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distributed benchmark for perf bench #5
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mitake
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On architectures where cputime_t is 64 bit type, is possible to trigger divide by zero on do_div(temp, (__force u32) total) line, if total is a non zero number but has lower 32 bit's zeroed. Removing casting is not a good solution since some do_div() implementations do cast to u32 internally. This problem can be triggered in practice on very long lived processes: PID: 2331 TASK: ffff880472814b00 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "oraagent.bin" #0 [ffff880472a51b70] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103214b #1 [ffff880472a51bd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b91c2 #2 [ffff880472a51ca0] oops_end at ffffffff814f0b00 #3 [ffff880472a51cd0] die at ffffffff8100f26b #4 [ffff880472a51d00] do_trap at ffffffff814f03f4 #5 [ffff880472a51d60] do_divide_error at ffffffff8100cfff torvalds#6 [ffff880472a51e00] divide_error at ffffffff8100be7b [exception RIP: thread_group_times+0x56] RIP: ffffffff81056a16 RSP: ffff880472a51eb8 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: bc3572c9fe12d194 RBX: ffff880874150800 RCX: 0000000110266fad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880472a51eb8 RDI: 001038ae7d9633dc RBP: ffff880472a51ef8 R8: 00000000b10a3a64 R9: ffff880874150800 R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: ffff880472a51f08 R13: ffff880472a51f10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#7 [ffff880472a51f00] do_sys_times at ffffffff8108845d torvalds#8 [ffff880472a51f40] sys_times at ffffffff81088524 torvalds#9 [ffff880472a51f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8100b0f2 RIP: 0000003808caac3a RSP: 00007fcba27ab6d8 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000064 RBX: ffffffff8100b0f2 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RSI: 000000000076d58e RDI: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RBP: 00007fcba27ab700 R8: 0000000000000020 R9: 000000000000091b R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff9ca41940 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcba27ac9c0 R15: 00007fff9ca41940 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000064 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120808092714.GA3580@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
mitake
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Oct 8, 2012
Fixes following lockdep splat : [ 1614.734896] ============================================= [ 1614.734898] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 1614.734901] 3.6.0-rc3+ torvalds#782 Not tainted [ 1614.734903] --------------------------------------------- [ 1614.734905] swapper/11/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1614.734907] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.734920] [ 1614.734920] but task is already holding lock: [ 1614.734922] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734932] [ 1614.734932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1614.734935] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1614.734935] [ 1614.734937] CPU0 [ 1614.734938] ---- [ 1614.734940] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734943] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734946] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734949] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1614.734949] [ 1614.734952] 7 locks held by swapper/11/0: [ 1614.734954] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff81592801>] __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.734964] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815d319c>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.734972] #2: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8160d116>] icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.734982] #3: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734989] #4: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815da240>] ip_queue_xmit+0x0/0x680 [ 1614.734997] #5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815d9925>] ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735004] torvalds#6: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff81595680>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0xe00 [ 1614.735012] [ 1614.735012] stack backtrace: [ 1614.735016] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/11 Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3+ torvalds#782 [ 1614.735018] Call Trace: [ 1614.735020] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810a50ac>] __lock_acquire+0x144c/0x1b10 [ 1614.735033] [<ffffffff810a334b>] ? check_usage+0x9b/0x4d0 [ 1614.735037] [<ffffffff810a6762>] ? mark_held_locks+0x82/0x130 [ 1614.735042] [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [ 1614.735047] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735051] [<ffffffff810a69ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735060] [<ffffffff81749b31>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [ 1614.735065] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735069] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735075] [<ffffffffa014f7f2>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [ 1614.735079] [<ffffffff81595112>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [ 1614.735083] [<ffffffff81594c6e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5e/0xa70 [ 1614.735087] [<ffffffff815957c1>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x141/0xe00 [ 1614.735093] [<ffffffff815b622e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [ 1614.735098] [<ffffffff81595865>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [ 1614.735102] [<ffffffff81595680>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa70/0xa70 [ 1614.735106] [<ffffffff815b4daa>] ? eth_header+0x3a/0xf0 [ 1614.735111] [<ffffffff8161d33e>] ? fib_get_table+0x2e/0x280 [ 1614.735117] [<ffffffff8160a7e2>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60 [ 1614.735121] [<ffffffff8160a863>] arp_send+0x43/0x50 [ 1614.735125] [<ffffffff8160b82f>] arp_solicit+0x18f/0x450 [ 1614.735132] [<ffffffff8159d9da>] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70 [ 1614.735137] [<ffffffff815a191a>] __neigh_event_send+0xea/0x300 [ 1614.735141] [<ffffffff815a1c93>] neigh_resolve_output+0x163/0x260 [ 1614.735146] [<ffffffff815d9cf5>] ip_finish_output+0x505/0x890 [ 1614.735150] [<ffffffff815d9925>] ? ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735154] [<ffffffff815dae79>] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [ 1614.735158] [<ffffffff815da1cd>] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [ 1614.735162] [<ffffffff815da403>] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [ 1614.735165] [<ffffffff815da240>] ? ip_local_out+0xa0/0xa0 [ 1614.735172] [<ffffffff815f4402>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [ 1614.735177] [<ffffffff815f5a11>] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a1/0x620 [ 1614.735181] [<ffffffff815f7e93>] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x393/0x960 [ 1614.735185] [<ffffffff815fce23>] ? tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.735189] [<ffffffff815fd317>] tcp_v4_err+0x657/0x6b0 [ 1614.735194] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735199] [<ffffffff8160d19e>] icmp_socket_deliver+0xce/0x230 [ 1614.735203] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735208] [<ffffffff8160d464>] icmp_unreach+0xe4/0x2c0 [ 1614.735213] [<ffffffff8160e520>] icmp_rcv+0x350/0x4a0 [ 1614.735217] [<ffffffff815d3285>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x135/0x4e0 [ 1614.735221] [<ffffffff815d319c>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.735225] [<ffffffff815d3ffa>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90 [ 1614.735229] [<ffffffff815d37b7>] ip_rcv_finish+0x187/0x730 [ 1614.735233] [<ffffffff815d425d>] ip_rcv+0x21d/0x300 [ 1614.735237] [<ffffffff81592a1b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x46b/0xd00 [ 1614.735241] [<ffffffff81592801>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.735245] [<ffffffff81593368>] process_backlog+0xb8/0x180 [ 1614.735249] [<ffffffff81593cf9>] net_rx_action+0x159/0x330 [ 1614.735257] [<ffffffff810491f0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x3e0 [ 1614.735264] [<ffffffff8109ed24>] ? tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 1614.735270] [<ffffffff8175419c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [ 1614.735278] [<ffffffff8100425d>] do_softirq+0x8d/0xc0 [ 1614.735282] [<ffffffff8104983e>] irq_exit+0xae/0xe0 [ 1614.735287] [<ffffffff8175494e>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x99 [ 1614.735291] [<ffffffff81753a1c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80 [ 1614.735293] <EOI> [<ffffffff810a14ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735306] [<ffffffff81336f85>] ? intel_idle+0xf5/0x150 [ 1614.735310] [<ffffffff81336f7e>] ? intel_idle+0xee/0x150 [ 1614.735317] [<ffffffff814e6ea9>] cpuidle_enter+0x19/0x20 [ 1614.735321] [<ffffffff814e7538>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa8/0x630 [ 1614.735327] [<ffffffff8100c1ba>] cpu_idle+0x8a/0xe0 [ 1614.735333] [<ffffffff8173762e>] start_secondary+0x220/0x222 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mitake
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Cancel work of the xfs_sync_worker before teardown of the log in xfs_unmountfs. This prevents occasional crashes on unmount like so: PID: 21602 TASK: ee9df060 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [c5377d28] crash_kexec at c0292c94 #1 [c5377d80] oops_end at c07090c2 #2 [c5377d98] no_context at c06f614e #3 [c5377dbc] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f6281 #4 [c5377df4] bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f629b #5 [c5377e00] do_page_fault at c070b0cb torvalds#6 [c5377e7c] error_code (via page_fault) at c070892c EAX: f300c6a8 EBX: f300c6a8 ECX: 000000c0 EDX: 000000c0 EBP: c5377ed0 DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 00000001 GS: ffffad20 CS: 0060 EIP: c0481ad0 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 torvalds#7 [c5377eb0] atomic64_read_cx8 at c0481ad0 torvalds#8 [c5377ebc] xlog_assign_tail_lsn_locked at f7cc7c6e [xfs] torvalds#9 [c5377ed4] xfs_trans_ail_delete_bulk at f7ccd520 [xfs] torvalds#10 [c5377f0c] xfs_buf_iodone at f7ccb602 [xfs] torvalds#11 [c5377f24] xfs_buf_do_callbacks at f7cca524 [xfs] torvalds#12 [c5377f30] xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks at f7cca5da [xfs] torvalds#13 [c5377f4c] xfs_buf_iodone_work at f7c718d0 [xfs] torvalds#14 [c5377f58] process_one_work at c024ee4c torvalds#15 [c5377f98] worker_thread at c024f43d torvalds#16 [c5377fb] kthread at c025326b torvalds#17 [c5377fe8] kernel_thread_helper at c070e834 PID: 26653 TASK: e79143b0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "umount" #0 [cde0fda0] __schedule at c0706595 #1 [cde0fe28] schedule at c0706b89 #2 [cde0fe30] schedule_timeout at c0705600 #3 [cde0fe94] __down_common at c0706098 #4 [cde0fec8] __down at c0706122 #5 [cde0fed0] down at c025936f torvalds#6 [cde0fee0] xfs_buf_lock at f7c7131d [xfs] torvalds#7 [cde0ff00] xfs_freesb at f7cc2236 [xfs] torvalds#8 [cde0ff10] xfs_fs_put_super at f7c80f21 [xfs] torvalds#9 [cde0ff1c] generic_shutdown_super at c0333d7a torvalds#10 [cde0ff38] kill_block_super at c0333e0f torvalds#11 [cde0ff48] deactivate_locked_super at c0334218 torvalds#12 [cde0ff58] deactivate_super at c033495d torvalds#13 [cde0ff68] mntput_no_expire at c034bc13 torvalds#14 [cde0ff7c] sys_umount at c034cc69 torvalds#15 [cde0ffa0] sys_oldumount at c034ccd4 torvalds#16 [cde0ffb0] system_call at c0707e66 commit 11159a0 added this to xfs_log_unmount and needs to be cleaned up at a later date. Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
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One of the modes of Huawei E367 has this QMI/wwan interface: I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=07 Driver=(none) E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=4ms Huawei use subclass and protocol to identify vendor specific functions, so adding a new vendor rule for this combination. The Pantech devices UML290 (106c:3718) and P4200 (106c:3721) use the same subclass to identify the QMI/wwan function. Replace the existing device specific UML290 entries with generic vendor matching, adding support for the Pantech P4200. The ZTE MF683 has 6 vendor specific interfaces, all using ff/ff/ff for cls/sub/prot. Adding a match on interface #5 which is a QMI/wwan interface. Cc: Fangxiaozhi (Franko) <fangxiaozhi@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> Cc: Shawn J. Goff <shawn7400@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mitake
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This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+ compilers. As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct" version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the "byteshift" implementation for both. Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis: Test case: int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } With the current ARM version: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov r3, r3, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr r3, r3, r1, asl torvalds#8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr r0, r3, r0, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, mov r2, #0 @ tmp184, ldrb r5, [r0, torvalds#6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B] ldrb r4, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B] ldrb ip, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] mov r5, r5, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] orr r5, r5, r4, asl torvalds#8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], ldrb r6, [r0, torvalds#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B] orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov ip, ip, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r1, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr ip, ip, r7, asl torvalds#8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r5, r6, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr ip, ip, r1, asl torvalds#24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], mov r1, r3 @, orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194 ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc. Now with the asm-generic version: foo: ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x bx lr @ bar: mov r3, r0 @ x, x ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x ldr r1, [r3, #4] @ unaligned @, bx lr @ This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows: long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; } then the resulting code is: bar: ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,, bx lr @ So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above unaligned code results are not just an accident. Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an ARMv5 target: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r2, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r3, r3, r1, asl torvalds#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r2, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r0, r3, r0, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r3, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149, ldrb r6, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150, ldrb r5, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r4, [r0, torvalds#6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153, ldrb r1, [r0, torvalds#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156, ldrb ip, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r2, r2, r7, asl torvalds#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r6, asl torvalds#8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150, orr r2, r2, r5, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r3, r3, r4, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153, orr r0, r2, ip, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, orr r1, r3, r1, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp155, tmp156, ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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Use spin_lock_irq() to quiet warning: [ 8.232324] BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, reboot/85 [ 8.234138] lock: c161c760, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: reboot/85, .owner_cpu: 0 [ 8.236132] Pid: 85, comm: reboot Not tainted 3.4.0-rc7-00656-g82163ed #5 [ 8.237965] Call Trace: [ 8.238648] [<c13dfd20>] ? printk+0x18/0x1a [ 8.239827] [<c122a5e0>] spin_dump+0x80/0xd0 [ 8.241016] [<c122a652>] spin_bug+0x22/0x30 [ 8.242181] [<c122a93b>] do_raw_spin_trylock+0x5b/0x70 [ 8.243611] [<c13e8bae>] _raw_spin_trylock+0xe/0x60 [ 8.244975] [<c1392230>] ? keypad_send_key.constprop.9+0xe0/0xe0 ==> [ 8.246638] [<c13922ea>] panel_scan_timer+0xba/0x570 [ 8.248019] [<c1392230>] ? keypad_send_key.constprop.9+0xe0/0xe0 [ 8.249689] [<c102f6f5>] run_timer_softirq+0x1e5/0x370 [ 8.251191] [<c102f645>] ? run_timer_softirq+0x135/0x370 [ 8.252718] [<c1392230>] ? keypad_send_key.constprop.9+0xe0/0xe0 [ 8.254462] [<c102a592>] __do_softirq+0xc2/0x1c0 [ 8.255758] [<c102a4d0>] ? local_bh_enable_ip+0x130/0x130 [ 8.257228] <IRQ> [<c102a855>] ? irq_exit+0x65/0x70 [ 8.258647] [<c1013ff9>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x49/0x80 [ 8.260226] [<c13e96c1>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x31/0x38 [ 8.261737] [<c12700e0>] ? drm_vm_open_locked+0x70/0xb0 [ 8.263166] [<c122489a>] ? delay_tsc+0x1a/0x30 [ 8.264452] [<c12248c9>] ? __delay+0x9/0x10 [ 8.265621] [<c12248ec>] ? __const_udelay+0x1c/0x20 ==> [ 8.266967] [<c139136c>] ? lcd_clear_fast_p8+0x9c/0xe0 [ 8.268386] [<c1391a66>] ? lcd_write+0x226/0x810 [ 8.269653] [<c1367900>] ? md_set_readonly+0xc0/0xc0 [ 8.271013] [<c122a9ed>] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9d/0xe0 [ 8.272470] [<c1392a98>] ? panel_lcd_print+0x38/0x40 [ 8.273837] [<c1392ace>] ? panel_notify_sys+0x2e/0x60 [ 8.275224] [<c1046634>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x84/0xb0 [ 8.276754] [<c10469ce>] ? __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3e/0x60 [ 8.278576] [<c1046a0a>] ? blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x1a/0x20 [ 8.280267] [<c1036a14>] ? kernel_restart_prepare+0x14/0x40 [ 8.281901] [<c1036a8e>] ? kernel_restart+0xe/0x50 [ 8.283216] [<c1036ce9>] ? sys_reboot+0x149/0x1e0 [ 8.284532] [<c10b3fb3>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x93/0xd70 [ 8.285956] [<c1019e35>] ? do_page_fault+0x215/0x5e0 [ 8.287330] [<c101a113>] ? do_page_fault+0x4f3/0x5e0 [ 8.288704] [<c1045ac6>] ? up_read+0x16/0x30 [ 8.289890] [<c101a113>] ? do_page_fault+0x4f3/0x5e0 [ 8.291252] [<c10d4486>] ? iterate_supers+0x86/0xd0 [ 8.292615] [<c122a9ed>] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9d/0xe0 [ 8.294049] [<c13e8dcd>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1d/0x20 [ 8.295449] [<c10d44ab>] ? iterate_supers+0xab/0xd0 [ 8.296795] [<c10fb620>] ? __sync_filesystem+0xa0/0xa0 [ 8.298199] [<c13e9b03>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x37 [ 8.306899] Restarting system. [ 8.307747] machine restart Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Cancel work of the xfs_sync_worker before teardown of the log in xfs_unmountfs. This prevents occasional crashes on unmount like so: PID: 21602 TASK: ee9df060 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [c5377d28] crash_kexec at c0292c94 #1 [c5377d80] oops_end at c07090c2 #2 [c5377d98] no_context at c06f614e #3 [c5377dbc] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f6281 #4 [c5377df4] bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f629b #5 [c5377e00] do_page_fault at c070b0cb torvalds#6 [c5377e7c] error_code (via page_fault) at c070892c EAX: f300c6a8 EBX: f300c6a8 ECX: 000000c0 EDX: 000000c0 EBP: c5377ed0 DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 00000001 GS: ffffad20 CS: 0060 EIP: c0481ad0 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 torvalds#7 [c5377eb0] atomic64_read_cx8 at c0481ad0 torvalds#8 [c5377ebc] xlog_assign_tail_lsn_locked at f7cc7c6e [xfs] torvalds#9 [c5377ed4] xfs_trans_ail_delete_bulk at f7ccd520 [xfs] torvalds#10 [c5377f0c] xfs_buf_iodone at f7ccb602 [xfs] torvalds#11 [c5377f24] xfs_buf_do_callbacks at f7cca524 [xfs] torvalds#12 [c5377f30] xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks at f7cca5da [xfs] torvalds#13 [c5377f4c] xfs_buf_iodone_work at f7c718d0 [xfs] torvalds#14 [c5377f58] process_one_work at c024ee4c torvalds#15 [c5377f98] worker_thread at c024f43d torvalds#16 [c5377fb] kthread at c025326b torvalds#17 [c5377fe8] kernel_thread_helper at c070e834 PID: 26653 TASK: e79143b0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "umount" #0 [cde0fda0] __schedule at c0706595 #1 [cde0fe28] schedule at c0706b89 #2 [cde0fe30] schedule_timeout at c0705600 #3 [cde0fe94] __down_common at c0706098 #4 [cde0fec8] __down at c0706122 #5 [cde0fed0] down at c025936f torvalds#6 [cde0fee0] xfs_buf_lock at f7c7131d [xfs] torvalds#7 [cde0ff00] xfs_freesb at f7cc2236 [xfs] torvalds#8 [cde0ff10] xfs_fs_put_super at f7c80f21 [xfs] torvalds#9 [cde0ff1c] generic_shutdown_super at c0333d7a torvalds#10 [cde0ff38] kill_block_super at c0333e0f torvalds#11 [cde0ff48] deactivate_locked_super at c0334218 torvalds#12 [cde0ff58] deactivate_super at c033495d torvalds#13 [cde0ff68] mntput_no_expire at c034bc13 torvalds#14 [cde0ff7c] sys_umount at c034cc69 torvalds#15 [cde0ffa0] sys_oldumount at c034ccd4 torvalds#16 [cde0ffb0] system_call at c0707e66 commit 11159a0 added this to xfs_log_unmount and needs to be cleaned up at a later date. Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
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Interface #5 on ZTE MF683 is a QMI/wwan interface. Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Shawn J. Goff <shawn7400@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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One of the modes of Huawei E367 has this QMI/wwan interface: I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=07 Driver=(none) E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=4ms Huawei use subclass and protocol to identify vendor specific functions, so adding a new vendor rule for this combination. The Pantech devices UML290 (106c:3718) and P4200 (106c:3721) use the same subclass to identify the QMI/wwan function. Replace the existing device specific UML290 entries with generic vendor matching, adding support for the Pantech P4200. The ZTE MF683 has 6 vendor specific interfaces, all using ff/ff/ff for cls/sub/prot. Adding a match on interface #5 which is a QMI/wwan interface. Cc: Fangxiaozhi (Franko) <fangxiaozhi@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> Cc: Shawn J. Goff <shawn7400@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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netlink_register_notifier requires notify functions to not sleep. nfc_stop_poll locks device mutex and must not be called from notifier. Create workqueue that will handle this for all devices. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/mutex.c:269 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 4497, name: neard 1 lock held by neard/4497: Pid: 4497, comm: neard Not tainted 3.5.0-999-nfc+ #5 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810952c5>] __might_sleep+0x145/0x200 [<ffffffff81743dde>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2e/0x50 [<ffffffff816ffd19>] nfc_stop_poll+0x39/0xb0 [<ffffffff81700a17>] nfc_genl_rcv_nl_event+0x77/0xc0 [<ffffffff8174aa8c>] notifier_call_chain+0x5c/0x120 [<ffffffff8174abd6>] __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x86/0x140 [<ffffffff8174ab50>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff815e1347>] ? skb_dequeue+0x67/0x90 [<ffffffff8174aca6>] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8162119a>] netlink_release+0x24a/0x280 [<ffffffff815d7aa8>] sock_release+0x28/0xa0 [<ffffffff815d7be7>] sock_close+0x17/0x30 [<ffffffff811b2a7c>] __fput+0xcc/0x250 [<ffffffff811b2c0e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81085009>] task_work_run+0x69/0x90 [<ffffffff8101b951>] do_notify_resume+0x81/0xd0 [<ffffffff8174ef22>] int_signal+0x12/0x17 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
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…aves P_Key change and guid change events are not of interest to all slaves, but only to those slaves which "see" the table slots whose contents have change. For example, if the guid at port 1, index 5 has changed in the PPF, we wish to propagate the gid-change event only to the function which has that guid index mapped to its port/guid table (in this case it is slave #5). Other functions should not get the event, since the event does not affect them. Similarly with P_Keys -- P_Key change events are forwarded only to slaves which have that P_Key index mapped to their virtual P_Key table. Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
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If a qdisc is installed on a bonding device, its possible to get following lockdep splat under stress : ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.6.0+ torvalds#211 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- ping/4876 is trying to acquire lock: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 but task is already holding lock: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock); lock(dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by ping/4876: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815e5030>] raw_sendmsg+0x600/0xc30 #1: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815ba4bd>] ip_finish_output+0x12d/0x870 #2: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x830 #3: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 #4: (&bond->lock){++.?..}, at: [<ffffffffa02128c1>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x4b0 [bonding] #5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x830 stack backtrace: Pid: 4876, comm: ping Not tainted 3.6.0+ torvalds#211 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a0145>] __lock_acquire+0x715/0x1b80 [<ffffffff810a256b>] ? mark_held_locks+0x9b/0x100 [<ffffffff810a1bf2>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8157a191>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff81726b7c>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x50 [<ffffffff8157a191>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff8106264d>] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x5d/0x90 [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x570/0x570 [<ffffffffa0212a6a>] bond_start_xmit+0x1da/0x4b0 [bonding] [<ffffffff815796d0>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x240/0x6b0 [<ffffffff81597c6e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x2a0 [<ffffffff8157a249>] dev_queue_xmit+0x199/0x830 [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x570/0x570 [<ffffffff815ba96f>] ip_finish_output+0x5df/0x870 [<ffffffff815ba4bd>] ? ip_finish_output+0x12d/0x870 [<ffffffff815bb964>] ip_output+0x54/0xf0 [<ffffffff815bad48>] ip_local_out+0x28/0x90 [<ffffffff815bc444>] ip_send_skb+0x14/0x50 [<ffffffff815bc4b2>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x32/0x40 [<ffffffff815e536a>] raw_sendmsg+0x93a/0xc30 [<ffffffff8128d570>] ? selinux_file_send_sigiotask+0x1f0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8109ddb4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffff815f6730>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x220/0x220 [<ffffffff8109ddb4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffff815f6855>] inet_sendmsg+0x125/0x240 [<ffffffff815f6730>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x220/0x220 [<ffffffff8155cddb>] sock_sendmsg+0xab/0xe0 [<ffffffff810a1650>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0xa0/0x2e0 [<ffffffff810a1650>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0xa0/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8155d18c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x37c/0x390 [<ffffffff81195b2a>] ? fsnotify+0x2ca/0x7e0 [<ffffffff811958e8>] ? fsnotify+0x88/0x7e0 [<ffffffff81361f36>] ? put_ldisc+0x56/0xd0 [<ffffffff8116f98a>] ? fget_light+0x3da/0x510 [<ffffffff8155f6c4>] sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x80 [<ffffffff8172fc22>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Avoid this problem using a distinct lock_class_key for bonding devices. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling off, never to be seen again. In the case where this occurred, an exiting thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex, bringing the box to its knees. PID: 18105 TASK: ffff8807fd412180 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kdmflush" #0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489 #1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs] #2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14 #3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs] #4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2 #5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41 torvalds#6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a torvalds#7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88 torvalds#8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850 torvalds#9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f [exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper] RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0 RSP: ffff8808157e7f58 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8107af60 RDI: ffff8803ee491d18 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Jan 12, 2014
All boards, except Amstrad E3, mark USB config with __initdata. As a result, when you compile USB into modules, they will try to refer already released platform data and the behaviour is undefined. For example on Nokia 770, I get the following kernel panic when modprobing ohci-hcd: [ 3.462158] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address e7fddef0 [ 3.477050] pgd = c3434000 [ 3.487365] [e7fddef0] *pgd=00000000 [ 3.498535] Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [#1] ARM [ 3.510955] Modules linked in: ohci_hcd(+) [ 3.522705] CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.7.0-770_tiny+ #5) [ 3.535552] PC is at 0xe7fddef0 [ 3.546508] LR is at ohci_omap_init+0x5c/0x144 [ohci_hcd] [ 3.560272] pc : [<e7fddef0>] lr : [<bf003140>] psr: a0000013 [ 3.560272] sp : c344bdb0 ip : c344bce0 fp : c344bdcc [ 3.589782] r10: 00000001 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00000000 [ 3.604553] r7 : 00000026 r6 : 000000de r5 : c0227300 r4 : c342d620 [ 3.621032] r3 : e7fddef0 r2 : c048b880 r1 : 00000000 r0 : 0000000a [ 3.637786] Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user [ 3.655822] Control: 0005317f Table: 13434000 DAC: 00000015 [ 3.672790] Process modprobe (pid: 425, stack limit = 0xc344a1b8) [ 3.690643] Stack: (0xc344bdb0 to 0xc344c000) [ 3.707031] bda0: bf0030e4 c342d620 00000000 c049e62c [ 3.727905] bdc0: c344be04 c344bdd0 c0150ff0 bf0030f4 bf001b88 00000000 c048a4ac c345b020 [ 3.748870] bde0: c342d620 00000000 c048a468 bf003968 00000001 bf006000 c344be34 c344be08 [ 3.769836] be00: bf001bf0 c0150e48 00000000 c344be18 c00b9bfc c048a478 c048a4ac bf0037f8 [ 3.790985] be20: c012ca04 c000e024 c344be44 c344be38 c012d968 bf001a84 c344be64 c344be48 [ 3.812164] be40: c012c8ac c012d95c 00000000 c048a478 c048a4ac bf0037f8 c344be84 c344be68 [ 3.833740] be60: c012ca74 c012c80c 20000013 00000000 c344be88 bf0037f8 c344beac c344be88 [ 3.855468] be80: c012b038 c012ca14 c38093cc c383ee10 bf0037f8 c35be5a0 c049d5e8 00000000 [ 3.877166] bea0: c344bebc c344beb0 c012c40c c012aff4 c344beec c344bec0 c012bfc0 c012c3fc [ 3.898834] bec0: bf00378c 00000000 c344beec bf0037f8 00067f39 00000000 00005c44 c000e024 [ 3.920837] bee0: c344bf14 c344bef0 c012cd54 c012befc c04ce080 00067f39 00000000 00005c44 [ 3.943023] bf00: c000e024 bf006000 c344bf24 c344bf18 c012db14 c012ccc0 c344bf3c c344bf28 [ 3.965423] bf20: bf00604c c012dad8 c344a000 bf003834 c344bf7c c344bf40 c00087ac bf006010 [ 3.987976] bf40: 0000000f bf003834 00067f39 00000000 00005c44 bf003834 00067f39 00000000 [ 4.010711] bf60: 00005c44 c000e024 c344a000 00000000 c344bfa4 c344bf80 c004c35c c0008720 [ 4.033569] bf80: c344bfac c344bf90 01422192 01427ea0 00000000 00000080 00000000 c344bfa8 [ 4.056518] bfa0: c000dec0 c004c2f0 01422192 01427ea0 01427ea0 00005c44 00067f39 00000000 [ 4.079406] bfc0: 01422192 01427ea0 00000000 00000080 b6e11008 014221aa be941fcc b6e1e008 [ 4.102569] bfe0: b6ef6300 be941758 0000e93c b6ef6310 60000010 01427ea0 00000000 00000000 [ 4.125946] Backtrace: [ 4.143463] [<bf0030e4>] (ohci_omap_init+0x0/0x144 [ohci_hcd]) from [<c0150ff0>] (usb_add_hcd+0x1b8/0x61c) [ 4.183898] r6:c049e62c r5:00000000 r4:c342d620 r3:bf0030e4 [ 4.205596] [<c0150e38>] (usb_add_hcd+0x0/0x61c) from [<bf001bf0>] (ohci_hcd_omap_drv_probe+0x17c/0x224 [ohci_hcd]) [ 4.248138] [<bf001a74>] (ohci_hcd_omap_drv_probe+0x0/0x224 [ohci_hcd]) from [<c012d968>] (platform_drv_probe+0x1c/0x20) [ 4.292144] r8:c000e024 r7:c012ca04 r6:bf0037f8 r5:c048a4ac r4:c048a478 [ 4.316192] [<c012d94c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x0/0x20) from [<c012c8ac>] (driver_probe_device+0xb0/0x208) [ 4.360168] [<c012c7fc>] (driver_probe_device+0x0/0x208) from [<c012ca74>] (__driver_attach+0x70/0x94) [ 4.405548] r6:bf0037f8 r5:c048a4ac r4:c048a478 r3:00000000 [ 4.429809] [<c012ca04>] (__driver_attach+0x0/0x94) from [<c012b038>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x54/0x90) [ 4.475708] r6:bf0037f8 r5:c344be88 r4:00000000 r3:20000013 [ 4.500366] [<c012afe4>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x0/0x90) from [<c012c40c>] (driver_attach+0x20/0x28) [ 4.528442] r7:00000000 r6:c049d5e8 r5:c35be5a0 r4:bf0037f8 [ 4.553466] [<c012c3ec>] (driver_attach+0x0/0x28) from [<c012bfc0>] (bus_add_driver+0xd4/0x228) [ 4.581878] [<c012beec>] (bus_add_driver+0x0/0x228) from [<c012cd54>] (driver_register+0xa4/0x134) [ 4.629730] r8:c000e024 r7:00005c44 r6:00000000 r5:00067f39 r4:bf0037f8 [ 4.656738] [<c012ccb0>] (driver_register+0x0/0x134) from [<c012db14>] (platform_driver_register+0x4c/0x60) [ 4.706542] [<c012dac8>] (platform_driver_register+0x0/0x60) from [<bf00604c>] (ohci_hcd_mod_init+0x4c/0x8c [ohci_hcd]) [ 4.757843] [<bf006000>] (ohci_hcd_mod_init+0x0/0x8c [ohci_hcd]) from [<c00087ac>] (do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x174) [ 4.808990] r4:bf003834 r3:c344a000 [ 4.832641] [<c0008710>] (do_one_initcall+0x0/0x174) from [<c004c35c>] (sys_init_module+0x7c/0x194) [ 4.881530] [<c004c2e0>] (sys_init_module+0x0/0x194) from [<c000dec0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x2c) [ 4.930664] r7:00000080 r6:00000000 r5:01427ea0 r4:01422192 [ 4.956481] Code: bad PC value [ 4.978729] ---[ end trace 58280240f08342c4 ]--- [ 5.002258] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Fix this by taking a copy of the data. Also mark Amstrad E3's data with __initdata to save some memory with multi-board kernels. Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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Pursuant to this review https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/12/500 by Stefan Richter, update the TODO file. - Clarify purpose of TODO file - Remove firewire item #4. As discussed in this conversation https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/13/564 knowing the AR buffer size is not a hard requirement. The required rx buffer size can be determined experimentally. - Remove firewire item #5. This was a private note for further experimentation. - Change firewire item #1. Change suggested header from uapi header to kernel-only header. Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Acked-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The following lines of code produce a kernel oops. fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0); fchmod(fd, 0666); [ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000 [ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP [ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button [ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ torvalds#465 Bochs Bochs [ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0 [ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0 [ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2 [ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4 [ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000) [ 139.924982] Stack: [ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940 [ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3 [ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08 [ 139.924982] Call Trace: [ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62 [ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26 [ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281 [ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76 [ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33 [ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c [ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value. This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation. Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is not NULL. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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1. Background Previously, if f2fs tries to move data blocks of an *evicting* inode during the cleaning process, it stops the process incompletely and then restarts the whole process, since it needs a locked inode to grab victim data pages in its address space. In order to get a locked inode, iget_locked() by f2fs_iget() is normally used, but, it waits if the inode is on freeing. So, here is a deadlock scenario. 1. f2fs_evict_inode() <- inode "A" 2. f2fs_balance_fs() 3. f2fs_gc() 4. gc_data_segment() 5. f2fs_iget() <- inode "A" too! If step #1 and #5 treat a same inode "A", step #5 would fall into deadlock since the inode "A" is on freeing. In order to resolve this, f2fs_iget_nowait() which skips __wait_on_freeing_inode() was introduced in step #5, and stops f2fs_gc() to complete f2fs_evict_inode(). 1. f2fs_evict_inode() <- inode "A" 2. f2fs_balance_fs() 3. f2fs_gc() 4. gc_data_segment() 5. f2fs_iget_nowait() <- inode "A", then stop f2fs_gc() w/ -ENOENT 2. Problem and Solution In the above scenario, however, f2fs cannot finish f2fs_evict_inode() only if: o there are not enough free sections, and o f2fs_gc() tries to move data blocks of the *evicting* inode repeatedly. So, the final solution is to use f2fs_iget() and remove f2fs_balance_fs() in f2fs_evict_inode(). The f2fs_evict_inode() actually truncates all the data and node blocks, which means that it doesn't produce any dirty node pages accordingly. So, we don't need to do f2fs_balance_fs() in practical. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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For now this will suffice for all platforms, later exotic ones needs to get this from DeviceTree Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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…ernel/git/vgupta/arc Pull new ARC architecture from Vineet Gupta: "Initial ARC Linux port with some fixes on top for 3.9-rc1: I would like to introduce the Linux port to ARC Processors (from Synopsys) for 3.9-rc1. The patch-set has been discussed on the public lists since Nov and has received a fair bit of review, specially from Arnd, tglx, Al and other subsystem maintainers for DeviceTree, kgdb... The arch bits are in arch/arc, some asm-generic changes (acked by Arnd), a minor change to PARISC (acked by Helge). The series is a touch bigger for a new port for 2 main reasons: 1. It enables a basic kernel in first sub-series and adds ptrace/kgdb/.. later 2. Some of the fallout of review (DeviceTree support, multi-platform- image support) were added on top of orig series, primarily to record the revision history. This updated pull request additionally contains - fixes due to our GNU tools catching up with the new syscall/ptrace ABI - some (minor) cross-arch Kconfig updates." * tag 'arc-v3.9-rc1-late' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc: (82 commits) ARC: split elf.h into uapi and export it for userspace ARC: Fixup the current ABI version ARC: gdbserver using regset interface possibly broken ARC: Kconfig cleanup tracking cross-arch Kconfig pruning in merge window ARC: make a copy of flat DT ARC: [plat-arcfpga] DT arc-uart bindings change: "baud" => "current-speed" ARC: Ensure CONFIG_VIRT_TO_BUS is not enabled ARC: Fix pt_orig_r8 access ARC: [3.9] Fallout of hlist iterator update ARC: 64bit RTSC timestamp hardware issue ARC: Don't fiddle with non-existent caches ARC: Add self to MAINTAINERS ARC: Provide a default serial.h for uart drivers needing BASE_BAUD ARC: [plat-arcfpga] defconfig for fully loaded ARC Linux ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image torvalds#8: platform registers SMP callbacks ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image torvalds#7: SMP common code to use callbacks ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image torvalds#6: cpu-to-dma-addr optional ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #5: NR_IRQS defined by ARC core ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #4: Isolate platform headers ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #3: switch to board callback ...
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The following script will produce a kernel oops: sudo ip netns add v sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up sudo ip netns del v where inspect by gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 107] 0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 #1 vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087 #2 0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299 #3 0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335 #4 0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851 #5 0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752 torvalds#6 0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170 torvalds#7 0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302 torvalds#8 0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157 torvalds#9 0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276 torvalds#10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168 torvalds#11 <signal handler called> torvalds#12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () torvalds#13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () (gdb) fr 0 #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; (gdb) l 528 static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev) 529 { 530 struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev); 531 struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id); 532 int err = 0; 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; 534 struct ip_mreqn mreq = { 535 .imr_multiaddr.s_addr = vxlan->gaddr, 536 .imr_ifindex = vxlan->link, 537 }; (gdb) p vn->sock $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0 The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock` is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does. Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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mnt_drop_write() must be called only if mnt_want_write() succeeded, otherwise the mnt_writers counter will diverge. mnt_writers counters are used to check if remounting FS as read-only is OK, so after an extra mnt_drop_write() call, it would be impossible to remount mqueue FS as read-only. Besides, on umount a warning would be printed like this one: ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] 3.9.0-rc3 #5 Not tainted ------------------------------------- a.out/12486 is trying to release lock (sb_writers) at: mnt_drop_write+0x1f/0x30 but there are no more locks to release! Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add a new ioctl, EXT4_IOC_SWAP_BOOT which swaps i_blocks and associated attributes (like i_blocks, i_size, i_flags, ...) from the specified inode with inode EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO (#5). This is typically used to store a boot loader in a secure part of the filesystem, where it can't be changed by a normal user by accident. The data blocks of the previous boot loader will be associated with the given inode. This usercode program is a simple example of the usage: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; int err; if ( argc != 2 ) { printf("usage: ext4-swap-boot-inode FILE-TO-SWAP\n"); exit(1); } fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY); if ( fd < 0 ) { perror("open"); exit(1); } err = ioctl(fd, EXT4_IOC_SWAP_BOOT); if ( err < 0 ) { perror("ioctl"); exit(1); } close(fd); exit(0); } [ Modified by Theodore Ts'o to fix a number of bugs in the original code.] Signed-off-by: Dr. Tilmann Bubeck <t.bubeck@reinform.de> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
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Otherwise we get a race between unload and reload of the same module: the new module doesn't see the old one in the list, but then fails because it can't register over the still-extant entries in sysfs: [ 103.981925] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 103.986902] WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:536 sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0() [ 103.993606] Hardware name: CrownBay Platform [ 103.998075] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/module/pch_gbe' [ 104.004784] Modules linked in: pch_gbe(+) [last unloaded: pch_gbe] [ 104.011362] Pid: 3021, comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 3.9.0-rc5+ #5 [ 104.018662] Call Trace: [ 104.021286] [<c103599d>] warn_slowpath_common+0x6d/0xa0 [ 104.026933] [<c1168c8b>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0 [ 104.031986] [<c1168c8b>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0 [ 104.037000] [<c1035a4e>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2e/0x30 [ 104.042188] [<c1168c8b>] sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0 [ 104.046982] [<c1168dbe>] create_dir+0x5e/0xa0 [ 104.051633] [<c1168e78>] sysfs_create_dir+0x78/0xd0 [ 104.056774] [<c1262bc3>] kobject_add_internal+0x83/0x1f0 [ 104.062351] [<c126daf6>] ? kvasprintf+0x46/0x60 [ 104.067231] [<c1262ebd>] kobject_add_varg+0x2d/0x50 [ 104.072450] [<c1262f07>] kobject_init_and_add+0x27/0x30 [ 104.078075] [<c1089240>] mod_sysfs_setup+0x80/0x540 [ 104.083207] [<c1260851>] ? module_bug_finalize+0x51/0xc0 [ 104.088720] [<c108ab29>] load_module+0x1429/0x18b0 We can teardown sysfs first, then to be sure, put the state in MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED so it's ignored while we deconstruct it. Reported-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com> Tested-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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The reason for this patch is crash in kmemdup caused by returning from get_callid with uniialized matchoff and matchlen. Removing Zero check of matchlen since it's done by ct_sip_get_header() BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880457b5763f IP: [<ffffffff810df7fc>] kmemdup+0x2e/0x35 PGD 27f6067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: xt_state xt_helper nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_mangle xt_connmark xt_conntrack ip6_tables nf_conntrack_ftp ip_vs_ftp nf_nat xt_tcpudp iptable_mangle xt_mark ip_tables x_tables ip_vs_rr ip_vs_lblcr ip_vs_pe_sip ip_vs nf_conntrack_sip nf_conntrack bonding igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core CPU 5 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 3.9.0-rc5+ #5 /S1200KP RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810df7fc>] [<ffffffff810df7fc>] kmemdup+0x2e/0x35 RSP: 0018:ffff8803fea03648 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff8803d61063e0 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff880457b5763f RDI: ffff8803d61063e0 RBP: ffff8803fea03658 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000011 R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 00ffffffff81a8a3 R12: ffff880457b5763f R13: ffff8803d67f786a R14: ffff8803fea03730 R15: ffffffffa0098e90 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8803fea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff880457b5763f CR3: 0000000001a0c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/5 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff8803ee18c000, task ffff8803ee18a480) Stack: ffff8803d822a080 000000000000001c ffff8803fea036c8 ffffffffa000937a ffffffff81f0d8a0 000000038135fdd5 ffff880300000014 ffff880300110000 ffffffff150118ac ffff8803d7e8a000 ffff88031e0118ac 0000000000000000 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa000937a>] ip_vs_sip_fill_param+0x13a/0x187 [ip_vs_pe_sip] [<ffffffffa007b209>] ip_vs_sched_persist+0x2c6/0x9c3 [ip_vs] [<ffffffff8107dc53>] ? __lock_acquire+0x677/0x1697 [<ffffffff8100972e>] ? native_sched_clock+0x3c/0x7d [<ffffffff8100972e>] ? native_sched_clock+0x3c/0x7d [<ffffffff810649bc>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x43/0xcf [<ffffffffa007bb1e>] ip_vs_schedule+0x181/0x4ba [ip_vs] ... Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans@schillstrom.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This can easily be triggered if a new CPU is added (via ACPI hotplug mechanism) and from user-space you do: echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/online (or wait for UDEV to do it) on a newly appeared physical CPU. The deadlock is that the "store_online" in drivers/base/cpu.c takes the cpu_hotplug_driver_lock() lock, then calls "cpu_up". "cpu_up" eventually ends up calling "save_mc_for_early" which also takes the cpu_hotplug_driver_lock() lock. And here is that lockdep thinks of it: smpboot: Stack at about ffff880075c39f44 smpboot: CPU3: has booted. microcode: CPU3 sig=0x206a7, pf=0x2, revision=0x25 ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.9.0upstream-10129-g167af0e #1 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- sh/2487 is trying to acquire lock: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 but task is already holding lock: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex); lock(x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by sh/2487: #0: (sb_writers#5){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811ca48d>] vfs_write+0x17d/0x190 #1: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812464ef>] sysfs_write_file+0x3f/0x160 #2: (s_active#20){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81246578>] sysfs_write_file+0xc8/0x160 #3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 #4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810961c2>] cpu_maps_update_begin+0x12/0x20 #5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810962a7>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x27/0x60 Suggested-and-Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v3.9 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368029583-23337-1-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Make sure that any open relayfs files are closed before unregistering with mac80211, otherwise this crash is seen: [ 1331.097846] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 6b6b6b8b [ 1331.098170] IP: [<c063d0d6>] debugfs_remove+0x26/0x80 [ 1331.098170] *pdpt = 000000002f9aa001 *pde = 0000000000000000 [ 1331.098170] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1331.098170] Modules linked in: iptable_raw xt_CT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag] [ 1331.098170] Pid: 4794, comm: rmmod Tainted: G WC 3.9.1+ #5 To Be Fi. [ 1331.098170] EIP: 0060:[<c063d0d6>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 [ 1331.098170] EIP is at debugfs_remove+0x26/0x80 [ 1331.098170] EAX: f2f3acd0 EBX: f2f3acd0 ECX: 00000006 EDX: f8622348 [ 1331.098170] ESI: 6b6b6b6b EDI: 00000001 EBP: ee251e14 ESP: ee251e0c [ 1331.098170] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 1331.098170] CR0: 8005003b CR2: 6b6b6b8b CR3: 2e7b7000 CR4: 000007e0 [ 1331.098170] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 1331.098170] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 1331.098170] Process rmmod (pid: 4794, ti=ee250000 task=efaa2560 task.ti=ee25) [ 1331.098170] Stack: [ 1331.098170] f241e170 0000000a ee251e1c f861394d ee251e28 c04e3088 f241e170 4 [ 1331.098170] c04e30fe f45482b0 ee251e54 c04e3187 f25e86b0 ee251e54 f8618748 0 [ 1331.098170] 0000000a 00000001 ee251e68 f860065b f2509e20 f25085a0 f5b6e8a4 8 [ 1331.098170] Call Trace: [ 1331.098170] [<f861394d>] remove_buf_file_handler+0xd/0x20 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<c04e3088>] relay_remove_buf+0x18/0x30 [ 1331.098170] [<c04e30fe>] relay_close_buf+0x2e/0x40 [ 1331.098170] [<c04e3187>] relay_close+0x77/0xf0 [ 1331.098170] [<f8618748>] ? dpd_exit+0x38/0x40 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f860065b>] ath9k_deinit_softc+0x8b/0xa0 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f86006b8>] ath9k_deinit_device+0x48/0x60 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f86107f1>] ath_pci_remove+0x31/0x50 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<c06dbff8>] pci_device_remove+0x38/0xc0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079daa4>] __device_release_driver+0x64/0xc0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079db97>] driver_detach+0x97/0xa0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079cacc>] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xe0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079c197>] ? bus_put+0x17/0x20 [ 1331.098170] [<c079cae3>] ? bus_remove_driver+0x83/0xe0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079e709>] driver_unregister+0x49/0x80 [ 1331.098170] [<c06dc138>] pci_unregister_driver+0x18/0x80 [ 1331.098170] [<f8610602>] ath_pci_exit+0x12/0x20 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f8619ce0>] ath9k_exit+0x17/0x337 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<c09e537d>] ? mutex_unlock+0xd/0x10 [ 1331.098170] [<c04bd36c>] sys_delete_module+0x17c/0x250 [ 1331.098170] [<c0540dc4>] ? do_munmap+0x244/0x2d0 [ 1331.098170] [<c0540e96>] ? vm_munmap+0x46/0x60 [ 1331.098170] [<c09e8dc4>] ? restore_all+0xf/0xf [ 1331.098170] [<c09ebf50>] ? __do_page_fault+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 1331.098170] [<c04b18e4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x180 [ 1331.098170] [<c09ef28d>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38 [ 1331.098170] Code: 90 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 83 ec 08 89 1c 24 89 74 24 04 3e 82 [ 1331.098170] EIP: [<c063d0d6>] debugfs_remove+0x26/0x80 SS:ESP 0068:ee251e0c [ 1331.098170] CR2: 000000006b6b6b8b [ 1331.727971] ---[ end trace b5bb9f2066cef7f9 ]--- Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Simon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call graph: #3 [ffff88003fc03938] __stack_chk_fail at ffffffff81037f77 #4 [ffff88003fc03948] icmp_send at ffffffff814d5fec #5 [ffff88003fc03ae8] ipv4_link_failure at ffffffff814a1795 torvalds#6 [ffff88003fc03af8] ipgre_tunnel_xmit at ffffffff814e7965 torvalds#7 [ffff88003fc03b78] dev_hard_start_xmit at ffffffff8146e032 torvalds#8 [ffff88003fc03bc8] sch_direct_xmit at ffffffff81487d66 torvalds#9 [ffff88003fc03c08] __qdisc_run at ffffffff81487efd torvalds#10 [ffff88003fc03c48] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffff8146e5a7 torvalds#11 [ffff88003fc03c88] ip_finish_output at ffffffff814ab596 Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP stack. We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure() is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation layer. A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well. Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing ! Reported-by: Daniel Petre <daniel.petre@rcs-rds.ro> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In Steven Rostedt's words: > I've been debugging the last couple of days why my tests have been > locking up. One of my tracing tests, runs all available tracers. The > lockup always happened with the mmiotrace, which is used to trace > interactions between priority drivers and the kernel. But to do this > easily, when the tracer gets registered, it disables all but the boot > CPUs. The lockup always happened after it got done disabling the CPUs. > > Then I decided to try this: > > while :; do > for i in 1 2 3; do > echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu$i/online > done > for i in 1 2 3; do > echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu$i/online > done > done > > Well, sure enough, that locked up too, with the same users. Doing a > sysrq-w (showing all blocked tasks): > > [ 2991.344562] task PC stack pid father > [ 2991.344562] rcu_preempt D ffff88007986fdf8 0 10 2 0x00000000 > [ 2991.344562] ffff88007986fc98 0000000000000002 ffff88007986fc48 0000000000000908 > [ 2991.344562] ffff88007986c280 ffff88007986ffd8 ffff88007986ffd8 00000000001d3c80 > [ 2991.344562] ffff880079248a40 ffff88007986c280 0000000000000000 00000000fffd4295 > [ 2991.344562] Call Trace: > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815437ba>] schedule+0x64/0x66 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541750>] schedule_timeout+0xbc/0xf9 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154bec0>] ? ftrace_call+0x5/0x2f > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81049513>] ? cascade+0xa8/0xa8 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815417ab>] schedule_timeout_uninterruptible+0x1e/0x20 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810c980c>] rcu_gp_kthread+0x502/0x94b > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81062791>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x50/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810c930a>] ? rcu_gp_fqs+0x64/0x64 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061cdb>] kthread+0xb1/0xb9 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81091e31>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.23+0x4e/0x55 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154c1dc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] kworker/0:1 D ffffffff81a30680 0 47 2 0x00000000 > [ 2991.344562] Workqueue: events cpuset_hotplug_workfn > [ 2991.344562] ffff880078dbbb58 0000000000000002 0000000000000006 00000000000000d8 > [ 2991.344562] ffff880078db8100 ffff880078dbbfd8 ffff880078dbbfd8 00000000001d3c80 > [ 2991.344562] ffff8800779ca5c0 ffff880078db8100 ffffffff81541fcf 0000000000000000 > [ 2991.344562] Call Trace: > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] ? __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815437ba>] schedule+0x64/0x66 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81543a39>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x24 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103d11b>] ? get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103d11b>] ? get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815422ff>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3b/0x40 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103d11b>] get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810af7e6>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x6e/0x3a8 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810b0ec6>] rebuild_sched_domains+0x1c/0x2a > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810b109b>] cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x1c7/0x1d3 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810b0ed9>] ? cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x5/0x1d3 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81058e07>] process_one_work+0x2d4/0x4d1 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81058d3a>] ? process_one_work+0x207/0x4d1 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8105964c>] worker_thread+0x2e7/0x3b5 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81059365>] ? rescuer_thread+0x332/0x332 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061cdb>] kthread+0xb1/0xb9 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154c1dc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] bash D ffffffff81a4aa80 0 2618 2612 0x10000000 > [ 2991.344562] ffff8800379abb58 0000000000000002 0000000000000006 0000000000000c2c > [ 2991.344562] ffff880077fea140 ffff8800379abfd8 ffff8800379abfd8 00000000001d3c80 > [ 2991.344562] ffff8800779ca5c0 ffff880077fea140 ffffffff81541fcf 0000000000000000 > [ 2991.344562] Call Trace: > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] ? __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815437ba>] schedule+0x64/0x66 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81543a39>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x24 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81530078>] ? rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81530078>] ? rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815422ff>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3b/0x40 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81530078>] rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81091c99>] ? __lock_is_held+0x32/0x53 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81548912>] notifier_call_chain+0x6b/0x98 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810671fd>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103cf64>] __cpu_notify+0x20/0x32 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103cf8d>] cpu_notify_nofail+0x17/0x36 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815225de>] _cpu_down+0x154/0x259 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81522710>] cpu_down+0x2d/0x3a > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81526351>] store_online+0x4e/0xe7 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8134d764>] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x22 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff811b3c5f>] sysfs_write_file+0x108/0x144 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8114c5ef>] vfs_write+0xfd/0x158 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8114c928>] SyS_write+0x5c/0x83 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154c494>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 > > As well as held locks: > > [ 3034.728033] Showing all locks held in the system: > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by rcu_preempt/10: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (rcu_preempt_state.onoff_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff810c9471>] rcu_gp_kthread+0x167/0x94b > [ 3034.728033] 4 locks held by kworker/0:1/47: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81058d3a>] process_one_work+0x207/0x4d1 > [ 3034.728033] #1: (cpuset_hotplug_work){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81058d3a>] process_one_work+0x207/0x4d1 > [ 3034.728033] #2: (cpuset_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b0ec1>] rebuild_sched_domains+0x17/0x2a > [ 3034.728033] #3: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8103d11b>] get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2563: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2565: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2569: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2572: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2575: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 7 locks held by bash/2618: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (sb_writers#5){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8114bc3f>] file_start_write+0x2a/0x2c > [ 3034.728033] #1: (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811b3b93>] sysfs_write_file+0x3c/0x144 > [ 3034.728033] #2: (s_active#54){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811b3c3e>] sysfs_write_file+0xe7/0x144 > [ 3034.728033] #3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810217c2>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x19 > [ 3034.728033] #4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8103d196>] cpu_maps_update_begin+0x17/0x19 > [ 3034.728033] #5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8103cfd8>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2c/0x6d > [ 3034.728033] torvalds#6: (rcu_preempt_state.onoff_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81530078>] rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by bash/2980: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > > Things looked a little weird. Also, this is a deadlock that lockdep did > not catch. But what we have here does not look like a circular lock > issue: > > Bash is blocked in rcu_cpu_notify(): > > 1961 /* Exclude any attempts to start a new grace period. */ > 1962 mutex_lock(&rsp->onoff_mutex); > > > kworker is blocked in get_online_cpus(), which makes sense as we are > currently taking down a CPU. > > But rcu_preempt is not blocked on anything. It is simply sleeping in > rcu_gp_kthread (really rcu_gp_init) here: > > 1453 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_DELAY > 1454 if ((prandom_u32() % (rcu_num_nodes * 8)) == 0 && > 1455 system_state == SYSTEM_RUNNING) > 1456 schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(2); > 1457 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_DELAY */ > > And it does this while holding the onoff_mutex that bash is waiting for. > > Doing a function trace, it showed me where it happened: > > [ 125.940066] rcu_pree-10 3.... 28384115273: schedule_timeout_uninterruptible <-rcu_gp_kthread > [...] > [ 125.940066] rcu_pree-10 3d..3 28384202439: sched_switch: prev_comm=rcu_preempt prev_pid=10 prev_prio=120 prev_state=D ==> next_comm=watchdog/3 next_pid=38 next_prio=120 > > The watchdog ran, and then: > > [ 125.940066] watchdog-38 3d..3 28384692863: sched_switch: prev_comm=watchdog/3 prev_pid=38 prev_prio=120 prev_state=P ==> next_comm=modprobe next_pid=2848 next_prio=118 > > Not sure what modprobe was doing, but shortly after that: > > [ 125.940066] modprobe-2848 3d..3 28385041749: sched_switch: prev_comm=modprobe prev_pid=2848 prev_prio=118 prev_state=R+ ==> next_comm=migration/3 next_pid=40 next_prio=0 > > Where the migration thread took down the CPU: > > [ 125.940066] migratio-40 3d..3 28389148276: sched_switch: prev_comm=migration/3 prev_pid=40 prev_prio=0 prev_state=P ==> next_comm=swapper/3 next_pid=0 next_prio=120 > > which finally did: > > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389282142: arch_cpu_idle_dead <-cpu_startup_entry > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389282548: native_play_dead <-arch_cpu_idle_dead > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389282924: play_dead_common <-native_play_dead > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389283468: idle_task_exit <-play_dead_common > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389284644: amd_e400_remove_cpu <-play_dead_common > > > CPU 3 is now offline, the rcu_preempt thread that ran on CPU 3 is still > doing a schedule_timeout_uninterruptible() and it registered it's > timeout to the timer base for CPU 3. You would think that it would get > migrated right? The issue here is that the timer migration happens at > the CPU notifier for CPU_DEAD. The problem is that the rcu notifier for > CPU_DOWN is blocked waiting for the onoff_mutex to be released, which is > held by the thread that just put itself into a uninterruptible sleep, > that wont wake up until the CPU_DEAD notifier of the timer > infrastructure is called, which wont happen until the rcu notifier > finishes. Here's our deadlock! This commit breaks this deadlock cycle by substituting a shorter udelay() for the previous schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(), while at the same time increasing the probability of the delay. This maintains the intensity of the testing. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Michael L. Semon has been testing CRC patches on a 32 bit system and been seeing assert failures in the directory code from xfs/080. Thanks to Michael's heroic efforts with printk debugging, we found that the problem was that the last free space being left in the directory structure was too small to fit a unused tag structure and it was being corrupted and attempting to log a region out of bounds. Hence the assert failure looked something like: ..... #5 calling xfs_dir2_data_log_unused() 36 32 #1 4092 4095 4096 #2 8182 8183 4096 XFS: Assertion failed: first <= last && last < BBTOB(bp->b_length), file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 568 Where #1 showed the first region of the dup being logged (i.e. the last 4 bytes of a directory buffer) and #2 shows the corrupt values being calculated from the length of the dup entry which overflowed the size of the buffer. It turns out that the problem was not in the logging code, nor in the freespace handling code. It is an initial condition bug that only shows up on 32 bit systems. When a new buffer is initialised, where's the freespace that is set up: [ 172.316249] calling xfs_dir2_leaf_addname() from xfs_dir_createname() [ 172.316346] torvalds#9 calling xfs_dir2_data_log_unused() [ 172.316351] #1 calling xfs_trans_log_buf() 60 63 4096 [ 172.316353] #2 calling xfs_trans_log_buf() 4094 4095 4096 Note the offset of the first region being logged? It's 60 bytes into the buffer. Once I saw that, I pretty much knew that the bug was going to be caused by this. Essentially, all direct entries are rounded to 8 bytes in length, and all entries start with an 8 byte alignment. This means that we can decode inplace as variables are naturally aligned. With the directory data supposedly starting on a 8 byte boundary, and all entries padded to 8 bytes, the minimum freespace in a directory block is supposed to be 8 bytes, which is large enough to fit a unused data entry structure (6 bytes in size). The fact we only have 4 bytes of free space indicates a directory data block alignment problem. And what do you know - there's an implicit hole in the directory data block header for the CRC format, which means the header is 60 byte on 32 bit intel systems and 64 bytes on 64 bit systems. Needs padding. And while looking at the structures, I found the same problem in the attr leaf header. Fix them both. Note that this only affects 32 bit systems with CRCs enabled. Everything else is just fine. Note that CRC enabled filesystems created before this fix on such systems will not be readable with this fix applied. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Debugged-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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Michael L. Semon has been testing CRC patches on a 32 bit system and been seeing assert failures in the directory code from xfs/080. Thanks to Michael's heroic efforts with printk debugging, we found that the problem was that the last free space being left in the directory structure was too small to fit a unused tag structure and it was being corrupted and attempting to log a region out of bounds. Hence the assert failure looked something like: ..... #5 calling xfs_dir2_data_log_unused() 36 32 #1 4092 4095 4096 #2 8182 8183 4096 XFS: Assertion failed: first <= last && last < BBTOB(bp->b_length), file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 568 Where #1 showed the first region of the dup being logged (i.e. the last 4 bytes of a directory buffer) and #2 shows the corrupt values being calculated from the length of the dup entry which overflowed the size of the buffer. It turns out that the problem was not in the logging code, nor in the freespace handling code. It is an initial condition bug that only shows up on 32 bit systems. When a new buffer is initialised, where's the freespace that is set up: [ 172.316249] calling xfs_dir2_leaf_addname() from xfs_dir_createname() [ 172.316346] torvalds#9 calling xfs_dir2_data_log_unused() [ 172.316351] #1 calling xfs_trans_log_buf() 60 63 4096 [ 172.316353] #2 calling xfs_trans_log_buf() 4094 4095 4096 Note the offset of the first region being logged? It's 60 bytes into the buffer. Once I saw that, I pretty much knew that the bug was going to be caused by this. Essentially, all direct entries are rounded to 8 bytes in length, and all entries start with an 8 byte alignment. This means that we can decode inplace as variables are naturally aligned. With the directory data supposedly starting on a 8 byte boundary, and all entries padded to 8 bytes, the minimum freespace in a directory block is supposed to be 8 bytes, which is large enough to fit a unused data entry structure (6 bytes in size). The fact we only have 4 bytes of free space indicates a directory data block alignment problem. And what do you know - there's an implicit hole in the directory data block header for the CRC format, which means the header is 60 byte on 32 bit intel systems and 64 bytes on 64 bit systems. Needs padding. And while looking at the structures, I found the same problem in the attr leaf header. Fix them both. Note that this only affects 32 bit systems with CRCs enabled. Everything else is just fine. Note that CRC enabled filesystems created before this fix on such systems will not be readable with this fix applied. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Debugged-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit 8a1fd29)
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This bug appear when a second PSC based driver appends an interrupt routine to the FIFO controller shared interrupt (like spi-mpc512x-psc). When reboot, uart_shutdown() remove the serial console interrupt handler while spi-mpc512x-psc isr is still activate and cause the following kernel panic: The system is going down for reboot NOW!rpc (ttyPSC0) (Mon Jun 10 12:26:07 20 INIT: Sending processirq 40: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.10.0-rc4-next-20130607-00001-ga0bceb3-dirty #5 Call Trace: [cfff9f00] [c0007910] show_stack+0x48/0x150 (unreliable) [cfff9f40] [c005ae60] __report_bad_irq.isra.6+0x34/0xe0 [cfff9f60] [c005b194] note_interrupt+0x214/0x26c [cfff9f90] [c00590fc] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xd0/0x1bc [cfff9fd0] [c005921c] handle_irq_event+0x34/0x54 [cfff9fe0] [c005b8f4] handle_level_irq+0x90/0xf4 [cfff9ff0] [c000cb98] call_handle_irq+0x18/0x28 [c050dd60] [c000575c] do_IRQ+0xcc/0x124 [c050dd90] [c000eb04] ret_from_except+0x0/0x14 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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As load_current_idt() is now what is used to update the IDT for the switches needed for NMI, lockdep debug, and for tracing, it must not call local_irq_save(). This is because one of the users of this is lockdep, which does tracing of local_irq_save() and when the debug trap is hit, we need to update the IDT before tracing interrupts being disabled. As load_current_idt() is used to do this, calling local_irq_save() which lockdep traces, defeats the point of calling load_current_idt(). As interrupts are already disabled when used by lockdep and NMI, the only other user is tracing that can disable interrupts itself. Simply have the tracing update disable interrupts before calling load_current_idt() instead of breaking the other users. Here's the dump that happened: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at /work/autotest/nobackup/linux-test.git/kernel/fork.c:1196 copy_process+0x2c3/0x1398() DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4570 Comm: gdm-simple-gree Not tainted 3.10.0-rc3-test+ #5 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 ffffffff81d2a7a5 ffff88006ed13d50 ffffffff8192822b ffff88006ed13d90 ffffffff81035f25 ffff8800721c6000 ffff88006ed13da0 0000000001200011 0000000000000000 ffff88006ed5e000 ffff8800721c6000 ffff88006ed13df0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8192822b>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff81035f25>] warn_slowpath_common+0x67/0x80 [<ffffffff81035fe1>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 [<ffffffff812bfc5d>] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x31/0x52 [<ffffffff810341f7>] copy_process+0x2c3/0x1398 [<ffffffff8103539d>] do_fork+0xa8/0x260 [<ffffffff810ca7b1>] ? trace_preempt_on+0x2a/0x2f [<ffffffff812afb3e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81937fe7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56 [<ffffffff81937fe7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56 [<ffffffff810355cf>] SyS_clone+0x16/0x18 [<ffffffff81938369>] stub_clone+0x69/0x90 [<ffffffff81937fc2>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ---[ end trace 8b157a9d20ca1aa2 ]--- in fork.c: #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled); <-- bug here DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled); #endif Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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pt_regs->event was set with artificial values to identify the low level system event (syscall trap / breakpoint trap / exceptions / interrupts) With r8 saving out of the way, the full word can be used to save real ECR (Exception Cause Register) which helps idenify the event naturally, including additional info such as cause code, param. Only for Interrupts, where ECR is not applicable, do we resort to synthetic non ECR values. SAVE_ALL_TRAP/EXCEPTIONS can now be merged as they both use ECR with different runtime values. The ptrace helpers now use the sub-fields of ECR to distinguish the events (e.g. vector 0x25 is trap, param 0 is syscall...) The following benefits will follow: (1) This centralizes the location of where ECR is saved and will allow the cleanup of task->thread.cause_code ECR placeholder which is set in non-uniform way. Then ARC VM code can safely rely on it being there for purpose of finer grained VM_EXEC dcache flush (based on exec fault: I-TLB Miss) (2) Further, ECR being passed around from low level handlers as arg can be eliminated as it is part of standard reg-file in pt_regs Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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…/kernel/git/vgupta/arc Pull first batch of ARC changes from Vineet Gupta: "There's a second bunch to follow next week - which depends on commits on other trees (irq/net). I'd have preferred the accompanying ARC change via respective trees, but it didn't workout somehow. Highlights of changes: - Continuation of ARC MM changes from 3.10 including zero page optimization Setting pagecache pages dirty by default Non executable stack by default Reducing dcache flushes for aliasing VIPT config - Long overdue rework of pt_regs machinery - removing the unused word gutters and adding ECR register to baseline (helps cleanup lot of low level code) - Support for ARC gcc 4.8 - Few other preventive fixes, cosmetics, usage of Kconfig helper.. The diffstat is larger than normal primarily because of arcregs.h header split as well as beautification of macros in entry.h" * tag 'arc-v3.11-rc1-part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc: (32 commits) ARC: warn on improper stack unwind FDE entries arc: delete __cpuinit usage from all arc files ARC: [tlb-miss] Fix bug with CONFIG_ARC_DBG_TLB_MISS_COUNT ARC: [tlb-miss] Extraneous PTE bit testing/setting ARC: Adjustments for gcc 4.8 ARC: Setup Vector Table Base in early boot ARC: Remove explicit passing around of ECR ARC: pt_regs update #5: Use real ECR for pt_regs->event vs. synth values ARC: stop using pt_regs->orig_r8 ARC: pt_regs update #4: r25 saved/restored unconditionally ARC: K/U SP saved from one location in stack switching macro ARC: Entry Handler tweaks: Simplify branch for in-kernel preemption ARC: Entry Handler tweaks: Avoid hardcoded LIMMS for ECR values ARC: Increase readability of entry handlers ARC: pt_regs update #3: Remove unused gutter at start of callee_regs ARC: pt_regs update #2: Remove unused gutter at start of pt_regs ARC: pt_regs update #1: Align pt_regs end with end of kernel stack page ARC: pt_regs update #0: remove kernel stack canary ARC: [mm] Remove @Write argument to do_page_fault() ARC: [mm] Make stack/heap Non-executable by default ...
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Jan 12, 2014
commit 2f7021a "cpufreq: protect 'policy->cpus' from offlining during __gov_queue_work()" caused a regression in CPU hotplug, because it lead to a deadlock between cpufreq governor worker thread and the CPU hotplug writer task. Lockdep splat corresponding to this deadlock is shown below: [ 60.277396] ====================================================== [ 60.277400] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 60.277407] 3.10.0-rc7-dbg-01385-g241fd04-dirty #1744 Not tainted [ 60.277411] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 60.277417] bash/2225 is trying to acquire lock: [ 60.277422] ((&(&j_cdbs->work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff810621b5>] flush_work+0x5/0x280 [ 60.277444] but task is already holding lock: [ 60.277449] (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81042d8b>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2b/0x60 [ 60.277465] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 60.277472] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 60.277477] -> #2 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}: [ 60.277490] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.277503] [<ffffffff815b6157>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x410 [ 60.277514] [<ffffffff81042cbc>] get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x60 [ 60.277522] [<ffffffff814b842a>] gov_queue_work+0x2a/0xb0 [ 60.277532] [<ffffffff814b7891>] cs_dbs_timer+0xc1/0xe0 [ 60.277543] [<ffffffff8106302d>] process_one_work+0x1cd/0x6a0 [ 60.277552] [<ffffffff81063d31>] worker_thread+0x121/0x3a0 [ 60.277560] [<ffffffff8106ae2b>] kthread+0xdb/0xe0 [ 60.277569] [<ffffffff815bb96c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 60.277580] -> #1 (&j_cdbs->timer_mutex){+.+...}: [ 60.277592] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.277600] [<ffffffff815b6157>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x410 [ 60.277608] [<ffffffff814b785d>] cs_dbs_timer+0x8d/0xe0 [ 60.277616] [<ffffffff8106302d>] process_one_work+0x1cd/0x6a0 [ 60.277624] [<ffffffff81063d31>] worker_thread+0x121/0x3a0 [ 60.277633] [<ffffffff8106ae2b>] kthread+0xdb/0xe0 [ 60.277640] [<ffffffff815bb96c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 60.277649] -> #0 ((&(&j_cdbs->work)->work)){+.+...}: [ 60.277661] [<ffffffff810ab826>] __lock_acquire+0x1766/0x1d30 [ 60.277669] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.277677] [<ffffffff810621ed>] flush_work+0x3d/0x280 [ 60.277685] [<ffffffff81062d8a>] __cancel_work_timer+0x8a/0x120 [ 60.277693] [<ffffffff81062e53>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20 [ 60.277701] [<ffffffff814b89d9>] cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x529/0x6f0 [ 60.277709] [<ffffffff814b76a7>] cs_cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x17/0x20 [ 60.277719] [<ffffffff814b5df8>] __cpufreq_governor+0x48/0x100 [ 60.277728] [<ffffffff814b6b80>] __cpufreq_remove_dev.isra.14+0x80/0x3c0 [ 60.277737] [<ffffffff815adc0d>] cpufreq_cpu_callback+0x38/0x4c [ 60.277747] [<ffffffff81071a4d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [ 60.277759] [<ffffffff81071b0e>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [ 60.277768] [<ffffffff815a0a68>] _cpu_down+0x88/0x330 [ 60.277779] [<ffffffff815a0d46>] cpu_down+0x36/0x50 [ 60.277788] [<ffffffff815a2748>] store_online+0x98/0xd0 [ 60.277796] [<ffffffff81452a28>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [ 60.277806] [<ffffffff811d9edb>] sysfs_write_file+0xdb/0x150 [ 60.277818] [<ffffffff8116806d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1f0 [ 60.277826] [<ffffffff811686fc>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [ 60.277834] [<ffffffff815bbbbe>] tracesys+0xd0/0xd5 [ 60.277842] other info that might help us debug this: [ 60.277848] Chain exists of: (&(&j_cdbs->work)->work) --> &j_cdbs->timer_mutex --> cpu_hotplug.lock [ 60.277864] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 60.277869] CPU0 CPU1 [ 60.277873] ---- ---- [ 60.277877] lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); [ 60.277885] lock(&j_cdbs->timer_mutex); [ 60.277892] lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); [ 60.277900] lock((&(&j_cdbs->work)->work)); [ 60.277907] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 60.277915] 6 locks held by bash/2225: [ 60.277919] #0: (sb_writers#6){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81168173>] vfs_write+0x1c3/0x1f0 [ 60.277937] #1: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811d9e3c>] sysfs_write_file+0x3c/0x150 [ 60.277954] #2: (s_active#61){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811d9ec3>] sysfs_write_file+0xc3/0x150 [ 60.277972] #3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81024cf7>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 60.277990] #4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815a0d32>] cpu_down+0x22/0x50 [ 60.278007] #5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81042d8b>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2b/0x60 [ 60.278023] stack backtrace: [ 60.278031] CPU: 3 PID: 2225 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7-dbg-01385-g241fd04-dirty #1744 [ 60.278037] Hardware name: Acer Aspire 5741G /Aspire 5741G , BIOS V1.20 02/08/2011 [ 60.278042] ffffffff8204e110 ffff88014df6b9f8 ffffffff815b3d90 ffff88014df6ba38 [ 60.278055] ffffffff815b0a8d ffff880150ed3f60 ffff880150ed4770 3871c4002c8980b2 [ 60.278068] ffff880150ed4748 ffff880150ed4770 ffff880150ed3f60 ffff88014df6bb00 [ 60.278081] Call Trace: [ 60.278091] [<ffffffff815b3d90>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 60.278101] [<ffffffff815b0a8d>] print_circular_bug+0x2b6/0x2c5 [ 60.278111] [<ffffffff810ab826>] __lock_acquire+0x1766/0x1d30 [ 60.278123] [<ffffffff81067e08>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x58/0x80 [ 60.278134] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.278142] [<ffffffff810621b5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x280 [ 60.278151] [<ffffffff810621ed>] flush_work+0x3d/0x280 [ 60.278159] [<ffffffff810621b5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x280 [ 60.278169] [<ffffffff810a9b14>] ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0x140 [ 60.278178] [<ffffffff81062d77>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x77/0x120 [ 60.278188] [<ffffffff810a9cbd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [ 60.278196] [<ffffffff81062d8a>] __cancel_work_timer+0x8a/0x120 [ 60.278206] [<ffffffff81062e53>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20 [ 60.278214] [<ffffffff814b89d9>] cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x529/0x6f0 [ 60.278225] [<ffffffff814b76a7>] cs_cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x17/0x20 [ 60.278234] [<ffffffff814b5df8>] __cpufreq_governor+0x48/0x100 [ 60.278244] [<ffffffff814b6b80>] __cpufreq_remove_dev.isra.14+0x80/0x3c0 [ 60.278255] [<ffffffff815adc0d>] cpufreq_cpu_callback+0x38/0x4c [ 60.278265] [<ffffffff81071a4d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [ 60.278275] [<ffffffff81071b0e>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [ 60.278284] [<ffffffff815a0a68>] _cpu_down+0x88/0x330 [ 60.278292] [<ffffffff81024cf7>] ? cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 60.278302] [<ffffffff815a0d46>] cpu_down+0x36/0x50 [ 60.278311] [<ffffffff815a2748>] store_online+0x98/0xd0 [ 60.278320] [<ffffffff81452a28>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [ 60.278329] [<ffffffff811d9edb>] sysfs_write_file+0xdb/0x150 [ 60.278337] [<ffffffff8116806d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1f0 [ 60.278347] [<ffffffff81185950>] ? fget_light+0x320/0x4b0 [ 60.278355] [<ffffffff811686fc>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [ 60.278364] [<ffffffff815bbbbe>] tracesys+0xd0/0xd5 [ 60.280582] smpboot: CPU 1 is now offline The intention of that commit was to avoid warnings during CPU hotplug, which indicated that offline CPUs were getting IPIs from the cpufreq governor's work items. But the real root-cause of that problem was commit a66b2e5 (cpufreq: Preserve sysfs files across suspend/resume) because it totally skipped all the cpufreq callbacks during CPU hotplug in the suspend/resume path, and hence it never actually shut down the cpufreq governor's worker threads during CPU offline in the suspend/resume path. Reflecting back, the reason why we never suspected that commit as the root-cause earlier, was that the original issue was reported with just the halt command and nobody had brought in suspend/resume to the equation. The reason for _that_ in turn, as it turns out, is that earlier halt/shutdown was being done by disabling non-boot CPUs while tasks were frozen, just like suspend/resume.... but commit cf7df37 (reboot: migrate shutdown/reboot to boot cpu) which came somewhere along that very same time changed that logic: shutdown/halt no longer takes CPUs offline. Thus, the test-cases for reproducing the bug were vastly different and thus we went totally off the trail. Overall, it was one hell of a confusion with so many commits affecting each other and also affecting the symptoms of the problems in subtle ways. Finally, now since the original problematic commit (a66b2e5) has been completely reverted, revert this intermediate fix too (2f7021a), to fix the CPU hotplug deadlock. Phew! Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reported-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Peter Wu <lekensteyn@gmail.com> Cc: 3.10+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Commits 6a1c068 and 9356b53, respectively 'tty: Convert termios_mutex to termios_rwsem' and 'n_tty: Access termios values safely' introduced a circular lock dependency with console_lock and termios_rwsem. The lockdep report [1] shows that n_tty_write() will attempt to claim console_lock while holding the termios_rwsem, whereas tty_do_resize() may already hold the console_lock while claiming the termios_rwsem. Since n_tty_write() and tty_do_resize() do not contend over the same data -- the tty->winsize structure -- correct the lock dependency by introducing a new lock which specifically serializes access to tty->winsize only. [1] Lockdep report ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/277 is trying to acquire lock: (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 but task is already holding lock: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}: [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8175b797>] down_read+0x47/0x5c [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (console_lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff810430a7>] console_lock+0x77/0x80 [<ffffffff8146b2a1>] con_flush_chars+0x31/0x50 [<ffffffff8145780c>] n_tty_write+0x1ec/0x4d0 [<ffffffff814541b9>] tty_write+0x159/0x2e0 [<ffffffff814543f5>] redirected_tty_write+0xb5/0xc0 [<ffffffff811ab9d5>] vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811abec5>] SyS_write+0x55/0xa0 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}: [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &tty->termios_rwsem --> console_lock --> (fb_notifier_list).rwsem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(console_lock); lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(&tty->termios_rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** 7 locks held by modprobe/277: #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b5b>] __driver_attach+0x5b/0xb0 #1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b69>] __driver_attach+0x69/0xb0 #2: (drm_global_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa008a6dd>] drm_get_pci_dev+0xbd/0x2a0 [drm] #3: (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d93f5>] register_framebuffer+0x25/0x320 #4: (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d8116>] lock_fb_info+0x26/0x60 #5: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d95a4>] register_framebuffer+0x1d4/0x320 torvalds#6: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 277 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision WorkStation T5400 /0RW203, BIOS A11 04/30/2012 ffffffff8213e5e0 ffff8802aa2fb298 ffffffff81755f19 ffff8802aa2fb2e8 ffffffff8174f506 ffff8802aa2fa000 ffff8802aa2fb378 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 ffff8802aa2ea910 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 0000000000000006 0000000000000007 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81755f19>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff8174f506>] print_circular_bug+0x1fb/0x20c [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30 [<ffffffff810b775e>] ? mark_held_locks+0xae/0x120 [<ffffffff810b78d5>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x105/0x1d0 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffff8173cbcb>] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x5b/0xc0 [<ffffffff81198874>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x104/0x290 [<ffffffffa01035e1>] ? drm_fb_helper_single_add_all_connectors+0x81/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff8175f162>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x80 [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff81497b00>] ? driver_probe_device+0x3a0/0x3a0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff81399a50>] ? ddebug_proc_open+0xb0/0xb0 [<ffffffff813855ae>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mitake
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Jan 12, 2014
We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries around till the last reference to the port was dropped. This is actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour: 1. Open port in guest 2. Hot-unplug port 3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same name already exists (even though it was unplugged). This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted) Hardware name: KVM sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1' Call Trace: [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core layers. Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors, and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected. This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers, resulting in oopses: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- PID: 6162 TASK: ffff8801147ad500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cat" #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b #1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322 #2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50 #3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b #4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2 #5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5 [exception RIP: strlen+2] RIP: ffffffff81272ae2 RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880118901c18 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88011799982c RSI: 00000000000000d0 RDI: 3a303030302f3030 RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38 R8: 0000000000000006 R9: ffffffffa0134500 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff880117a1cc10 R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: 0000000000000017 R15: ffffffff81aff700 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d torvalds#7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551 torvalds#8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb torvalds#9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct itself. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: chayang <chayang@redhat.com> Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <anantyog@in.ibm.com> Reported-by: FuXiangChun <xfu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <qzhang@redhat.com> Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <sluo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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In several places, this snippet is used when removing neigh entries: list_del(&neigh->list); ipoib_neigh_free(neigh); The list_del() removes neigh from the associated struct ipoib_path, while ipoib_neigh_free() removes neigh from the device's neigh entry lookup table. Both of these operations are protected by the priv->lock spinlock. The table however is also protected via RCU, and so naturally the lock is not held when doing reads. This leads to a race condition, in which a thread may successfully look up a neigh entry that has already been deleted from neigh->list. Since the previous deletion will have marked the entry with poison, a second list_del() on the object will cause a panic: #5 [ffff8802338c3c70] general_protection at ffffffff815108c5 [exception RIP: list_del+16] RIP: ffffffff81289020 RSP: ffff8802338c3d20 RFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff880433e60c88 RCX: 0000000000009e6c RDX: 0000000000000246 RSI: ffff8806012ca298 RDI: ffff880433e60c88 RBP: ffff8802338c3d30 R8: ffff8806012ca2e8 R9: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8804346b2020 R13: ffff88032a3e7540 R14: ffff8804346b26e0 R15: 0000000000000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 torvalds#6 [ffff8802338c3d38] ipoib_cm_tx_handler at ffffffffa066fe0a [ib_ipoib] torvalds#7 [ffff8802338c3d98] cm_process_work at ffffffffa05149a7 [ib_cm] torvalds#8 [ffff8802338c3de8] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa05161aa [ib_cm] torvalds#9 [ffff8802338c3e38] worker_thread at ffffffff81090e10 torvalds#10 [ffff8802338c3ee8] kthread at ffffffff81096c66 torvalds#11 [ffff8802338c3f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c0ca We move the list_del() into ipoib_neigh_free(), so that deletion happens only once, after the entry has been successfully removed from the lookup table. This same behavior is already used in ipoib_del_neighs_by_gid() and __ipoib_reap_neigh(). Signed-off-by: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Reviewed-by: Shlomo Pongratz <shlomop@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
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Pull SCSI target fixes from Nicholas Bellinger: "The first patch is to address a long standing issue where INQUIRY vendor + model response data was not correctly padded with ASCII spaces, causing MSFT and Falconstor multipath stacks to not function with our LUNs. The second -> forth patches are additional iscsi-target regression fixes for the post >= v3.10 iser-target changes. The second and third are failure cases that have appeared during further testing, and the forth is only reproducible with malformed NOP packets. The fifth patch is a v3.11 specific regression caused by a recent optimization that showed up during WRITE I/O failure testing. I'll be sending Patch #1 and Patch #5 to Greg-KH separately for stable" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nab/target-pending: target: Fix se_cmd->state_list leak regression during WRITE failure iscsi-target: Fix potential NULL pointer in solicited NOPOUT reject iscsi-target: Fix iscsit_transport reference leak during NP thread reset iscsi-target: Fix ImmediateData=Yes failure regression in >= v3.10 target: Fix trailing ASCII space usage in INQUIRY vendor+model
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When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has been brought up. For example: [ 0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK [ 0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors torvalds#6 torvalds#7 torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 OK [ 0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 torvalds#16 torvalds#17 OK [ 0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors torvalds#18 torvalds#19 torvalds#20 torvalds#21 torvalds#22 torvalds#23 But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all CPUs booted up. Signed-off-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: <guohanjun@huawei.com> Cc: <wangyijing@huawei.com> Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1378378676-18276-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com [ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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When parsing lines from objdump a line containing source code starting with a numeric label is mistaken for a line of disassembly starting with a memory address. Current validation fails to recognise that the "memory address" is out of range and calculates an invalid offset which later causes this segfault: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 631 hits += h->addr[offset++]; (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 #1 0x00000000004d65e3 in annotate_browser__calc_percent (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:364 #2 0x00000000004d7433 in annotate_browser__run (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:672 #3 0x00000000004d80c9 in symbol__tui_annotate (sym=0xc989a0, map=0xa02660, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:962 #4 0x00000000004d7aa0 in hist_entry__tui_annotate (he=0xdf73f0, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:823 #5 0x00000000004dd648 in perf_evsel__hists_browse (evsel=0xa01da0, nr_events=1, helpline= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", ev_name=0xa02cd0 "cycles", left_exits=false, hbt= 0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1659 torvalds#6 0x00000000004de372 in perf_evlist__tui_browse_hists (evlist=0xa01520, help= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", hbt=0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1950 torvalds#7 0x000000000042cf6b in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fffffffd6c0) at builtin-report.c:581 torvalds#8 0x000000000042e25d in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0, prefix=0x0) at builtin-report.c:965 torvalds#9 0x000000000041a0e1 in run_builtin (p=0x801548, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:319 torvalds#10 0x000000000041a319 in handle_internal_command (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:376 torvalds#11 0x000000000041a465 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe38c, argv=0x7fffffffe380) at perf.c:420 torvalds#12 0x000000000041a707 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:521 After the fix is applied the symbol can be annotated showing the problematic line "1: rep" copy_user_generic_string /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/3.9.10-100.fc17.x86_64/vmlinux */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) CFI_STARTPROC ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx and %edx,%edx jz 4f je 37 cmpl $8,%edx cmp $0x8,%edx jb 2f /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ jb 33 ALIGN_DESTINATION mov %edi,%ecx and $0x7,%ecx je 28 sub $0x8,%ecx neg %ecx sub %ecx,%edx 1a: mov (%rsi),%al mov %al,(%rdi) inc %rsi inc %rdi dec %ecx jne 1a movl %edx,%ecx 28: mov %edx,%ecx shrl $3,%ecx shr $0x3,%ecx andl $7,%edx and $0x7,%edx 1: rep 100.00 rep movsq %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsq 2: movl %edx,%ecx 33: mov %edx,%ecx 3: rep rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsb 4: xorl %eax,%eax 37: xor %eax,%eax data32 xchg %ax,%ax ASM_CLAC ret retq Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1379009721-27667-1-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Some ARC SMP systems lack native atomic R-M-W (LLOCK/SCOND) insns and can only use atomic EX insn (reg with mem) to build higher level R-M-W primitives. This includes a SystemC based SMP simulation model. So rwlocks need to use a protecting spinlock for atomic cmp-n-exchange operation to update reader(s)/writer count. The spinlock operation itself looks as follows: mov reg, 1 ; 1=locked, 0=unlocked retry: EX reg, [lock] ; load existing, store 1, atomically BREQ reg, 1, rety ; if already locked, retry In single-threaded simulation, SystemC alternates between the 2 cores with "N" insn each based scheduling. Additionally for insn with global side effect, such as EX writing to shared mem, a core switch is enforced too. Given that, 2 cores doing a repeated EX on same location, Linux often got into a livelock e.g. when both cores were fiddling with tasklist lock (gdbserver / hackbench) for read/write respectively as the sequence diagram below shows: core1 core2 -------- -------- 1. spin lock [EX r=0, w=1] - LOCKED 2. rwlock(Read) - LOCKED 3. spin unlock [ST 0] - UNLOCKED spin lock [EX r=0,w=1] - LOCKED -- resched core 1---- 5. spin lock [EX r=1] - ALREADY-LOCKED -- resched core 2---- 6. rwlock(Write) - READER-LOCKED 7. spin unlock [ST 0] 8. rwlock failed, retry again 9. spin lock [EX r=0, w=1] -- resched core 1---- 10 spinlock locked in torvalds#9, retry #5 11. spin lock [EX gets 1] -- resched core 2---- ... ... The fix was to unlock using the EX insn too (step 7), to trigger another SystemC scheduling pass which would let core1 proceed, eliding the livelock. Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: torvalds#16 torvalds#17 torvalds#18 torvalds#19 torvalds#20 torvalds#21 torvalds#22 torvalds#23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: torvalds#24 torvalds#25 torvalds#26 torvalds#27 torvalds#28 torvalds#29 torvalds#30 torvalds#31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: torvalds#32 torvalds#33 torvalds#34 torvalds#35 torvalds#36 torvalds#37 torvalds#38 torvalds#39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: torvalds#40 torvalds#41 torvalds#42 torvalds#43 torvalds#44 torvalds#45 torvalds#46 torvalds#47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: torvalds#48 torvalds#49 torvalds#50 torvalds#51 #52 #53 torvalds#54 torvalds#55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: torvalds#56 torvalds#57 #58 torvalds#59 torvalds#60 torvalds#61 torvalds#62 torvalds#63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The recent 3.12 pull request for apparmor was missing a couple rcu _protected access modifiers. Resulting in the follow suspicious RCU usage [ 29.804534] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 29.804539] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted [ 29.804541] ------------------------------- [ 29.804545] security/apparmor/include/policy.h:363 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 29.804548] [ 29.804548] other info that might help us debug this: [ 29.804548] [ 29.804553] [ 29.804553] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 29.804558] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268: [ 29.804560] #0: (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>] file_start_write+0x27/0x29 [ 29.804576] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>] aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c [ 29.804589] [ 29.804589] stack backtrace: [ 29.804595] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5 [ 29.804599] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc. UL50VT /UL50VT , BIOS 217 03/01/2010 [ 29.804602] 0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d90 ffffffff8144eb9b ffff8800b94db540 [ 29.804611] ffff8800b95a1dc0 ffffffff81087439 ffff880138cc3a18 ffff880138cc3a18 [ 29.804619] ffff8800b9464a90 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1df0 ffffffff811f5084 [ 29.804628] Call Trace: [ 29.804636] [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82 [ 29.804642] [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105 [ 29.804649] [<ffffffff811f5084>] __aa_update_replacedby+0x53/0x7f [ 29.804655] [<ffffffff811f5408>] __replace_profile+0x11f/0x1ed [ 29.804661] [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c [ 29.804668] [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c [ 29.804674] [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113 [ 29.804680] [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a [ 29.804687] [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 29.804691] [ 29.804694] =============================== [ 29.804697] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 29.804700] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted [ 29.804703] ------------------------------- [ 29.804706] security/apparmor/policy.c:566 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 29.804709] [ 29.804709] other info that might help us debug this: [ 29.804709] [ 29.804714] [ 29.804714] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 29.804718] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268: [ 29.804721] #0: (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>] file_start_write+0x27/0x29 [ 29.804733] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>] aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c [ 29.804744] [ 29.804744] stack backtrace: [ 29.804750] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5 [ 29.804753] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc. UL50VT /UL50VT , BIOS 217 03/01/2010 [ 29.804756] 0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d80 ffffffff8144eb9b ffff8800b94db540 [ 29.804764] ffff8800b95a1db0 ffffffff81087439 ffff8800b95b02b0 0000000000000000 [ 29.804772] ffff8800b9efba08 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1dd0 ffffffff811f4f94 [ 29.804779] Call Trace: [ 29.804786] [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82 [ 29.804791] [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105 [ 29.804798] [<ffffffff811f4f94>] aa_free_replacedby_kref+0x4d/0x62 [ 29.804804] [<ffffffff811f4f47>] ? aa_put_namespace+0x17/0x17 [ 29.804810] [<ffffffff811f4f0b>] kref_put+0x36/0x40 [ 29.804816] [<ffffffff811f5423>] __replace_profile+0x13a/0x1ed [ 29.804822] [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c [ 29.804829] [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c [ 29.804835] [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113 [ 29.804840] [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a [ 29.804847] [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: miles.lane@gmail.com CC: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 #2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 #3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 #4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f #5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 torvalds#6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: torvalds#16 torvalds#17 torvalds#18 torvalds#19 torvalds#20 torvalds#21 torvalds#22 torvalds#23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: torvalds#24 torvalds#25 torvalds#26 torvalds#27 torvalds#28 torvalds#29 torvalds#30 torvalds#31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: torvalds#32 torvalds#33 torvalds#34 torvalds#35 torvalds#36 torvalds#37 torvalds#38 torvalds#39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: torvalds#40 torvalds#41 torvalds#42 torvalds#43 torvalds#44 torvalds#45 torvalds#46 torvalds#47 [ 3.600005] .... node torvalds#6, CPUs: torvalds#48 torvalds#49 torvalds#50 torvalds#51 #52 #53 torvalds#54 torvalds#55 [ 4.202005] .... node torvalds#7, CPUs: torvalds#56 torvalds#57 #58 torvalds#59 torvalds#60 torvalds#61 torvalds#62 torvalds#63 [ 4.811005] .... node torvalds#8, CPUs: torvalds#64 torvalds#65 torvalds#66 torvalds#67 torvalds#68 torvalds#69 #70 torvalds#71 [ 5.421006] .... node torvalds#9, CPUs: torvalds#72 torvalds#73 torvalds#74 torvalds#75 torvalds#76 torvalds#77 torvalds#78 torvalds#79 [ 6.032005] .... node torvalds#10, CPUs: torvalds#80 torvalds#81 torvalds#82 torvalds#83 torvalds#84 torvalds#85 torvalds#86 torvalds#87 [ 6.648006] .... node torvalds#11, CPUs: torvalds#88 torvalds#89 torvalds#90 torvalds#91 torvalds#92 torvalds#93 torvalds#94 torvalds#95 [ 7.262005] .... node torvalds#12, CPUs: torvalds#96 torvalds#97 torvalds#98 torvalds#99 torvalds#100 torvalds#101 torvalds#102 torvalds#103 [ 7.865005] .... node torvalds#13, CPUs: torvalds#104 torvalds#105 torvalds#106 torvalds#107 torvalds#108 torvalds#109 torvalds#110 torvalds#111 [ 8.466005] .... node torvalds#14, CPUs: torvalds#112 torvalds#113 torvalds#114 torvalds#115 torvalds#116 torvalds#117 torvalds#118 torvalds#119 [ 9.073006] .... node torvalds#15, CPUs: torvalds#120 torvalds#121 torvalds#122 torvalds#123 torvalds#124 torvalds#125 torvalds#126 torvalds#127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 #2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 #3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 #4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f #5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 torvalds#6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit f112a04)
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Booting a mx6 with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING we get: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.12.0-rc4-next-20131009+ torvalds#34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: (&imx_drm_device->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<804575a8>] imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id+0x28/0x98 but task is already holding lock: (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<802fe778>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x54 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}: [<800777d0>] __lock_acquire+0x18d4/0x1c24 [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c [<805ead5c>] _mutex_lock_nest_lock+0x58/0x3a8 [<802fec50>] drm_crtc_init+0x48/0xa8 [<80457c88>] imx_drm_add_crtc+0xd4/0x144 [<8045e2e8>] ipu_drm_probe+0x114/0x1fc [<80312278>] platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x50 [<80310c68>] driver_probe_device+0x110/0x22c [<80310e20>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0 [<8030f218>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90 [<80310750>] driver_attach+0x20/0x28 [<8031034c>] bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1dc [<803114d8>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc [<80312198>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64 [<808172fc>] ipu_drm_driver_init+0x18/0x20 [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160 [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4 [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}: [<800777d0>] __lock_acquire+0x18d4/0x1c24 [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c [<805eb100>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x3a4 [<802fe758>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x20/0x54 [<802fead4>] drm_encoder_init+0x20/0x7c [<80457ae4>] imx_drm_add_encoder+0x88/0xec [<80459838>] imx_ldb_probe+0x344/0x4fc [<80312278>] platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x50 [<80310c68>] driver_probe_device+0x110/0x22c [<80310e20>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0 [<8030f218>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90 [<80310750>] driver_attach+0x20/0x28 [<8031034c>] bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1dc [<803114d8>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc [<80312198>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64 [<8081722c>] imx_ldb_driver_init+0x18/0x20 [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160 [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4 [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c -> #0 (&imx_drm_device->mutex){+.+.+.}: [<805e510c>] print_circular_bug+0x74/0x2e0 [<80077ad0>] __lock_acquire+0x1bd4/0x1c24 [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c [<805eb100>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x3a4 [<804575a8>] imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id+0x28/0x98 [<80459a98>] imx_ldb_encoder_prepare+0x34/0x114 [<802ef724>] drm_crtc_helper_set_mode+0x1f0/0x4c0 [<802f0344>] drm_crtc_helper_set_config+0x828/0x99c [<802ff270>] drm_mode_set_config_internal+0x5c/0xdc [<802eebe0>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x50/0xb4 [<802af580>] fbcon_init+0x490/0x500 [<802dd104>] visual_init+0xa8/0xf8 [<802df414>] do_bind_con_driver+0x140/0x37c [<802df764>] do_take_over_console+0x114/0x1c4 [<802af65c>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x6c/0xd4 [<802b2b30>] fbcon_event_notify+0x7c8/0x818 [<80049954>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c [<80049cd8>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68 [<80049d10>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28 [<802a75f0>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x24 [<802a9224>] register_framebuffer+0x188/0x268 [<802ee994>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x2bc/0x4b8 [<802f118c>] drm_fbdev_cma_init+0x7c/0xec [<80817288>] imx_fb_helper_init+0x54/0x90 [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160 [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4 [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &imx_drm_device->mutex --> &dev->mode_config.mutex --> &crtc->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&crtc->mutex); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&crtc->mutex); lock(&imx_drm_device->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a90bc>] register_framebuffer+0x20/0x268 #1: (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a7a90>] lock_fb_info+0x20/0x44 #2: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a9218>] register_framebuffer+0x17c/0x268 #3: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<80049cbc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68 #4: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<802fe758>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x20/0x54 #5: (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<802fe778>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x54 In order to avoid this lockdep warning, remove the locking from imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id() and imx_drm_crtc_panel_format_pins(). Tested on a mx6sabrelite and mx53qsb. Reported-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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If EM Transmit bit is busy during init ata_msleep() is called. It is wrong - msleep() should be used instead of ata_msleep(), because if EM Transmit bit is busy for one port, it will be busy for all other ports too, so using ata_msleep() causes wasting tries for another ports. The most common scenario looks like that now (six ports try to transmit a LED meaasege): - port #0 tries for the 1st time and succeeds - ports #1-5 try for the 1st time and sleeps - port #1 tries for the 2nd time and succeeds - ports #2-5 try for the 2nd time and sleeps - port #2 tries for the 3rd time and succeeds - ports #3-5 try for the 3rd time and sleeps - port #3 tries for the 4th time and succeeds - ports #4-5 try for the 4th time and sleeps - port #4 tries for the 5th time and succeeds - port #5 tries for the 5th time and sleeps At this moment port #5 wasted all its five tries and failed to initialize. Because there are only 5 (EM_MAX_RETRY) tries available usually only five ports succeed to initialize. The sixth port and next ones usually will fail. If msleep() is used instead of ata_msleep() the first port succeeds to initialize in the first try and next ones usually succeed to initialize in the second try. tj: updated comment Signed-off-by: Lukasz Dorau <lukasz.dorau@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) torvalds#6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) torvalds#7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) torvalds#8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) torvalds#9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) torvalds#10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) torvalds#6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) torvalds#7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) torvalds#8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) torvalds#9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) torvalds#10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) torvalds#11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) torvalds#12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from: smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 OK smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 OK smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 OK smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 OK Brought up 16 CPUs to something like: x86: Booting SMP configuration: .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 .... node #1, CPUs: #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 .... node #2, CPUs: torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 .... node #3, CPUs: torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table
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