/0x1c20 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40 ? can_nocow_extent+0x490/0x490 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x30 ? can_nocow_extent+0x490/0x490 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40 btrfs_direct_IO+0x227/0x400 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40 generic_file_direct_write+0xcf/0x180 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x308/0x58c aio_write+0xf8/0x1d0 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x30 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 io_submit_one+0x3a9/0x620 ? io_submit_one+0xe5/0x620 __ia32_compat_sys_io_submit+0xb2/0x270 do_int80_syscall_32+0x5b/0x1a0 entry_INT80_compat+0x88/0xa0 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fb50c09 ] Adam reported a record command crash for simple session like: $ perf record -e cpu-clock ls with following backtrace: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 3543 ev = event_update_event__new(size + 1, PERF_EVENT_UPDATE__UNIT, evsel->id[0]); (gdb) bt #0 perf_event__synthesize_event_update_unit #1 0x000000000051e469 in perf_event__synthesize_extra_attr #2 0x00000000004445cb in record__synthesize #3 0x0000000000444bc5 in __cmd_record ... We synthesize an update event that needs to touch the evsel id array, which is not defined at that time. Fix this by forcing the id allocation for events with their unit defined. Reflecting possible read_format ID bit in the attr tests. Reported-by: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Adam Lee <leeadamrobert@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201477 Fixes: bfd8f72 ("perf record: Synthesize unit/scale/... in event update") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181112130012.5424-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c5a94f4 ] It was observed that a process blocked indefintely in __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), waiting for FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP to be cleared via fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup(). At this time, ->backing_objects was empty, which would normaly prevent __fscache_read_or_alloc_page() from getting to the point of waiting. This implies that ->backing_objects was cleared *after* __fscache_read_or_alloc_page was was entered. When an object is "killed" and then "dropped", FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP is cleared in fscache_lookup_failure(), then KILL_OBJECT and DROP_OBJECT are "called" and only in DROP_OBJECT is ->backing_objects cleared. This leaves a window where something else can set FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP and __fscache_read_or_alloc_page() can start waiting, before ->backing_objects is cleared There is some uncertainty in this analysis, but it seems to be fit the observations. Adding the wake in this patch will be handled correctly by __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), as it checks if ->backing_objects is empty again, after waiting. Customer which reported the hang, also report that the hang cannot be reproduced with this fix. The backtrace for the blocked process looked like: PID: 29360 TASK: ffff881ff2ac0f80 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "zsh" #0 [ffff881ff43efbf8] schedule at ffffffff815e56f1 #1 [ffff881ff43efc58] bit_wait at ffffffff815e64ed #2 [ffff881ff43efc68] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e61b8 #3 [ffff881ff43efca0] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e625e #4 [ffff881ff43efd08] fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup at ffffffffa04f2e8f [fscache] #5 [ffff881ff43efd18] __fscache_read_or_alloc_page at ffffffffa04f2ffe [fscache] #6 [ffff881ff43efd58] __nfs_readpage_from_fscache at ffffffffa0679668 [nfs] torvalds#7 [ffff881ff43efd78] nfs_readpage at ffffffffa067092b [nfs] torvalds#8 [ffff881ff43efda0] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81187a73 torvalds#9 [ffff881ff43efe50] nfs_file_read at ffffffffa066544b [nfs] torvalds#10 [ffff881ff43efe70] __vfs_read at ffffffff811fc756 torvalds#11 [ffff881ff43efee8] vfs_read at ffffffff811fccfa torvalds#12 [ffff881ff43eff18] sys_read at ffffffff811fda62 torvalds#13 [ffff881ff43eff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815e986e Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6c5c748 ] ibmvnic_reset can create and schedule a reset work item from an IRQ context, so do not use a mutex, which can sleep. Convert the reset work item mutex to a spin lock. Locking debugger generated the trace output below. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 120, name: kworker/8:1 4 locks held by kworker/8:1/120: #0: 0000000017c05720 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x188/0x710 #1: 00000000ace90706 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x188/0x710 #2: 000000007632871f (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnl_lock+0x30/0x50 #3: 00000000fc36813a (&(&crq->lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: ibmvnic_tasklet+0x88/0x2010 [ibmvnic] irq event stamp: 26293 hardirqs last enabled at (26292): [<c000000000122468>] tasklet_action_common.isra.12+0x78/0x1c0 hardirqs last disabled at (26293): [<c000000000befce8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x48/0xf0 softirqs last enabled at (26288): [<c000000000a8ac78>] dev_deactivate_queue.constprop.28+0xc8/0x160 softirqs last disabled at (26289): [<c0000000000306e0>] call_do_softirq+0x14/0x24 CPU: 8 PID: 120 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6 #6 Workqueue: events linkwatch_event Call Trace: [c0000003fffa7a50] [c000000000bc83e4] dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) [c0000003fffa7aa0] [c00000000015ba0c] ___might_sleep+0x2dc/0x320 [c0000003fffa7b20] [c000000000be960c] __mutex_lock+0x8c/0xb40 [c0000003fffa7c30] [d000000006202ac8] ibmvnic_reset+0x78/0x330 [ibmvnic] [c0000003fffa7cc0] [d0000000062097f4] ibmvnic_tasklet+0x1054/0x2010 [ibmvnic] [c0000003fffa7e00] [c0000000001224c8] tasklet_action_common.isra.12+0xd8/0x1c0 [c0000003fffa7e60] [c000000000bf1238] __do_softirq+0x1a8/0x64c [c0000003fffa7f90] [c0000000000306e0] call_do_softirq+0x14/0x24 [c0000003f3f87980] [c00000000001ba50] do_softirq_own_stack+0x60/0xb0 [c0000003f3f879c0] [c0000000001218a8] do_softirq+0xa8/0x100 [c0000003f3f879f0] [c000000000121a74] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x174/0x180 [c0000003f3f87a60] [c000000000bf003c] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x5c/0x80 [c0000003f3f87a90] [c000000000a8ac78] dev_deactivate_queue.constprop.28+0xc8/0x160 [c0000003f3f87ad0] [c000000000a8c8b0] dev_deactivate_many+0xd0/0x520 [c0000003f3f87b70] [c000000000a8cd40] dev_deactivate+0x40/0x60 [c0000003f3f87ba0] [c000000000a5e0c4] linkwatch_do_dev+0x74/0xd0 [c0000003f3f87bd0] [c000000000a5e694] __linkwatch_run_queue+0x1a4/0x1f0 [c0000003f3f87c30] [c000000000a5e728] linkwatch_event+0x48/0x60 [c0000003f3f87c50] [c0000000001444e8] process_one_work+0x238/0x710 [c0000003f3f87d20] [c000000000144a48] worker_thread+0x88/0x4e0 [c0000003f3f87db0] [c00000000014e3a8] kthread+0x178/0x1c0 [c0000003f3f87e20] [c00000000000bfd0] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon <tlfalcon@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ed04191 upstream. This patch avoids that KASAN sporadically reports the following: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rxe_run_task+0x1e/0x60 [rdma_rxe] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801c50d8f4 by task check/24830 CPU: 4 PID: 24830 Comm: check Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6-dbg+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xca print_address_description+0x71/0x239 kasan_report.cold.5+0x242/0x301 __asan_load1+0x47/0x50 rxe_run_task+0x1e/0x60 [rdma_rxe] rxe_post_send+0x4bd/0x8d0 [rdma_rxe] srpt_zerolength_write+0xe1/0x160 [ib_srpt] srpt_close_ch+0x8b/0xe0 [ib_srpt] srpt_set_enabled+0xe7/0x150 [ib_srpt] srpt_tpg_enable_store+0xc0/0x100 [ib_srpt] configfs_write_file+0x157/0x1d0 __vfs_write+0xd7/0x3d0 vfs_write+0x102/0x290 ksys_write+0xab/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x210 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Allocated by task 13856: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc+0x105/0x320 rxe_alloc+0xff/0x1f0 [rdma_rxe] rxe_create_qp+0x9f/0x160 [rdma_rxe] ib_create_qp+0xf5/0x690 [ib_core] rdma_create_qp+0x6a/0x140 [rdma_cm] srpt_cm_req_recv.cold.59+0x1588/0x237b [ib_srpt] srpt_rdma_cm_req_recv.isra.35+0x1d5/0x220 [ib_srpt] srpt_rdma_cm_handler+0x6f/0x100 [ib_srpt] cma_listen_handler+0x59/0x60 [rdma_cm] cma_ib_req_handler+0xd5b/0x2570 [rdma_cm] cm_process_work+0x2e/0x110 [ib_cm] cm_work_handler+0x2aae/0x502b [ib_cm] process_one_work+0x481/0x9e0 worker_thread+0x67/0x5b0 kthread+0x1cf/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 Freed by task 3440: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 __kasan_slab_free+0x139/0x190 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 kmem_cache_free+0xbc/0x330 rxe_elem_release+0x66/0xe0 [rdma_rxe] rxe_destroy_qp+0x3f/0x50 [rdma_rxe] ib_destroy_qp+0x140/0x360 [ib_core] srpt_release_channel_work+0xdc/0x310 [ib_srpt] process_one_work+0x481/0x9e0 worker_thread+0x67/0x5b0 kthread+0x1cf/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 Cc: Sergey Gorenko <sergeygo@mellanox.com> Cc: Max Gurtovoy <maxg@mellanox.com> Cc: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 721b1d9 ] kcopyd has no upper limit to the number of jobs one can allocate and issue. Under certain workloads this can lead to excessive memory usage and workqueue stalls. For example, when creating multiple dm-snapshot targets with a 4K chunk size and then writing to the origin through the page cache. Syncing the page cache causes a large number of BIOs to be issued to the dm-snapshot origin target, which itself issues an even larger (because of the BIO splitting taking place) number of kcopyd jobs. Running the following test, from the device mapper test suite [1], dmtest run --suite snapshot -n many_snapshots_of_same_volume_N , with 8 active snapshots, results in the kcopyd job slab cache growing to 10G. Depending on the available system RAM this can lead to the OOM killer killing user processes: [463.492878] kthreadd invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x6040c0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null), order=1, oom_score_adj=0 [463.492894] kthreadd cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0 [463.492948] CPU: 7 PID: 2 Comm: kthreadd Not tainted 4.19.0-rc7 #3 [463.492950] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 [463.492952] Call Trace: [463.492964] dump_stack+0x7d/0xbb [463.492973] dump_header+0x6b/0x2fc [463.492987] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xee/0x190 [463.493012] oom_kill_process+0x302/0x370 [463.493021] out_of_memory+0x113/0x560 [463.493030] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xf40/0x1020 [463.493055] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x348/0x3c0 [463.493067] cache_grow_begin+0x81/0x8b0 [463.493072] ? cache_grow_begin+0x874/0x8b0 [463.493078] fallback_alloc+0x1e4/0x280 [463.493092] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xd6/0x370 [463.493098] ? copy_process.part.31+0x1c5/0x20d0 [463.493105] copy_process.part.31+0x1c5/0x20d0 [463.493115] ? __lock_acquire+0x3cc/0x1550 [463.493121] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [463.493129] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [463.493135] ? finish_task_switch+0x90/0x280 [463.493165] _do_fork+0xe0/0x6d0 [463.493191] ? kthreadd+0x19f/0x220 [463.493233] kernel_thread+0x25/0x30 [463.493235] kthreadd+0x1bf/0x220 [463.493242] ? kthread_create_on_cpu+0x90/0x90 [463.493248] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [463.493279] Mem-Info: [463.493285] active_anon:20631 inactive_anon:4831 isolated_anon:0 [463.493285] active_file:80216 inactive_file:80107 isolated_file:435 [463.493285] unevictable:0 dirty:51266 writeback:109372 unstable:0 [463.493285] slab_reclaimable:31191 slab_unreclaimable:3483521 [463.493285] mapped:526 shmem:4903 pagetables:1759 bounce:0 [463.493285] free:33623 free_pcp:2392 free_cma:0 ... [463.493489] Unreclaimable slab info: [463.493513] Name Used Total [463.493522] bio-6 1028KB 1028KB [463.493525] bio-5 1028KB 1028KB [463.493528] dm_snap_pending_exception 236783KB 243789KB [463.493531] dm_exception 41KB 42KB [463.493534] bio-4 1216KB 1216KB [463.493537] bio-3 439396KB 439396KB [463.493539] kcopyd_job 6973427KB 6973427KB ... [463.494340] Out of memory: Kill process 1298 (ruby2.3) score 1 or sacrifice child [463.494673] Killed process 1298 (ruby2.3) total-vm:435740kB, anon-rss:20180kB, file-rss:4kB, shmem-rss:0kB [463.506437] oom_reaper: reaped process 1298 (ruby2.3), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB Moreover, issuing a large number of kcopyd jobs results in kcopyd hogging the CPU, while processing them. As a result, processing of work items, queued for execution on the same CPU as the currently running kcopyd thread, is stalled for long periods of time, hurting performance. Running the aforementioned test we get, in dmesg, messages like the following: [67501.194592] BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 27s! [67501.195586] Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: [67501.195591] workqueue events: flags=0x0 [67501.195597] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 [67501.195611] pending: cache_reap [67501.195641] workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 [67501.195645] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 [67501.195656] pending: vmstat_update [67501.195682] workqueue kblockd: flags=0x18 [67501.195687] pwq 5: cpus=2 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=-20 active=1/256 [67501.195698] pending: blk_timeout_work [67501.195753] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8 [67501.195757] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 [67501.195768] pending: do_work [dm_mod] [67501.195802] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8 [67501.195806] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 [67501.195817] pending: do_work [dm_mod] [67501.195834] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8 [67501.195838] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 [67501.195848] pending: do_work [dm_mod] [67501.195881] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8 [67501.195885] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 [67501.195896] pending: do_work [dm_mod] [67501.195920] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8 [67501.195924] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=2/256 [67501.195935] in-flight: 67:do_work [dm_mod] [67501.195945] pending: do_work [dm_mod] [67501.195961] pool 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 hung=27s workers=3 idle: 129 23765 The root cause for these issues is the way dm-snapshot uses kcopyd. In particular, the lack of an explicit or implicit limit to the maximum number of in-flight COW jobs. The merging path is not affected because it implicitly limits the in-flight kcopyd jobs to one. Fix these issues by using a semaphore to limit the maximum number of in-flight kcopyd jobs. We grab the semaphore before allocating a new kcopyd job in start_copy() and start_full_bio() and release it after the job finishes in copy_callback(). The initial semaphore value is configurable through a module parameter, to allow fine tuning the maximum number of in-flight COW jobs. Setting this parameter to zero initializes the semaphore to INT_MAX. A default value of 2048 maximum in-flight kcopyd jobs was chosen. This value was decided experimentally as a trade-off between memory consumption, stalling the kernel's workqueues and maintaining a high enough throughput. Re-running the aforementioned test: * Workqueue stalls are eliminated * kcopyd's job slab cache uses a maximum of 130MB * The time taken by the test to write to the snapshot-origin target is reduced from 05m20.48s to 03m26.38s [1] https://github.com/jthornber/device-mapper-test-suite Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Ilias Tsitsimpis <iliastsi@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4f4b374 ] This is the much more correct fix for my earlier attempt at: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/12/10/118 Short recap: - There's not actually a locking issue, it's just lockdep being a bit too eager to complain about a possible deadlock. - Contrary to what I claimed the real problem is recursion on kn->count. Greg pointed me at sysfs_break_active_protection(), used by the scsi subsystem to allow a sysfs file to unbind itself. That would be a real deadlock, which isn't what's happening here. Also, breaking the active protection means we'd need to manually handle all the lifetime fun. - With Rafael we discussed the task_work approach, which kinda works, but has two downsides: It's a functional change for a lockdep annotation issue, and it won't work for the bind file (which needs to get the errno from the driver load function back to userspace). - Greg also asked why this never showed up: To hit this you need to unregister a 2nd driver from the unload code of your first driver. I guess only gpus do that. The bug has always been there, but only with a recent patch series did we add more locks so that lockdep built a chain from unbinding the snd-hda driver to the acpi_video_unregister call. Full lockdep splat: [12301.898799] ============================================ [12301.898805] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [12301.898811] 4.20.0-rc7+ torvalds#84 Not tainted [12301.898815] -------------------------------------------- [12301.898821] bash/5297 is trying to acquire lock: [12301.898826] 00000000f61c6093 (kn->count#39){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80 [12301.898841] but task is already holding lock: [12301.898847] 000000005f634021 (kn->count#39){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190 [12301.898856] other info that might help us debug this: [12301.898862] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12301.898867] CPU0 [12301.898870] ---- [12301.898874] lock(kn->count#39); [12301.898879] lock(kn->count#39); [12301.898883] *** DEADLOCK *** [12301.898891] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [12301.898899] 5 locks held by bash/5297: [12301.898903] #0: 00000000cd800e54 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x17f/0x1b0 [12301.898915] #1: 000000000465e7c2 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xd3/0x190 [12301.898925] #2: 000000005f634021 (kn->count#39){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190 [12301.898936] #3: 00000000414ef7ac (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x34/0x240 [12301.898950] #4: 000000003218fbdf (register_count_mutex){+.+.}, at: acpi_video_unregister+0xe/0x40 [12301.898960] stack backtrace: [12301.898968] CPU: 1 PID: 5297 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ torvalds#84 [12301.898974] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook 8460p/161C, BIOS 68SCF Ver. F.01 03/11/2011 [12301.898982] Call Trace: [12301.898989] dump_stack+0x67/0x9b [12301.898997] __lock_acquire+0x6ad/0x1410 [12301.899003] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80 [12301.899010] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 [12301.899017] ? mutex_spin_on_owner+0xe4/0x150 [12301.899023] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 [12301.899030] ? lock_acquire+0x90/0x180 [12301.899036] lock_acquire+0x90/0x180 [12301.899042] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80 [12301.899049] __kernfs_remove+0x296/0x310 [12301.899055] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80 [12301.899060] ? kernfs_name_hash+0xd/0x80 [12301.899066] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x6c/0x100 [12301.899073] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80 [12301.899080] bus_remove_driver+0x92/0xa0 [12301.899085] acpi_video_unregister+0x24/0x40 [12301.899127] i915_driver_unload+0x42/0x130 [i915] [12301.899160] i915_pci_remove+0x19/0x30 [i915] [12301.899169] pci_device_remove+0x36/0xb0 [12301.899176] device_release_driver_internal+0x185/0x240 [12301.899183] unbind_store+0xaf/0x180 [12301.899189] kernfs_fop_write+0x104/0x190 [12301.899195] __vfs_write+0x31/0x180 [12301.899203] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6f/0x80 [12301.899209] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x29/0x50 [12301.899216] ? __sb_start_write+0x13c/0x1a0 [12301.899221] ? vfs_write+0x17f/0x1b0 [12301.899227] vfs_write+0xb9/0x1b0 [12301.899233] ksys_write+0x50/0xc0 [12301.899239] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x180 [12301.899247] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [12301.899253] RIP: 0033:0x7f452ac7f7a4 [12301.899259] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 aa f0 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83 [12301.899273] RSP: 002b:00007ffceafa6918 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [12301.899282] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007f452ac7f7a4 [12301.899288] RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 00005612a1abf7c0 RDI: 0000000000000001 [12301.899295] RBP: 00005612a1abf7c0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00005612a1c46730 [12301.899301] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000d [12301.899308] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f452af4a740 R15: 000000000000000d Looking around I've noticed that usb and i2c already handle similar recursion problems, where a sysfs file can unbind the same type of sysfs somewhere else in the hierarchy. Relevant commits are: commit 356c05d Author: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Date: Mon May 14 13:30:03 2012 -0400 sysfs: get rid of some lockdep false positives commit e9b526f Author: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com> Date: Fri May 17 14:56:35 2013 +0200 i2c: suppress lockdep warning on delete_device Implement the same trick for driver bind/unbind. v2: Put the macro into bus.c (Greg). Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c@intel.com> Cc: Arend van Spriel <aspriel@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl> Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vivek Gautam <vivek.gautam@codeaurora.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit aff9cf5 upstream. We were experiencing a crash similar to the one reported as part of commit:a5ba1d95e46e ("uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()") in our testbed as well. We continue to observe the same crash after integrating the commit a5ba1d9 ("uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()") On reviewing the change, the port lock should be taken prior to checking for if (!circ->buf) in fn. __uart_put_char and other fns. that update the buffer uart_state->xmit. Traceback: [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4870] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000003b [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] PC is at memcpy+0x48/0x180 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] LR is at uart_write+0x74/0x120 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] pc : [<ffffffc0002e6808>] lr : [<ffffffc0003747cc>] pstate: 000001c5 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] sp : ffffffc076433d30 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x29: ffffffc076433d30 x28: 0000000000000140 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x27: ffffffc0009b9d5e x26: ffffffc07ce36580 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000140 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x23: ffffffc000891200 x22: ffffffc01fc34000 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x21: 0000000000000fff x20: 0000000000000076 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x19: 0000000000000076 x18: 0000000000000000 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x17: 000000000047cf08 x16: ffffffc000099e68 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x15: 0000000000000018 x14: 776d726966205948 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x13: 50203a6c6974755f x12: 74647075205d3333 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x11: 3a35323a36203831 x10: 30322f37322f3131 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x9 : 5b205d303638342e x8 : 746164206f742070 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x7 : 7520736920657261 x6 : 000000000000003b [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x5 : 000000000000817a x4 : 0000000000000008 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x3 : 2f37322f31312a5b x2 : 000000000000006e [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x1 : ffffffc0009b9cf0 x0 : 000000000000003b [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] CPU2: stopping [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: P D O 4.1.51 #3 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] Hardware name: Broadcom-v8A (DT) [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] Call trace: [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc0000883b8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x150 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc00008851c>] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc0005ee810>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc00008e844>] handle_IPI+0x18c/0x1a0 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc000080c68>] gic_handle_irq+0x88/0x90 Fixes: a5ba1d9 ("uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Samir Virmani <samir@embedur.com> Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Feb 7, 2019
commit 9e69666 upstream. This patch adds quirk VID/PID IDs for the Opus #3 DAP (made by 'The Bit') in order to enable Native DSD support. [ NOTE: this could be handled in the generic way with fp->dvd_raw if we add 0x10cb to the vendor whitelist, but since 0x10cb shows a different vendor name (Erantech), put to the individual entry at this time -- tiwai ] Signed-off-by: Olek Poplavsky <woodenbits@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Feb 13, 2019
[ Upstream commit 6347244 ] Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 is marked as notrace, the function called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 shouldn't be traceable either. ftrace_graph_caller() gets called every time func write_comp_data() gets called if it isn't marked 'notrace'. This is the backtrace from gdb: #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff8010201920 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff8010439714 in write_comp_data (type=5, arg1=0, arg2=0, ip=18446743524224276596) at ../kernel/kcov.c:116 #3 0xffffff8010439894 in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (arg1=<optimized out>, arg2=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/kcov.c:188 #4 0xffffff8010201874 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743524226602768, parent=0xffffff801014b918, frame_pointer=18446743524223531344) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:27 #5 0xffffff801020194c in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Rework so that write_comp_data() that are called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_*_cmp*() are marked as 'notrace'. Commit 903e8ff ("kernel/kcov.c: mark funcs in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() as notrace") missed to mark write_comp_data() as 'notrace'. When that patch was created gcc-7 was used. In lib/Kconfig.debug config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp) That code path isn't hit with gcc-7. However, it were that with gcc-8. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206143011.23719-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 1009870 upstream. The H6 main pin controller has four banks of interrupt-triggering pins. The driver as originally submitted only specified three, but had pin descriptions referencing a fourth bank. This results in a out-of-bounds access into .irq_array of struct sunxi_pinctrl. This however did not result in a crash until v4.20, with commit a66d972 ("devres: Align data[] to ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN"), which changed the alignment of memory region returned by devm_kcalloc(). The increase likely moved the out-of-bounds access into the next, unmapped page. With KASAN on, the bug is quite clear: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sunxi_pinctrl_init_with_variant+0x49c/0x12b8 Write of size 4 at addr ffff80002c680280 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00016-gc480a5e6a077 #3 Hardware name: OrangePi Lite2 (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x220 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xac/0xd4 print_address_description+0x60/0x25c kasan_report+0x14c/0x1ac __asan_store4+0x80/0xa0 sunxi_pinctrl_init_with_variant+0x49c/0x12b8 h6_pinctrl_probe+0x18/0x20 platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xc8 really_probe+0x244/0x4b0 driver_probe_device.part.4+0x11c/0x164 __driver_attach+0x120/0x190 bus_for_each_dev+0xe8/0x158 driver_attach+0x30/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x308/0x318 driver_register+0xbc/0x1d0 __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x88 h6_pinctrl_driver_init+0x18/0x20 do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x208 kernel_init_freeable+0x230/0x2c8 kernel_init+0x10/0x108 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c Allocated by task 1: kasan_kmalloc.part.0+0x4c/0x100 kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe8 kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x130/0x238 devm_kmalloc+0x34/0xd0 sunxi_pinctrl_init_with_variant+0x1d8/0x12b8 h6_pinctrl_probe+0x18/0x20 platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xc8 really_probe+0x244/0x4b0 driver_probe_device.part.4+0x11c/0x164 __driver_attach+0x120/0x190 bus_for_each_dev+0xe8/0x158 driver_attach+0x30/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x308/0x318 driver_register+0xbc/0x1d0 __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x88 h6_pinctrl_driver_init+0x18/0x20 do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x208 kernel_init_freeable+0x230/0x2c8 kernel_init+0x10/0x108 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c Freed by task 0: (stack is not available) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff80002c680080 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of 512-byte region [ffff80002c680080, ffff80002c680280) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffff7e0000b1a000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80002e00c780 index:0xffff80002c683c80 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x10200(slab|head) raw: 0000000000010200 ffff80002e003a10 ffff80002e003a10 ffff80002e00c780 raw: ffff80002c683c80 0000000000100001 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff80002c680180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff80002c680200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff80002c680280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff80002c680300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff80002c680380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Correct the number of IRQ banks so there are no more mismatches. Fixes: c8a8309 ("pinctrl: sunxi: add support for the Allwinner H6 main pin controller") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com> Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The v3/v4 upstream submissions of the NETSEC driver made a backward
incompatible change to the DT binding, where the PHY node has been
moved into an intermediate MDIO subnode rather than appearing directly
under the NETSEC controller node. The new driver can deal with both
arrangements, but the old driver will cease to work once systems are
upgraded to a new firmware version that uses the new (and official)
version of the binding.
Therefore, we need to update the driver in erp-noupstream, so the v4.14
installer may still be used regardless of the firmware version, allowing
users to upgrade their firmware without regard for which kernel version
they are using.
NOTE: There was a bug in v4 in the microcode loading routine. A fix
has been incorporated into this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org