dwc_otg: Probable use-after-free in handle_hc_intr resulting in Oops or SLUB errors #217
Comments
|
The OOPS is almost certainly a continuation of #190 - this case being brought out into the open on the model A because of the lack of SOF interrupts. The QTD is being freed immediately after interrupts are re-enabled in dwc_otg_qtd_add() which results in either null pointer dereference without SLUB debugging turned on, or a dereference of 0x6b6b6b6b with SLUB debugging enabled. There is still a use-after-free going on as evidenced by SLUB detecting corruption. Either the qtd or qh structs are being tampered with after freeing - offset 0x10 in each case is: I also note the offset 0x3F also has an overwritten byte to A5 - no idea what this is. Edit: I patched the offending function into a more sane check carried out prior to firing the QTD off into the driver. I will leave the Pi online overnight and see if it falls over. |
|
Interesting. I hope you find a fix. |
|
This is what I've gotten so far:
This completely solves the first OOPS experienced. It doesn't remove the SLUB poison overwritten though. The hack is just there to narrow the causes down (i.e. eliminate double free) One clue is that kill_urbs_in_qh will predictably OOPS due to dereferencing freed memory in the non_periodic_sched_active qh list. This is replicated by pulling the USB stick out of the port at just the right time. |
|
I've found the cause of the memory corruption (I think). In dwc_otg_hcd_handle_hc_n_intr, the various halt conditions of a host channel are processed. If a NYET occurs on an non-periodic OUT, the channel is halted with xfercomp and nyet bits set - the driver commentary says: but the NYET interrupt isn't cleared by xfercomp. I think this results in the IRQ being re-entrant but with xfercomp cleared and nyet active - which leads to accessing a qtd that doesn't exist because xfercomp removed it. I need to check to see that this is actually happening. This correlates with the stacktrace associated with the corruption - in most cases it's a control URB that results in the use-after-free. |
|
@P33M |
|
Found the incorrect QTD access. In handle_hc_n_intr the execution flow hands off to each interrupt type handler in turn with xfercomp at the top of the queue. The incorrect access happens around line 1589 in dwc_otg_hcd_intr.c (exact lines incorrect as I have added debug statements). This is presumably because the ACK interrupt fires after Xfercomp as Xfercomp can take up to 500us to complete. This behaviour I have only seen on CONTROL type endpoints where the device spends time processing data - e.g. in my case it is when my RTL5370 chipset finishes loading firmware. In this case I doubt the use-after-free will result in memory corruption as we are in and IRQ and there are no further allocations before handle_ack_intr, however if the ACK interrupt fires after the handler completes... Issue #205 may be related. If the xfercomp completes and the ACK interrupt then fires with the hc not expecting it, you will get this result. In this case it is certain that kernel memory is corrupt because the QTD circleq will be empty and no check is made before accessing the QTD. |
|
Note that #217 (comment) is hogwash - NYET is handled correctly as far as I can tell. As for a bugfix - there seems to be a few of these arbitrary qtd->error_count = 0 statements scattered throughout the code. In general the entire file is an exercise in how not to write an interrupt handler due to the extremely scattered and convoluted call graph, overall SLOC, calls to freeing memory etc, etc. Therefore just bludgeoning in for a fix for laggy hardware would be fraught with danger. I will be back from my current field job at the weekend and will have more time to think on a solution. Suggestions, anyone? |
|
I've found another terrible bit of code that also means that it's possible to end up with a null qtr pointer when you go to schedule a transaction… Turns out the driver does the following: add_qtd(qh, qtd) Unfortunately schedule periodic also enables the start of frame interrupt which then means the SOF interrupt occurs and tries to actually access the qh->qtd structure before we've filled it in! I think the changes I've got so far for my FIQ implementation means that now I'm just doing it all a lot quicker which in turn means I'm more likely to hit the problem! More hacking ensues…. Gordon Gordon Hollingworth, Director of Engineering On 21 Feb 2013, at 11:39, P33M notifications@github.com wrote:
|
|
OK... I'm getting these with IN endpoints (both BULK and CONTROL) on my RTL5370 - why on earth does the hardware generate an interrupt on an IN endpoint after it's already interrupted that the transaction is complete? |
|
Eurgh. I've uncovered yet more bugs while attempting to pin down this one. Those issues aside, I've determined the following:
What I am unable to determine is the phase in the transaction upon which this odd bug occurs. It's most definitely not after the transfer is completed and the hc is disabled. |
|
It would be possible to elastoplast this one like so: This at least solves the specific case of memory corruption picked up by SLUB in my case. |
|
Apologies for the steadily decreasing signal to noise ratio of this thread but yet more info: This is hardware wierdness. After tracing the actual interrupt servicing it appears that the ACK interrupt is being raised after a transfer complete interrupt despite the hc's interrupts being cleared and masked! This only occurs on (non-split) transfers which have previously halted in an error state, in my case I get a reproducible xacterr interrupt with my RTL5370 on cold boot for 2 IN transactions. If a transaction has previously bombed out, when requeued the ACK interrupt is unmasked and in theory used to reset the error count. If the xfercomp is subsequently triggered on the last packet in a transaction the QTD ends up being freed by xfercomp and the resulting re-entry into the IRQ will result in a freed byte being overwritten to 0x00. If the interrupts were happening around the time where something else was allocating memory this could result in corruption. Basically, by the time we actually get to the ACK interrupt handler both the interrupt and mask reg do in fact read 0x0000000, but during the top-level re-entry it looks like the register write hasn't taken hold: The state of the mask at the hc_n_intr level is as expected for a error-prone bulk IN endpoint prior to the channel being disabled, but a scant few function calls later the hcint register is mysteriously 0x00000000, as it should be after an xfercomp has completed and disabled the hc. |
|
This is interesting, I've seen something similar in the FIQ processing I'm doing now, where I actually run through the FIQ twice for each interrupt even though at the end I write a mask to clear the interrupt and read it back to check the value. Added memory barriers to no avail… I could do with provoking the problem in a small test application (i.e. an RTOS app like uboot) so that I can get the Broadcom guys to run a sim of the chip to see what's happening. My assumption is that this is likely to do with some asynchronous clocking which means that although the mask is removed the interrupt is still pending in some later clocked logic… Gordon Gordon Hollingworth, Director of Engineering On 25 Feb 2013, at 19:48, P33M notifications@github.com wrote:
|
|
There definitely is something screwy happening - if I busy-wait on reading the mask (or hcint) register after the write in hc_cleanup until the result is 0, the loop is never executed (and still spurious ACKs). Similarly if I induce a ridiculously big delay (133us) before the hc_cleanup function returns, I still get spurious ACKs. |
|
Welp here's my fix: This fix relies on the fact that we only hit this incorrect function call because of an unmasked ACK bit being set - conditions in which it is enabled described above. If the channel is already halted then don't do anything, otherwise proceed as normal and reset the error count. ACKs during split transfers result in a call to handle_ack_intr elsewhere in the processing chain. I tried to do this in a way that's the least intrusive to the overall execution flow - messing with this mass of spaghetti will probably only make things worse. I have tested it on a variety of USB devices 1.1+2.0 both directly connected to a Model A and behind a hub. As an aside, the processing time for USB transfer completion is something I wish I hadn't looked at - using GPIO profiling to toggle GPIOs when in various interrupt handlers, xfercomp takes anywhere between 20 and 50uS to complete - that means the CPU is spinning inside an interrupt for up to 40% of the remaining microframe! |
|
No noise on the forum since this patch pushed - closing issue. |
We allocate the cpufreq table after calling rcu_read_lock(),
which disables preemption. This causes scheduling while atomic
warnings. Use GFP_ATOMIC instead of GFP_KERNEL and update for
kcalloc while we're here.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1246
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 80, name: modprobe
5 locks held by modprobe/80:
#0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c050d484>] __driver_attach+0x48/0x98
#1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c050d494>] __driver_attach+0x58/0x98
#2: (subsys mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<c050c114>] subsys_interface_register+0x38/0xc8
#3: (cpufreq_rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<c05a9c8c>] __cpufreq_add_dev.isra.22+0x84/0x92c
#4: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<c05ab24c>] dev_pm_opp_init_cpufreq_table+0x18/0x10c
Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null)
CPU: 2 PID: 80 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-next-20140701-00035-g286857f216aa-dirty #217
[<c0214da8>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c02123f8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c02123f8>] (show_stack) from [<c070141c>] (dump_stack+0x70/0xbc)
[<c070141c>] (dump_stack) from [<c02f4cb0>] (__kmalloc+0x124/0x250)
[<c02f4cb0>] (__kmalloc) from [<c05ab270>] (dev_pm_opp_init_cpufreq_table+0x3c/0x10c)
[<c05ab270>] (dev_pm_opp_init_cpufreq_table) from [<bf000508>] (cpufreq_init+0x48/0x378 [cpufreq_generic])
[<bf000508>] (cpufreq_init [cpufreq_generic]) from [<c05a9e08>] (__cpufreq_add_dev.isra.22+0x200/0x92c)
[<c05a9e08>] (__cpufreq_add_dev.isra.22) from [<c050c160>] (subsys_interface_register+0x84/0xc8)
[<c050c160>] (subsys_interface_register) from [<c05a9494>] (cpufreq_register_driver+0x108/0x2d8)
[<c05a9494>] (cpufreq_register_driver) from [<bf000888>] (generic_cpufreq_probe+0x50/0x74 [cpufreq_generic])
[<bf000888>] (generic_cpufreq_probe [cpufreq_generic]) from [<c050e994>] (platform_drv_probe+0x18/0x48)
[<c050e994>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c050d1f4>] (driver_probe_device+0x128/0x370)
[<c050d1f4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c050d4d0>] (__driver_attach+0x94/0x98)
[<c050d4d0>] (__driver_attach) from [<c050b778>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x54/0x88)
[<c050b778>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c050c894>] (bus_add_driver+0xe8/0x204)
[<c050c894>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c050dd48>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf4)
[<c050dd48>] (driver_register) from [<c0208870>] (do_one_initcall+0xac/0x1d8)
[<c0208870>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c028b6b4>] (load_module+0x190c/0x21e8)
[<c028b6b4>] (load_module) from [<c028c034>] (SyS_init_module+0xa4/0x110)
[<c028c034>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c020f0c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Fixes: a0dd7b7 (PM / OPP: Move cpufreq specific OPP functions out of generic OPP library)
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: 3.16+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.16+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
commit 3c5445c upstream. We allocate the cpufreq table after calling rcu_read_lock(), which disables preemption. This causes scheduling while atomic warnings. Use GFP_ATOMIC instead of GFP_KERNEL and update for kcalloc while we're here. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1246 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 80, name: modprobe 5 locks held by modprobe/80: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c050d484>] __driver_attach+0x48/0x98 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c050d494>] __driver_attach+0x58/0x98 #2: (subsys mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<c050c114>] subsys_interface_register+0x38/0xc8 #3: (cpufreq_rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<c05a9c8c>] __cpufreq_add_dev.isra.22+0x84/0x92c #4: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<c05ab24c>] dev_pm_opp_init_cpufreq_table+0x18/0x10c Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) CPU: 2 PID: 80 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-next-20140701-00035-g286857f216aa-dirty #217 [<c0214da8>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c02123f8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c02123f8>] (show_stack) from [<c070141c>] (dump_stack+0x70/0xbc) [<c070141c>] (dump_stack) from [<c02f4cb0>] (__kmalloc+0x124/0x250) [<c02f4cb0>] (__kmalloc) from [<c05ab270>] (dev_pm_opp_init_cpufreq_table+0x3c/0x10c) [<c05ab270>] (dev_pm_opp_init_cpufreq_table) from [<bf000508>] (cpufreq_init+0x48/0x378 [cpufreq_generic]) [<bf000508>] (cpufreq_init [cpufreq_generic]) from [<c05a9e08>] (__cpufreq_add_dev.isra.22+0x200/0x92c) [<c05a9e08>] (__cpufreq_add_dev.isra.22) from [<c050c160>] (subsys_interface_register+0x84/0xc8) [<c050c160>] (subsys_interface_register) from [<c05a9494>] (cpufreq_register_driver+0x108/0x2d8) [<c05a9494>] (cpufreq_register_driver) from [<bf000888>] (generic_cpufreq_probe+0x50/0x74 [cpufreq_generic]) [<bf000888>] (generic_cpufreq_probe [cpufreq_generic]) from [<c050e994>] (platform_drv_probe+0x18/0x48) [<c050e994>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c050d1f4>] (driver_probe_device+0x128/0x370) [<c050d1f4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c050d4d0>] (__driver_attach+0x94/0x98) [<c050d4d0>] (__driver_attach) from [<c050b778>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x54/0x88) [<c050b778>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c050c894>] (bus_add_driver+0xe8/0x204) [<c050c894>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c050dd48>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf4) [<c050dd48>] (driver_register) from [<c0208870>] (do_one_initcall+0xac/0x1d8) [<c0208870>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c028b6b4>] (load_module+0x190c/0x21e8) [<c028b6b4>] (load_module) from [<c028c034>] (SyS_init_module+0xa4/0x110) [<c028c034>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c020f0c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) Fixes: a0dd7b7 (PM / OPP: Move cpufreq specific OPP functions out of generic OPP library) Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.1.0-rc7+ raspberrypi#217 Tainted: G O --------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. swapper/6/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: (ext_devt_lock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff8143a60c>] blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810bf6b1>] __lock_acquire+0x461/0x1e70 [<ffffffff810c1947>] lock_acquire+0xb7/0x290 [<ffffffff818ac3a8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50 [<ffffffff8143a07d>] blk_alloc_devt+0x6d/0xd0 <-- take the lock in process context [..] [<ffffffff810bf64e>] __lock_acquire+0x3fe/0x1e70 [<ffffffff810c00ad>] ? __lock_acquire+0xe5d/0x1e70 [<ffffffff810c1947>] lock_acquire+0xb7/0x290 [<ffffffff8143a60c>] ? blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 [<ffffffff818ac3a8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50 [<ffffffff8143a60c>] ? blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 [<ffffffff8143a60c>] blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 <-- take the lock in softirq [<ffffffff8143bfec>] part_release+0x1c/0x50 [<ffffffff8158edf6>] device_release+0x36/0xb0 [<ffffffff8145ac2b>] kobject_cleanup+0x7b/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8145aad0>] kobject_put+0x30/0x70 [<ffffffff8158f147>] put_device+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff8143c29c>] delete_partition_rcu_cb+0x16c/0x180 [<ffffffff8143c130>] ? read_dev_sector+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff810e0e0f>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x2ff/0xa90 [<ffffffff810e0dcf>] ? rcu_process_callbacks+0x2bf/0xa90 [<ffffffff81067e2e>] __do_softirq+0xde/0x600 Neil sees this in his tests and it also triggers on pmem driver unbind for the libnvdimm tests. This fix is on top of an initial fix by Keith for incorrect usage of mutex_lock() in this path: 2da7809 "block: Fix dev_t minor allocation lifetime". Both this and 2da7809 are candidates for -stable. Fixes: 2da7809 ("block: Fix dev_t minor allocation lifetime") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
commit 4d66e5e upstream. ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.1.0-rc7+ raspberrypi#217 Tainted: G O --------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. swapper/6/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: (ext_devt_lock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff8143a60c>] blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810bf6b1>] __lock_acquire+0x461/0x1e70 [<ffffffff810c1947>] lock_acquire+0xb7/0x290 [<ffffffff818ac3a8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50 [<ffffffff8143a07d>] blk_alloc_devt+0x6d/0xd0 <-- take the lock in process context [..] [<ffffffff810bf64e>] __lock_acquire+0x3fe/0x1e70 [<ffffffff810c00ad>] ? __lock_acquire+0xe5d/0x1e70 [<ffffffff810c1947>] lock_acquire+0xb7/0x290 [<ffffffff8143a60c>] ? blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 [<ffffffff818ac3a8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50 [<ffffffff8143a60c>] ? blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 [<ffffffff8143a60c>] blk_free_devt+0x3c/0x70 <-- take the lock in softirq [<ffffffff8143bfec>] part_release+0x1c/0x50 [<ffffffff8158edf6>] device_release+0x36/0xb0 [<ffffffff8145ac2b>] kobject_cleanup+0x7b/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8145aad0>] kobject_put+0x30/0x70 [<ffffffff8158f147>] put_device+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff8143c29c>] delete_partition_rcu_cb+0x16c/0x180 [<ffffffff8143c130>] ? read_dev_sector+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff810e0e0f>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x2ff/0xa90 [<ffffffff810e0dcf>] ? rcu_process_callbacks+0x2bf/0xa90 [<ffffffff81067e2e>] __do_softirq+0xde/0x600 Neil sees this in his tests and it also triggers on pmem driver unbind for the libnvdimm tests. This fix is on top of an initial fix by Keith for incorrect usage of mutex_lock() in this path: 2da7809 "block: Fix dev_t minor allocation lifetime". Both this and 2da7809 are candidates for -stable. Fixes: 2da7809 ("block: Fix dev_t minor allocation lifetime") Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Hi, [ 197.670449] ============================================================================= |
|
Why are you using kernel 3.2.26? |
|
One of our devices had 3.2.26. We updated it to 4.1.8 and we still see the same issue. =============================================================================BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwrittenDisabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Bytes b4 cd2b6bf0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ FIX kmalloc-64: Marking all objects used |
|
4.1.8 is not the latest version available in either our Raspbian repositories or via rpi-update. Do you still see this issue with the latest shipped kernel (for information, 4.9.30 via rpi-update, 4.4.24 via Raspbian deb)? |
|
Sorry for the delay. We cannot possibly use kernel-4.9.30 directly since we don't have many of our drivers ported to 4.9.30. We ported them to 4.1.8. Can I accommodate the newest dwc_otg driver to 4.1.8? Also I am looking for ways that help debug this issue. |
With 4.11-rc4, the following command triggers a WARN_ON, when a sink is not enabled. perf record -e cs_etm/@20010000.etf/ [88286.547741] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [88286.552332] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2156 at kernel/workqueue.c:1442 __queue_work+0x29c/0x3b8 [88286.560427] Modules linked in: [88286.563451] [88286.564928] CPU: 3 PID: 2156 Comm: perf_v4.11 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4 raspberrypi#217 [88286.573453] Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform, BIOS EDK II Aug 15 2016 [88286.584128] task: ffff80097597c200 task.stack: ffff8009768b0000 [88286.589990] PC is at __queue_work+0x29c/0x3b8 [88286.594303] LR is at __queue_work+0x104/0x3b8 [88286.598614] pc : [<ffff0000080d8c7c>] lr : [<ffff0000080d8ae4>] pstate: a00001c5 [88286.605934] sp : ffff8009768b3aa0 [88286.609212] x29: ffff8009768b3aa0 x28: ffff80097ff3da00 [88286.614477] x27: ffff80097ff89c00 x26: ffff8009751b0e00 [88286.619741] x25: ffff000008c9f000 x24: 0000000000000003 [88286.625004] x23: 0000000000000040 x22: ffff000008d3dab8 [88286.630268] x21: ffff800977804400 x20: 0000000000000007 [88286.635532] x19: ffff000008c54000 x18: 0000fffff9185160 [88286.640795] x17: 0000ffffb33d9a38 x16: ffff000008088270 [88286.646059] x15: 0000ffffb345b590 x14: 0000000000000000 [88286.651322] x13: 0000000000000004 x12: 0000000000000040 [88286.656586] x11: 0000000000000068 x10: 0000000000000000 [88286.661849] x9 : ffff800977400028 x8 : 0000000000000000 [88286.667113] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0000080d8ae4 [88286.672376] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000080 [88286.677639] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [88286.682903] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8009751b0e08 [88286.688166] [88286.689638] ---[ end trace 31633f18fd33d4cb ]--- [88286.694206] Call trace: [88286.696627] Exception stack(0xffff8009768b38d0 to 0xffff8009768b3a00) [88286.703004] 38c0: ffff000008c54000 0001000000000000 [88286.710757] 38e0: ffff8009768b3aa0 ffff0000080d8c7c ffff8009768b3b50 ffff80097ff8a5b0 [88286.718511] 3900: 0000800977325000 0000000000000000 0000000000000040 ffff80097ffc6180 [88286.726264] 3920: ffff8009768b3940 ffff0000088a8694 ffff80097ffc5800 0000000000000000 [88286.734017] 3940: ffff8009768b3960 ffff0000081919c0 ffff80097ffc5280 0000000000000001 [88286.741771] 3960: ffff8009768b3a50 ffff00000819206c ffff8009751b0e08 0000000000000000 [88286.749523] 3980: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000080 0000000000000000 [88286.757277] 39a0: ffff0000080d8ae4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff800977400028 [88286.765029] 39c0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000068 0000000000000040 0000000000000004 [88286.772783] 39e0: 0000000000000000 0000ffffb345b590 ffff000008088270 0000ffffb33d9a38 [88286.780537] [<ffff0000080d8c7c>] __queue_work+0x29c/0x3b8 [88286.785883] [<ffff0000080d8df8>] queue_work_on+0x60/0x78 [88286.791146] [<ffff000008764c68>] etm_setup_aux+0x178/0x238 [88286.796578] [<ffff000008183600>] rb_alloc_aux+0x228/0x310 [88286.801925] [<ffff00000817e564>] perf_mmap+0x404/0x5a8 [88286.807015] [<ffff0000081c60cc>] mmap_region+0x394/0x5c0 [88286.812276] [<ffff0000081c654c>] do_mmap+0x254/0x388 [88286.817191] [<ffff0000081a989c>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xbc/0xe0 [88286.822452] [<ffff0000081c3ffc>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xac/0x228 [88286.827884] [<ffff000008088288>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28 [88286.832714] [<ffff000008082f30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 The patch makes sure that the event_data->work is initialised properly before we could possibly use it. Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Tested-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit d755209) Change-Id: I7a12c9fcf58e5ec2eb5998d0d6cc2cfbef289fcd
commit 082f230 upstream. Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 raspberrypi#210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 raspberrypi#211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 raspberrypi#212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 raspberrypi#213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 raspberrypi#214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 raspberrypi#215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 raspberrypi#216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 raspberrypi#217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 raspberrypi#218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 raspberrypi#219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 raspberrypi#220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 raspberrypi#221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 082f230 upstream. Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 082f230 upstream. Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ mount/779 is trying to acquire lock: ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 but task is already holding lock: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: start_transaction+0x444/0x700 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by mount/779: #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0 ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 ? capable+0x3a/0x60 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup the balance_ctl. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
commit fb28610 upstream. While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ mount/779 is trying to acquire lock: ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 but task is already holding lock: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: start_transaction+0x444/0x700 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by mount/779: #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0 ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 ? capable+0x3a/0x60 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup the balance_ctl. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb28610 upstream. While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.10.0-rc6+ raspberrypi#217 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ mount/779 is trying to acquire lock: ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 but task is already holding lock: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: start_transaction+0x444/0x700 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by mount/779: #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ raspberrypi#217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0 ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 ? capable+0x3a/0x60 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup the balance_ctl. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…kprobe_event_gen_test_exit() When trace_get_event_file() failed, gen_kretprobe_test will be assigned as the error code. If module kprobe_event_gen_test is removed now, the null pointer dereference will happen in kprobe_event_gen_test_exit(). Check if gen_kprobe_test or gen_kretprobe_test is error code or NULL before dereference them. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 2210 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1-00171-g2159299a3b74-dirty #217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kprobe_event_gen_test_exit+0x1c/0xb5 [kprobe_event_gen_test] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffff9ffffff2. RSP: 0018:ffffc900015bfeb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffffffffea RBX: ffffffffa0002080 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffa0001054 RSI: ffffffffa0001064 RDI: ffffffffdfc6349c RBP: ffffffffa0000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00000000001e95c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000800 R13: ffffffffa0002420 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f56b75be540(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff9ffffff2 CR3: 000000010874a006 CR4: 0000000000330ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __x64_sys_delete_module+0x206/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd8/0x190 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221108015130.28326-2-shangxiaojing@huawei.com/ Fixes: 6483624 ("tracing: Add kprobe event command generation test module") Signed-off-by: Shang XiaoJing <shangxiaojing@huawei.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
…kprobe_event_gen_test_exit() commit e0d7526 upstream. When trace_get_event_file() failed, gen_kretprobe_test will be assigned as the error code. If module kprobe_event_gen_test is removed now, the null pointer dereference will happen in kprobe_event_gen_test_exit(). Check if gen_kprobe_test or gen_kretprobe_test is error code or NULL before dereference them. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [raspberrypi#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 2210 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1-00171-g2159299a3b74-dirty raspberrypi#217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kprobe_event_gen_test_exit+0x1c/0xb5 [kprobe_event_gen_test] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffff9ffffff2. RSP: 0018:ffffc900015bfeb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffffffffea RBX: ffffffffa0002080 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffa0001054 RSI: ffffffffa0001064 RDI: ffffffffdfc6349c RBP: ffffffffa0000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00000000001e95c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000800 R13: ffffffffa0002420 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f56b75be540(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff9ffffff2 CR3: 000000010874a006 CR4: 0000000000330ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __x64_sys_delete_module+0x206/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd8/0x190 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221108015130.28326-2-shangxiaojing@huawei.com/ Fixes: 6483624 ("tracing: Add kprobe event command generation test module") Signed-off-by: Shang XiaoJing <shangxiaojing@huawei.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If a kernel thread is created by a user thread, it may carry FPU/SIMD thread info flags (TIF_USEDFPU, TIF_USEDSIMD, etc.). Then it will be considered as a fpu owner and kernel try to save its FPU/SIMD context and cause such errors: [ 41.518931] do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]: [ 41.523933] CPU: 1 PID: 395 Comm: iou-wrk-394 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ #217 [ 41.530757] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB/Loongson-LS3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB, BIOS vUDK2018-LoongArch-V2.0.pre-beta8 08/18/2022 [ 41.544064] $ 0 : 0000000000000000 90000000011e9468 9000000106c7c000 9000000106c7fcf0 [ 41.552101] $ 4 : 9000000106305d40 9000000106689800 9000000106c7fd08 0000000003995818 [ 41.560138] $ 8 : 0000000000000001 90000000009a72e4 0000000000000020 fffffffffffffffc [ 41.568174] $12 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 00000009aab7e130 [ 41.576211] $16 : 00000000000001ff 0000000000000407 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 41.584247] $20 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 9000000106c7fd70 90000001002f0400 [ 41.592284] $24 : 0000000000000000 900000000178f740 90000000011e9834 90000001063057c0 [ 41.600320] $28 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 9000000006826b40 9000000106305140 [ 41.608356] era : 9000000000228848 _save_fp+0x0/0xd8 [ 41.613542] ra : 90000000011e9468 __schedule+0x568/0x8d0 [ 41.619160] CSR crmd: 000000b0 [ 41.619163] CSR prmd: 00000000 [ 41.622359] CSR euen: 00000000 [ 41.625558] CSR ecfg: 00071c1c [ 41.628756] CSR estat: 000f0000 [ 41.635239] ExcCode : f (SubCode 0) [ 41.638783] PrId : 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit) [ 41.643191] Modules linked in: acpi_ipmi vfat fat ipmi_si ipmi_devintf cfg80211 ipmi_msghandler rfkill fuse efivarfs [ 41.653734] Process iou-wrk-394 (pid: 395, threadinfo=0000000004ebe913, task=00000000636fa1be) [ 41.662375] Stack : 00000000ffff0875 9000000006800ec0 9000000006800ec0 90000000002d57e0 [ 41.670412] 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 9000000106535880 0000000000000001 [ 41.678450] 9000000105291800 0000000000000000 9000000105291838 900000000178e000 [ 41.686487] 9000000106c7fd90 9000000106305140 0000000000000001 90000000011e9834 [ 41.694523] 00000000ffff0875 90000000011f034c 9000000105291838 9000000105291830 [ 41.702561] 0000000000000000 9000000006801440 00000000ffff0875 90000000002d48c0 [ 41.710597] 9000000128800001 9000000106305140 9000000105291838 9000000105291838 [ 41.718634] 9000000105291830 9000000107811740 9000000105291848 90000000009bf1e0 [ 41.726672] 9000000105291830 9000000107811748 2d6b72772d756f69 0000000000343933 [ 41.734708] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 41.742745] ... [ 41.745252] Call Trace: [ 42.197868] [<9000000000228848>] _save_fp+0x0/0xd8 [ 42.205214] [<90000000011ed468>] __schedule+0x568/0x8d0 [ 42.210485] [<90000000011ed834>] schedule+0x64/0xd4 [ 42.215411] [<90000000011f434c>] schedule_timeout+0x88/0x188 [ 42.221115] [<90000000009c36d0>] io_wqe_worker+0x184/0x350 [ 42.226645] [<9000000000221cf0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0x9c This can be easily triggered by ltp testcase syscalls/io_uring02 and it can also be easily fixed by clearing the FPU/SIMD thread info flags for kernel threads in copy_thread(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Qi Hu <huqi@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
…kprobe_event_gen_test_exit() commit e0d7526 upstream. When trace_get_event_file() failed, gen_kretprobe_test will be assigned as the error code. If module kprobe_event_gen_test is removed now, the null pointer dereference will happen in kprobe_event_gen_test_exit(). Check if gen_kprobe_test or gen_kretprobe_test is error code or NULL before dereference them. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 2210 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1-00171-g2159299a3b74-dirty #217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kprobe_event_gen_test_exit+0x1c/0xb5 [kprobe_event_gen_test] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffff9ffffff2. RSP: 0018:ffffc900015bfeb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffffffffea RBX: ffffffffa0002080 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffa0001054 RSI: ffffffffa0001064 RDI: ffffffffdfc6349c RBP: ffffffffa0000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00000000001e95c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000800 R13: ffffffffa0002420 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f56b75be540(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff9ffffff2 CR3: 000000010874a006 CR4: 0000000000330ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __x64_sys_delete_module+0x206/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd8/0x190 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221108015130.28326-2-shangxiaojing@huawei.com/ Fixes: 6483624 ("tracing: Add kprobe event command generation test module") Signed-off-by: Shang XiaoJing <shangxiaojing@huawei.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e428e96 upstream. If a kernel thread is created by a user thread, it may carry FPU/SIMD thread info flags (TIF_USEDFPU, TIF_USEDSIMD, etc.). Then it will be considered as a fpu owner and kernel try to save its FPU/SIMD context and cause such errors: [ 41.518931] do_fpu invoked from kernel context![raspberrypi#1]: [ 41.523933] CPU: 1 PID: 395 Comm: iou-wrk-394 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#217 [ 41.530757] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB/Loongson-LS3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB, BIOS vUDK2018-LoongArch-V2.0.pre-beta8 08/18/2022 [ 41.544064] $ 0 : 0000000000000000 90000000011e9468 9000000106c7c000 9000000106c7fcf0 [ 41.552101] $ 4 : 9000000106305d40 9000000106689800 9000000106c7fd08 0000000003995818 [ 41.560138] $ 8 : 0000000000000001 90000000009a72e4 0000000000000020 fffffffffffffffc [ 41.568174] $12 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 00000009aab7e130 [ 41.576211] $16 : 00000000000001ff 0000000000000407 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 41.584247] $20 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 9000000106c7fd70 90000001002f0400 [ 41.592284] $24 : 0000000000000000 900000000178f740 90000000011e9834 90000001063057c0 [ 41.600320] $28 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 9000000006826b40 9000000106305140 [ 41.608356] era : 9000000000228848 _save_fp+0x0/0xd8 [ 41.613542] ra : 90000000011e9468 __schedule+0x568/0x8d0 [ 41.619160] CSR crmd: 000000b0 [ 41.619163] CSR prmd: 00000000 [ 41.622359] CSR euen: 00000000 [ 41.625558] CSR ecfg: 00071c1c [ 41.628756] CSR estat: 000f0000 [ 41.635239] ExcCode : f (SubCode 0) [ 41.638783] PrId : 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit) [ 41.643191] Modules linked in: acpi_ipmi vfat fat ipmi_si ipmi_devintf cfg80211 ipmi_msghandler rfkill fuse efivarfs [ 41.653734] Process iou-wrk-394 (pid: 395, threadinfo=0000000004ebe913, task=00000000636fa1be) [ 41.662375] Stack : 00000000ffff0875 9000000006800ec0 9000000006800ec0 90000000002d57e0 [ 41.670412] 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 9000000106535880 0000000000000001 [ 41.678450] 9000000105291800 0000000000000000 9000000105291838 900000000178e000 [ 41.686487] 9000000106c7fd90 9000000106305140 0000000000000001 90000000011e9834 [ 41.694523] 00000000ffff0875 90000000011f034c 9000000105291838 9000000105291830 [ 41.702561] 0000000000000000 9000000006801440 00000000ffff0875 90000000002d48c0 [ 41.710597] 9000000128800001 9000000106305140 9000000105291838 9000000105291838 [ 41.718634] 9000000105291830 9000000107811740 9000000105291848 90000000009bf1e0 [ 41.726672] 9000000105291830 9000000107811748 2d6b72772d756f69 0000000000343933 [ 41.734708] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 41.742745] ... [ 41.745252] Call Trace: [ 42.197868] [<9000000000228848>] _save_fp+0x0/0xd8 [ 42.205214] [<90000000011ed468>] __schedule+0x568/0x8d0 [ 42.210485] [<90000000011ed834>] schedule+0x64/0xd4 [ 42.215411] [<90000000011f434c>] schedule_timeout+0x88/0x188 [ 42.221115] [<90000000009c36d0>] io_wqe_worker+0x184/0x350 [ 42.226645] [<9000000000221cf0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0x9c This can be easily triggered by ltp testcase syscalls/io_uring02 and it can also be easily fixed by clearing the FPU/SIMD thread info flags for kernel threads in copy_thread(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Qi Hu <huqi@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
My Model A Pi oopses in a reproducible way after a while under the following conditions:
This is with latest default kernel.
The problem is most reproducible with my RT5370 wifi dongle whose rt2800_usb driver will periodically do radio link maintenance as dictated by its link quality management (setting gain/speed etc). The problem also occurs at infrequent intervals during a wifi data transfer.
If the device is plugged in via a hub (including the smsc one on a Pi model B) the system no longer Oopses.
First OOPS:
I recompiled the kernel with debug info, reproduced the OOPS and traced the exception to line 507 in dwc_otg_hcd.c -
For some reason qh (or qtd) ends up null.
This line is only called if SOF interrupts are disabled and the qtd allocation was successful, i.e. if there are no periodic endpoints enabled.
As usual I have reconfigured the kernel to do SLUB debugging with poison/redzone/user checking enabled along with more general debug options. SLUB is reporting a possible use-after-free (which reliably happens on boot):
I'm somewhat stuck at this point as I've drudged through the transfer complete interrupt handling with no avail.
I got a similar oops when I unplugged a zd1211b device; possibly related:
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: