lkl: Turn off unnecessary SLUB_DEBUG_ON defconfig #41
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SLUB_DEBUG_ON appears to cause a significant (visible under tests with netperf) performance hit for no particular benefit. Signed off by: Patrick Collins <pscollins@google.com>
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Thanks for the patch Patrick. It looks like it uncovers a test failure on mingw and I am trying to get to the root cause. |
ghost
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lkl: Turn off unnecessary SLUB_DEBUG_ON defconfig
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thehajime
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Dec 13, 2016
The kernel WARNs and then crashes today if wm8994_device_init() fails after calling devm_regulator_bulk_get(). That happens because there are multiple devices involved here and the order in which managed resources are freed isn't correct. The regulators are added as children of wm8994->dev. Whereas, devm_regulator_bulk_get() receives wm8994->dev as the device, though it gets the same regulators which were added as children of wm8994->dev earlier. During failures, the children are removed first and the core eventually calls regulator_unregister() for them. As regulator_put() was never done for them (opposite of devm_regulator_bulk_get()), the kernel WARNs at WARN_ON(rdev->open_count); And eventually it crashes from debugfs_remove_recursive(). --------x------------------x---------------- wm8994 3-001a: Device is not a WM8994, ID is 0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /mnt/ssd/all/work/repos/devel/linux/drivers/regulator/core.c:4072 regulator_unregister+0xc8/0xd0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6-00154-g54fe84cbd50b lkl#41 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [<c010e24c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010af38>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c010af38>] (show_stack) from [<c032a1c4>] (dump_stack+0x88/0x9c) [<c032a1c4>] (dump_stack) from [<c011a98c>] (__warn+0xe8/0x100) [<c011a98c>] (__warn) from [<c011aa54>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x20/0x28) [<c011aa54>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c0384a0c>] (regulator_unregister+0xc8/0xd0) [<c0384a0c>] (regulator_unregister) from [<c0406434>] (release_nodes+0x16c/0x1dc) [<c0406434>] (release_nodes) from [<c04039c4>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0x110) [<c04039c4>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c0403a64>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c0403a64>] (device_release_driver) from [<c0402b24>] (bus_remove_device+0xd8/0x104) [<c0402b24>] (bus_remove_device) from [<c03ffcd8>] (device_del+0x10c/0x218) [<c03ffcd8>] (device_del) from [<c0404e4c>] (platform_device_del+0x1c/0x88) [<c0404e4c>] (platform_device_del) from [<c0404ec4>] (platform_device_unregister+0xc/0x20) [<c0404ec4>] (platform_device_unregister) from [<c0428bc0>] (mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x5c/0x64) [<c0428bc0>] (mfd_remove_devices_fn) from [<c03ff9d8>] (device_for_each_child_reverse+0x4c/0x78) [<c03ff9d8>] (device_for_each_child_reverse) from [<c04288c4>] (mfd_remove_devices+0x20/0x30) [<c04288c4>] (mfd_remove_devices) from [<c042758c>] (wm8994_device_init+0x2ac/0x7f0) [<c042758c>] (wm8994_device_init) from [<c04f14a8>] (i2c_device_probe+0x178/0x1fc) [<c04f14a8>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04036fc>] (driver_probe_device+0x214/0x2c0) [<c04036fc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach+0xac/0xb0) [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0x9c) [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c040406c>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8) [<c040406c>] (driver_register) from [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver+0x34/0x84) [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x40/0x170) [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x15c/0x1fc) [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init) from [<c0107978>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) ---[ end trace 0919d3d0bc998260 ]--- [snip..] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000078 pgd = c0004000 [00000078] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc6-00154-g54fe84cbd50b lkl#41 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) task: ee874000 task.stack: ee878000 PC is at down_write+0x14/0x54 LR is at debugfs_remove_recursive+0x30/0x150 [snip..] [<c06e489c>] (down_write) from [<c02e9954>] (debugfs_remove_recursive+0x30/0x150) [<c02e9954>] (debugfs_remove_recursive) from [<c0382b78>] (_regulator_put+0x24/0xac) [<c0382b78>] (_regulator_put) from [<c0382c1c>] (regulator_put+0x1c/0x2c) [<c0382c1c>] (regulator_put) from [<c0406434>] (release_nodes+0x16c/0x1dc) [<c0406434>] (release_nodes) from [<c04035d4>] (driver_probe_device+0xec/0x2c0) [<c04035d4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach+0xac/0xb0) [<c0403854>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0x9c) [<c0401a74>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<c0402cf0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c040406c>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8) [<c040406c>] (driver_register) from [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver+0x34/0x84) [<c04f20a0>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x40/0x170) [<c01017d0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x15c/0x1fc) [<c0a00dbc>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [<c06e07b0>] (kernel_init) from [<c0107978>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) Code: e1a04000 f590f000 e3a03001 e34f3fff (e1902f9f) ---[ end trace 0919d3d0bc998262 ]--- --------x------------------x---------------- Fix the kernel warnings and crashes by using regulator_bulk_get() instead of devm_regulator_bulk_get() and explicitly freeing the supplies in exit paths. Tested on Exynos 5250, dual core ARM A15 machine. Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
thehajime
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Dec 13, 2016
Since commit: 4bcc595 ("printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines") printk() requires KERN_CONT to continue log messages. Lots of printk() in lockdep.c and print_ip_sym() don't have it. As the result lockdep reports are completely messed up. Add missing KERN_CONT and inline print_ip_sym() where necessary. Example of a messed up report: 0-rc5+ lkl#41 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor0/5036 is trying to acquire lock: ( rtnl_mutex ){+.+.+.} , at: [<ffffffff86b3d6ac>] rtnl_lock+0x1c/0x20 but task is already holding lock: ( &net->packet.sklist_lock ){+.+...} , at: [<ffffffff873541a6>] packet_diag_dump+0x1a6/0x1920 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 ( &net->packet.sklist_lock +.+...} ... Without this patch all scripts that parse kernel bug reports are broken. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: andreyknvl@google.com Cc: aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Cc: joe@perches.com Cc: syzkaller@googlegroups.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480343083-48731-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
thehajime
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Oct 10, 2017
[ Upstream commit 2423496 ] The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ lkl#41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tavip
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May 2, 2018
Documentation: teaching: labs: interrupts.rst typos and errors correction
retrage
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Dec 14, 2018
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().
Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.
BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48 max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
#0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
lkl#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
lkl#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
lkl#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ lkl#26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
__lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
__skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
__sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
prp
pushed a commit
to lsds/lkl
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 7, 2020
[ Upstream commit a2ec905 ] Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes. This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below. This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt. With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary. general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic lkl#41-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth] Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75 RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28 RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth] hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 kthread+0x104/0x140 Fixes: c215e93 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event") Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <bgodavar@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org> Tested-by: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
rodionov
pushed a commit
to rodionov/lkl
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 2, 2025
…>cur_tx KCSAN reported the following data-race: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll [r8169] / rtl8169_start_xmit [r8169] write (marked) to 0xffff888102474b74 of 4 bytes by task 5358 on cpu 29: rtl8169_start_xmit (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4254) r8169 dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4889 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 net/core/dev.c:3544 net/core/dev.c:3560) sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:342) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3817 net/core/dev.c:4306) ip_finish_output2 (./include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 ./include/net/neighbour.h:526 ./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:233) __ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:311 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:293) ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:328) ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:435) ip_send_skb (./include/net/dst.h:458 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:127 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1486) udp_send_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:963) udp_sendmsg (net/ipv4/udp.c:1246) inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:840 (discriminator 4)) sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:753) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2177) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2185) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) read to 0xffff888102474b74 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21: rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4397 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 (discriminator 14)) asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:636) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390) call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433) value changed: 0x002f4815 -> 0x002f4816 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G L 6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 lkl#41 Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023 ================================================================== The write side of drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c is: ================== 4251 /* rtl_tx needs to see descriptor changes before updated tp->cur_tx */ 4252 smp_wmb(); 4253 → 4254 WRITE_ONCE(tp->cur_tx, tp->cur_tx + frags + 1); 4255 4256 stop_queue = !netif_subqueue_maybe_stop(dev, 0, rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp), 4257 R8169_TX_STOP_THRS, 4258 R8169_TX_START_THRS); The read side is the function rtl_tx(): 4355 static void rtl_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp, 4356 int budget) 4357 { 4358 unsigned int dirty_tx, bytes_compl = 0, pkts_compl = 0; 4359 struct sk_buff *skb; 4360 4361 dirty_tx = tp->dirty_tx; 4362 4363 while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) { 4364 unsigned int entry = dirty_tx % NUM_TX_DESC; 4365 u32 status; 4366 4367 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1); 4368 if (status & DescOwn) 4369 break; 4370 4371 skb = tp->tx_skb[entry].skb; 4372 rtl8169_unmap_tx_skb(tp, entry); 4373 4374 if (skb) { 4375 pkts_compl++; 4376 bytes_compl += skb->len; 4377 napi_consume_skb(skb, budget); 4378 } 4379 dirty_tx++; 4380 } 4381 4382 if (tp->dirty_tx != dirty_tx) { 4383 dev_sw_netstats_tx_add(dev, pkts_compl, bytes_compl); 4384 WRITE_ONCE(tp->dirty_tx, dirty_tx); 4385 4386 netif_subqueue_completed_wake(dev, 0, pkts_compl, bytes_compl, 4387 rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp), 4388 R8169_TX_START_THRS); 4389 /* 4390 * 8168 hack: TxPoll requests are lost when the Tx packets are 4391 * too close. Let's kick an extra TxPoll request when a burst 4392 * of start_xmit activity is detected (if it is not detected, 4393 * it is slow enough). -- FR 4394 * If skb is NULL then we come here again once a tx irq is 4395 * triggered after the last fragment is marked transmitted. 4396 */ → 4397 if (tp->cur_tx != dirty_tx && skb) 4398 rtl8169_doorbell(tp); 4399 } 4400 } Obviously from the code, an earlier detected data-race for tp->cur_tx was fixed in the line 4363: 4363 while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) { but the same solution is required for protecting the other access to tp->cur_tx: → 4397 if (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx && skb) 4398 rtl8169_doorbell(tp); The write in the line 4254 is protected with WRITE_ONCE(), but the read in the line 4397 might have suffered read tearing under some compiler optimisations. The fix eliminated the KCSAN data-race report for this bug. It is yet to be evaluated what happens if tp->cur_tx changes between the test in line 4363 and line 4397. This test should certainly not be cached by the compiler in some register for such a long time, while asynchronous writes to tp->cur_tx might have occurred in line 4254 in the meantime. Fixes: 94d8a98 ("r8169: reduce number of workaround doorbell rings") Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Cc: nic_swsd@realtek.com Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/dc7fc8fa-4ea4-e9a9-30a6-7c83e6b53188@alu.unizg.hr/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Jan 2, 2025
…cArray[entry].opts1 KCSAN reported the following data-race: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4368 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff888140d37570 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21: rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4368 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1074 (discriminator 14)) asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390) call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433) value changed: 0xb0000042 -> 0x00000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G L 6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 lkl#41 Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023 ================================================================== The read side is in drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c ========================================= 4355 static void rtl_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp, 4356 int budget) 4357 { 4358 unsigned int dirty_tx, bytes_compl = 0, pkts_compl = 0; 4359 struct sk_buff *skb; 4360 4361 dirty_tx = tp->dirty_tx; 4362 4363 while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) { 4364 unsigned int entry = dirty_tx % NUM_TX_DESC; 4365 u32 status; 4366 → 4367 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1); 4368 if (status & DescOwn) 4369 break; 4370 4371 skb = tp->tx_skb[entry].skb; 4372 rtl8169_unmap_tx_skb(tp, entry); 4373 4374 if (skb) { 4375 pkts_compl++; 4376 bytes_compl += skb->len; 4377 napi_consume_skb(skb, budget); 4378 } 4379 dirty_tx++; 4380 } 4381 4382 if (tp->dirty_tx != dirty_tx) { 4383 dev_sw_netstats_tx_add(dev, pkts_compl, bytes_compl); 4384 WRITE_ONCE(tp->dirty_tx, dirty_tx); 4385 4386 netif_subqueue_completed_wake(dev, 0, pkts_compl, bytes_compl, 4387 rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp), 4388 R8169_TX_START_THRS); 4389 /* 4390 * 8168 hack: TxPoll requests are lost when the Tx packets are 4391 * too close. Let's kick an extra TxPoll request when a burst 4392 * of start_xmit activity is detected (if it is not detected, 4393 * it is slow enough). -- FR 4394 * If skb is NULL then we come here again once a tx irq is 4395 * triggered after the last fragment is marked transmitted. 4396 */ 4397 if (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx && skb) 4398 rtl8169_doorbell(tp); 4399 } 4400 } tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1 is reported to have a data-race and READ_ONCE() fixes this KCSAN warning. 4366 → 4367 status = le32_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1)); 4368 if (status & DescOwn) 4369 break; 4370 Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Cc: nic_swsd@realtek.com Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/dc7fc8fa-4ea4-e9a9-30a6-7c83e6b53188@alu.unizg.hr/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
rodionov
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Jan 2, 2025
…>opts1 KCSAN reported the following data-race bug: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4430 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4583) r8169 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff888117e43510 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21: rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4430 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4583) r8169 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1074 (discriminator 14)) asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390) call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433) value changed: 0x80003fff -> 0x3402805f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G L 6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 lkl#41 Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023 ================================================================== drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c: ========================================== 4429 → 4430 status = le32_to_cpu(desc->opts1); 4431 if (status & DescOwn) 4432 break; 4433 4434 /* This barrier is needed to keep us from reading 4435 * any other fields out of the Rx descriptor until 4436 * we know the status of DescOwn 4437 */ 4438 dma_rmb(); 4439 4440 if (unlikely(status & RxRES)) { 4441 if (net_ratelimit()) 4442 netdev_warn(dev, "Rx ERROR. status = %08x\n", Marco Elver explained that dma_rmb() doesn't prevent the compiler to tear up the access to desc->opts1 which can be written to concurrently. READ_ONCE() should prevent that from happening: 4429 → 4430 status = le32_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(desc->opts1)); 4431 if (status & DescOwn) 4432 break; 4433 As the consequence of this fix, this KCSAN warning was eliminated. Fixes: 6202806 ("r8169: drop member opts1_mask from struct rtl8169_private") Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Cc: nic_swsd@realtek.com Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/dc7fc8fa-4ea4-e9a9-30a6-7c83e6b53188@alu.unizg.hr/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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SLUB_DEBUG_ON appears to cause a significant (visible under tests with
netperf) performance hit for no particular benefit.
This closes #39.
Signed off by: Patrick Collins pscollins@google.com