AMBA software DTR patch #166

rewolff · 2012-11-30T11:04:56Z

This is the software DTR patch.

To enable add:
amba-pl011.dtr_pin=18

on the kernel commandline when the amba-pl011 module is compiled into the kernel.
use dtr_pin=18 on the insmod commandline if you use this as a module.

ghollingworth · 2013-08-22T09:17:32Z

Does this fix a problem? Since it's been nine months I'm assuming no one else is having trouble...

Please reopen if this is an issue

rewolff · 2013-08-22T09:32:10Z

The hardware provides: "You can easily provide a DTR on a GPIO pin if neccessary". This implements that.

If you connect an arduino board directly on the serial port of the raspberry pi, the standard arduino software expects to be able to reset the arduino by toggling the DTR line. This causes the bootloader to be active for a few miliseconds during which the programmer starts sending a new firmware for the atmega328.

The core of the matter is that I can make it work without this patch.

IF (we're running on a raspberry pi)
toggle GPIO 18 to reset the arduino
start programming

That is exactly what "having device drivers" Is all about. That we're getting rid of all the low-level stuff in all of the programs so that a program becomes portable. With this patch the arduino software is portable to the raspberry pi, in that a simple recompile will make it able to reset the arduino with the DTR line as it does on different platforms.

Without this patch, the avrdude program needs to be replaced by a script that toggles the GPIO and then starts up the real binary. Messy. Or a special patch needs to be written for avrdude to do this itself. Messy.

I don't seem to have permissions to be able to reopen.

ghollingworth · 2013-08-22T09:59:38Z

Does this work if you just add the setting to the kernel command line, i.e. edit cmdline.txt

We don't really want to dedicate one of the 'somewhat precious' GPIOs to this task, maybe if there was a special arduino distribution?

rewolff · 2013-08-22T10:44:29Z

The patch is totally inactive if you don't pass the cmdline parameter.
Those that want the DTR function should chose the GPIO they want, and configure its use in the cmdline.txt file.

ghollingworth · 2013-08-22T11:04:48Z

Sorry I hadn't noticed the patch along side! You'll need to push this upstream first, if it gets accepted we'll take it

Gordon

rewolff · 2013-08-22T11:32:02Z

On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 04:05:03AM -0700, ghollingworth wrote:

Sorry I hadn't noticed the patch along side! You'll need to push
this upstream first, if it gets accepted we'll take it

What is upstream?

ghollingworth · 2013-08-22T11:43:40Z

You need to submit your patches to the linux kernel mailing list to be included in the linux kernel. Once your patch has been accepted then give us a shout and we'll add it in (main issue being merge conflicts if we take it here) plus there are a different set of people who are watching that amba driver and will comment on the patch.

[ Upstream commit c784be4 ] The calls to arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() are always made with the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock acquired via memory_hotplug_begin(). On pSeries, arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() eventually call resize_hpt() which in turn calls stop_machine() which acquires the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock again, thereby resulting in the recursive acquisition of this lock. In the absence of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, we hadn't observed a system lockup during a memory hotplug operation because cpus_read_lock() is a per-cpu rwsem read, which, in the fast-path (in the absence of the writer, which in our case is a CPU-hotplug operation) simply increments the read_count on the semaphore. Thus a recursive read in the fast-path doesn't cause any problems. However, we can hit this problem in practice if there is a concurrent CPU-Hotplug operation in progress which is waiting to acquire the write-side of the lock. This will cause the second recursive read to block until the writer finishes. While the writer is blocked since the first read holds the lock. Thus both the reader as well as the writers fail to make any progress thereby blocking both CPU-Hotplug as well as Memory Hotplug operations. Memory-Hotplug CPU-Hotplug CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ 1. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [memory_hotplug_begin] 2. down_write(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [cpu_up/cpu_down] 3. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [stop_machine()] Lockdep complains as follows in these code-paths. swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 but task is already holding lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: (____ptrval____) (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __driver_attach+0x12c/0x1b0 #1: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 #2: (____ptrval____) (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: percpu_down_write+0x54/0x1a0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc5-58373-gbc99402235f3-dirty #166 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) __lock_acquire+0x1110/0x1c70 lock_acquire+0x240/0x290 cpus_read_lock+0x64/0xf0 stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 pseries_lpar_resize_hpt+0x19c/0x2c0 resize_hpt_for_hotplug+0x70/0xd0 arch_add_memory+0x58/0xfc devm_memremap_pages+0x5e8/0x8f0 pmem_attach_disk+0x764/0x830 nvdimm_bus_probe+0x118/0x240 really_probe+0x230/0x4b0 driver_probe_device+0x16c/0x1e0 __driver_attach+0x148/0x1b0 bus_for_each_dev+0x90/0x130 driver_attach+0x34/0x50 bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x360 driver_register+0x108/0x170 __nd_driver_register+0xd0/0xf0 nd_pmem_driver_init+0x34/0x48 do_one_initcall+0x1e0/0x45c kernel_init_freeable+0x540/0x64c kernel_init+0x2c/0x160 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 Fix this issue by 1) Requiring all the calls to pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() be made with cpu_hotplug_lock held. 2) In pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() invoke stop_machine_cpuslocked() as a consequence of 1) 3) To satisfy 1), in hpt_order_set(), call mmu_hash_ops.resize_hpt() with cpu_hotplug_lock held. Fixes: dbcf929 ("powerpc/pseries: Add support for hash table resizing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+ Reported-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1557906352-29048-1-git-send-email-ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit c784be4 upstream. The calls to arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() are always made with the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock acquired via memory_hotplug_begin(). On pSeries, arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() eventually call resize_hpt() which in turn calls stop_machine() which acquires the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock again, thereby resulting in the recursive acquisition of this lock. In the absence of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, we hadn't observed a system lockup during a memory hotplug operation because cpus_read_lock() is a per-cpu rwsem read, which, in the fast-path (in the absence of the writer, which in our case is a CPU-hotplug operation) simply increments the read_count on the semaphore. Thus a recursive read in the fast-path doesn't cause any problems. However, we can hit this problem in practice if there is a concurrent CPU-Hotplug operation in progress which is waiting to acquire the write-side of the lock. This will cause the second recursive read to block until the writer finishes. While the writer is blocked since the first read holds the lock. Thus both the reader as well as the writers fail to make any progress thereby blocking both CPU-Hotplug as well as Memory Hotplug operations. Memory-Hotplug CPU-Hotplug CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ 1. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [memory_hotplug_begin] 2. down_write(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [cpu_up/cpu_down] 3. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [stop_machine()] Lockdep complains as follows in these code-paths. swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 but task is already holding lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: (____ptrval____) (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __driver_attach+0x12c/0x1b0 #1: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 #2: (____ptrval____) (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: percpu_down_write+0x54/0x1a0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc5-58373-gbc99402235f3-dirty #166 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) __lock_acquire+0x1110/0x1c70 lock_acquire+0x240/0x290 cpus_read_lock+0x64/0xf0 stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 pseries_lpar_resize_hpt+0x19c/0x2c0 resize_hpt_for_hotplug+0x70/0xd0 arch_add_memory+0x58/0xfc devm_memremap_pages+0x5e8/0x8f0 pmem_attach_disk+0x764/0x830 nvdimm_bus_probe+0x118/0x240 really_probe+0x230/0x4b0 driver_probe_device+0x16c/0x1e0 __driver_attach+0x148/0x1b0 bus_for_each_dev+0x90/0x130 driver_attach+0x34/0x50 bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x360 driver_register+0x108/0x170 __nd_driver_register+0xd0/0xf0 nd_pmem_driver_init+0x34/0x48 do_one_initcall+0x1e0/0x45c kernel_init_freeable+0x540/0x64c kernel_init+0x2c/0x160 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 Fix this issue by 1) Requiring all the calls to pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() be made with cpu_hotplug_lock held. 2) In pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() invoke stop_machine_cpuslocked() as a consequence of 1) 3) To satisfy 1), in hpt_order_set(), call mmu_hash_ops.resize_hpt() with cpu_hotplug_lock held. Fixes: dbcf929 ("powerpc/pseries: Add support for hash table resizing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+ Reported-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1557906352-29048-1-git-send-email-ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The IPA BCM resource ("IP0") on sc7180 was moved to the clk-rpmh driver in commit bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") and modeled as a clk, but this interconnect driver still had it modeled as an interconnect. This was mostly OK because nobody used the interconnect definition, until the interconnect framework started dropping bandwidth requests on interconnects that aren't used via the sync_state callback in commit 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state"). Once that patch was applied the IP0 resource was going to be controlled from two places, the clk framework and the interconnect framework. Even then, things were probably going to be OK, because commit b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") was needed to actually drop bandwidth requests on unused interconnects, of which the IPA was one of the interconnect that wasn't getting dropped to zero. Combining the three commits together leads to bad behavior where the interconnect framework is disabling the IP0 resource because it has no users while the clk framework thinks the IP0 resource is on because the only user, the IPA driver, has turned it on via clk_prepare_enable(). Depending on when sync_state is called, we can get into a situation like below: IPA driver probes IPA driver gets notified modem started runtime PM get() IPA clk enabled -> IP0 resource is ON sync_state runs interconnect zeroes out the IP0 resource -> IP0 resource is off IPA driver tries to access a register and blows up The crash is an unclocked access that manifest as an SError. SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbe000011 -- SError CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ #166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 lr : mutex_lock+0x30/0x80 sp : ffffffc00da9b9c0 x29: ffffffc00da9b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffc00da9bc90 x25: ffffff80c2024010 x24: ffffff80c2024000 x23: ffffff8083100000 x22: ffffff80831000d0 x21: ffffff80831000a8 x20: ffffff80831000a8 x19: ffffff8083100070 x18: 00000000ffff0a00 x17: 000000002f7254f1 x16: 0000000000000100 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 000000000001f0b8 x10: ffffffc00931f0b8 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : fefefefefeff2f60 x6 : 0000808080808080 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080808080800000 x3 : ffffff80d2d4ee28 x2 : ffffff808c1d6e40 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8083100070 Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ #166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x114 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x38 panic+0x150/0x38c nmi_panic+0x88/0xa0 arm64_serror_panic+0x74/0x80 do_serror+0x0/0x80 do_serror+0x58/0x80 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c el1h_64_error+0x78/0x7c mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 __gsi_channel_start+0x50/0x17c gsi_channel_start+0x54/0x90 ipa_endpoint_enable_one+0x34/0xc0 ipa_open+0x4c/0x120 Remove all IP0 resource management from the interconnect driver so that clk-rpmh is the sole owner. This fixes the issue by preventing the interconnect driver from overwriting the IP0 resource data that the clk-rpmh driver wrote. Cc: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com> Cc: Mike Tipton <quic_mdtipton@quicinc.com> Fixes: b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") Fixes: bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") Fixes: 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Tested-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412220033.1273607-2-swboyd@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2f37249 ] The IPA BCM resource ("IP0") on sc7180 was moved to the clk-rpmh driver in commit bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") and modeled as a clk, but this interconnect driver still had it modeled as an interconnect. This was mostly OK because nobody used the interconnect definition, until the interconnect framework started dropping bandwidth requests on interconnects that aren't used via the sync_state callback in commit 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state"). Once that patch was applied the IP0 resource was going to be controlled from two places, the clk framework and the interconnect framework. Even then, things were probably going to be OK, because commit b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") was needed to actually drop bandwidth requests on unused interconnects, of which the IPA was one of the interconnect that wasn't getting dropped to zero. Combining the three commits together leads to bad behavior where the interconnect framework is disabling the IP0 resource because it has no users while the clk framework thinks the IP0 resource is on because the only user, the IPA driver, has turned it on via clk_prepare_enable(). Depending on when sync_state is called, we can get into a situation like below: IPA driver probes IPA driver gets notified modem started runtime PM get() IPA clk enabled -> IP0 resource is ON sync_state runs interconnect zeroes out the IP0 resource -> IP0 resource is off IPA driver tries to access a register and blows up The crash is an unclocked access that manifest as an SError. SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbe000011 -- SError CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ raspberrypi#166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 lr : mutex_lock+0x30/0x80 sp : ffffffc00da9b9c0 x29: ffffffc00da9b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffc00da9bc90 x25: ffffff80c2024010 x24: ffffff80c2024000 x23: ffffff8083100000 x22: ffffff80831000d0 x21: ffffff80831000a8 x20: ffffff80831000a8 x19: ffffff8083100070 x18: 00000000ffff0a00 x17: 000000002f7254f1 x16: 0000000000000100 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 000000000001f0b8 x10: ffffffc00931f0b8 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : fefefefefeff2f60 x6 : 0000808080808080 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080808080800000 x3 : ffffff80d2d4ee28 x2 : ffffff808c1d6e40 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8083100070 Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ raspberrypi#166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x114 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x38 panic+0x150/0x38c nmi_panic+0x88/0xa0 arm64_serror_panic+0x74/0x80 do_serror+0x0/0x80 do_serror+0x58/0x80 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c el1h_64_error+0x78/0x7c mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 __gsi_channel_start+0x50/0x17c gsi_channel_start+0x54/0x90 ipa_endpoint_enable_one+0x34/0xc0 ipa_open+0x4c/0x120 Remove all IP0 resource management from the interconnect driver so that clk-rpmh is the sole owner. This fixes the issue by preventing the interconnect driver from overwriting the IP0 resource data that the clk-rpmh driver wrote. Cc: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com> Cc: Mike Tipton <quic_mdtipton@quicinc.com> Fixes: b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") Fixes: bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") Fixes: 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Tested-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412220033.1273607-2-swboyd@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit cee409b ] gpio_keys module can either accept gpios or interrupts. The module initializes delayed work in case of gpios only and is only used if debounce timer is not used, so make sure cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called only when its gpio-backed and debounce_use_hrtimer is false. This fixes the issue seen below when the gpio_keys module is unloaded and an interrupt pin is used instead of GPIO: [ 360.297569] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 360.302303] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 237 at kernel/workqueue.c:3066 __flush_work+0x414/0x470 [ 360.310531] Modules linked in: gpio_keys(-) [ 360.314797] CPU: 0 PID: 237 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-arm64-renesas-00116-g73636105874d-dirty #166 [ 360.324662] Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g054l2 (DT) [ 360.331270] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 360.338318] pc : __flush_work+0x414/0x470 [ 360.342385] lr : __cancel_work_timer+0x140/0x1b0 [ 360.347065] sp : ffff80000a7fba00 [ 360.350423] x29: ffff80000a7fba00 x28: ffff000012b9c5c0 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 360.357664] x26: ffff80000a7fbb80 x25: ffff80000954d0a8 x24: 0000000000000001 [ 360.364904] x23: ffff800009757000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff80000919b000 [ 360.372143] x20: ffff00000f5974e0 x19: ffff00000f5974e0 x18: ffff8000097fcf48 [ 360.379382] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000053f40 [ 360.386622] x14: ffff800009850e88 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: 000000000000a60c [ 360.393861] x11: 000000000000a610 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000008 [ 360.401100] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 00000000a473c394 x6 : 0080808080808080 [ 360.408339] x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000919b458 [ 360.415578] x2 : ffff8000097577f0 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 360.422818] Call trace: [ 360.425299] __flush_work+0x414/0x470 [ 360.429012] __cancel_work_timer+0x140/0x1b0 [ 360.433340] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x10/0x18 [ 360.437931] gpio_keys_quiesce_key+0x28/0x58 [gpio_keys] [ 360.443327] devm_action_release+0x10/0x18 [ 360.447481] release_nodes+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 360.451194] devres_release_all+0x90/0x100 [ 360.455346] device_unbind_cleanup+0x14/0x60 [ 360.459677] device_release_driver_internal+0xe8/0x168 [ 360.464883] driver_detach+0x4c/0x90 [ 360.468509] bus_remove_driver+0x54/0xb0 [ 360.472485] driver_unregister+0x2c/0x58 [ 360.476462] platform_driver_unregister+0x10/0x18 [ 360.481230] gpio_keys_exit+0x14/0x828 [gpio_keys] [ 360.486088] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1e0/0x270 [ 360.490945] invoke_syscall+0x40/0xf8 [ 360.494661] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xf0/0x110 [ 360.499515] do_el0_svc+0x20/0x78 [ 360.502877] el0_svc+0x48/0xf8 [ 360.505977] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0 [ 360.510216] el0t_64_sync+0x148/0x14c [ 360.513930] irq event stamp: 4306 [ 360.517288] hardirqs last enabled at (4305): [<ffff8000080b0300>] __cancel_work_timer+0x130/0x1b0 [ 360.526359] hardirqs last disabled at (4306): [<ffff800008d194fc>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x88 [ 360.534204] softirqs last enabled at (4278): [<ffff8000080104a0>] _stext+0x4a0/0x5e0 [ 360.542133] softirqs last disabled at (4267): [<ffff8000080932ac>] irq_exit_rcu+0x18c/0x1b0 [ 360.550591] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524135822.14764-1-prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 2f37249 upstream. The IPA BCM resource ("IP0") on sc7180 was moved to the clk-rpmh driver in commit bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") and modeled as a clk, but this interconnect driver still had it modeled as an interconnect. This was mostly OK because nobody used the interconnect definition, until the interconnect framework started dropping bandwidth requests on interconnects that aren't used via the sync_state callback in commit 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state"). Once that patch was applied the IP0 resource was going to be controlled from two places, the clk framework and the interconnect framework. Even then, things were probably going to be OK, because commit b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") was needed to actually drop bandwidth requests on unused interconnects, of which the IPA was one of the interconnect that wasn't getting dropped to zero. Combining the three commits together leads to bad behavior where the interconnect framework is disabling the IP0 resource because it has no users while the clk framework thinks the IP0 resource is on because the only user, the IPA driver, has turned it on via clk_prepare_enable(). Depending on when sync_state is called, we can get into a situation like below: IPA driver probes IPA driver gets notified modem started runtime PM get() IPA clk enabled -> IP0 resource is ON sync_state runs interconnect zeroes out the IP0 resource -> IP0 resource is off IPA driver tries to access a register and blows up The crash is an unclocked access that manifest as an SError. SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbe000011 -- SError CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ #166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 lr : mutex_lock+0x30/0x80 sp : ffffffc00da9b9c0 x29: ffffffc00da9b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffc00da9bc90 x25: ffffff80c2024010 x24: ffffff80c2024000 x23: ffffff8083100000 x22: ffffff80831000d0 x21: ffffff80831000a8 x20: ffffff80831000a8 x19: ffffff8083100070 x18: 00000000ffff0a00 x17: 000000002f7254f1 x16: 0000000000000100 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 000000000001f0b8 x10: ffffffc00931f0b8 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : fefefefefeff2f60 x6 : 0000808080808080 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080808080800000 x3 : ffffff80d2d4ee28 x2 : ffffff808c1d6e40 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8083100070 Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ #166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x114 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x38 panic+0x150/0x38c nmi_panic+0x88/0xa0 arm64_serror_panic+0x74/0x80 do_serror+0x0/0x80 do_serror+0x58/0x80 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c el1h_64_error+0x78/0x7c mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 __gsi_channel_start+0x50/0x17c gsi_channel_start+0x54/0x90 ipa_endpoint_enable_one+0x34/0xc0 ipa_open+0x4c/0x120 Remove all IP0 resource management from the interconnect driver so that clk-rpmh is the sole owner. This fixes the issue by preventing the interconnect driver from overwriting the IP0 resource data that the clk-rpmh driver wrote. Cc: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com> Cc: Mike Tipton <quic_mdtipton@quicinc.com> Fixes: b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") Fixes: bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") Fixes: 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Tested-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412220033.1273607-2-swboyd@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2f37249 upstream. The IPA BCM resource ("IP0") on sc7180 was moved to the clk-rpmh driver in commit bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") and modeled as a clk, but this interconnect driver still had it modeled as an interconnect. This was mostly OK because nobody used the interconnect definition, until the interconnect framework started dropping bandwidth requests on interconnects that aren't used via the sync_state callback in commit 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state"). Once that patch was applied the IP0 resource was going to be controlled from two places, the clk framework and the interconnect framework. Even then, things were probably going to be OK, because commit b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") was needed to actually drop bandwidth requests on unused interconnects, of which the IPA was one of the interconnect that wasn't getting dropped to zero. Combining the three commits together leads to bad behavior where the interconnect framework is disabling the IP0 resource because it has no users while the clk framework thinks the IP0 resource is on because the only user, the IPA driver, has turned it on via clk_prepare_enable(). Depending on when sync_state is called, we can get into a situation like below: IPA driver probes IPA driver gets notified modem started runtime PM get() IPA clk enabled -> IP0 resource is ON sync_state runs interconnect zeroes out the IP0 resource -> IP0 resource is off IPA driver tries to access a register and blows up The crash is an unclocked access that manifest as an SError. SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbe000011 -- SError CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ raspberrypi#166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 lr : mutex_lock+0x30/0x80 sp : ffffffc00da9b9c0 x29: ffffffc00da9b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffc00da9bc90 x25: ffffff80c2024010 x24: ffffff80c2024000 x23: ffffff8083100000 x22: ffffff80831000d0 x21: ffffff80831000a8 x20: ffffff80831000a8 x19: ffffff8083100070 x18: 00000000ffff0a00 x17: 000000002f7254f1 x16: 0000000000000100 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 000000000001f0b8 x10: ffffffc00931f0b8 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : fefefefefeff2f60 x6 : 0000808080808080 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080808080800000 x3 : ffffff80d2d4ee28 x2 : ffffff808c1d6e40 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8083100070 Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt CPU: 0 PID: 3595 Comm: mmdata_mgr Not tainted 5.17.1+ raspberrypi#166 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x114 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x38 panic+0x150/0x38c nmi_panic+0x88/0xa0 arm64_serror_panic+0x74/0x80 do_serror+0x0/0x80 do_serror+0x58/0x80 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c el1h_64_error+0x78/0x7c mutex_lock+0x4c/0x80 __gsi_channel_start+0x50/0x17c gsi_channel_start+0x54/0x90 ipa_endpoint_enable_one+0x34/0xc0 ipa_open+0x4c/0x120 Remove all IP0 resource management from the interconnect driver so that clk-rpmh is the sole owner. This fixes the issue by preventing the interconnect driver from overwriting the IP0 resource data that the clk-rpmh driver wrote. Cc: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com> Cc: Mike Tipton <quic_mdtipton@quicinc.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x Fixes: b95b668 ("interconnect: qcom: icc-rpmh: Add BCMs to commit list in pre_aggregate") Fixes: bcd63d2 ("clk: qcom: rpmh: Add IPA clock for SC7180") Fixes: 7d3b0b0 ("interconnect: qcom: Use icc_sync_state") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Tested-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412220033.1273607-2-swboyd@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit cee409b ] gpio_keys module can either accept gpios or interrupts. The module initializes delayed work in case of gpios only and is only used if debounce timer is not used, so make sure cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called only when its gpio-backed and debounce_use_hrtimer is false. This fixes the issue seen below when the gpio_keys module is unloaded and an interrupt pin is used instead of GPIO: [ 360.297569] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 360.302303] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 237 at kernel/workqueue.c:3066 __flush_work+0x414/0x470 [ 360.310531] Modules linked in: gpio_keys(-) [ 360.314797] CPU: 0 PID: 237 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-arm64-renesas-00116-g73636105874d-dirty raspberrypi#166 [ 360.324662] Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g054l2 (DT) [ 360.331270] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 360.338318] pc : __flush_work+0x414/0x470 [ 360.342385] lr : __cancel_work_timer+0x140/0x1b0 [ 360.347065] sp : ffff80000a7fba00 [ 360.350423] x29: ffff80000a7fba00 x28: ffff000012b9c5c0 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 360.357664] x26: ffff80000a7fbb80 x25: ffff80000954d0a8 x24: 0000000000000001 [ 360.364904] x23: ffff800009757000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff80000919b000 [ 360.372143] x20: ffff00000f5974e0 x19: ffff00000f5974e0 x18: ffff8000097fcf48 [ 360.379382] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000053f40 [ 360.386622] x14: ffff800009850e88 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: 000000000000a60c [ 360.393861] x11: 000000000000a610 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000008 [ 360.401100] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 00000000a473c394 x6 : 0080808080808080 [ 360.408339] x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000919b458 [ 360.415578] x2 : ffff8000097577f0 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 360.422818] Call trace: [ 360.425299] __flush_work+0x414/0x470 [ 360.429012] __cancel_work_timer+0x140/0x1b0 [ 360.433340] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x10/0x18 [ 360.437931] gpio_keys_quiesce_key+0x28/0x58 [gpio_keys] [ 360.443327] devm_action_release+0x10/0x18 [ 360.447481] release_nodes+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 360.451194] devres_release_all+0x90/0x100 [ 360.455346] device_unbind_cleanup+0x14/0x60 [ 360.459677] device_release_driver_internal+0xe8/0x168 [ 360.464883] driver_detach+0x4c/0x90 [ 360.468509] bus_remove_driver+0x54/0xb0 [ 360.472485] driver_unregister+0x2c/0x58 [ 360.476462] platform_driver_unregister+0x10/0x18 [ 360.481230] gpio_keys_exit+0x14/0x828 [gpio_keys] [ 360.486088] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1e0/0x270 [ 360.490945] invoke_syscall+0x40/0xf8 [ 360.494661] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xf0/0x110 [ 360.499515] do_el0_svc+0x20/0x78 [ 360.502877] el0_svc+0x48/0xf8 [ 360.505977] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0 [ 360.510216] el0t_64_sync+0x148/0x14c [ 360.513930] irq event stamp: 4306 [ 360.517288] hardirqs last enabled at (4305): [<ffff8000080b0300>] __cancel_work_timer+0x130/0x1b0 [ 360.526359] hardirqs last disabled at (4306): [<ffff800008d194fc>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x88 [ 360.534204] softirqs last enabled at (4278): [<ffff8000080104a0>] _stext+0x4a0/0x5e0 [ 360.542133] softirqs last disabled at (4267): [<ffff8000080932ac>] irq_exit_rcu+0x18c/0x1b0 [ 360.550591] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524135822.14764-1-prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system crashes with: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063 Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #166 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6. RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048 RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28 R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code. Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed booting. Fixes: aa3d480 ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 51a6fa0 upstream. When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system crashes with: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063 Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #166 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6. RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048 RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28 R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code. Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed booting. Fixes: aa3d480 ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 51a6fa0 upstream. When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system crashes with: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063 Oops: 0011 [raspberrypi#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ raspberrypi#166 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6. RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048 RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28 R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code. Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed booting. Fixes: aa3d480 ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

If a relocatable kernel is loaded at an address that is not 2MB aligned and told not to relocate to zero, the kernel can crash due to mark_rodata_ro() incorrectly changing some read-write data to read-only. Scenarios where the misalignment can occur are when the kernel is loaded by kdump or using the RELOCATABLE_TEST config option. Example crash with the kernel loaded at 5MB: Run /sbin/init as init process BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000000452000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000005b6730 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-00011-g349188be4841 #166 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,git-5b4c5a hv:linux,kvm pSeries NIP: c0000000005b6730 LR: c000000000ae9ab8 CTR: 0000000000000380 REGS: c000000004503250 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.2.0-rc1-00011-g349188be4841) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44288480 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c0000000005b66ec DAR: c000000000452000 DSISR: 0a000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP memset+0x68/0x104 LR zero_user_segments.constprop.0+0xa8/0xf0 Call Trace: ext4_mpage_readpages+0x7f8/0x830 ext4_readahead+0x48/0x60 read_pages+0xb8/0x380 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x19c/0x250 filemap_fault+0x58c/0xae0 __do_fault+0x60/0x100 __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1a40 handle_mm_fault+0x120/0x300 ___do_page_fault+0x20c/0xa80 do_page_fault+0x30/0xc0 data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 This happens because mark_rodata_ro() tries to change permissions on the range _stext..__end_rodata, but _stext sits in the middle of the 2MB page from 4MB to 6MB: radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000002400000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) The logic that changes the permissions assumes the linear mapping was split correctly at boot, so it marks the entire 2MB page read-only. That leads to the write fault above. To fix it, the boot time mapping logic needs to consider that if the kernel is running at a non-zero address then _stext is a boundary where it must split the mapping. That leads to the mapping being split correctly, allowing the rodata permission change to take happen correctly, with no spillover: radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000500000 with 64.0 KiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000500000-0x0000000000600000 with 64.0 KiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000600000-0x0000000002400000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) If the kernel is loaded at a 2MB aligned address, the mapping continues to use 2MB pages as before: radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000002c00000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000002c00000-0x0000000100000000 with 2.00 MiB pages Fixes: c55d7b5 ("powerpc: Remove STRICT_KERNEL_RWX incompatibility with RELOCATABLE") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110124753.1325426-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

commit 98d0219 upstream. If a relocatable kernel is loaded at an address that is not 2MB aligned and told not to relocate to zero, the kernel can crash due to mark_rodata_ro() incorrectly changing some read-write data to read-only. Scenarios where the misalignment can occur are when the kernel is loaded by kdump or using the RELOCATABLE_TEST config option. Example crash with the kernel loaded at 5MB: Run /sbin/init as init process BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000000452000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000005b6730 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-00011-g349188be4841 #166 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,git-5b4c5a hv:linux,kvm pSeries NIP: c0000000005b6730 LR: c000000000ae9ab8 CTR: 0000000000000380 REGS: c000000004503250 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.2.0-rc1-00011-g349188be4841) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44288480 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c0000000005b66ec DAR: c000000000452000 DSISR: 0a000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP memset+0x68/0x104 LR zero_user_segments.constprop.0+0xa8/0xf0 Call Trace: ext4_mpage_readpages+0x7f8/0x830 ext4_readahead+0x48/0x60 read_pages+0xb8/0x380 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x19c/0x250 filemap_fault+0x58c/0xae0 __do_fault+0x60/0x100 __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1a40 handle_mm_fault+0x120/0x300 ___do_page_fault+0x20c/0xa80 do_page_fault+0x30/0xc0 data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 This happens because mark_rodata_ro() tries to change permissions on the range _stext..__end_rodata, but _stext sits in the middle of the 2MB page from 4MB to 6MB: radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000002400000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) The logic that changes the permissions assumes the linear mapping was split correctly at boot, so it marks the entire 2MB page read-only. That leads to the write fault above. To fix it, the boot time mapping logic needs to consider that if the kernel is running at a non-zero address then _stext is a boundary where it must split the mapping. That leads to the mapping being split correctly, allowing the rodata permission change to take happen correctly, with no spillover: radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000500000 with 64.0 KiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000500000-0x0000000000600000 with 64.0 KiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000600000-0x0000000002400000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) If the kernel is loaded at a 2MB aligned address, the mapping continues to use 2MB pages as before: radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000002c00000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec) radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000002c00000-0x0000000100000000 with 2.00 MiB pages Fixes: c55d7b5 ("powerpc: Remove STRICT_KERNEL_RWX incompatibility with RELOCATABLE") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110124753.1325426-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…el.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux into xfs-6.8-mergeA xfs: log intent item recovery should reconstruct defer work state Long Li reported a KASAN report from a UAF when intent recovery fails: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfs_cui_release+0xb7/0xc0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012575e60 by task kworker/u8:3/103 CPU: 3 PID: 103 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-next-20230619-00003-g94543a53f9a4-dirty raspberrypi#166 Workqueue: xfs-cil/sda xlog_cil_push_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x70 print_report+0xc2/0x600 kasan_report+0xb6/0xe0 xfs_cui_release+0xb7/0xc0 xfs_cud_item_release+0x3c/0x90 xfs_trans_committed_bulk+0x2d5/0x7f0 xlog_cil_committed+0xaba/0xf20 xlog_cil_push_work+0x1a60/0x2360 process_one_work+0x78e/0x1140 worker_thread+0x58b/0xf60 kthread+0x2cd/0x3c0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 531: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x55/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc+0x195/0x5f0 xfs_cui_init+0x198/0x1d0 xlog_recover_cui_commit_pass2+0x133/0x5f0 xlog_recover_items_pass2+0x107/0x230 xlog_recover_commit_trans+0x3e7/0x9c0 xlog_recovery_process_trans+0x140/0x1d0 xlog_recover_process_ophdr+0x1a0/0x3d0 xlog_recover_process_data+0x108/0x2d0 xlog_recover_process+0x1f6/0x280 xlog_do_recovery_pass+0x609/0xdb0 xlog_do_log_recovery+0x84/0xe0 xlog_do_recover+0x7d/0x470 xlog_recover+0x25f/0x490 xfs_log_mount+0x2dd/0x6f0 xfs_mountfs+0x11ce/0x1e70 xfs_fs_fill_super+0x10ec/0x1b20 get_tree_bdev+0x3c8/0x730 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2c0 path_mount+0xecf/0x1800 do_mount+0xf3/0x110 __x64_sys_mount+0x154/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0x39/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 531: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x1b0 kmem_cache_free+0xf8/0x510 xfs_cui_item_free+0x95/0xb0 xfs_cui_release+0x86/0xc0 xlog_recover_cancel_intents.isra.0+0xf8/0x210 xlog_recover_finish+0x7e7/0x980 xfs_log_mount_finish+0x2bb/0x4a0 xfs_mountfs+0x14bf/0x1e70 xfs_fs_fill_super+0x10ec/0x1b20 get_tree_bdev+0x3c8/0x730 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2c0 path_mount+0xecf/0x1800 do_mount+0xf3/0x110 __x64_sys_mount+0x154/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0x39/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012575dc8 which belongs to the cache xfs_cui_item of size 432 The buggy address is located 152 bytes inside of freed 432-byte region [ffff888012575dc8, ffff888012575f78) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0000495d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888012576208 pfn:0x12574 head:ffffea0000495d00 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x1fffff80010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 001fffff80010200 ffff888012092f40 ffff888014570150 ffff888014570150 raw: ffff888012576208 00000000001e0010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888012575d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc ffff888012575d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888012575e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888012575e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888012575f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc ================================================================== "If process intents fails, intent items left in AIL will be delete from AIL and freed in error handling, even intent items that have been recovered and created done items. After this, uaf will be triggered when done item committed, because at this point the released intent item will be accessed. xlog_recover_finish xlog_cil_push_work ---------------------------- --------------------------- xlog_recover_process_intents xfs_cui_item_recover//cui_refcount == 1 xfs_trans_get_cud xfs_trans_commit <add cud item to cil> xfs_cui_item_recover <error occurred and return> xlog_recover_cancel_intents xfs_cui_release //cui_refcount == 0 xfs_cui_item_free //free cui <release other intent items> xlog_force_shutdown //shutdown <...> <push items in cil> xlog_cil_committed xfs_cud_item_release xfs_cui_release // UAF "Intent log items are created with a reference count of 2, one for the creator, and one for the intent done object. Log recovery explicitly drops the creator reference after it is inserted into the AIL, but it then processes the log item as if it also owns the intent-done reference. "The code in ->iop_recovery should assume that it passes the reference to the done intent, we can remove the intent item from the AIL after creating the done-intent, but if that code fails before creating the done-intent then it needs to release the intent reference by log recovery itself. "That way when we go to cancel the intent, the only intents we find in the AIL are the ones we know have not been processed yet and hence we can safely drop both the creator and the intent done reference from xlog_recover_cancel_intents(). "Hence if we remove the intent from the list of intents that need to be recovered after we have done the initial recovery, we acheive two things: "1. the tail of the log can be moved forward with the commit of the done intent or new intent to continue the operation, and "2. We avoid the problem of trying to determine how many reference counts we need to drop from intent recovery cancelling because we never come across intents we've actually attempted recovery on." Restated: The cause of the UAF is that xlog_recover_cancel_intents thinks that it owns the refcount on any intent item in the AIL, and that it's always safe to release these intent items. This is not true after the recovery function creates an log intent done item and points it at the log intent item because releasing the done item always releases the intent item. The runtime defer ops code avoids all this by tracking both the log intent and the intent done items, and releasing only the intent done item if both have been created. Long Li proposed fixing this by adding state flags, but I have a more comprehensive fix. First, observe that the latter half of the intent _recover functions are nearly open-coded versions of the corresponding _finish_one function that uses an onstack deferred work item to single-step through the item. Second, notice that the recover function is not an exact match because of the odd behavior that unfinished recovered work items are relogged with separate log intent items instead of a single new log intent item, which is what the defer ops machinery does. Dave and I have long suspected that recovery should be reconstructing the defer work state from what's in the recovered intent item. Now we finally have an excuse to refactor the code to do that. This series starts by fixing a resource leak in LARP recovery. We fix the bug that Long Li reported by switching the intent recovery code to construct chains of xfs_defer_pending objects and then using the defer pending objects to track the intent/done item ownership. Finally, we clean up the code to reconstruct the exact incore state, which means we can remove all the opencoded _recover code, which makes maintaining log items much easier. v2: minor changes per review comments v3: pick up more rvb tags, fix build errors This has been lightly tested with fstests. Enjoy! Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> * tag 'reconstruct-defer-work-6.8_2023-12-06' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux: xfs: move ->iop_recover to xfs_defer_op_type xfs: use xfs_defer_finish_one to finish recovered work items xfs: dump the recovered xattri log item if corruption happens xfs: recreate work items when recovering intent items xfs: transfer recovered intent item ownership in ->iop_recover xfs: pass the xfs_defer_pending object to iop_recover xfs: use xfs_defer_pending objects to recover intent items xfs: don't leak recovered attri intent items

@2

[ Upstream commit 8ecf3c1 ] Recent additions in BPF like cpu v4 instructions, test_bpf module exhibits the following failures: test_bpf: #82 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #83 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #84 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #85 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #86 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_W jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #165 ALU_SDIV_X: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #166 ALU_SDIV_K: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #169 ALU_SMOD_X: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #170 ALU_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #172 ALU64_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #313 BSWAP 16: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcd eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 301 PASS test_bpf: #314 BSWAP 32: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcdab89 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 555 PASS test_bpf: #315 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 268 PASS test_bpf: #316 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef >> 32 -> 0xefcdab89 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 269 PASS test_bpf: #317 BSWAP 16: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x1032 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 460 PASS test_bpf: #318 BSWAP 32: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x10325476 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 320 PASS test_bpf: #319 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x98badcfe eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 222 PASS test_bpf: #320 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 >> 32 -> 0x10325476 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 273 PASS test_bpf: #344 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_B eBPF filter opcode 0091 (@5) unsupported jited:0 432 PASS test_bpf: #345 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_H eBPF filter opcode 0089 (@5) unsupported jited:0 381 PASS test_bpf: #346 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W eBPF filter opcode 0081 (@5) unsupported jited:0 505 PASS test_bpf: #490 JMP32_JA: Unconditional jump: if (true) return 1 eBPF filter opcode 0006 (@1) unsupported jited:0 261 PASS test_bpf: Summary: 1040 PASSED, 10 FAILED, [924/1038 JIT'ed] Fix them by adding missing processing. Fixes: daabb2b ("bpf/tests: add tests for cpuv4 instructions") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/91de862dda99d170697eb79ffb478678af7e0b27.1709652689.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

AMBA software DTR patch

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ghollingworth closed this Aug 22, 2013

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AMBA software DTR patch #166

AMBA software DTR patch #166

rewolff commented Nov 30, 2012

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

rewolff commented Aug 22, 2013

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

rewolff commented Aug 22, 2013

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

rewolff commented Aug 22, 2013

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

AMBA software DTR patch #166

AMBA software DTR patch #166

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rewolff commented Nov 30, 2012

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

rewolff commented Aug 22, 2013

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

rewolff commented Aug 22, 2013

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013

rewolff commented Aug 22, 2013

ghollingworth commented Aug 22, 2013