bpf: cgroup_sock lsm flavor #17
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Allow per-cgroup lsm attachment of a subset of hooks that operate on the 'struct sock' Expected usage: 1. attach raw tracepoint hook with expected_attach=BPF_LSM_CGROUP_SOCK 2. this causes fmod_ret trampoline that invokes __cgroup_bpf_run_lsm_sock 3. __cgroup_bpf_run_lsm_sock relies on existing cgroup_bpf->effective array which is extended to include new slots for lsm hooks 4. attach same program to the cgroup_fd Current limitation: - abusing x86 jit, not generic - no proper error handling (detach tracepoint first will probably cause problems) - 2 hooks for now for demonstration purposes - lsm specific, maybe can be extended fentry/fexit/fmod_ret Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Open up enough fields for selftests. Will be extended in the real patch series to match bpf_sock fields. Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
lsm+expected_attach_type=BPF_LSM_CGROUP_SOCK Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Implement two things I'd like to get from this: 1. apply default sk_priority policy 2. permit TX-only AF_PACKET socket Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
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Master branch: 8cbf062 |
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=614736 expired. Closing PR. |
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When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.
[ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
[ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
...
[ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280
crash> bt
...
PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd"
...
#9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
[exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090
RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0
R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
#11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
#12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
#13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
#14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
#15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
#16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
#17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
#18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
#19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
#20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
#21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
#22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
#23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
#24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
#25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
#26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92
crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)
To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.
Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In calipso_map_cat_ntoh(), in the for loop, if the return value of netlbl_bitmap_walk() is equal to (net_clen_bits - 1), when netlbl_bitmap_walk() is called next time, out-of-bounds memory accesses of bitmap[byte_offset] occurs. The bug was found during fuzzing. The following is the fuzzing report BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 Read of size 1 at addr ffffff8107bf6f70 by task err_OH/252 CPU: 7 PID: 252 Comm: err_OH Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7+ #17 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x21c/0x230 show_stack+0x1c/0x60 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c print_address_description.constprop.0+0x70/0x2d0 __kasan_report+0x158/0x16c kasan_report+0x74/0x120 __asan_load1+0x80/0xa0 netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 calipso_opt_getattr+0x1a8/0x230 calipso_sock_getattr+0x218/0x340 calipso_sock_getattr+0x44/0x60 netlbl_sock_getattr+0x44/0x80 selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt+0x138/0x170 selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x60 security_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x90 __sys_setsockopt+0xbc/0x2b0 __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x6c/0x84 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x88/0xa0 el0_svc+0x128/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0x120 el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170 Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Hulk Robot reported a issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092 CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17 Call Trace: [...] memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline] __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline] __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x459fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9 RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140 RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- ext4_xattr_set ext4_xattr_set_handle ext4_xattr_ibody_find >> s->end < s->base >> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR >> xattr_check_inode is not executed ext4_xattr_ibody_set ext4_xattr_set_entry >> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base >> UAF in memcpy we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt touch /mnt/file setfattr -n user.cat -v `seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]'` /mnt/file In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic: header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode) = raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize is->s.base = IFIRST(header) = header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size In ext4_xattr_set_entry min_offs = s->end - s->base = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) last = s->first free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32) = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32) In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8. The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when memcpy is executed. Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220616021358.2504451-3-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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When doing slub_debug test, kfence's 'test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu' kunit test case cause a use-after-free error: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kobject_del+0x14/0x30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007679090 by task kunit_try_catch/261 CPU: 1 PID: 261 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B N 6.0.0-rc5-next-20220916 #17 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x87/0x2a5 print_report+0x103/0x1ed kasan_report+0xb7/0x140 kobject_del+0x14/0x30 kmem_cache_destroy+0x130/0x170 test_exit+0x1a/0x30 kunit_try_run_case+0xad/0xc0 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x26/0x50 kthread+0x17b/0x1b0 </TASK> The cause is inside kmem_cache_destroy(): kmem_cache_destroy acquire lock/mutex shutdown_cache schedule_work(kmem_cache_release) (if RCU flag set) release lock/mutex kmem_cache_release (if RCU flag not set) In some certain timing, the scheduled work could be run before the next RCU flag checking, which can then get a wrong value and lead to double kmem_cache_release(). Fix it by caching the RCU flag inside protected area, just like 'refcnt' Fixes: 0495e33 ("mm/slab_common: Deleting kobject in kmem_cache_destroy() without holding slab_mutex/cpu_hotplug_lock") Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
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Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these metadata files for a malformed NTFS image. [ 240.190827] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 240.191583] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 240.191956] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 240.192391] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 240.192897] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 240.193805] CPU: 0 PID: 242 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 5.19.0+ #17 [ 240.194477] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 240.195152] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.195679] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.196642] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.197019] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.197523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.197877] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.198292] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.198647] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.199410] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.199895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.200314] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 240.200839] Call Trace: [ 240.201104] <TASK> [ 240.201502] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 240.202297] ? ___slab_alloc+0x465/0x830 [ 240.202614] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 240.202886] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x32/0x90 [ 240.203157] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250 [ 240.203543] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0 [ 240.203785] mi_get+0x70/0x140 [ 240.204012] ni_load_mi_ex+0xfa/0x190 [ 240.204346] ? ni_std5+0x90/0x90 [ 240.204588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.204859] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 240.205107] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 240.205600] ? ntfs_load_attr_list+0xbe/0x300 [ 240.205864] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 240.206157] ntfs_iget5+0x56c/0x1870 [ 240.206510] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 240.206776] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.207030] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.207545] ntfs_fill_super+0xb8f/0x1e20 [ 240.207839] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.208069] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 240.208467] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 240.208846] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.209221] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 240.209804] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.210519] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 240.210991] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 240.211455] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 240.211806] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.212112] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 240.212559] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 240.212906] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.213329] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 240.213829] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 240.214246] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 240.214774] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 240.215080] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 240.215442] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 240.215811] RIP: 0033:0x7f233b4e948a [ 240.216104] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 240.217615] RSP: 002b:00007fff02211ec8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 240.218718] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdc35b060 RCX: 00007f233b4e948a [ 240.219556] RDX: 0000561cdc35b260 RSI: 0000561cdc35b2e0 RDI: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.219975] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdc35b280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 240.220403] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.220803] R13: 0000561cdc35b260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 240.221256] </TASK> [ 240.221567] Modules linked in: [ 240.222028] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 240.223291] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 240.223669] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.224058] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.225033] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.225968] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.226624] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.227307] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.227816] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228330] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228729] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.229281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.230298] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
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When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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Upon physical link change, firmware reports to the kernel about the change along with the details like speed, lmac_type_id, etc. Kernel derives lmac_type based on lmac_type_id received from firmware. In a few scenarios, firmware returns an invalid lmac_type_id, which is resulting in below kernel panic. This patch adds the missing validation of the lmac_type_id field. Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 35.321595] Modules linked in: [ 35.328982] CPU: 0 PID: 31 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.4.210-g2e3169d8e1bc-dirty #17 [ 35.337014] Hardware name: Marvell CN103XX board (DT) [ 35.344297] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 35.352730] pstate: 40400089 (nZcv daIf +PAN -UAO) [ 35.360267] pc : strncpy+0x10/0x30 [ 35.366595] lr : cgx_link_change_handler+0x90/0x180 Fixes: 61071a8 ("octeontx2-af: Forward CGX link notifications to PFs") Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hkelam@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sai Krishna <saikrishnag@marvell.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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May 30, 2023
The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] #10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 #13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] #14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] #15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 #16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 #17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 #18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 #19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 #20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 #21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 #22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a #23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 #24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 #25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f #26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 #27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d #10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac #10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 #11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc #12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] #13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] #14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] #15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] #16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] #17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com
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Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com
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Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com
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Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com
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Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com
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Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230626131942.5100-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
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The buffer is used to save register mapping in a sample. Normally perf samples don't have any register so the string should be empty. But it missed to initialize the buffer when the size is 0. And it's passed to PyUnicode_FromString() with a garbage data. So it returns NULL due to invalid input (instead of an empty unicode string object) which causes a segfault like below: Thread 2.1 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 0x7ffff7c83780 (LWP 193775)] 0x00007ffff6dbca2e in PyDict_SetItem () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpython3.11.so.1.0 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff6dbca2e in PyDict_SetItem () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpython3.11.so.1.0 #1 0x00007ffff6dbf848 in PyDict_SetItemString () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpython3.11.so.1.0 #2 0x000055555575824d in pydict_set_item_string_decref (val=0x0, key=0x5555557f96e3 "iregs", dict=0x7ffff5f7f780) at util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c:145 #3 set_regs_in_dict (evsel=0x555555efc370, sample=0x7fffffffb870, dict=0x7ffff5f7f780) at util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c:776 #4 get_perf_sample_dict (sample=sample@entry=0x7fffffffb870, evsel=evsel@entry=0x555555efc370, al=al@entry=0x7fffffffb2e0, addr_al=addr_al@entry=0x0, callchain=callchain@entry=0x7ffff63ef440) at util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c:923 #5 0x0000555555758ec1 in python_process_tracepoint (sample=0x7fffffffb870, evsel=0x555555efc370, al=0x7fffffffb2e0, addr_al=0x0) at util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c:1044 #6 0x00005555555c5db8 in process_sample_event (tool=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, sample=<optimized out>, evsel=0x555555efc370, machine=0x555555ef4d68) at builtin-script.c:2421 #7 0x00005555556b7793 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x555555ef4b60, event=0x7ffff62ff7d0, tool=0x7fffffffc150, file_offset=30672, file_path=0x555555efb8a0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1639 #8 0x00005555556bc864 in do_flush (show_progress=true, oe=0x555555efb700) at util/ordered-events.c:245 #9 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x555555efb700, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__FINAL, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 #10 0x00005555556bd06e in ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x555555efb700, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__FINAL) at util/ordered-events.c:342 #11 0x00005555556b9d63 in __perf_session__process_events (session=0x555555ef4b60) at util/session.c:2465 #12 perf_session__process_events (session=0x555555ef4b60) at util/session.c:2627 #13 0x00005555555cb1d0 in __cmd_script (script=0x7fffffffc150) at builtin-script.c:2839 #14 cmd_script (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-script.c:4365 #15 0x0000555555650811 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x555555ed8948 <commands+456>, argc=argc@entry=4, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffe240) at perf.c:323 #16 0x0000555555597eb3 in handle_internal_command (argv=0x7fffffffe240, argc=4) at perf.c:377 #17 run_argv (argv=<synthetic pointer>, argcp=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:421 #18 main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe240) at perf.c:537 Fixes: 51cfe7a ("perf python: Avoid 2 leak sanitizer issues") Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Permit enslavement to netdevices with uppers The mlxsw driver currently makes the assumption that the user applies configuration in a bottom-up manner. Thus netdevices need to be added to the bridge before IP addresses are configured on that bridge or SVI added on top of it. Enslaving a netdevice to another netdevice that already has uppers is in fact forbidden by mlxsw for this reason. Despite this safety, it is rather easy to get into situations where the offloaded configuration is just plain wrong. As an example, take a front panel port, configure an IP address: it gets a RIF. Now enslave the port to the bridge, and the RIF is gone. Remove the port from the bridge again, but the RIF never comes back. There is a number of similar situations, where changing the configuration there and back utterly breaks the offload. Similarly, detaching a front panel port from a configured topology means unoffloading of this whole topology -- VLAN uppers, next hops, etc. Attaching the port back is then not permitted at all. If it were, it would not result in a working configuration, because much of mlxsw is written to react to changes in immediate configuration. There is nothing that would go visit netdevices in the attached-to topology and offload existing routes and VLAN memberships, for example. In this patchset, introduce a number of replays to be invoked so that this sort of post-hoc offload is supported. Then remove the vetoes that disallowed enslavement of front panel ports to other netdevices with uppers. The patchset progresses as follows: - In patch #1, fix an issue in the bridge driver. To my knowledge, the issue could not have resulted in a buggy behavior previously, and thus is packaged with this patchset instead of being sent separately to net. - In patch #2, add a new helper to the switchdev code. - In patch #3, drop mlxsw selftests that will not be relevant after this patchset anymore. - Patches #4, #5, #6, #7 and #8 prepare the codebase for smoother introduction of the rest of the code. - Patches #9, #10, #11, #12, #13 and #14 replay various aspects of upper configuration when a front panel port is introduced into a topology. Individual patches take care of bridge and LAG RIF memberships, switchdev replay, nexthop and neighbors replay, and MACVLAN offload. - Patches #15 and #16 introduce RIFs for newly-relevant netdevices when a front panel port is enslaved (in which case all uppers are newly relevant), or, respectively, deslaved (in which case the newly-relevant netdevice is the one being deslaved). - Up until this point, the introduced scaffolding was not really used, because mlxsw still forbids enslavement of mlxsw netdevices to uppers with uppers. In patch #17, this condition is finally relaxed. A sizable selftest suite is available to test all this new code. That will be sent in a separate patchset. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Sep 21, 2023
The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230828221018.19471-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Nov 6, 2023
Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Nov 7, 2023
Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Nov 8, 2023
Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
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Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
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Add test to validate BPF verifier's register range bounds tracking logic. The main bulk is a lot of auto-generated tests based on a small set of seed values for lower and upper 32 bits of full 64-bit values. Currently we validate only range vs const comparisons, but the idea is to start validating range over range comparisons in subsequent patch set. When setting up initial register ranges we treat registers as one of u64/s64/u32/s32 numeric types, and then independently perform conditional comparisons based on a potentially different u64/s64/u32/s32 types. This tests lots of tricky cases of deriving bounds information across different numeric domains. Given there are lots of auto-generated cases, we guard them behind SLOW_TESTS=1 envvar requirement, and skip them altogether otherwise. With current full set of upper/lower seed value, all supported comparison operators and all the combinations of u64/s64/u32/s32 number domains, we get about 7.7 million tests, which run in about 35 minutes on my local qemu instance without parallelization. But we also split those tests by init/cond numeric types, which allows to rely on test_progs's parallelization of tests with `-j` option, getting run time down to about 5 minutes on 8 cores. It's still something that shouldn't be run during normal test_progs run. But we can run it a reasonable time, and so perhaps a nightly CI test run (once we have it) would be a good option for this. We also add a small set of tricky conditions that came up during development and triggered various bugs or corner cases in either selftest's reimplementation of range bounds logic or in verifier's logic itself. These are fast enough to be run as part of normal test_progs test run and are great for a quick sanity checking. Let's take a look at test output to understand what's going on: $ sudo ./test_progs -t reg_bounds_crafted #191/1 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0xffffffff] (u64)< 0:OK ... #191/115 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0:OK ... #191/137 reg_bounds_crafted/(u64)[0xffffffff; 0x100000000] (u64)== 0:OK Each test case is uniquely and fully described by this generated string. E.g.: "(u64)[0; 0x17fffffff] (s32)< 0". This means that we initialize a register (R6) in such a way that verifier knows that it can have a value in [(u64)0; (u64)0x17fffffff] range. Another register (R7) is also set up as u64, but this time a constant (zero in this case). They then are compared using 32-bit signed < operation. Resulting TRUE/FALSE branches are evaluated (including cases where it's known that one of the branches will never be taken, in which case we validate that verifier also determines this as a dead code). Test validates that verifier's final register state matches expected state based on selftest's own reg_state logic, implemented from scratch for cross-checking purposes. These test names can be conveniently used for further debugging, and if -vv verboseness is requested we can get a corresponding verifier log (with mark_precise logs filtered out as irrelevant and distracting). Example below is slightly redacted for brevity, omitting irrelevant register output in some places, marked with [...]. $ sudo ./test_progs -a 'reg_bounds_crafted/(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1' -vv ... VERIFIER LOG: ======================== func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 0: (05) goto pc+2 3: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 4: (bc) w6 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R6_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 5: (85) call bpf_get_current_pid_tgid#14 ; R0_w=scalar() 6: (bc) w7 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar() R7_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 7: (b4) w1 = 0 ; R1_w=0 8: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2=4294967295 9: (ae) if w6 < w1 goto pc-9 9: R1=0 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 10: (2e) if w6 > w2 goto pc-10 10: R2=4294967295 R6=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 11: (b4) w1 = -1 ; R1_w=4294967295 12: (b4) w2 = -1 ; R2_w=4294967295 13: (ae) if w7 < w1 goto pc-13 ; R1_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 14: (2e) if w7 > w2 goto pc-14 14: R2_w=4294967295 R7=4294967295 15: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 16: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 17: (ce) if w6 s< w7 goto pc+3 ; R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R7=4294967295 18: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=0,smax=umax=4294967295,smin32=-1,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 19: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 20: (95) exit from 17 to 21: [...] 21: (bc) w0 = w6 ; [...] R6=scalar(id=1,smin=umin=umin32=2147483648,smax=umax=umax32=4294967294,smax32=-2,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffffff)) 22: (bc) w0 = w7 ; [...] R7=4294967295 23: (95) exit from 13 to 1: [...] 1: [...] 1: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 2: (95) exit processed 24 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2 peak_states 2 mark_read 1 ===================== Verifier log above is for `(u32)[0; U32_MAX] (s32)< -1` use cases, where u32 range is used for initialization, followed by signed < operator. Note how we use w6/w7 in this case for register initialization (it would be R6/R7 for 64-bit types) and then `if w6 s< w7` for comparison at instruction #17. It will be `if R6 < R7` for 64-bit unsigned comparison. Above example gives a good impression of the overall structure of a BPF programs generated for reg_bounds tests. In the future, this "framework" can be extended to test not just conditional jumps, but also arithmetic operations. Adding randomized testing is another possibility. Some implementation notes. We basically have our own generics-like operations on numbers, where all the numbers are stored in u64, but how they are interpreted is passed as runtime argument enum num_t. Further, `struct range` represents a bounds range, and those are collected together into a minimal `struct reg_state`, which collects range bounds across all four numberical domains: u64, s64, u32, s64. Based on these primitives and `enum op` representing possible conditional operation (<, <=, >, >=, ==, !=), there is a set of generic helpers to perform "range arithmetics", which is used to maintain struct reg_state. We simulate what verifier will do for reg bounds of R6 and R7 registers using these range and reg_state primitives. Simulated information is used to determine branch taken conclusion and expected exact register state across all four number domains. Implementation of "range arithmetics" is more generic than what verifier is currently performing: it allows range over range comparisons and adjustments. This is the intended end goal of this patch set overall and verifier logic is enhanced in subsequent patches in this series to handle range vs range operations, at which point selftests are extended to validate these conditions as well. For now it's range vs const cases only. Note that tests are split into multiple groups by their numeric types for initialization of ranges and for comparison operation. This allows to use test_progs's -j parallelization to speed up tests, as we now have 16 groups of parallel running tests. Overall reduction of running time that allows is pretty good, we go down from more than 30 minutes to slightly less than 5 minutes running time. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-8-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Petr Machata says:
====================
mlxsw: Support CFF flood mode
The registers to configure to initialize a flood table differ between the
controlled and CFF flood modes. In therefore needs to be an op. Add it,
hook up the current init to the existing families, and invoke the op.
PGT is an in-HW table that maps addresses to sets of ports. Then when some
HW process needs a set of ports as an argument, instead of embedding the
actual set in the dynamic configuration, what gets configured is the
address referencing the set. The HW then works with the appropriate PGT
entry.
Among other allocations, the PGT currently contains two large blocks for
bridge flooding: one for 802.1q and one for 802.1d. Within each of these
blocks are three tables, for unknown-unicast, multicast and broadcast
flooding:
. . . | 802.1q | 802.1d | . . .
| UC | MC | BC | UC | MC | BC |
\______ _____/ \_____ ______/
v v
FID flood vectors
Thus each FID (which corresponds to an 802.1d bridge or one VLAN in an
802.1q bridge) uses three flood vectors spread across a fairly large region
of PGT.
This way of organizing the flood table (called "controlled") is not very
flexible. E.g. to decrease a bridge scale and store more IP MC vectors, one
would need to completely rewrite the bridge PGT blocks, or resort to hacks
such as storing individual MC flood vectors into unused part of the bridge
table.
In order to address these shortcomings, Spectrum-2 and above support what
is called CFF flood mode, for Compressed FID Flooding. In CFF flood mode,
each FID has a little table of its own, with three entries adjacent to each
other, one for unknown-UC, one for MC, one for BC. This allows for a much
more fine-grained approach to PGT management, where bits of it are
allocated on demand.
. . . | FID | FID | FID | FID | FID | . . .
|U|M|B|U|M|B|U|M|B|U|M|B|U|M|B|
\_____________ _____________/
v
FID flood vectors
Besides the FID table organization, the CFF flood mode also impacts Router
Subport (RSP) table. This table contains flood vectors for rFIDs, which are
FIDs that reference front panel ports or LAGs. The RSP table contains two
entries per front panel port and LAG, one for unknown-UC traffic, and one
for everything else. Currently, the FW allocates and manages the table in
its own part of PGT. rFIDs are marked with flood_rsp bit and managed
specially. In CFF mode, rFIDs are managed as all other FIDs. The driver
therefore has to allocate and maintain the flood vectors. Like with bridge
FIDs, this is more work, but increases flexibility of the system.
The FW currently supports both the controlled and CFF flood modes. To shed
complexity, in the future it should only support CFF flood mode. Hence this
patchset, which adds CFF flood mode support to mlxsw.
Since mlxsw needs to maintain both the controlled mode as well as CFF mode
support, we will keep the layout as compatible as possible. The bridge
tables will stay in the same overall shape, just their inner organization
will change from flood mode -> FID to FID -> flood mode. Likewise will RSP
be kept as a contiguous block of PGT memory, as was the case when the FW
maintained it.
- The way FIDs get configured under the CFF flood mode differs from the
currently used controlled mode. The simple approach of having several
globally visible arrays for spectrum.c to statically choose from no
longer works.
Patch #1 thus privatizes all FID initialization and finalization logic,
and exposes it as ops instead.
- Patch #2 renames the ops that are specific to the controlled mode, to
make room in the namespace for the CFF variants.
Patch #3 extracts a helper to compute flood table base out of
mlxsw_sp_fid_flood_table_mid().
- The op fid_setup configured fid_offset, i.e. the number of this FID
within its family. For rFIDs in CFF mode, to determine this number, the
driver will need to do fallible queries.
Thus in patch #4, make the FID setup operation fallible as well.
- Flood mode initialization routine differs between the controlled and CFF
flood modes. The controlled mode needs to configure flood table layout,
which the CFF mode does not need to do.
In patch #5, move mlxsw_sp_fid_flood_table_init() up so that the
following patch can make use of it.
In patch #6, add an op to be invoked per table (if defined).
- The current way of determining PGT allocation size depends on the number
of FIDs and number of flood tables. RFIDs however have PGT footprint
depending not on number of FIDs, but on number of ports and LAGs, because
which ports an rFID should flood to does not depend on the FID itself,
but on the port or LAG that it references.
Therefore in patch #7, add FID family ops for determining PGT allocation
size.
- As elaborated above, layout of PGT will differ between controlled and CFF
flood modes. In CFF mode, it will further differ between rFIDs and other
FIDs (as described at previous patch). The way to pack the SFMR register
to configure a FID will likewise differ from controlled to CFF.
Thus in patches #8 and #9 add FID family ops to determine PGT base
address for a FID and to pack SFMR.
- Patches #10 and #11 add more bits for RSP support. In patch #10, add a
new traffic type enumerator, for non-UC traffic. This is a combination of
BC and MC traffic, but the way that mlxsw maps these mnemonic names to
actual traffic type configurations requires that we have a new name to
describe this class of traffic.
Patch #11 then adds hooks necessary for RSP table maintenance. As ports
come and go, and join and leave LAGs, it is necessary to update flood
vectors that the rFIDs use. These new hooks will make that possible.
- Patches #12, #13 and #14 introduce flood profiles. These have been
implicit so far, but the way that CFF flood mode works with profile IDs
requires that we make them explicit.
Thus in patch #12, introduce flood profile objects as a set of flood
tables that FID families then refer to. The FID code currently only
uses a single flood profile.
In patch #13, add a flood profile ID to flood profile objects.
In patch #14, when in CFF mode, configure SFFP according to the existing
flood profiles (or the one that exists as of that point).
- Patches #15 and #16 add code to implement, respectively, bridge FIDs and
RSP FIDs in CFF mode.
- In patch #17, toggle flood_mode_prefer_cff on Spectrum-2 and above, which
makes the newly-added code live.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1701183891.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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Test runners on debug kernels occasionally fail with: # # RUN tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async ... # # tls.c:1883:poll_partial_rec_async:Expected poll(&pfd, 1, 5) (0) == 1 (1) # # tls.c:1870:poll_partial_rec_async:Expected status (256) == 0 (0) # # poll_partial_rec_async: Test failed at step #17 # # FAIL tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async # not ok 699 tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async # # FAILED: 698 / 699 tests passed. This points to the second poll() in the test which is expected to wait for the sender to send the rest of the data. Apparently under some conditions that doesn't happen within 5ms, bump the timeout to 20ms. Fixes: 23fcb62 ("selftests: tls: add tests for poll behavior") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213142055.395564-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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An errant disk backup on my desktop got into debugfs and triggered the following deadlock scenario in the amdgpu debugfs files. The machine also hard-resets immediately after those lines are printed (although I wasn't able to reproduce that part when reading by hand): [ 1318.016074][ T1082] ====================================================== [ 1318.016607][ T1082] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1318.017107][ T1082] 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 Not tainted [ 1318.017598][ T1082] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1318.018096][ T1082] tar/1082 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1318.018585][ T1082] ffff98c44175d6a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.019084][ T1082] [ 1318.019084][ T1082] but task is already holding lock: [ 1318.020052][ T1082] ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.020607][ T1082] [ 1318.020607][ T1082] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 1318.020607][ T1082] [ 1318.022081][ T1082] [ 1318.022081][ T1082] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 1318.023083][ T1082] [ 1318.023083][ T1082] -> #2 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 1318.024114][ T1082] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xe0/0x12f0 [ 1318.024639][ T1082] ww_mutex_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 1318.025161][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x18a/0x330 [ 1318.025683][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350 [ 1318.026210][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310 [ 1318.026728][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0 [ 1318.027242][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 1318.027759][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 1318.028281][ T1082] [ 1318.028281][ T1082] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 1318.029297][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x16c/0x330 [ 1318.029790][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350 [ 1318.030263][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310 [ 1318.030722][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0 [ 1318.031168][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 1318.031598][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 1318.032011][ T1082] [ 1318.032011][ T1082] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 1318.032778][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680 [ 1318.033141][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0 [ 1318.033487][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80 [ 1318.033814][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.034181][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80 [ 1318.034487][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360 [ 1318.034788][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 [ 1318.035085][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180 [ 1318.035375][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 1318.035664][ T1082] [ 1318.035664][ T1082] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1318.035664][ T1082] [ 1318.036487][ T1082] Chain exists of: [ 1318.036487][ T1082] &mm->mmap_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [ 1318.036487][ T1082] [ 1318.037310][ T1082] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1318.037310][ T1082] [ 1318.037838][ T1082] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1318.038101][ T1082] ---- ---- [ 1318.038350][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 1318.038590][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [ 1318.038839][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 1318.039083][ T1082] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 1318.039328][ T1082] [ 1318.039328][ T1082] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1318.039328][ T1082] [ 1318.040029][ T1082] 1 lock held by tar/1082: [ 1318.040259][ T1082] #0: ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.040560][ T1082] [ 1318.040560][ T1082] stack backtrace: [ 1318.041053][ T1082] CPU: 22 PID: 1082 Comm: tar Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 3316c85d50e282c5643b075d1f01a4f6365e39c2 [ 1318.041329][ T1082] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B650 AORUS PRO AX/B650 AORUS PRO AX, BIOS F20 12/14/2023 [ 1318.041614][ T1082] Call Trace: [ 1318.041895][ T1082] <TASK> [ 1318.042175][ T1082] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 [ 1318.042460][ T1082] check_noncircular+0x145/0x160 [ 1318.042743][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680 [ 1318.043022][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0 [ 1318.043301][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.043580][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.043856][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80 [ 1318.044131][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.044408][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu 8fe2afaa910cbd7654c8cab23563a94d6caebaab] [ 1318.044749][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80 [ 1318.045042][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360 [ 1318.045333][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 [ 1318.045623][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180 [ 1318.045913][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.046201][ T1082] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 1318.046487][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.046773][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047057][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047337][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047611][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 1318.047887][ T1082] RIP: 0033:0x7f480b70a39d [ 1318.048162][ T1082] Code: 91 ba 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb b2 e8 18 a3 01 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d a9 3c 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 48 83 [ 1318.048769][ T1082] RSP: 002b:00007ffde77f5c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 1318.049083][ T1082] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000800 RCX: 00007f480b70a39d [ 1318.049392][ T1082] RDX: 0000000000000800 RSI: 000055c9f2120c00 RDI: 0000000000000008 [ 1318.049703][ T1082] RBP: 0000000000000800 R08: 000055c9f2120a94 R09: 0000000000000007 [ 1318.050011][ T1082] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c9f2120c00 [ 1318.050324][ T1082] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000800 [ 1318.050638][ T1082] </TASK> amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read() holds a reservation when it calls put_user(), which may fault and acquire the mmap_sem. This violates the established locking order. Bounce the mqd data through a kernel buffer to get put_user() out of the illegal section. Fixes: 445d85e ("drm/amdgpu: add debugfs interface for reading MQDs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Reviewed-by: Shashank Sharma <shashank.sharma@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter updates for net-next The following patchset contains Netfilter updates for net-next: Patch #1 skips transaction if object type provides no .update interface. Patch #2 skips NETDEV_CHANGENAME which is unused. Patch #3 enables conntrack to handle Multicast Router Advertisements and Multicast Router Solicitations from the Multicast Router Discovery protocol (RFC4286) as untracked opposed to invalid packets. From Linus Luessing. Patch #4 updates DCCP conntracker to mark invalid as invalid, instead of dropping them, from Jason Xing. Patch #5 uses NF_DROP instead of -NF_DROP since NF_DROP is 0, also from Jason. Patch #6 removes reference in netfilter's sysctl documentation on pickup entries which were already removed by Florian Westphal. Patch #7 removes check for IPS_OFFLOAD flag to disable early drop which allows to evict entries from the conntrack table, also from Florian. Patches #8 to #16 updates nf_tables pipapo set backend to allocate the datastructure copy on-demand from preparation phase, to better deal with OOM situations where .commit step is too late to fail. Series from Florian Westphal. Patch #17 adds a selftest with packetdrill to cover conntrack TCP state transitions, also from Florian. Patch #18 use GFP_KERNEL to clone elements from control plane to avoid quick atomic reserves exhaustion with large sets, reporter refers to million entries magnitude. * tag 'nf-next-24-05-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf-next: netfilter: nf_tables: allow clone callbacks to sleep selftests: netfilter: add packetdrill based conntrack tests netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: remove dirty flag netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: move cloning of match info to insert/removal path netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prepare pipapo_get helper for on-demand clone netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: merge deactivate helper into caller netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prepare walk function for on-demand clone netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prepare destroy function for on-demand clone netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: make pipapo_clone helper return NULL netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: move prove_locking helper around netfilter: conntrack: remove flowtable early-drop test netfilter: conntrack: documentation: remove reference to non-existent sysctl netfilter: use NF_DROP instead of -NF_DROP netfilter: conntrack: dccp: try not to drop skb in conntrack netfilter: conntrack: fix ct-state for ICMPv6 Multicast Router Discovery netfilter: nf_tables: remove NETDEV_CHANGENAME from netdev chain event handler netfilter: nf_tables: skip transaction if update object is not implemented ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240512161436.168973-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().
Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.
Committer notes:
Further explanation from Ian Rogers:
My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
#0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
#1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
#2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
#3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
#4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
#5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)
Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
#0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746
This frame has 1 object(s):
[32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.
Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] #10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] #11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 #12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f #13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] #14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 #15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b #16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] #17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e #18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde #19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada #20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 #21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch skips ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch uses test_progs_get_error() helper to skip ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch uses test_progs_get_error() helper to skip ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch uses test_progs_get_error() helper to skip ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch uses test_progs_get_error() helper to skip ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch uses test_progs_get_error() helper to skip ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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There are still some "ENOTSUPP" (-524) errors left when running BPF selftests on a Loongarch platform since ASSERT_GE() are used there to check the return values, not ASSERT_OK(): ''' test_bpf_cookie:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK tracing_subtest:FAIL:fentry.link_create unexpected fentry.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:FAIL lsm_subtest:FAIL:lsm.link_create unexpected lsm.link_create: \ actual -524 < expected 0 #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:FAIL #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:OK #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:OK #17 bpf_cookie:FAIL ... ... test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:load_vmlinux_btf 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:get_bpf_testmod_btf_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_get_from_fd 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:btf_find_by_name 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:PASS:bpf_prog_load 0 nsec test_module_fentry_shadow:FAIL:bpf_link_create unexpected \ bpf_link_create: actual -524 < expected 0 #168 module_fentry_shadow:FAIL ''' Just like in ASSERT_OK(), this patch uses test_progs_get_error() helper to skip ENOTSUPP (524) and ENOTSUP (95) in ASSERT_GT() too. With this change, the new output of these selftests look like: ''' #17/1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #17/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:OK #17/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:OK #17/4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #17/5 bpf_cookie/multi_uprobe_attach_api:OK #17/6 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #17/7 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #17/8 bpf_cookie/trampoline:SKIP #17/9 bpf_cookie/lsm:SKIP #17/10 bpf_cookie/tp_btf:SKIP #17/11 bpf_cookie/raw_tp:SKIP #17 bpf_cookie:OK (SKIP: 4/11) ... ... #168 module_fentry_shadow:SKIP ''' Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
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…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next into main Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter/IPVS updates for net-next The following patchset contains Netfilter/IPVS updates for net-next: Patch #1 to #11 to shrink memory consumption for transaction objects: struct nft_trans_chain { /* size: 120 (-32), cachelines: 2, members: 10 */ struct nft_trans_elem { /* size: 72 (-40), cachelines: 2, members: 4 */ struct nft_trans_flowtable { /* size: 80 (-48), cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ struct nft_trans_obj { /* size: 72 (-40), cachelines: 2, members: 4 */ struct nft_trans_rule { /* size: 80 (-32), cachelines: 2, members: 6 */ struct nft_trans_set { /* size: 96 (-24), cachelines: 2, members: 8 */ struct nft_trans_table { /* size: 56 (-40), cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ struct nft_trans_elem can now be allocated from kmalloc-96 instead of kmalloc-128 slab. Series from Florian Westphal. For the record, I have mangled patch #1 to add nft_trans_container_*() and use if for every transaction object. I have also added BUILD_BUG_ON to ensure struct nft_trans always comes at the beginning of the container transaction object. And few minor cleanups, any new bugs are of my own. Patch #12 simplify check for SCTP GSO in IPVS, from Ismael Luceno. Patch #13 nf_conncount key length remains in the u32 bound, from Yunjian Wang. Patch #14 removes unnecessary check for CTA_TIMEOUT_L3PROTO when setting default conntrack timeouts via nfnetlink_cttimeout API, from Lin Ma. Patch #15 updates NFT_SECMARK_CTX_MAXLEN to 4096, SELinux could use larger secctx names than the existing 256 bytes length. Patch #16 adds a selftest to exercise nfnetlink_queue listeners leaving nfnetlink_queue, from Florian Westphal. Patch #17 increases hitcount from 255 to 65535 in xt_recent, from Phil Sutter. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:
[exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
#8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
#9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
#10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
#11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
#12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
#13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
#14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
#15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
#16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
#17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb
crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
state = 5,
state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).
This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").
There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.
Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.
Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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iter_finish_branch_entry() doesn't put the branch_info from/to map
elements creating memory leaks. This can be seen with:
```
$ perf record -e cycles -b perf test -w noploop
$ perf report -D
...
Direct leak of 984344 byte(s) in 123043 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fb2654f3bd7 in malloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x564d3400d10b in map__get util/map.h:186
#2 0x564d3400d10b in ip__resolve_ams util/machine.c:1981
#3 0x564d34014d81 in sample__resolve_bstack util/machine.c:2151
#4 0x564d34094790 in iter_prepare_branch_entry util/hist.c:898
#5 0x564d34098fa4 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1238
#6 0x564d33d1f0c7 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:334
#7 0x564d34031eb7 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1655
#8 0x564d3403ba52 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
#9 0x564d3403ba52 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
#10 0x564d3402d32e in perf_session__process_user_event util/session.c:1708
#11 0x564d34032480 in perf_session__process_event util/session.c:1877
#12 0x564d340336ad in reader__read_event util/session.c:2399
#13 0x564d34033fdc in reader__process_events util/session.c:2448
#14 0x564d34033fdc in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2495
#15 0x564d34033fdc in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2661
#16 0x564d33d27113 in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1065
#17 0x564d33d27113 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
#18 0x564d33e0ccb7 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
#19 0x564d33e0d45e in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
#20 0x564d33cdd827 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
#21 0x564d33cdd827 in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
...
```
Clearing up the map_symbols properly creates maps reference count
issues so resolve those. Resolving this issue doesn't improve peak
heap consumption for the test above.
Committer testing:
$ sudo dnf install libasan
$ make -k CORESIGHT=1 EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" CC=clang O=/tmp/build/$(basename $PWD)/ -C tools/perf install-bin
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240807065136.1039977-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
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The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used. So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in the hist entry can be garbage. So it shouldn't access it unconditionally. I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles. $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true $ sudo perf report -s cgroup Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48 48 return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso; (gdb) bt #0 0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48 #1 0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344 #2 0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385 #3 0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:644 #4 0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0, block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761 #5 0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779 #6 0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015 #7 0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0) at util/hist.c:1260 #8 0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334 #9 0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232 #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271 #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354 #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132 #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342 #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60) at util/session.c:780 #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406 As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a value. This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same. I only checked the 'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same). Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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During noirq suspend phase the Raspberry Pi power driver suffer of firmware property timeouts. The reason is that the IRQ of the underlying BCM2835 mailbox is disabled and rpi_firmware_property_list() will always run into a timeout [1]. Since the VideoCore side isn't consider as a wakeup source, set the IRQF_NO_SUSPEND flag for the mailbox IRQ in order to keep it enabled during suspend-resume cycle. [1] PM: late suspend of devices complete after 1.754 msecs WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 438 at drivers/firmware/raspberrypi.c:128 rpi_firmware_property_list+0x204/0x22c Firmware transaction 0x00028001 timeout Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 438 Comm: bash Tainted: G C 6.9.3-dirty #17 Hardware name: BCM2835 Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0x88/0xec __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xb0 warn_slowpath_fmt from rpi_firmware_property_list+0x204/0x22c rpi_firmware_property_list from rpi_firmware_property+0x68/0x8c rpi_firmware_property from rpi_firmware_set_power+0x54/0xc0 rpi_firmware_set_power from _genpd_power_off+0xe4/0x148 _genpd_power_off from genpd_sync_power_off+0x7c/0x11c genpd_sync_power_off from genpd_finish_suspend+0xcc/0xe0 genpd_finish_suspend from dpm_run_callback+0x78/0xd0 dpm_run_callback from device_suspend_noirq+0xc0/0x238 device_suspend_noirq from dpm_suspend_noirq+0xb0/0x168 dpm_suspend_noirq from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1b8/0x5ac suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x254/0x2e4 pm_suspend from state_store+0xa8/0xd4 state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x1a0 kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x12c/0x184 vfs_write from ksys_write+0x78/0xc0 ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Exception stack(0xcc93dfa8 to 0xcc93dff0) [...] PM: noirq suspend of devices complete after 3095.584 msecs Link: raspberrypi/firmware#1894 Fixes: 0bae6af ("mailbox: Enable BCM2835 mailbox support") Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jassisinghbrar@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
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…dfl() When getting an LLC CPU mask in the default CPU selection policy, scx_select_cpu_dfl(), a pointer to the sched_domain is dereferenced using rcu_read_lock() without holding rcu_read_lock(). Such an unprotected dereference often causes the following warning and can cause an invalid memory access in the worst case. Therefore, protect dereference of a sched_domain pointer using a pair of rcu_read_lock() and unlock(). [ 20.996135] ============================= [ 20.996345] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 20.996563] 6.11.0-virtme #17 Tainted: G W [ 20.996576] ----------------------------- [ 20.996576] kernel/sched/ext.c:3323 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] other info that might help us debug this: [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 20.996576] 4 locks held by kworker/8:1/140: [ 20.996576] #0: ffff8b18c00dd348 ((wq_completion)pm){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4a0/0x590 [ 20.996576] #1: ffffb3da01f67e58 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ba/0x590 [ 20.996576] #2: ffffffffa316f9f0 (&rcu_state.gp_wq){..-.}-{2:2}, at: swake_up_one+0x15/0x60 [ 20.996576] #3: ffff8b1880398a60 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: try_to_wake_up+0x59/0x7d0 [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] stack backtrace: [ 20.996576] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/8:1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-virtme #17 [ 20.996576] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 20.996576] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 20.996576] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 20.996576] Sched_ext: simple (disabling+all), task: runnable_at=-6ms [ 20.996576] Call Trace: [ 20.996576] <IRQ> [ 20.996576] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 [ 20.996576] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0x96 [ 20.996576] scx_select_cpu_dfl+0x234/0x260 [ 20.996576] select_task_rq_scx+0xfb/0x190 [ 20.996576] select_task_rq+0x47/0x110 [ 20.996576] try_to_wake_up+0x110/0x7d0 [ 20.996576] swake_up_one+0x39/0x60 [ 20.996576] rcu_core+0xb08/0xe50 [ 20.996576] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 20.996576] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 20.996576] handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x410 [ 20.996576] irq_exit_rcu+0x78/0xa0 [ 20.996576] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x73/0x80 [ 20.996576] </IRQ> [ 20.996576] <TASK> [ 20.996576] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [ 20.996576] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x70 [ 20.996576] Code: f5 53 48 8b 74 24 10 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 18 e8 11 b4 36 ff 48 89 df e8 99 0d 37 ff f7 c5 00 02 00 00 75 17 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2b <65> ff 0d 5b 55 3c 5e 74 16 5b 5d e9 95 8e 28 00 e8 a5 ee 44 ff 9c [ 20.996576] RSP: 0018:ffffb3da01f67d20 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 20.996576] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffffa4640220 RCX: 0000000000000040 [ 20.996576] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1c7b27b [ 20.996576] RBP: 0000000000000246 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 20.996576] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000021c R12: 0000000000000246 [ 20.996576] R13: ffff8b1881363958 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8b1881363800 [ 20.996576] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4b/0x70 [ 20.996576] serial_port_runtime_resume+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] __rpm_callback+0x44/0x170 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] rpm_callback+0x55/0x60 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] rpm_resume+0x582/0x7b0 [ 20.996576] pm_runtime_work+0x7c/0xb0 [ 20.996576] process_one_work+0x1fb/0x590 [ 20.996576] worker_thread+0x18e/0x350 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 20.996576] </TASK> [ 21.056592] sched_ext: BPF scheduler "simple" disabled (unregistered from user space) Signed-off-by: Changwoo Min <changwoo@igalia.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Current loop calls vfs_statfs() while holding the q->limits_lock. If FS takes some locking in vfs_statfs callback, this may lead to ABBA locking bug (at least, FAT fs has this issue actually). So this patch calls vfs_statfs() outside q->limits_locks instead, because looks like no reason to hold q->limits_locks while getting discord configs. Chain exists of: &sbi->fat_lock --> &q->q_usage_counter(io)#17 --> &q->limits_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->limits_lock); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)#17); lock(&q->limits_lock); lock(&sbi->fat_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Reported-by: syzbot+a5d8c609c02f508672cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a5d8c609c02f508672cc Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Pull request for series with
subject: bpf: cgroup_sock lsm flavor
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=614736